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2000 DIGILAW 804 (ALL)

DAURALA SAHKARI GANNA VIKAS SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2000-05-24

ALOKE CHAKRABARTI

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ALOKE CHAKRABARTI, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition was heard alongwith Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27178 of 1996 co-operative Cane Development Union Limited v. The Appellate Authority Evam Addl. Labour commissioner, U. P. and others. ( 2 ) THIS writ petition was filed by the employer challenging the order passed by the Labour Court with regard to a dispute relating to entitlement of the workmen concerned to the rate of pay for a particular period. ( 3 ) HEARD Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioner employer and Mr. Shyam Narain learned counsel for the respondent workmen. ( 4 ) UPON consideration of the contentions of the respective parties, I find that the point required to be considered here is as to whether the relevant Government policy as quoted in the impugned order entitled the workmen to the wage revision as claimed by them. The workmen contended that the date of revision of wage in respect of them was January 1, 1986 and according to the employer such date was January 1, 1988. Both sides contended that the decision depends on the interpretation of Clauses 3 and 5 of the said Government policy as quoted in the impugned order. On behalf of employer a further contention has been raised with regard to maintainability of proceeding before the Labour Court on a contention that the claim being disputed, the workmen were not entitled to relief under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 5 ) WITH regard to main contention between the parties, a perusal of the said policy as contained in the Government Order and quoted in the impugned order, apparently shows that the contention of the workmen is to be accepted. Admittedly, all the concerned workmen retired during the period between January 31, 1986 and July 31, 1986 and all of them were seasonal workmen under the employer. Clause 3 read with the opening words of the said Policy clearly shows that such seasonal workmen, who were not in employment on the date of issuance of the government Order, i. e. December 19, 1989, or were to retire by March 31, 1990 were entitled to revised pay with effect from January 1, 1986. Clause 3 read with the opening words of the said Policy clearly shows that such seasonal workmen, who were not in employment on the date of issuance of the government Order, i. e. December 19, 1989, or were to retire by March 31, 1990 were entitled to revised pay with effect from January 1, 1986. Clause-5 of the said policy deals with the workmen, who were still working on the date of issuance of the said Government Order and for them the date of application of the revised pay is December 1, 1988. ( 6 ) IN view of aforesaid, as the workmen concerned, admittedly, superannuated, did satisfy the said requirement and were governed by Clause 3 of the said Policy. On the admitted facts, I am of the opinion, that the said workmen did not come within the scope of paragraph 5 of the said policy. Therefore, the concerned workmen became entitled to revised pay scale with effect from january 1, 1986. ( 7 ) WITH regard to other contention of the parties as regards maintainability of the proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, I find that in respect of such a dispute the workmen were entitled to approach the said forum. The law as referred to by the learned counsel for the parties, shows that the claim of the workmen could be decided within the scope of the said law as difference of language between Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C makes it clear that it need not be a claim under an award as a basis for the purpose of approaching forum under Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C. Law in this connection, as settled in the case of Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 : 1963-II-LLJ-89, makes the position clear. ( 8 ) ON behalf of contesting parties law has been cited in support of their respective claims but as position in law is clear in this respect, there is no ground for interference with the impugned order. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. .