Judgment : 1. The above second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 24. 1998 made in A.S.No.108 of 1987 by the Court of Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 211. 1986 made in O.S.No.52 of 1985 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Devakottai. 2. Advertingto the facts of the case, it is a suit filed by the appellant herein for recovery of sum of Rs.27,274.20 coupled with interest and costs on account of the supply of paddy to the defendants thus, pleading to the effect that the defendants have indulged in the business of purchase of paddy with the plaintiff market committee as per Sec.6(9) of the Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1959; that at the rate of 45 paise per Rs.100 from out of the purchase money, the purchasers-defendants had to pay in favour of the plaintiffs and in such manner, the defendants have not submitted the a counts for the purchase of the paddy from 7. 1979 to 312. 1981 in spite of notices having been sent; that during the said period, as per the accounts maintained by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, the defendants have effected the purchase for a total amount of Rs.60,60,940.82 for which they were liable to pay an amount of Rs.27,274.20 in the above said manner and demanding the said amount, many notices have been sent to the defendants, but they never came forward to pay the said amount in favour of the plaintiff. Hence the suit. 3. In the written statement filed by the third defendant and adopted by the other defendants, they would plead that from 7. 1979, within three years, the plaintiff has not come forward to agitate his claim and hence the suit has become time barred within the meaning of the law of limitation and at this score itself, the suit becomes liable to be dismissed in limine. Further pleading that for the period covering from 7. 1979 to 312. 1981, they have paid the amount due to the plaintiff and besides generally denying all the allegations of the plaint, the defendants would ultimately plead to dismiss the suit with costs. 4. Based onthe facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties, the trial court has framed the following issues for determination in the suit. .(i) Whether the suit has been barred by limitation. 4. Based onthe facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties, the trial court has framed the following issues for determination in the suit. .(i) Whether the suit has been barred by limitation. and .(ii) What relief is the plaintiff entitled. The trial court had then conducted trial of the case with due opportunity for both parties to be heard, wherein on behalf of the plaintiff, two witnessess have been examined for oral evidence as P.Ws.1 and 2 and 24 documents have been marked as Exs.A.1 to A 24 and on behalf of the defendants, the witnesses examined and the documents marked were nil. 5. The trial Court having appreciated the evidence thus placed on record in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case in its own way and in further consideration of the position of law regarding the law of limitation, had ultimately arrived at the conclusion to dismiss the suit thereby dismissing the same on ground that it is barred by limitation, but without awarding any cost, as per its judgment dated 211. 1986. 6. Aggrieved, the plaintiff in the suit had preferred an appeal in A.S.No.108 of 1987 before the Court of Principal District Judge of Ramanathapuram District at Madurai and the said first appellate court having framed the limitation point as the only point for consideration and having a wide discussion on that point and also the facts and circumstances of the case, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to hold that the suit was barred by limitation, as per its judgment and decree dated 24. 1988 as a result of which, the appellant in A.S.No.108 of 1987 who is the plaintiff before the trial Court has now come forward to prefer the above second appeal on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal and the same has been admitted for determination of the following Substantial questions of Law: .(i) Whether the courts below are right in holding that the suit is barred by limitation. .(ii) When assessment to market fees could be made only on the basis of the returns filed by the assessee, and when the assessee had failed to submit the returns to enable the appellant to make an assessment and with the result the fees payable could not be determined to enable the appellant to maintain his action to a successful results, whether the cause of action could be said to have arisen. (iii) The appellant had made the assessment on the basis of the information gathered from the third party sources, whether it could be said that limitation would start running from the year of assessment. 7. All the above three substantial questions of law revolve around one question, that is the question of law of limitation. Hence, if the first question is settled only thereafter the question of settling the other two substantial questions of law would arise. 8. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the suit had been dismissed concurrently on ground of limitation; that the starting point is as per the procedures of the Agriculture Produce Market Act; that the Market Committee shall issue licence and collect the levy for which the members have to file the Returns on the basis of which, the amount of levy at the rate of 45 paise per Rs.100 is due to the committee, the appellant herein; that in case the Returns are not filed in the normal course by the members who purchase the paddy, the appellant has to address to the Commercial Tax Department, which will send the copy of the Returns and only after the receipt of the said copy, the appellant would be able to calculate the fees and make the demand as per Rule 51(a) of the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Produce Market Rules. 9. The learned counsel with particular mention to the case in hand would argue that the specific period concerned with the case is in between 7. 1979 and to 312. 1981; that in spite of reminders, no returns had been filed by the respondents herein and hence the plaintiff addressed to the Commercial Tax Department on 210. 1983 under Ex.A-10 and the copy of the returns had been sent by the said Department in Ex.A-11 dated 111. 1983; that under Ex.A-12 dated 25. 1979 and to 312. 1981; that in spite of reminders, no returns had been filed by the respondents herein and hence the plaintiff addressed to the Commercial Tax Department on 210. 1983 under Ex.A-10 and the copy of the returns had been sent by the said Department in Ex.A-11 dated 111. 1983; that under Ex.A-12 dated 25. 1984, the appellant sent a demand notice; that on receipt of the demand notice, the respondents who should have met the demands, had not done it and hence, the suit was filed on 12. 1994; that the trial court and the appellate court proceeded on the basis that the limitation started on 8. 1979 when cause of action arose since it was the date on which the defendants had to pay the amount. But unless the quantum is arrived at, neither could there be any demand, nor would the question of payment arise and the appellants would not be able to pay anything in such circumstances and the question that arises that under Ex.A-11 dated 111. 1983, the Commercial Tax Officer sent the report at the earliest point and the demand was made on 25. 1984 under Ex.A-12 demand notice. Still, since the defendants did not come forward to pay the amounts as per the demand notice, the appellant was left with no option but to file the suit. 10. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite Sec.468, Cr.P.C. and would argue that on failure to file the returns, the limitation is calculated from the date of receipt of the demand notice and Rule 51(a) of the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Produce Market Rules also says the same and would cite a judgment delivered in Ramanathapuram Market Committee v. Mohammed Shamshudeen, 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 514 wherein it is held; “The trial court failed to note that the accused was being prosecuted not for failure to furnish the return but for failure to pay the market fee. There was, therefore, no basis for holding that the offence had been committed on 33. 1980 and for holding that the limitation started running from the above date. As already stated by me earlier, the offence is committed only when the respondent failed to pay the fee within the time stipulated in the demand notice and limitation starts running only from that date. 1980 and for holding that the limitation started running from the above date. As already stated by me earlier, the offence is committed only when the respondent failed to pay the fee within the time stipulated in the demand notice and limitation starts running only from that date. It therefore follows that the prosecution is well within time.” Citing the above judgment, the learned counsel would further submit that since the assessee did not file the returns, the Committee had no alternative except to demand the same in the manner as if had done and would cite another judgment delivered in Commissioner of Taxes v. Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1979 Gau. 10 wherein it is held; “Accrual of a right to sue means accrual of case of action for the suit. Evidently, the cause of action, if any, arose in June, 1940 when the Matriculation Certificate of the respondent was issued. It is not the case of the respondent that he had no occasion to deal with the certificate and he was not aware of the age recorded in his certificate. In the plaint he has stated that through oversight and ignorance he could not take steps earlier, to correct his age in the certificate. Oversight and ignorance cannot extend the period of limitation. The fact that the respondent wrote a letter to the Registrar is also of no consequence, so far as limitation is concerned. Merely by writing such a letter the respondent cannot prolong the period of limitation. So also, executive instructions contained in the note under Subsidiary Rule 8 cannot override the provisions of the Limitation Act.” 11. On the part of the learned counsel for the respondents, he would submit that it is a concurrent finding purely on a question of law governing the law of limitation; that the appellants have been lethargic in initiating measures at the appropriate time and ultimately they have lost the time to claim the levy that is said to have been due to them. It has been factually and legally proved by both the courts below that the suit is time barred and hence would pray to dismiss the second appeal. 12. The simple question that is to be solved in this second appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It has been factually and legally proved by both the courts below that the suit is time barred and hence would pray to dismiss the second appeal. 12. The simple question that is to be solved in this second appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. According to the respondents, the appellant Market Committee has acted in a lethargic and casual manner for years together, and they have failed to collect the levy as per Rule 51(a) of the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Produce Market Rules; that for the period commencing from 7. 1979 it becomes due on 8. 1979 and the limitation starts from there itself. But it is seen from the materials made available on record that from 7. 1979 to 312. 1981, the appellant never bothered about making any attempt to collect the levy that is said to have been due, but only on 210. 1983 under Ex.A-10 they have casually asked the Commercial Tax Department to supply with the copy of the returns and in spite of the same having been sent under Ex.A-11 dated 111. 1983, the appellant has sent the demand notice on 25. 1984 under Ex.A-12 that is after a period of six months thereby showing its utter carelessness and hence, it is a case hopelessly time barred and would pray to dismiss the appeal. 13. From out of the two judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the first one reported in Ramanathapuram Market Committee v. Mohammed Shamshudeen , 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 514 is absolutely not applicable to this action since it had been delivered in a criminal case to suit the convenience of the criminal proceedings. This being a civil action for the collection of a levy, it is only the law of limitation that is applicable and not Sec.468, Cr.P.C. and hence this judgment is not accepted by this Court since being inapplicable to the case in hand in any manner. So far as the second judgment reported in Commissioner of Taxes v. Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1979 Gau 10 is concerned, it is relating to the issue of age certificate and has absolutely no bearing with the case in hand and hence, the norms proposed therein cannot be applied to this case. 14. So far as the second judgment reported in Commissioner of Taxes v. Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1979 Gau 10 is concerned, it is relating to the issue of age certificate and has absolutely no bearing with the case in hand and hence, the norms proposed therein cannot be applied to this case. 14. A cursory glance made into the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as the first appellate court would clearly disclose that the point in issue that is the question of limitation has been well considered in a merited manner so as to arrive at a concurrent decision by both the courts alike and the decision arrived at by both the courts below in a like manner regarding the question of limitation so as to ultimately hold that the suit is barred by limitation and hence warrants no interference. 15. In the recent judgment of the Apex Court rendered in a civil appeal arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) dated 14. 1999 delivered in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2213 it is categorically held in the following manner; ”The right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right. It has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the Appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two interferences are possible, one drawn by the lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 16. In view of the above clarification rendered by the Apex Court and in further consideration that the above second appeal having arisen out of the concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court as well coupled with the fact that the question Nos.2 and 3 framed in the name of substantial questions of law being more in the nature of being answered on the factual position of the case and since they have already been well determined by both the trial Court and the first appellate court alike following the dictum of law and the proposition rendered by the Apex Court, and the limitation question as per the first substantial question of law framed supra having been answered against the appellant. This Court does not see any valid or tangible reason that exists for causing interference into the well considered and well merited judgments of both the courts below as a result of which absolutely no interference as sought for on the part of the appellant herein is called for. 17. In result, the above second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 24. 17. In result, the above second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 24. 1988 made in A.S.No.108 of 1987 by the Court of Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram District at Madurai thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 211. 1986 made in O.S.No.52 of 1985 by the court of Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, is upheld. No costs.