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2000 DIGILAW 805 (MAD)

S. Balasubramanaian Chettiar v. Aravind Enterprises, Cloth Merchants, Tirunelveli Town, through its Partner, P. Easkki

2000-08-11

V.KANAGARAJ

body2000
JUDGMENT: The above second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.1.1989 made in A.S.No.73 of 1987 by the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli thereby modifying the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1987 made in O.S.No.790 of 1983 by the Court of District Munsif, Tirunelveli. 2. Adverting to the facts and circumstances encircling the whole affair, the respondent herein filed a suit in O.S.No.790 of 1983 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Tirunelveli for recovery of a sum of Rs.8,294.31 against the appellant herein with future interest at 12% p.a. from the date of plaint till the date of realisation and for costs thereby contending that the appellant/ defendant is having their business transactions with him and during such transactions, he became liable to pay the said amount. 3. The appellant/ defendant filed a written statement before the trial Court thereby submitting that he is not liable to pay any interest on the outstanding khata amount and mere printing in the bill about the quantum of interest will not bind him to pay any interest. Further submitting that he is liable to pay only Rs.3,621.78 he has prayed the Court to pass decree only to that extent. 4. Based on the facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties, the trial Court having framed the following issues, (1) Whether the defendant is liable to pay a sum of Rs.8,294.31 with interest? (2) Whether the defendant is liable to pay interest at 12% p.a. as claimed by the plaintiff, and (3) To what relief, the plaintiff is entitled? conducted the trial of the case with due opportunity for both parties to be heard, wherein on behalf of the plaintiff one Sudalai was examined as P.W.1 and 15 documents were marked as Exs.A-1 to A-15 and the defendant, besides examining himself as D.W.1 has also marked ten documents as Exs.B-1 to B-10. 5. The trial Court having appreciated the evidence thus placed on record in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case in its own way had ultimately arrived at the conclusion to decree the suit in part without costs thereby directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,665.75 to the plaintiff together with future interest at 12% p.a. from the date of plaint till the date of realisation. 6. 6. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.73 of 1987 on the file of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli and the said first appellate Court framed the following point for consideration: “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for by him.” The first appellate Court relying on the earlier decision of this Court reported in A.K.Srinivasa Naidu v. Jayarama Reddiar, (1976)2 M.L.J. 166 : A.i.R. 1977 Mad. 56 and having observed that, ‘except the oral testimony of the defendant, there is no other independent oral evidence or documentary evidence to prove that there is a contract between him and the plaintiff for not collecting interest on the arrears’ has allowed the appeal thereby decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff as prayed for and modifying the judgment and decree of the trial Court to that extent. It is only against the said judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the defendant before the trial Court has come forward to file the above second appeal on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal and this Court admitted the above second appeal for determination of the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in awarding interest when there is express or at least implied agreement to prove that there was no contract to pay interest? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in interpreting Sec.62 of the Sale of Goods Act? and (3) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in drawing adverse inference against the appellant for non-examination of the partners of the plaintiff firm which is humanly impossible? 7. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the appellate Court has erred in awarding the interest when there is no express or implied agreement to that effect; that the interpretation of Sec.62 of the Sale of Goods Act by the lower appellate Court is wrong and that the lower appellate Court has erred in drawing the adverse inference against the appellant for non-examination of the partners of the plaintiff’s firm, which is wrong. In fact, these are the three points occupying the three substantial questions of law, which have been framed by this Court for the determination of the above second appeal. In fact, these are the three points occupying the three substantial questions of law, which have been framed by this Court for the determination of the above second appeal. The learned counsel would end up his argument stating that it is humanly impossible on the part of the appellant to examine the partners of the plaintiff’s firm and would pray to allow the above second appeal. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that there is absolutely no contract to the contrary and hence he is entitled for the interest, even as per the relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Act and the lower appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit relying upon the judgment cited by them delivered by this Court in A.K.Srinivasa Naidu v. Jayarama Reddiar, (1976)2 M.L.J. 166 : A.i.R. 1977 Mad. 56, wherein it is held that, “It is no doubt true that a seller is entitled to the award of interest on the price of the goods provided there was no contract to the contrary as between himself and the buyer. Obviously, therefore this liability on the part of the buyer to suffer interest is a statutory liability arising under Sec.61(2) of the Act.” 9. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondent would cite the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in M/s.Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India, (1990)1 S.C.C. 71 , wherein it is held: “The award of interest to seller on amount of price not paid by buyer within a reasonable time cannot be denied merely because in the notice served under Sec.80, C.P.C., the seller had not claimed interest.” 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent would cite yet another judgment delivered in Gujarat Agro Oil Enterprises Ltd., Ahmedabad v. Arvind H.Pathak, A.I.R. 1993 Guj. 47, wherein it is held: “Interest can be awarded on principal amount.” 11. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is one delivered in Rajpati Prasad v. Kaushalya Kuer, A.I.R. 1981 Pat. 47, wherein it is held: “Interest can be awarded on principal amount.” 11. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is one delivered in Rajpati Prasad v. Kaushalya Kuer, A.I.R. 1981 Pat. 187, wherein it is held: “As per Sec.61(2) of the Act it is manifest that even in the absence of a contract to pay interest, so long as no contract to the contrary was pleaded and proved, the Court has a discretion to award to the plaintiff interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the price of the goods sold by him from the date of which the price was payable. The defendant did not allege that there was a contract to the contrary within the meaning of the expression as used in Sec.61(2). He was denying the existence of any contract whatsoever between him and the plaintiff. Therefore, even if the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling him to recover interest on the amount due to him from the defendant on account of the price of goods supplied, the Court had the power of grant him interest on the amount of the price at such rate as it thought fit.” 12. The last judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is one delivered by this Court in Standard Printing Machinery Company, by Managing Partner, Baldevji v. Vinayagam and Company, (1959)1 M.L.J. 167 , wherein it is held that: “The mere fact, that in a suit for the price of goods sold and interest, the buyer plaintiff allege a contract for the payment of interest, which he is unable to prove, does not mean that he is disentitled to relief under Sec.61(2) of the Sale of Goods Act.” 13. Citing the above judgments, the learned counsel for the respondent would pray to dismiss the above second appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court. 14. Citing the above judgments, the learned counsel for the respondent would pray to dismiss the above second appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court. 14. On a over all study of the materials made available on record, it comes to be known that Ex.A-11 bill book contains the version that, “from that day onwards, the amount carry interest at Re.1 per mensum per Rs.100” thereby making it very clear that the amount that is due to the seller carries the interest at 12% p.a. Even according to the judgments cited above, the seller is always entitled to the award of interest on the price of the goods sold. But, according to the Sale of Goods Act, the only condition for denying the interest for the seller is that there should be a contract contrary to the above perception. In this matter, since there is no express or implied contract for the amount not carrying any interest, it goes without saying that the seller is entitled to the award of interest on the price of the goods sold and this legal perception has been rightly appreciated by the first appellate Court and no such misinterpretation has been given by the first appellate Court, as alleged by the appellant herein. 15. For all the above discussions held, the lower appellate Court is right in arriving at a decision to modify the judgment and decree of the trial Court and granting interest with costs throughout. There is absolutely no legal infirmity or inconsistency or any patent error or perversity in approach so far as the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is concerned so as to warrant interference by this Court into the well considered and well merited judgment of the first appellate Court. 16. In result, the above second appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs throughout. 17. The judgment and decree dated 23.1.1989 made in A.S.No.73 of 1987 by the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli thereby modifying the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1987 made in O.S.No.790 of 1983 by the Court of District Munsif, Tirunelveli is hereby confirmed.