Judgment D.K. Seth, J. (1) By means of these group of Criminal Misc. Applications, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the respective First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as the F.I.R.) lodged against them. (2) In Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997, the F.I.R. related to Crime No. 821 under Section 13 (1) (e), read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, lodged at Police Station Hazrat Ganj, district Lucknow. On 4.10.1997, an order was passed on the said application by this Court staying the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the said case on a condition that he would make himself available for interrogation and shall not leave India without permission. The interim order was subsequently modified by an order dated 29.4.1998, that the Investigating Officer should not indulge in disturbing the other members of the family of the petitioner in connection with the said case and that the police shall restrict its activities as required for proper investigation and that the D.I.G. should take suitable action so that in the garb of investigation, the Investigating Officer may not indulge in disturbing the other members of the family. Ultimately, the matter was nominated along with Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6487 of 1997, 6525 of 1997, 6588 of 1997 and 7102 of 1997 by Hon'ble the Chief Justice to this Court. With the consent of the parties, all these matters were taken up for hearing together. Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners addressed the Court in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997, Mr. D.V. Singh and Mr. P.P. Srivastava addressed the Court in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997, Mr. Ramendra Asthana had addressed the Court in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997. Mr. Prem Prakash had addressed the Court on behalf of the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 and after he concluded, Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate argued the case on behalf of the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 for some time. Mr. W.H. Khan though was present at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997 but he did not attempt to argue the case. Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate argued the case on behalf of the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 for some time. Mr. W.H. Khan though was present at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997 but he did not attempt to argue the case. The cases were adjourned from time to time since one or the other lawyer was not present and the other lawyers were not prepared to argue his case. The argument had commenced on 11.10.1999 and had continued till the judgment was reserved. (3) Before I proceed further, it may be useful to refer to a resume as to how the respective cases have proceeded. RESUME OF THE PROCEEDINGS (4) In Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 (Sri Brijendra vs. State of U.P.) an interim order was passed on 29.10.1997 by which the enquiry or investigation was permitted to proceed in connection with case Crime No. 805 of 1997 under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Police Station, Hazratganj, District Lucknow but the report under Section 173, Cr. P.C. shall not be filed and the applicant shall not be arrested without the permission of the Court and the matter was directed to be listed for further orders on 25.11.1997. By an order dated 22.4.1998, counter and rejoinder-affidavits were directed to be filed. On 9.7.1998, the interim order was directed to remain operative and the case was directed to be listed on 7.8.1998. Thereafter no order was recorded in this case. Whereas on the order sheet of Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997, an order was passed on 9.9.1998 extending the interim order till 14.9.1998. On 22.9.1998, the case was directed to be listed on 13.10.1998 extending the stay till 29.10.1998. On 29.10.1998, the matter was directed to be listed on 2.11.1998 and the interim order was extended till the next date of hearing. On 3.11.1998, the interim order was extended till the next date of listing of the case. Thereafter on 13.11.1998, the said case was directed to be listed on 13.11.1998 along with connected petitions and the interim order was extended till then. (5) In the meantime, an order was passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 on 22.9.1998 for listing of the case on 13.10.1998. Thereafter on 13.11.1998, the said case was directed to be listed on 13.11.1998 along with connected petitions and the interim order was extended till then. (5) In the meantime, an order was passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 on 22.9.1998 for listing of the case on 13.10.1998. On 9.12.1998, again time was granted for filing of the counter-affidavit in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997 and filing rejoinder-affidavit and the matter was directed to be listed on 22.12.1998 and interim order was directed to remain in operation till the next date of listing. Thereafter on 22.12.1998, the matter was directed to be listed on 12.1.1999, till then the interim order was directed to remain in operation. Thereafter an order was recorded on 12.1.1999 in Hindi, which I am unable to read. On 25.1.1999 on the prayer of Shri P.P. Srivastava, the case was adjourned and the interim order was extended till the next date of hearing while directing the matter to be listed on 9.3.1999. On 12.3.1999 the matter was directed to be listed on 22.3.1999. On 22.3.1999 another order was recorded in Hindi which I am unable to read. Whereas in the order sheet of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997, no further orders was recorded. (6) Thereafter these matters were nominated to this Court by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, whereupon the matter was listed on 11.10.1999. Thereafter the matter was listed on 13.10.1999 and on the prayer of Shri Prem Prakash learned counsel for the applicant in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997, time was granted and the matter was directed to be listed on 28.10.1999 along with other connected matters. On 11.10.1999 Mr. D.V. Singh resumed his argument in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 and continued for some time and then prayed for adjournment. Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi made his submission on 12.10.1999 in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997, which remained inconclusive. The matter was directed to be put on the next date. Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi had concluded his submission on 12.10.1999 in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997. After Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi concluded his submission, the matter was directed to be put up on 13.10.1999. Application No. 6487 of 1997, which remained inconclusive. The matter was directed to be put on the next date. Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi had concluded his submission on 12.10.1999 in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997. After Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi concluded his submission, the matter was directed to be put up on 13.10.1999. On 13.10.1999 rejoinder and supplementary affidavit and III supplementary counter-affidavits were filed which were taken on record and the matter was directed to be listed on 28.10.1999 since Mr. Prem Prakash had prayed for time on 13.10.1999. (7) On 28.10.1999 Mr. Ramendra Asthana resumed his submission which remained inconclusive, therefore, the matter was directed to be put up on 29.10.1999 for further hearing. Mr. Asthana continued his argument on 29.10.1999 which could not be concluded. Therefore, the matter was directed to be listed on the next date i.e. on 11.11.1999. Mr. Asthana concluded his argument on 11.11.1999. (8) Mr. Prem Prakash then (1.11.1999) had commenced his submission in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 which could not be completed and as such the matter was directed to be put up on 3.11.1999. On 3.11.1999 MR. Prem Prakash argued the case. On 5.11.1999 Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad learned Senior Advocate took up the argument after Shri Prem Prakash argument in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. The argument could not be concluded. He then prayed for listing the case on 9.12.1999. Accordingly the case was listed on 9.12.1999. On 9.12.1999 an application was filed by Mr. Prem Prakash in Court. In the said application, it was prayed that in view of the order dated 8.12.1999 passed by the Division Bench at Lucknow in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6298 of 1999, the Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997, should be heard and decided with four other writ petitions pending at Lucknow Bench. On this ground Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the applicant prayed for time to make an application before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. (9) In such circumstances, this Court had passed an order on 9.12.1999 that these matters were being heard for some time and was being adjourned from time to time since the argument could not be concluded. Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the applicant prayed for time to make an application before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. (9) In such circumstances, this Court had passed an order on 9.12.1999 that these matters were being heard for some time and was being adjourned from time to time since the argument could not be concluded. Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad continued his argument for some time on the previous occasion and that the matter was assigned to this Court by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, this matter could not be released and then the order dated 8.12.1999 was passed in some other matter which was not assigned to this Court. The said application contained a prayer for passing appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Prasad then contends that appropriate order means allowing some time to make an application before Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It was pointed out to him that this cannot be a ground for adjournment of hearing of the part-heard matter which was fixed earlier. At this stage, Mr. Prasad contended that he has some personal difficulty in arguing the case on that date and that he would not be able to make himself-available during the course of next week, therefore, he prayed that the matter may be fixed on or after 20.12.1999. Mr. P.M.N. Singh learned Additional Advocate General opposed the prayer for adjournment but ultimately he had acceded to the personal inconvenience of Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad and agreed that the matter may be taken up on 21.12.1999. Accordingly the matter was fixed on that date. On 21.12.1999 again a prayer was made on behalf of Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad by Mr. Prem Prakash though the date was fixed on the prayer of Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad. Similar prayer was made in respect of another matter, viz. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997. Therefore, these two matters viz. Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6588 of 1997 and 6525 of 1997 were postponed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh was requested to address the Court on other cases viz. Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6486 of 1997, 6487 of 1997 and 7102 of 1997. (10) Mr. P.M.N. Singh learned Additional Advocate General resumed his argument but could not conclude. The matter was directed to be put up on the next date. On 22.12.1999 again a prayer was made on behalf of Mr. Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6486 of 1997, 6487 of 1997 and 7102 of 1997. (10) Mr. P.M.N. Singh learned Additional Advocate General resumed his argument but could not conclude. The matter was directed to be put up on the next date. On 22.12.1999 again a prayer was made on behalf of Mr. Prem Prakash for accommodation and that the hearing should not be continued. But since the case of Mr. Prem Prakash was postponed by the earlier order, there was no scope for making such prayer but the learned counsel insisted for passing over of the matter which Mr. P.M.N. Singh was arguing though MR. Prem Prakash was not appearing in that matter. Therefore, the adjournment was not allowed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh resumed his submission but could not conclude. The matter was fixed on 4.1.2000. On 4.1.2000 on the ground of ill-health of MR. P.M.N. Singh, the matter was adjourned and was passed over to the following date. On 5.1.2000 MR. P.M.N. Singh resumed his submission and continued till rising of the Court. On 6.1.2000 MR. P.M.N. Singh continued his submission and the matter was directed to be put up on the following date. On 7.1.2000 MR. P.M.N. Singh continued his argument, which remained inconclusive. The matter was directed to be listed on 10.1.2000, on which date the matter could not be taken up and was directed to be put up on 12.1.2000. On 12.1.2000 Mr. P.M.N. Singh resumed his argument and concluded. Respective counsel for the applicants were permitted to reply. While a prayer was made by Mr. P.P. Srivastava learned counsel for the applicant in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 for dismissal of the said application as withdrawn. Upon such prayer, the said Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 was dismissed as withdrawn. (11) On 13.1.2000 Mr. Ramendra Asthana resumed his reply which remained inconclusive and the matter was directed to be listed on 17.1.2000. Mr. Asthana had concluded his submission and the judgment was reserved in respect of Criminal. Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997 and the remaining cases were directed to be listed on 20.1.2000. (12) On 20.1.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel submitted that Shri P.P. Srivastava had no power to appear in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997, therefore the same could not be dismissed as withdrawn. Mr. D.V. Singh was appearing in the said case. Mr. (12) On 20.1.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel submitted that Shri P.P. Srivastava had no power to appear in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997, therefore the same could not be dismissed as withdrawn. Mr. D.V. Singh was appearing in the said case. Mr. P.P. Srivastava did not mention that he was making the prayer on behalf of Mr. D.V. Singh, therefore, the order dated 12.1.2000 dismissing the Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 may be reconsidered and the records be summoned. Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 submitted that he had filed an application for dismissal of the said case as withdrawn but the said application is not before this Court, therefore, he submits that his case may be taken up on the next date. Accordingly the matter was adjourned to the next date. On 21.1.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel filed an application for withdrawing the said case as not pressed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh opposed the said prayer on the ground that the applicant himself did not swear the application. Mr. Prem Prakash, learned counsel submitted that similar application filed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 was allowed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh contended that he was moving an application for recalling the said order. The matter was adjourned to 3.2.2000. On 3.2.2000 Shri Mahendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel assisting Mr. P.M.N. Singh filed an application for recalling the order dated 12.1.2000 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997. The matter was directed to be listed on 15.2.2000. On 15.2.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel again prayed for adjournment till 18.2.2000, therefore, the Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6588 of 1997 and 6487 of 1997 were adjourned till 18.2.2000. Judgment in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997 was reserved on 17.1.2000. Mr. P.M.N. Singh learned Additional Advocate General contended that argument in Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6486 of 1997 and 6525 of 1997 were concluded. Therefore, the judgment in these two matters were also reserved and the matter was directed to be listed on 18.2.2000. (13) On 18.2.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel asked for time to file rejoinder affidavit since rejoinder-affidavit could not be affirmed on account of death of the mother of the applicant. 6486 of 1997 and 6525 of 1997 were concluded. Therefore, the judgment in these two matters were also reserved and the matter was directed to be listed on 18.2.2000. (13) On 18.2.2000 Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel asked for time to file rejoinder affidavit since rejoinder-affidavit could not be affirmed on account of death of the mother of the applicant. It was recorded on 18.2.2000 that the affidavit in support of the application for withdrawal was affirmed by one Shri Dharamvir while one Shri Suresh Shekhar had affirmed the affidavit in support of the application for transfer of the matter to the Lucknow Bench and Shri Manish Pandey had affirmed the affidavit in support of the application particularly for summoning the records of the Vigilance Department, therefore, personal presence of the applicant was not necessary for affirming the rejoinder-affidavit. Then Mr. Prem Prakash learned counsel submitted that his application for withdrawal of the case may be allowed as was allowed in the case of B.P. Nilratna. Mr. P.M.N. Singh learned Additional Advocate General contended that the matter was argued for long time, therefore, it could not be withdrawn at this stage. Mr. Prem Prakash acknowledged his inability to argue the case at this stage without rejoinder affidavit and submitted that he was instructed only to withdraw the case and not to argue the case. The matter was adjourned on earlier occasion on the ground of personal inconvenience of Mr. Prem Prakash. He was asked to argue the application for withdrawal and he was not asked to argue the main case. But Mr. Prem Prakash had stuck to his stand that he was instructed only to withdraw the application and not to argue. Mr. Prem Prakash had initially argued and concluded his submission and thereafter Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel also argued for few days and thereafter on account of his personal inconvenience, he sought for adjournment. Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad had also elaborately argued the case and had also pressed the application for transfer of the case to the Lucknow Bench, which was not acceded to and now an application is filed for withdrawal of the case to which Mr. P.M.N. Singh has raised objection in writing. Mr. Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad had also elaborately argued the case and had also pressed the application for transfer of the case to the Lucknow Bench, which was not acceded to and now an application is filed for withdrawal of the case to which Mr. P.M.N. Singh has raised objection in writing. Mr. Prem Prakash had contended that the Additional Advocate General or the Standing Counsel has no authority to appear on behalf of the Vigilance Commission and he wanted to seek instruction on the question as to whether the Additional Advocate General or the Standing Counsel could represent the Vigilance Commission. Mr. P.M.N. Singh submitted that an authority was given to the State to represent the Vigilance Commission which Mr. Prem Prakash wanted to counter by obtaining certain materials from the Vigilance Department, viz. the Vigilance Manual, which was not available to him. By the said order dated 18.2.2000, it was further observed that since the matter was adjourned from time to time every after substantial argument has been advanced by two learned counsel, therefore, it was not proper to adjourn the case any more. Since Mr. Prem Prakash had expressed his inability to argue the case on merit as well as even to argue on the question of withdrawal of the petition, therefore, the hearing may be treated to have been concluded. The judgment was, therefore, reserved on all questions including the merit as well as the withdrawal of the petition. Mr. Prem Prakash was permitted to submit his written note of submission on any of the question which he may like to submit within a period of 10 days. Mr. P.M.N. Singh was also permitted to submit his written note of submission after exchange of the same before filing. Parties were permitted to include such documents, which they want or intend to rely upon in such written note. The petition relating to Dr. B.P. Nilratna was directed to be listed on 1.3.2000. (14) Accordingly, written note was submitted on behalf of the State. Thereafter Criminal Misc. Applications No. 6487 of 1997, was listed on 1.3.2000. On 1.3.2000 the matter was directed to be listed on 29.3.2000 within which Mr. P.P. Srivastava was permitted to file his objection. On 29.3.2000 two weeks time was granted to Mr. P.P. Srivastava for filing counter-affidavit and the matter was directed to be listed on 13.4.2000. Thereafter Criminal Misc. Applications No. 6487 of 1997, was listed on 1.3.2000. On 1.3.2000 the matter was directed to be listed on 29.3.2000 within which Mr. P.P. Srivastava was permitted to file his objection. On 29.3.2000 two weeks time was granted to Mr. P.P. Srivastava for filing counter-affidavit and the matter was directed to be listed on 13.4.2000. The matter was listed on 13.4.2000 on which date Mr. D.V. Singh appearing on behalf of Mr. Srivastava filed rejoinder-affidavit and argued the matter on the question of recalling of the order for withdrawal to which Mr. P.M.N. Singh had replied. The order was however reserved. In Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997, accommodation was never sought for when the matter was adjourned on prayer of others until Mr. P.M.N. Singh had resumed his submission. After the judgments were reserved in other connected matter, an application for withdrawal was filed by Mr. W.H. Khan stating that though the matter was not heard yet the judgment was reserved. However, on no occasion any prayer for accommodation in respect of this case was ever made though these matters were appearing as group cases and the hearing in respect of all the matters were continued. Even after Mr. P.M.N. Singh had concluded his submission, no prayer was made as such. Mr. W.H. Khan, however, used to remain present in Court and used to watch the proceedings but on no occasion he had ever prayed for accommodation in respect of his matter. Neither he had ever come forward to advance any argument. Then again the question being identical and all the matters were being heard together, permitting the learned counsel to make their submission one after the other. However, the judgment was reserved. (15) From the perusal of the summary of the procedure relating to this group of cases, it would be apparent that how Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad and Mr. Prem Prakash had dragged on the matter and without disclosing that another writ petition was filed before the Lucknow Bench when time was granted on the ground of personal inconvenience. Then again the Court was informed about the filing of the other case before the Lucknow Bench without producing either the order passed in the said matter or the petition or application filed before the Lucknow Bench. Then again the Court was informed about the filing of the other case before the Lucknow Bench without producing either the order passed in the said matter or the petition or application filed before the Lucknow Bench. (16) After the nomination was made to this Court by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, all these cases were listed together since all these matters involved one and the same identical question of law in respect of almost similar allegations made against each of the applicants in the respective F.I.R. lodged against each of the applicants. Therefore, all these group cases were taken up together in the presence of the counsel for each of the applicants in different applications and the learned Additional Advocate General. A modality was agreed between the parties that each of the counsel for the applicant would address the Court first one-after the other, and after their submission is over, the learned Additional Advocate General shall address the Court on all matters and thereafter reply would be given by all the counsel for each of the application in the same manner. Accordingly the matter was taken up and argument was initiated by Mr. D.V. Singh, Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi, Mr. Ramendra Asthana, Mr. Prem Prakash and Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad. Though Mr. W.H. Khan, learned counsel for the applicant in one of the cases used to remain in court for some time and used to keep watch on the proceeding but did not come forward to argue his case. The matter used to be listed in the list-some time in the computer list, which is used to be notified in the notice board. Now let us refer to the relevant submissions made by the respective counsel in respect of each individual cases. Submission of the Applicants' Counsel Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 – (17) Shri D.V. Singh, learned counsel for the applicant opened his argument in respect of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997, pointing out to the infirmity in the F.I.R. to the extent that it does not disclose a case under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the absence of any expression that the applicant was unable to satisfactorily account for the assets and properties acquired or in possession disproportionate to his known source of income. He had elaborated his submission and had placed reliance on the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1982 SC 949 . (18) The argument made by Mr. D.V. Singh is on the same line, which was more elaborately dealt with by Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi in the other case after he took over when Mr. D.V. Singh asked for adjournment. The argument that has been made by Mr. D.V. Singh can be found more developed in the argument of Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi. Therefore, I refrain from repeating the said argument in view of the submission made by Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi as noted hereinafter, from which the contention of Mr. Singh could also be followed. Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6486 of 1997 and 6487 of 1997 – Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi had based his argument on Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which is identical with those of Section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, since repealed by the subsequent Act. He contended that unless the F.I.R. discloses a prima facie case, no cognizance of the F.I.R. could be taken. In the present case, pointing out from the F.I.R., Mr. Chaturvedi had contended that the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence. According to him, an offence is disclosed only when a public servant cannot satisfactorily account for the pecuniary resources for the property disproportionate to his known source of income. The F.I.R. has not disclosed that the petitioner was unable to satisfactorily account for his assets and properties and as such, no offence is disclosed. Therefore, according to him, cognizance of the F.I.R. and the subsequent investigation cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. He relied on the decisions in the case of M. Krishna Reddy vs. State, AIR 1993 SC 313 and Swapan Kumar Guha vs. State of West Bengal, 1982 (1) SCC 561 : AIR 1982 SC 949 , in support of his contention. He had elaborated his submission to the extent that in the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra), the question was related to the same proposition emanating from Section 5 (1) (e) of the 1947 Act, since repealed. As such, the proposition laid down therein will be applicable in the present case in full force. He had elaborated his submission to the extent that in the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra), the question was related to the same proposition emanating from Section 5 (1) (e) of the 1947 Act, since repealed. As such, the proposition laid down therein will be applicable in the present case in full force. Relying on Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he contended that only when there are materials on the F.I.R. to enable an officer to suspect about the commission of an offence, only then he may investigate under Section 156 after following the procedure prescribed under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So far as the procedure is concerned, it has not been disputed. Mr. Chaturvedi had founded his submission on the question that the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence and as such, there is no reason for a police officer to suspect the commission of an offence. In other words, according to him, unless an offence is disclosed, Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not come into play. He contends that the F.I.R. must contain such ingredients which disclose an offence. Only then the investigation may ensue. Relying on Section 13 (1) (e), he contends that the possession of assets and properties disproportionate to income is not an offence as has been disclosed in the F.I.R. until and unless there is any allegation that the accused is unable to account for the same. The F.I.R. does not contain any expression or report that the petitioner was unable to account for the properties and assets disproportionate to his known source of income. He next contended that the F.I.R. is based on an information received from the Income Tax Department pursuant to a raid conducted by it. The F.I.R. was lodged mechanically by the Government without verifying the information or giving any opportunity to the petitioner to account for the assets and properties and as such, there was no offence disclosed, and therefore, no investigation could ensue. He then contends that Section 482 of the Code empowers the court to quash such F.I.R. which is an abuse of process of law without disclosing any offence since life and liberty of a person cannot be interfered with. He then contends that Section 482 of the Code empowers the court to quash such F.I.R. which is an abuse of process of law without disclosing any offence since life and liberty of a person cannot be interfered with. According to him, right to life referred to in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is right to live as has been held by the Apex Court in many of the decisions by reason whereof the said proposition of law is a settled one. He then contends that right to live means right to live with dignity. Investigation against a person brings down indignity on him and thus interferes with the right to live with dignity. If it is by abuse of process of law, then in exercise of inherent power, the High Court is empowered to quash the F.I.R. He further contends that the continuation of investigation contemplates arrest and there is a reasonable apprehension of the petitioner being arrested in connection with the case. The apprehension of being arrested is infringement of personal liberty. Therefore, according to him, unless the F.I.R. discloses an offence, the infringement of the liberty in respect of an offence pursuant to such F.I.R. would be sheer abuse of process of law and as such, cannot be allowed and is to be quashed. Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997 – (19) Shri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the applicant had contended that in the F.I.R. income from 1989-1997 has been assessed. Whereas property acquired by the petitioner and the members of the family between 1970 and 1988 is being charged. Originally F.I.R. and the sanction for prosecution on an earlier occasion was quashed which is Annexure-5 to the application at page 47. Therefore, the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed. Relying Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, he contended that possession of assets is not an offence. It is inability to account for is an offence. Unless this ingredient is present in the F.I.R. the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed. He relied on para 108 at page 629 particularly sub-para (3) of the decision in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chaudhry Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . It is inability to account for is an offence. Unless this ingredient is present in the F.I.R. the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed. He relied on para 108 at page 629 particularly sub-para (3) of the decision in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chaudhry Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . (20) He also relied on the decision in the case of Nasuruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 , arising out of the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Nirmal Das Khatima vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1972 All 200 . HE had placed reliance on paragraph Nos. 26, 37 and 38 of the Supreme Court decision. HE then relied on paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 of the decision in the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, AIR 1988 SC 709 and Pepsi Food Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 (5) SCC 749 , paras 22, 26 and 29. He then contended that properties of the wife and son have been included. Relying on Article 22, he contends that because of successive proceeding under different provision, viz. before the Lok Ayukt as well as the Income Tax Department, the applicant was suffering double jeopardy in respect of the same offence by reason of lodging of F.I.R. Relying on Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, he contends that provisions of Income Tax Act and the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act cannot proceed together. (21) He also alleged mala fide against the State as detailed in his application in paragraphs 35 to 49. He then contended that there was no material before the authority to lodge the F.I.R. According to him in view of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, two convictions are not permissible and, therefore, the F.I.R. is to be quashed. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997 – (22) Mr. Prem Prakash, learned counsel for the applicant after having placed the list of dates contended that in the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 a special procedure has been provided for safeguarding a public servant. Unless the proceeding is in consonance with the procedure established by law, no proceeding can be initiated against the public servant by reason of the protection provided under the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act. Unless the proceeding is in consonance with the procedure established by law, no proceeding can be initiated against the public servant by reason of the protection provided under the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act. He further contends that illegally procured evidence could not be relied upon, though however now there had been departure by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court. Relying on Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act he contends that the possession of property and asset are not offence. It is an offence only when the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known source of income in respect of property in his possession. From the F.I.R. he points out that this ingredient is not present. The F.I.R. proceeds only to quote a report from the Income Tax Department in regard to a raid conducted against the applicant. According to him there was no application of mind of the authority lodging F.I.R. He also contends that there was no preliminary enquiry before the F.I.R. was lodged. According to him, before lodging such F.I.R. it should be preceded by preliminary enquiry in order to ascertain that there are certain substance in the allegation. The authority lodging F.I.R. cannot act mechanically and base its assumption or form its opinion out of the report of the Income Tax Department pursuant to the raid without application of mind. It ought to have looked into the facts that the properties mentioned did not belong to the applicant, whereas it was alleged that the property was in the benami of others. The authority should have ascertained the genuineness of the allegation that whether the persons holding the property in benami of the applicant or not. According to him in the said case some of the properties belonged to one Mr. Bhatnagar, a senior advocate and erstwhile Advocate General of this Court and that one of the car seized from the premises of the applicant at Delhi belong to MR. P.P. Srivastava, Senior Counsel and former Advocate General U.P. This fact Mr. Prem Prakash had pointed out from the pleadings of this case. Relying on Sections 2 (e) and 21 of the Indian Penal Code, Mr. P.P. Srivastava, Senior Counsel and former Advocate General U.P. This fact Mr. Prem Prakash had pointed out from the pleadings of this case. Relying on Sections 2 (e) and 21 of the Indian Penal Code, Mr. Prem Prakash had explained who are public servants and contended that by reason of such provision, the applicant being a public servant is entitled to the protection provided in U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965. He then contended that the basis of the F.I.R. was the panchnama of the Income Tax raids held on 21.1.1997 In the F.I.R. itself it was mentioned that the F.I.R. was being lodged pursuant to the order of the State Government. He contends that the State Government has no power to direct lodging of F.I.R. Therefore, the order dated 15.2.1997 passed by the Government directing lodging of the F.I.R. is void and non est and therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be sustained. The F.I.R. was lodged on 26.9.1997. According to him it was lodged without any evidence or verification. Then again the panchanama cannot be a foundation for lodging of the F.I.R. since panchanama was signed by one Chetna who was not authorised to do the same, though she might be related to the applicant. (23) He then contended that unless the raid is conducted by the Income Tax Department, no F.I.R. could be lodged. On the basis of the documents relating to the income-tax raids no opinion could be formed for lodging the F.I.R. In view of the Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, possession under sub-section (1) (c) could not be basis for lodging F.I.R. under Section 13 (1) (e). Thereafter he led the Court through the decision of the income-tax authority in respect of the cases arising out of the income-tax raids and pointed out that though the Income Tax Officer was dissatisfied with the explanation given but on appeal the appellate authority had held that each of the item mentioned in the report of raid had since been explained satisfactorily. The proceeding was held in favour of the applicant after holding that all the items were satisfactorily accounted for. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is a judicial proceeding and the finding therein is a judicial finding. Such finding has reached finality. The proceeding was held in favour of the applicant after holding that all the items were satisfactorily accounted for. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is a judicial proceeding and the finding therein is a judicial finding. Such finding has reached finality. Since the said decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was not challenged and as such the finding of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is binding upon this Court and is to be accepted as to have been satisfactorily accounted for. Since there are material before this Court to come to a conclusion that the allegation about the possession of the property and asset were satisfactorily accounted for, therefore, there cannot be any basis for formation of an opinion for lodging of the F.I.R. or to proceed with the investigation pursuant to such F.I.R. (24) Relying on the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1982 SC 949 , he contended that there being no material while the F.I.R. was lodged and that there being material after the F.I.R. was lodged to show that the allegations are wholly baseless and the investigation is a sheer abuse of process of law. Therefore, according to him the F.I.R. is to be quashed. Inasmuch as at the moment there are materials to show that the allegations are wholly baseless and mala fide. Therefore, this petition should be allowed. He had also contended that his submissions are in addition to the submissions of Mr. Gopal Chaturvedi and Mr. Ramendra Asthana which shall be deemed to have been adopted by him and that he would rely on the same decisions which were cited by the said two counsel. After Mr. Prem Prakash had concluded his submission, Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate appeared in the matter and wanted to make submission in addition to what has been submitted by Mr. Prem Prakash. He contended that period of probation duty was also included in the check period which conclusively shows that there was complete non-application of mind. He further elaborated the submission made by Prem Prakash while repeating the same more elaborately. Prem Prakash. He contended that period of probation duty was also included in the check period which conclusively shows that there was complete non-application of mind. He further elaborated the submission made by Prem Prakash while repeating the same more elaborately. He had placed the F.I.R. in detail and had made his submission explaining the allegation made in the F.I.R. and correlated the same with the materials on record which were brought as Annexure to the affidavit and had led the court through such material to show that there is no foundation for the allegation made in the F.I.R. and on those material even now there cannot be any investigation since the applicant had satisfactorily accounted for each and every item of the assets and properties forming the allegation of the F.I.R. He had placed the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in detail and had pointed out elaborately placing the whole order before this Court, while going through in between lines explaining each part as to how each of the assets and properties alleged to be in the possession of the applicant mentioned in the F.I.R. were satisfactorily accounted for. He then contended that the allegation in the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence. In the absence of any allegation that the applicant was unable to satisfactorily account for the possession of the properties and assets and unless this ingredient is present, according to him no investigation can take place on the basis of such F.I.R. Therefore, the F.I.R. should be quashed. (25) He then contends that there was nothing on record to show that the applicant was ever asked to account for and that he failed to satisfactorily account for on being so asked and that he was given any opportunity to explain or account for the said property or there was anything to show that any enquiry was made to ascertain that the allegation made in the panchnama of the income-tax raid had any basis or foundation with the properties held by the benamidar or not which could have been verified because some of the properties alleged to have been held by Mr. Bhatnagar. It was also pointed out that one of the car that was raided from the house of the son of the applicant at Delhi belonged to Shri P.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate. This also shows that how there was non-application of mind. Bhatnagar. It was also pointed out that one of the car that was raided from the house of the son of the applicant at Delhi belonged to Shri P.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate. This also shows that how there was non-application of mind. He wanted to make further submission, wherefore the matter was adjourned to 20.12.1999 on his prayer. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997 – (26) Mr. W.H. Khan though used to keep watch on the proceedings and used to remain present in Court but no accommodation was prayed for by him. Neither he had come forward to advance his argument. Even after MR. P.M.N. Singh had concluded his submission when the other counsel had replied, MR. Khan did not turn up either to seek accommodation or to advance his submission on the face of the fact that MR. Prem Prakash had all along attempted to postpone his own case as well as other cases. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY Mr. P.M.N. Singh, on the other hand, contended that the question of satisfactorily accounting for does not come at the stage of F.I.R. or investigation. It is at the stage of trial for holding guilty for misconduct. In this connection, he had relied on the decision in the case of M. Krishna Reddy vs. State, AIR 1993 SC 313 , Veeraswamy vs. Union of India, JT 1991 (3) SC 198, Rajendra Bajaj vs. State, JT 1999 (2) SC 112, Union of India vs. Win Chaddha, AIR 1993 SC 1082. According to him, if other materials have come, apart from the F.I.R. those are also to be looked into by the Court and if there are reason to suspect about the commission of an offence, the investigation may proceed. It is only a suspicion about the commission of an offence that enables investigation. He further contends that the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) has to be understood in the context of that case and it cannot be stretched to all situations. The question of liberty referred to in the decision of M. Krishna Reddy vs. State (supra) was related to a situation after the trial was over and the appeal was decided. The question of liberty referred to therein cannot be attracted to the stage of lodging of F.I.R. during investigation. The question of liberty referred to in the decision of M. Krishna Reddy vs. State (supra) was related to a situation after the trial was over and the appeal was decided. The question of liberty referred to therein cannot be attracted to the stage of lodging of F.I.R. during investigation. In support of his contention, on the other hand, he relied on a decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. O.P. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 2983 , paras 9 and 14. (27) MR. P.M.N. Singh had also relied on the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Piraji, AIR 1996 SC 722 : 1996 (1) SCC 542 , Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Rajiv Gandhi and another, 1996 (1) SCC 253, Rajendra Prasad Tyagi vs. Director General of Police, W.P. No. 7281 of 1997, decided by this Court on 7.11.1997 Jayant Vitamins Ltd. vs. Chaitanya Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1930 . (28) He then contends that the commencement and continuation of other collateral proceedings under the Income Tax and Lok Ayukt Act has no bearing on the investigation carried on under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of F.I.R. In this context, he refers to the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra). According to him, other materials mentioned in paragraph 66 in the decision in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) are materials, collected in investigation, but not defence materials, since until the charge-sheet is submitted, there is no stage for defence. In support of this contention, he relies on the case of State of Bihar vs. P.P. Sharma, 1992 (1) Supp. SCC 222, Mukund Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1 44 . He also relied on the decision in the case of Atique Ahmad in W.P. No. 469 of 1995, decided on 3rd Judge reference on 25.11.1995 Bhajan Lal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 602 . HE further contends that if the offence alleged, even based on same facts, but constitute different offence Article 20 of the Constitution and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted. It is not facts or allegations but ingredients of the offence, identity whereof has to be established, is the decisive criteria. HE further contends that if the offence alleged, even based on same facts, but constitute different offence Article 20 of the Constitution and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted. It is not facts or allegations but ingredients of the offence, identity whereof has to be established, is the decisive criteria. In support of his contention he relied on the decision in the case of the State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 558, State of Bihar vs. Mohd. Ali, AIR 1989 SC 1 , Section 403 (1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Radhey Shyam vs. State of Bihar, 1993 (3) SCC 54 . Mr. P.M.N. Singh had also referred to the F.I.R. as well as the enquiry and the authorization being Annexures-CA1, CA2 and CA3 respectively of the counter-affidavit in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties as referred to above at length. POINTS FOR DECISION (29) Before referring to the individual cases, let us now examine the proposition of law that emerges out of these cases and calls for a decision at this stage of the proceedings. All these cases involve one and identical question – 1. As to whether the F.I.R. discloses a case so as to enable the investigation to continue or, in other words, on the face of the allegations made in the F.I.R. it is liable to be quashed in exercise of the power conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Each of the counsel had pointed out that in none of the F.I.R. it is ever alleged that the applicant was unable to satisfactorily account for the assets. Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act specifies misconduct of a public servant when he is possessed of properties and assets disproportionate to his known source of income, which he is unable to account for satisfactorily. Admittedly all the counsel arguing the cases on behalf of respective applicants have sought to make a capital out of it. 2. A person cannot be subjected to a criminal investigation without there being proper foundation for undertaking such investigation. Admittedly all the counsel arguing the cases on behalf of respective applicants have sought to make a capital out of it. 2. A person cannot be subjected to a criminal investigation without there being proper foundation for undertaking such investigation. It has been held that such a proceeding would affect right to live within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India that includes right to live and to live with dignity. There-fore, unless the F.I.R. discloses an offence, no investigation can be initiated. 3. In all these cases, it is also urged that in view of parallel proceeding under the Income Tax Act and that under the Lok Ayukt Act, the present proceeding is hit by the principle of Double Jeopardy. 4. The question as to preliminary enquiry i.e., before lodging the F.I.R. the Government has to make a preliminary enquiry, is also common in all these cases. 5. Similarly lodging of the F.I.R. was an outcome of malice and mala fide is also a common question that falls for determination in all these cases. 6. Whether the lodging of F.I.R. violates the protection provided to an officer under the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 or in other words whether lodging of the F.I.R. is hit by the mischief of protection provided in U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act. 7. Whether the lodging of the F.I.R. pursuant to the order of the State Government is bad. 8. In a few of the cases, prayer for withdrawal has been made. As such, the question whether leave to withdraw should be allowed or not. If yes, then what would be the effect of such leave is the question that is common in three cases. (30) Thus, these cases involve a few broad questions which may be sub-divided into subsidiary or supplementary questions to the one such broad question. There are also some preliminary questions as well. Let us therefore proceed one by one to decide the preliminary questions followed by those on merit. Extent of protection under the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965. The object for legislating the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 being U.P. Act No. VII of 1965 replacing the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Ordinance, 1965, is – "1. Complaints containing allegations of corruption and other malpractice against Gazetted Officers are now being enquired into by the Directorate of Vigilance, set up in accordance with the Vigilance Commission Scheme. The object for legislating the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 being U.P. Act No. VII of 1965 replacing the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Ordinance, 1965, is – "1. Complaints containing allegations of corruption and other malpractice against Gazetted Officers are now being enquired into by the Directorate of Vigilance, set up in accordance with the Vigilance Commission Scheme. The rules regarding the conduct of enquiries by the Directorate of Vigilance could not authorise the Directorate to investigate into complaints in accordance with the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless some statutory provision was made to empower the officers of the Directorate to function as police officers and to apply to them the Police Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder. 2. A large number of cases had already been entrusted to the Directorate of Vigilance for enquiry, and it was felt that investigation into such cases was not likely to proceed expeditiously unless police powers were invested on the officers of the Directorate." (31) From the scheme of the said Act, it appears that the said provision was engrafted in addition to the ordinary mode of investigation against the officer not in derogation to the conduct of an enquiry or investigation available under the Code of Criminal Procedure as is entrusted on the Police who are authorised to conduct such enquiry and investigation under the Police Act, 1861. By reason of Section 2, the officers of the Vigilance Establishment have been also empowered to discharge all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities of the police officers holding corresponding rank in the police force of the State in connection with investigation of offences specified in the notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act which includes offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. (32) By reason of Section 4, the superintendence of the Vigilance Establishment was vested in the State Government and by reason of sub-section (2) thereof the administration of the said establishment was vested in an officer to be called the Director of Vigilance, appointed in this behalf by the State Government with the authority of all power exercisable by the Inspector General of Police in respect of ordinary police force of the State. Sub-section (3) provides that unless otherwise provided in the said Act, the provisions of the Police Act, 1861 and of the rules and regulations made thereunder as they apply in relation to member of the ordinary police force of the State shall apply in relation to members of the said establishment subject to such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as may be made therein by the State Government consistently with the purposes of the Act. Nowhere in the Scheme of the Act, any protection is provided to any officer with regard to any offence enumerated in the notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act. It does not prohibit proceeding against an officer through ordinary process. Both Vigilance Establishment as well as ordinary police force are entitled to deal with the offences including the investigation of offences mentioned in the notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act. The scheme of the Act was only to authorise the officers of the Vigilance Department to carry on the investigation with the same power as is available to a police officer of equal rank. Neither under the said Act nor under the Prevention of Corruption Act there is any provision which prohibits investigation of an offence through ordinary manner nor there is any provision that investigation is to be made only through the provision of 1965 Act. It also does not prohibit parallel proceeding one under the General Law through General Agency viz. Code of Criminal Procedure and the Police and under the Vigilance Establishment Act. It is only a kind of investigation, which is to be carried out. Thus process of investigation is in addition to the general procedure and not in derogation thereof. It had never intended to provide any protection to an officer charged. (33) Prevention of Corruption Act prescribed in Section 28 that the provisions of the said Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force, and nothing contained therein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might, apart from the said Act, be instituted against him. Section 17 prescribes rank of the officer in respect of the respective areas as to who are authorised to conduct investigation under the said Act notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 17 prescribes rank of the officer in respect of the respective areas as to who are authorised to conduct investigation under the said Act notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The said provision prescribes that the police officer not below the rank of the officer mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 17 were empowered to investigate any offence punishable under the said Act without the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. However, it is provided in the proviso that if a police officer below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. (34) Thus, this provision does not prescribe that the investigation is to be undertaken only in accordance with the Vigilance Establishment Act and not otherwise. However, by reason of Section 19, cognizance of an offence under the said Act cannot be taken by the Court in respect of Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 committed by a public servant without the previous sanction of the Government. But that section is necessary only when the Court takes cognizance, viz. after the charge-sheet is presented before the Court and the Court proceeds to frame charges. Section 7 empowers initiation of investigation without the orders of the Magistrate. Neither any sanction from the State Government nor any order from the Metropolitan Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class would be necessary to initiate the investigation. The lodging of F.I.R. is only an instrumentality through which investigation is initiated. Thus, the submission of Mr. Prem Prakash with regard to protection available under the Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 is unsustainable. Lodging of F.I.R. under the order of the State Government-whether bad – (35) In view of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, F.I.R. in respect of an offence under Section 13 (1) (e) can be investigated by the officers mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c). It is only under the authority of the State Government an officer other than those may initiate the investigation. If there is an order of the Government for initiation of the investigation it does not in any manner violate any of the provisions of law. It is only under the authority of the State Government an officer other than those may initiate the investigation. If there is an order of the Government for initiation of the investigation it does not in any manner violate any of the provisions of law. It is in the interest of the State Government in order to maintain transparency in its administration and cleanliness within its rank and file, the State Government may direct lodging of F.I.R. It is the headache of the administration to take steps if necessary to direct one or the other officer to lodge F.I.R. No officer in the administration could do it without the authority given to it. Even if the officer may do it without the orders of the Government still then the orders of the Government would not add any infirmity by reason of order passed by it directing lodging of F.I.R. The lodging of F.I.R. does not affect the right of a person. If there are reason to suspect commission of an offence, it can be lodged by any one and if the State Government directs any of its officer to do it, it does not become fatal to vitiate validity of the F.I.R. Neither in any way it prejudices a person against whom the F.I.R. is lodged. Therefore, submission made by Mr. Prem Prakash in this regard is wholly misplaced and misconceived. Double Jeopardy – (36) The principle of double jeopardy as contemplated under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India prohibits prosecution and punishment of a person for the same offence more than once. The expression offence used in Article 20 is to be understood as defined in Section 3 (38) of the General Clauses Act which applies to the Constitution by reason of Article 367. In order to attract this provision, the offence must be the same or in other words involving the same ingredients in all respect. But trial for a separate and distinct offence even though they might be based on the self-same allegation but making out different ingredient for different offence would not be barred under Article 20 (2). This Article has to be taken as supplemented by Section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, as well as Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called as the Code as provided in Section 403 of 1898 Code, now Section 300 of the 1973 Code. This Article has to be taken as supplemented by Section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, as well as Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called as the Code as provided in Section 403 of 1898 Code, now Section 300 of the 1973 Code. The principle is based on the doctrine of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit. The object is to avoid harassment that might be caused to a person for successive criminal proceeding where only one crime has been committed. (37) The above principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the decision Maqbool Husain vs. State, 1952 SCR 730, State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte and another, AIR 1961 SC 578 , Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and another, AIR 1961 SC 29 , Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent of District Jail, Amritsar, AIR 1958 SC 118, Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay and another vs. L.R. Melwani and another, AIR 1970 SC 962 . (38) Section 3 (38) of the General Clauses Act defines offence to mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. This expression means that if an act constitutes an offence under a particular law satisfying the ingredients required for such offence then he cannot be tried for an offence within the meaning of the said provision. Unless the act or omission constitutes an offence, the same cannot be an offence within the meaning of General Clauses Act. Thus definition of offence means that if an act or omission gives rise to some ingredients that constitute an offence such act or omission is an offence. Thus one set of act or omission may constitute different ingredients for different offence either under the one law in relation to one subject or law covering different subjects. This is made clear from Section 26 of the General Clauses Act which provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactment, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Section 300 (1) of the 1973 Code prohibits trial for an offence in respect whereof a person has been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction and convicted or acquitted of such offence, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force. Section 300 (1) of the 1973 Code prohibits trial for an offence in respect whereof a person has been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction and convicted or acquitted of such offence, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force. A person shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221 of the Code, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. Section 220 of the Code permits simultaneous trial of several distinct and different offences that might be constituted out of the same transaction or series of acts or omission. Section 221 permits trial of an offence that might be disclosed out of the same transaction or series of acts and omissions though not charged. Sub-section (2) of Section 300 permits subsequent trial with the consent of the State Government for any distinct offence for which separate charge might have been made against the accused at the former trial under Section 220 (1) of the Code. Thus the provision is not absolute. Trial is prohibited in respect of the same offence arising out of one set of act or omission excluding distinct or separate offence for which charge can be framed under Section 220 (1) of the Code even arising out of the same set of act or omission. (39) Thus, from Section 26 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 300 (1) and (2) of the Cr. P.C. 1973, it is abundantly clear that the principle of double jeopardy is not attracted if one set of act or omission constitutes separate and distinct offence either under one enactment or under different enactments. In that event, the offence would not be the same offence within meaning of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 20 has neither eclipsed nor had obliterated the provisions of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act nor of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It has only reiterated the same while recognising it as a fundamental right for a citizen, adding strength and constitutional flavour. There is no conflict in between any of these provisions. It has only reiterated the same while recognising it as a fundamental right for a citizen, adding strength and constitutional flavour. There is no conflict in between any of these provisions. On the other hand each of these provisions are supplemental to each other. The prohibition that was engrafted in the said two provisions has since been adopted in the Constitution as fundamental right while securing the freedom or liberty of the citizens. Article 20 (2) thus prohibits second trial of a person for the same offence as distinct from separate and distinct offence though arising out of the same set of acts or omission constituting the ingredient distinct and separate from the offence involved in the first. (40) Support for the above proposition may be found in decisions referred to hereinafter. In the case of State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte and another, AIR 1961 SC 558, where the Apex Court had observed as follows – "15. If, therefore, the offences were distinct there is no question of the rule as to double-jeopardy as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution being applicable. 16. The next point to be considered is as regards the scope of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to the act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments, the emphasis is not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion of the section which refers to shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. If the offences are not the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked. It therefore, follows that in the present case as the respondents are not being sought to be punished for the same offence twice but for two distinct offences constituted or made up of different ingredients the bar of the provision is inapplicable. 17. It therefore, follows that in the present case as the respondents are not being sought to be punished for the same offence twice but for two distinct offences constituted or made up of different ingredients the bar of the provision is inapplicable. 17. In passing, it may be pointed out that the construction we have placed on Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act is precisely in line with the terms of Section 403 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which runs : "403 (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under Section 235, sub-section (1)." (41) In State of Bihar vs. Murad Ali Khan and others, AIR 1989 SC 1 , it was held that same act may constitute an offence under more than one enactment. If there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments, even arising out of the same set of act or omission, a double punishment is not barred. Referring to the decision in Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar, AIR 1958 SC 118, the Apex Court had pointed out that offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is an offence different from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. The Apex Court had taken similar view in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotry, AIR 1957 SC 592 , following the decision in the case of Om Prakash Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 458 , holding inter alia that the offence under Section 409 of the I.P.C. and Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are two distinct and separate offences. This decision had also placed reliance on the decision in the case of S. L. Apte (supra). This decision had also placed reliance on the decision in the case of S. L. Apte (supra). (42) In this case the same set of act or omission is suspected to constitute an offence under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act separate and distinct from any under the Income Tax Act or which may be gone into under the Lok Ayukt Act. Though it may not be possible at this stage to come to a definite finding yet from the materials, it appears that the offence alleged is distinct and separate. Then again the trial is prohibited only after conviction or acquittal. Here that stage has not yet arrived. The above provision does not prohibit trial until there is a conviction or acquittal and till it remains in force. Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy is in no way can be attracted in this case for the present proposition which we are concerned. PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY (43) Now let us examine the contention with regard to the necessity of enquiry before lodging F.I.R. Much has been sought to be made out of the decision in the case of P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 520 . In the said case, it was laid down that before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanor and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. Inasmuch as lodging of a baseless F.I.R. inflicts incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but the department he belonged to in general. The department has to proceed fairly in the matter, when the enquiry is to be held for the purpose of finding out whether criminal proceedings are to be respected to the scope thereof must be limited to the examination of persons who have knowledge of the affairs of the delinquent officer and documents bearing on the same to find out whether there is prima facie evidence of guilt of the officer. Howsoever serious the crime and howsoever incriminating the circumstances may be against a person supposed to be guilty of a crime the Code of Criminal Procedure aims at securing a conviction if it can be had by the use of utmost fairness on the part of the officers investigating into the crime before the lodging of a charge-sheet. Paragraphs 17, 19, 21, 24 and 25 of the said judgment are relevant for our present purpose. (44) A plain reading of the observation made by the Supreme Court in the said case makes out a distinction between lodging of the charge-sheet and lodging of F.I.R. Before charge-sheet, an investigation is ensued by reason of Chapter XIV of the Code itself, this stands on a different footing from the observation made in respect of enquiry even before the F.I.R. is lodged. But in any case, the principle is only to aid causes for the purpose of making it fair. The said observation requires that there must be application of mind and some materials to believe prima facie that there was sufficient material to suspect commission of an offence. The preliminary enquiry that has been referred to in the decision in the case of P. Sirajjuddin (supra) was to ensure that an officer should not be harassed unnecessarily on the basis of baseless allegation. Before lodging F.I.R., there should be sufficient material before the authority concerned, who is expected to have applied its mind to it. (45) Such application of mind may be reflected from any order that might be passed by the State Government which shows that the State Government had applied its mind and had directed lodging of F.I.R. which presupposes that there were some preliminary enquiry. Such necessity of preliminary enquiry may also be satisfied if any of the limb of the Government either of the State or of the Union had made preliminary enquiry and has reason to suspect commission of an offence in respect of the enactment under which the department had made the enquiry. If the same set of act or omission constitutes offence under different enactment constituting different ingredients for such distinct offence, it is not necessary to make another enquiry. The Government is not bound to hold such enquiry time and again. If the same set of act or omission constitutes offence under different enactment constituting different ingredients for such distinct offence, it is not necessary to make another enquiry. The Government is not bound to hold such enquiry time and again. Materials that might have been obtained in one process of enquiry by one department may be relied upon by the other department and the same may form the basis for forming the opinion as to the suspicion about commission of offence under the one or the other enactment. (46) When F.I.R. is challenged, it is not necessary to go into all these questions in detail when on the face of it, it appears that there are some materials for forming such an opinion. If such a question is to be gone into, in that event, the persons in high status may be utilising all their powers and resources at their command to forestall every proceeding through sheer abuse of process of law and thereby prevent the proceeding of investigation and seek immunity in respect of their offence by taking resort to all process to delay the legal process, frustrating the whole purpose of investigation. In such matters, one should not lose sight of the position of such person. By virtue of their position, the possibility of influencing and obstructing the investigation process cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the Court ought to be a little more careful and cautious in dealing with such matters. It is the duty of the Court not to be overwhelmed by the status and position of such person for drawing a distinction in such matters between a person in high position and an ordinary one in the lower rank or in the street. (47) The lodging of F.I.R. and process of investigation is to be quick so as to prevent an offender from using his office and status as well as resources at his command to frustrate the sole investigation and taking the advantage of the delay to manipulate and monitor his defence in such a manner to jeopardize the whole process. In the eye of law, all offenders are to be looked into equally. Because a person is holding a very high post he cannot be treated differently from an ordinary citizen. The principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be overlooked because of the status of a person. In the eye of law, all offenders are to be looked into equally. Because a person is holding a very high post he cannot be treated differently from an ordinary citizen. The principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be overlooked because of the status of a person. The observation made in the said decision may be a wholesome principle or policy for the State but cannot be treated to be a legal right eventually to use the same as sword and utilise the process altogether to his benefit. (48) On the other hand, if a person uses his position and status taking all advantage of holding public office it is more heinous than committing offence. If a person uses his position and status and abuse his resources at his command and then again take advantage of his influence and uses the principle of policy laid down in the said decision as a sword to cut through the entire process in that event it would send a wrong message to the whole mass and encourage corruption at high level which will percolate down to the bottom eroding the entire morale of the personnel and the fabric of the whole administration. The Court cannot allow its process to treat person in power and position differently than the ordinary citizen. The observation made in the said decision in 1971 might have some value having regard to the old values then in the mind of the Judges and the people in the society. Law cannot be static. It has to mould itself according to the need of the society. It cannot close its eyes to the present day needs and cries of the people. It cannot be oblivion of the situation prevailing in the society. It is a common knowledge that now-a-days there are some amount of corruption in the administration which is reflected in occasional news report. Corruption at high level appears to be spreading fast. The magnitude may not be alarming now. How little it may be, unless it is prevented at this stage, then the days will not be very far off when it may reach point of no return. If we stick to the old principles and values then it would be almost impossible to turn the process of point of no return to a point of return. Desperate need requires desperate remedy. If we stick to the old principles and values then it would be almost impossible to turn the process of point of no return to a point of return. Desperate need requires desperate remedy. Since the old values had given way and scruples and values have been on the verge of disappearance from the society and is fast becoming a matter of the past it is attempting to pervade the administration, it is high time to have some introspect and find out modes and methodology to curb it. (49) People have a right of governance. Our Government is of the people by the people and for the people. Corruption in the administration, howsoever little it might be, it affects the governance, a responsibility of the Government cast on it by the Constitution. Transparency in the administration is one of the characteristics which the Government is bound to maintain. The entire approach has to be given a new dimension. It has to avoid pedantic and mechanical approach. Unless attempts are made to nip the corruption at the bud it may bear a poisonous fruit that might result into disaster, if not calamity. A note of caution needs be sounded. The Court might remind itself of not being too technical in laying down a principle while interpreting a proposition. It has to be construed in its proper prospective. The decision in Sirajuddin (supra) had never intended to lay down a hard and fast rule as such to exclude the benefit of the process of enquiry by another limb of the Government and that no assistance could be had out of it by another department when the same act and omission forms the basis to suspect commission of offence under a different enactment. (50) Therefore, it is not necessary to hold a full-fledged preliminary enquiry before lodging F.I.R. It would be sufficient if there are some materials for forming an opinion to the extent that a person is suspected to have committed an offence. It is the suspicion that is sufficient to form an opinion for lodging F.I.R. even if it is based on the enquiry made by some other agency. It is the suspicion that is sufficient to form an opinion for lodging F.I.R. even if it is based on the enquiry made by some other agency. However, the decision in the case P. Sirajuddin (supra) is not an absolute proposition that at every point of time before lodging F.I.R. preliminary enquiry is to be held even when there are sufficient materials to suspect commission of an offence even though such materials might have come not on account of any preliminary enquiry by the department lodging the F.I.R. but might have emerged out of an enquiry made by some other agency. The above proposition finds strength and clarity in the observation of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. W.N. Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082. It would help us to benefit in borrowing the observation made therein as quoted below:- "90. Under the scheme of Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there are various provisions under which no prior notice or opportunity of being heard is conferred as a matter of course to an accused person while the proceeding is in the stage of an investigation. 91. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 at p. 359: AIR 1992 SC 604 at p. 616, this Court to which both of us (Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.) were parties after making reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 and the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha, 1967 (3) SCR 668 , has pointed out that "the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is exclusively within the domain of the investigating agencies over which the Courts cannot have control and have no power to stifle or impinge upon the proceedings in the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in compliance with the provisions relating to investigation." 92. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under a certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173 (2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances. 93. It may be noted that under Section 227 of the Code dealing with discharge of an accused in a trial before a Court of Session under Chapter XVIII, the accused is to be heard and permitted to make his submission before the stage of framing the charge. Under Section 228 of the Code, the trial Judge has to consider not only the records of the case and documents submitted therewith but also the submissions of the accused and the prosecution made under Section 227. Similarly, under Section 239 falling under Chapter XIX dealing with the trial of warrant cases, the Magistrate may give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard and discharge the accused for the reasons to be recorded in case, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code dealing with framing of charge also reaffirms the consideration of the examination of an accused under Section 239 before the charge is framed. 94. Section 240 of the Code dealing with framing of charge also reaffirms the consideration of the examination of an accused under Section 239 before the charge is framed. 94. Under Section 235 (2), in a trial before a Court of Sessions and under Section 248 (2) of the trial of warrant cases, the accused as a matter of right, is to be given an opportunity of being heard. Unlike the above provisions which we have referred to above by way of illustration, the provisions relating to the investigation under Chapter XII do not confer any right of prior notice and hearing to the accused and on the other hand, they are silent in this respect. 95. It is relevant and significant to note that a police officer, in charge of a police station, or a police officer making an investigation can make a search or cause search to be made for the reasons to be recorded without any warrant from the Court or without giving the prior notice to any one or any opportunity of being heard. The basic objective of such a course is to preserve secrecy in the mode of investigation lest the valuable evidence to be unearthed will be either destroyed or lost. We think it unnecessary to make detailed examination on this aspect except saying that an accused cannot claim any right of prior notice or opportunity of being heard inclusive of his arrest or search of his residence or seizure of any property in his possession connected with the crime unless otherwise provided under the law. 96. True, there are certain rights conferred on an accused to be enjoyed at certain stages under the Code of Criminal Procedure such as Section 50 whereunder the person arrested is to be informed of the grounds of his arrest and of his right of bail and under Section 57 dealing with person arrested not to be detained for more than 24 hours and under Section 167 dealing with the procedure if the investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours - which are all in conformity with the 'Right to Life' and 'Personal Liberty' enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and the valuable safeguards ingrained in Article 22 of the Constitution for the protection of an arrestee or detenu in certain cases. But so long as the investigating agency proceeds with his action or investigation in strict compliance with the statutory provisions relating to arrest or investigation of a criminal case and according to the procedure established by law, no one can make any legitimate grievance to stifle or to impinge upon the proceedings of arrest or detention during investigation as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 97…………….. 98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation as lifeless, absurd and self-defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary. 170. It may not be out of place to state, in this context, that there are certain provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code which authorise a police officer to register a case and investigate the matter if there is any reason to suspect the commission of an offence or reasonable suspicion of commission of any offence. Section 157 (1) requires an officer in charge of police station who from information received or otherwise has reason to suspect the commission of an offence-that is a cognizable offence, he can investigate the matter under Section 156. The expression reason to suspect as occurring in Section 157 (1) is not qualified as in Section 41 (a) and (g) of the Code, wherein the expression reasonable suspicion is used. Therefore, what Section 157 (1) requires is that the police officer should have reason to suspect with regard to the commission of an offence. See Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . The principle emerging from the above discussion may be found preceding the discussion in paragraph 89 of the said decision which is as under – "89. Therefore, what Section 157 (1) requires is that the police officer should have reason to suspect with regard to the commission of an offence. See Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . The principle emerging from the above discussion may be found preceding the discussion in paragraph 89 of the said decision which is as under – "89. Applying the above principle, it may be held that when the Investigating Officer is not deciding any matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining whether a prima facie case is made out or not and a full enquiry in case of filing a report under Section 173 (2) follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant to the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that stage rule of audi alteram partem superimposes an obligation to issue a prior notice and hear the accused which the statute does not expressly recognize. The question is not whether audi alteram partem is implicit, but where the occasion for its attraction exists at all." (51) Now coming to the context of the facts of this case for our present purpose and for examining as to how far the above proposition can be attracted, we may refer to the decision in K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India and others (supra). In the said case, the counsel laid great emphasis on the expression for which he cannot satisfactorily account used in clause (e) of Section 5 (1) now Section 13 (1) (e) to contend that the public servant is entitled to an opportunity before the Investigating Officer to explain the alleged disproportionality between assets and the known source of income. The Investigating Officer is required to consider the explanation and the charge-sheet filed by him must contain such averment. The failure to mention that requirement would vitiate the charge-sheet and render it invalid. This submission was negatived by the Apex Court on the reasoning that it completely overlooks the powers of the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer is only required to collect material to find out whether the offence alleged appears to have been committed. In the course of the investigation, he may examine the accused. He may seek his clarification and if necessary he may cross check with him about his known sources of income and assets possessed by him. The accused should not be kept in darkness. In the course of the investigation, he may examine the accused. He may seek his clarification and if necessary he may cross check with him about his known sources of income and assets possessed by him. The accused should not be kept in darkness. He should be taken into confidence if he is willing to co-operate. But to state that after collection of all material, the Investigating Officer must give an opportunity to the accused and call upon him to account for the excess of the assets over the known source of income and then decide whether the accounting is satisfactory or not would be elevating the Investigating Officer to the position of an enquiry officer or a Judge. The Investigating Officer is not holding an enquiry against the conduct of the public servant or determining the disputed issues regarding disproportionality between the assets and the income of the accused. He just collects material from all sides and prepares a report, which he files in the Court as charge-sheet. (52) Thus, it appears that even at the stage of submission of charge-sheet, the question of holding preliminary enquiry as to whether the offender has been able to satisfactorily account for has been ruled out. Therefore, when lodging the F.I.R. the person who lodges the F.I.R. is neither an enquiry officer nor a Judge and he is also not an Investigating Officer collecting material. It is only a statement that a person possesses property disproportionate to his known source of income which itself gives rise to a presumption that the same are ill-gotten gain. Thus, question of preliminary enquiry before lodging a F.I.R. is completely overruled. Mala fide – So far as the question of mala fide is concerned, unsubstantiated allegation of mala fide does not make out a case of mala fide. Case of mala fide is to be substantiated. Any such ground cannot be gone into at this stage of initiation of the enquiry and examining the F.I.R. unless mala fide writ large on the face of the F.I.R. and the facts disclosed and that it is substantiated to such an extent that there is no doubt about the mala fide in the minds of the Court. The presumption of mala fide or the probability or possibility of mala fide would not empower the Court to stall an investigation which is otherwise wholly outside the domain of the Court. The presumption of mala fide or the probability or possibility of mala fide would not empower the Court to stall an investigation which is otherwise wholly outside the domain of the Court. Even in the Cr. P.C. nothing has been provided to stop an enquiry even by the Investigating Officer himself. Nowhere in the Code, no role is prescribed for the Court to stop the process of investigation and as such in the name of mala fide, the Court cannot interfere unless there are substantiated case of mala fide and that mala fide writ large and is so predominantly apparent that there are overwhelming material for the Court to arrive at a conclusion that the existence of mala fide cannot be ruled out. Regard may be had to the caution sounded by the Apex Court that interference in the investigation by the High Court is to be made sparingly in rarest of rare cases. (53) In State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , it was pointed out that on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides, the complaint could not be thrown over-board. Even assuming that the complaint was lodged on account of certain personal animosity, that by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. While making the above observation, the Apex Court had drawn inspiration from the decision in the case of Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877 . (54) When the information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation, which decides the fate of the accused person. Question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution is initiated on extraneous consideration and for an unauthorized purpose. There is no material whatsoever in this case to show that on the date when the F.I.R. was lodged, the person lodging the F.I.R. was activated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. Question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution is initiated on extraneous consideration and for an unauthorized purpose. There is no material whatsoever in this case to show that on the date when the F.I.R. was lodged, the person lodging the F.I.R. was activated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. The dominant purpose for registering the case against the applicants was to have an investigation done into the allegations contained in the F.I.R. and in the event of there being sufficient material in support of the allegations to present the charge-sheet before the court. There is no material to show that the dominant object of registering the case was the character assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate them. The informant, being in a peculiar position having lodged the accusation, is bound to be looked down upon by the accused person. The allegations of mala fide, therefore, against the informant based on the facts after the lodging of the F.I.R. are of no consequence and cannot be the basis for quashing the proceedings. Then again the person against whom mala fide or bias was imputed should be impleaded co-nominee as party respondent to the proceeding and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his absence, no enquiry into those allegations could be made. Otherwise, it itself is violative of principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. In this case first informant has not been impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court is estopped from looking into the question of mala fide or bias. Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act intentionally without any just cause or excuse or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power. Malice in law is not established from the omission to consider some documents said to be relevant to the accused. Equally reporting the commission of a crime to the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be colourable exercise of power with bad faith or fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide exercise of power. (55) Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive for ulterior purpose. Equally reporting the commission of a crime to the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be colourable exercise of power with bad faith or fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide exercise of power. (55) Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive for ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances not contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely:- (i) Whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive. (ii) Whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. (56) The action, must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand. In the case of State of Bihar and another vs. P.P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, the Supreme Court had observed as follows – "22. The question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution is initiated on extraneous considerations and for an unauthorised purpose. There is no material whatsoever in this case to show that on the date when the F.I.R. was lodged by R.K. Singh he was activiated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. The dominant purpose of registering the case against the respondents was to have an investigation done into the allegations contained in the F.I.R. and in the event of there being sufficient material in support of the allegations to present the charge-sheet before the Court. The dominant purpose of registering the case against the respondents was to have an investigation done into the allegations contained in the F.I.R. and in the event of there being sufficient material in support of the allegations to present the charge-sheet before the Court. There is no material to show that dominant object of registering the case was the character assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate them. This Court in State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldhana, (1980) 1 SCC 554 , has held that when the information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation which decides the fate of the accused person. This Court in State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp .(1) SCC 335 : JT 1990 (4) SC 650, permitted the State Government to hold investigation afresh against Ch. Bhajan Lal in spite of the fact that prosecution was lodged at the instance of Dharam Pal who was inimical towards Bhajan Lal. 23. The informant, being in a peculiar position having lodged the accusation, is bound to be looked down upon by the accused persons. The allegations of mala fide, therefore, against the informant based on the facts after the lodging of the F.I.R. are of no consequence and cannot be the basis for quashing the proceedings. As regards the Investigating Officer, he has wide powers under the Criminal Procedure Code. He has to perform his duties with the sole object of investigating the allegations and in the course of the investigation he has to take into consideration the relevant material whether against or in favour of the accused, simply because the Investigating Officer, while acting bona fide, rules out certain documents as irrelevant, it is no ground to assume that he acted mala fide. THE police report submitted by the Investigating Officer has to pass through the judicial scrutiny of a Magistrate at the stage of taking cognizance. Although the accused person has no right to be heard at that stage but in case the accused person has any grudge against the Investigating Officer or with the method of investigation he can bring to the notice of the Magistrate his grievances which can be looked into by the Magistrate. When the police report under Section 173, Cr. Although the accused person has no right to be heard at that stage but in case the accused person has any grudge against the Investigating Officer or with the method of investigation he can bring to the notice of the Magistrate his grievances which can be looked into by the Magistrate. When the police report under Section 173, Cr. P.C. has to go through the judicial scrutiny it is not open to the High Court to find fault with the same on the ground that certain documents were not taken into consideration by the Investigating Officer. We do not, therefore, agree with the High Court that the F.I.R. and the investigation is vitiated because of the mala fide on the part of the informant and the Investigating Officer." (57) The facts of any of the cases, with which we are now dealing, does not disclose any such material by reason whereof this Court can come to a conclusion that the mala fide writ large on the face of the F.I.R. nor there are any material satisfying the test as enunciated. (58) Having regard to the allegations of mala fide made in the respective cases and the facts and circumstances of each such case does not appear to make out even a prima facie case of mala fide. On the basis of the allegations made, I do not find any reason to believe or hold that there are malice or bias or mala fide in lodging the F.I.R. in the F.I.R. itself. Therefore, the ground of mala fide as urged by the respective counsel for the parties are hereby overruled. Right to live with dignity – Right to live with dignity does not postulate that no investigation can be undertaken against a respectable person. Law cannot be different for different citizen. However, it does not preclude investigation through procedure established by law. Position and status of a person is not a symbol of immunity from investigation against such person, if there are material to suspect commission of offence by him. It has to be viewed with the consideration as to whether a case is disclosed in the F.I.R. Effect of quashing of earlier prosecution vis-a-vis Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997. (59) This is a defence. Therefore, it cannot be looked into now at this stage. It has to be viewed with the consideration as to whether a case is disclosed in the F.I.R. Effect of quashing of earlier prosecution vis-a-vis Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997. (59) This is a defence. Therefore, it cannot be looked into now at this stage. The sanction was quashed prima facie on account of some defect in law and not on merit. Therefore, it cannot preclude a subsequent proceedings. Whether the quashing of the earlier prosecution has any hearing or not is a question, which is required to be decided by the Court not by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, it cannot be a ground to quash the F.I.R. at this stage. This point is again to be viewed with the consideration as to whether the F.I.R. discloses a case. Property acquired prior to the period charged. (60) This question is also a question of defence. This cannot be gone into at this stage. It is a consideration under the gaze of the Court. The Investigating Officer has no authority to decide the same and that too before the investigation starts. This is also to be viewed with the consideration as to whether a case is disclosed in the F.I.R. That apart, Section 23 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides a relaxation with regard to the specification of details of properties, i.e. particular items or exact dates in the charge. F.I.R. does not stand on a better footing than the charge. Thus, absence of particulars or details in the F.I.R. cannot be treated to be so fatal to warrant quashing of the F.I.R. Property of other members of the Family. This question is also a defence. This cannot be looked into for the purpose of quashing the F.I.R. at this stage when the investigation is initiated. These are matters of investigation by the investigating authority. This cannot be interfered with now. This has again to be viewed with the consideration as to whether the F.I.R. discloses a case. Satisfactorily account for. (61) Whether the applicant is capable of satisfactorily account for is also not a consideration at this stage. Whatever material is brought on affidavits by the applicant are all materials to be decided on evidence as defence. This is not the stage for being gone into. The provision of Prevention of Corruption Act stands on a different footing from those of ordinary criminal law. Whatever material is brought on affidavits by the applicant are all materials to be decided on evidence as defence. This is not the stage for being gone into. The provision of Prevention of Corruption Act stands on a different footing from those of ordinary criminal law. Inasmuch as under the ordinary law, it is for the prosecution to prove the offence. Whereas under this Act, it is for the accused to satisfy that the acquisition is not ill-gotten gain, constituting the offence. In other words, it is for the accused to prove that he is innocent and not quality. In other words, there is a presumption of guilt unless the accused proves his innocence. Therefore, the Court has to take a more cautious approach. It is to be kept in the mind that there is not for the prosecution to prove that the property and assets are ill-gotten gain but for the accused to prove that the properties and assets are not ill gotten gain. The scheme of the Act stands altogether on a characteristic distinct from ordinary criminal law. For offence under Section 7 or 11, 12 or 13 (1) (a) and (b) or 14 (b) of the Act permits presumption against the accused, as provided in Section 20 of the Act. At the same time Section 23 prescribes that absence of details or particulars in the charge will not be fatal. Despite such absence the charge shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question again is to be viewed more particularly along with the consideration for disclosure of case in the F.I.R. Then again if this is the position with regard to charge then when considering F.I.R. one has to be more liberal. When such omission is not fatal for the charge, then it can by no stretch of imagination be fatal for the F.I.R. Inclusion of probation period: (62) This is also a defence and at the same time, the answer can be found in Section 23 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for the same reasons as has been given while answering the proposition under the heading property acquired. Decision of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal vis-a-vis Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. This is also a defence, which is not supposed to be looked into at this stage. Decision of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal vis-a-vis Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. This is also a defence, which is not supposed to be looked into at this stage. Whether the said decision accounts for satisfactorily is a question, which can be gone into at the trial when defence is permitted. It is not permissible now for the Court to consider the defence and decide the case even before the investigation is over. This will amount to interference with investigation. Question of Benami. (63) The question of benami is also a defence, which cannot be entered into now for the same reason noted earlier and has to be viewed with the consideration about disclosure of offence. Disclosure of Case in F.I.R. (64) Unless an offence is disclosed from the F.I.R. it is liable to be quashed. The leading case on this question much relied upon and where the question has since been crystallized, is that of State of West Bengal vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, AIR (1982) SC 949 : 1982 1 SCC 561 . In answer to the proposition that when a statute creates an offence and imposes penalty, it must be construed strictly in favour of the subject on the principle that no person can be put in peril of his life and liberty on an ambiguity. Relying on the decision in the case of W.H. King vs. Republic of India, AIR 1952 SC 156 , the Apex Court had answered that rule of strict interpretation of penal statute in no way affects the fundamental right of interpretation. The primary test to be applied is the language used in the Act. When the words are clear and plain, the Court must accept the intention of the Legislature. If the allegations in the F.I.R. or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute an offence alleged in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises. It is a matter merely of looking at the F.I.R. or the complaint in order to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. If not, them it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused. This observation was made referring to the decision in the case of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 . If not, them it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused. This observation was made referring to the decision in the case of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 . Though the Criminal Procedure Code confers unfettered power to the police to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, but in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking power of the High Court. The High Court may restrain the police from misusing their legal powers. This was the observation of the Apex Court while referring to the decision in S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1970 SC 786 . While dealing with the case of King-Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, the Apex Court in Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) had pointed out from the said decision in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad to a passage oft-quoted but much misunderstood, while laying down that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which is within their province. But the said proposition was qualified with the expression that no doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation. Thus the Privy Council took care to qualify the statement of law which ultimately means that it is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. This question has since been crystalised by the Apex Court in paragraph 21 of Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) with the following words, namely, that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reasons to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reasons to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offence. On the other hand, if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. In paragraph 22, the Apex Court had observed that there is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. While laying down the proposition, the Apex Court had drawn inspiration from the decision in the case of Prabhu Dayal Deorah vs. District Magistrate, Kamrup, AIR 1974 SC 183 , where warning uttered by Mathew, J., in his majority judgment to the extent, namely : "We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure establihsed by law." After discussing respective submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and the decisions cited, the Apex Court had laid down the legal proposition in paragraphs 64 and 65 in the following manner:- "64. The legal proposition appears to be that even offence is disclosed, the Court will not normally interfere with investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed if however the material do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation in he absence of, any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them. An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interest of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the detriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. 65. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made, is disclosed or not, the Court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or the F.I.R. and the Court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. In considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made, is disclosed or not, the Court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or the F.I.R. and the Court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. On a consideration of all the relevant materials, the Court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual." (65) Thus, the legal proposition that emerges to have been settled and crystallized in the said decision is that the Court cannot interfere with the investigation into an offence when an offence is disclosed. In order to ascertain whether an offence is disclosed or not, the Court need not be confined to the F.I.R. only. It may look into the complaint, any other materials and the facts and circumstances of the case. But when no offence is disclosed then the Court may interfere. But while laying down this proposition in favour of interference by Court, a note of caution has since been sounded. It had cautioned that by reason of such interference, the community may not suffer and the justice may not be the first casualty. In as much as, it would then permit the offender taking advantage of the judicial process to thwart the investigation much to the detriment of the interest of the community and the society. It is bounden duty of the Court to see that every offender is brought to justice and every offence is punished. Else it would send a wrong message down the society and encourage the offenders to indulge in offences and secure their position taking advantage of the legal process. (66) Therefore, it is not a question of technicality. It is bounden duty of the Court to see that every offender is brought to justice and every offence is punished. Else it would send a wrong message down the society and encourage the offenders to indulge in offences and secure their position taking advantage of the legal process. (66) Therefore, it is not a question of technicality. It is not a question of looking at a matter mechanically. It is not a question of finding out defects and faults in the F.I.R. It is not a question to find out as to whether the allegations made in the complaint, on the face of it requires to show that the same are sufficient to bring out a conviction. The question is a question of exercise of discretion by the Court. Such discretion has to be exercised judicially. The justice delivery system has been introduced to prevent offence. The punishment upon conviction is deterrent for the offenders. The system is meant for keeping the fabric of the society free of offence. It is a process for punishing an offender committing an offence against the society. The society has to be kept free of the germs of offence. It has to maintain a congenial atmosphere and environment so as to weed out offence by means of deterrence in the form of punishment so as to make the people think twice before a committing an offence. The more strict in bringing an offender to book, the more is the possibility of preventing offence and the society more free of offence. The more relaxation, the more is encouragement for indulging in offences. Therefore, the Apex Court had sounded the caution that the Court has to bear in mind that no offender should go unpunished. (67) The F.I.R. is the basis on which investigation is initiated. The initiation of investigation is not based on the condition that on the face of it, the F.I.R. would disclose a conviction. On the other hand, it is a matter which gives rise to suspect that an offence might have been committed. If the ingredients disclosed in the F.I.R. be sufficient to make the police suspect the commission of an offence, it is entitled to investigate. On the other hand, it is a matter which gives rise to suspect that an offence might have been committed. If the ingredients disclosed in the F.I.R. be sufficient to make the police suspect the commission of an offence, it is entitled to investigate. (68) In the name of guarding the life and liberty of a citizen who is alleged to have committed an offence, the Court cannot permit its process to be abused much to the detriment of the justice delivery system and thereby sending wrong signal and message down to the society where honest people feel frustrated and disheartened while dishonest goes on unpunished having taken advantage of the judicial system abusing its process much to his advantage. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and another vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, AIR 1988 SC 709 , the same view was taken by the Apex Court to the extent that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. (69) While dealing with the right of an accused to call for the diary or part of it in the case of Mukund Lal vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1989 SC 1 44 , the Apex Court had again pointed out that while the public interest requirement on the perspective of safeguarding, the interest of all persons standing trial cannot be compromised. At the same time, the public interest requirement from the perspective of enabling the investigating agency to investigate the crime against the society in order that the interest of the community to ensure that a culprit is traced and brought to book is also safeguarded. (70) In State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. At the same time, the public interest requirement from the perspective of enabling the investigating agency to investigate the crime against the society in order that the interest of the community to ensure that a culprit is traced and brought to book is also safeguarded. (70) In State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , the Apex Court had laid down the categories of cases in which High Court may interfere at the investigation, while pointing out that it is not possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases where such power could be exercised. The guidelines that were laid down are as follows:- "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and the other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." At the same time, while laying down these guidelines the Supreme Court had also sounded a note of caution that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. (71) The note of caution sounded in various decisions was reiterated in M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. vs. Chaitanyakumar and another, AIR 1992 SC 1930 , where it was held that as repeatedly pointed out by various decision of this Court that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation. (72) In Hazari Lal Gupta vs. Rameshwar Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 484 , the Apex Court had held that the High Court does not ordinarily inquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. (72) In Hazari Lal Gupta vs. Rameshwar Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 484 , the Apex Court had held that the High Court does not ordinarily inquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. When dealing with a case seeking quashing of proceedings where investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding the investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. O.P. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 2983 , it was held as under:- "10. Dr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that though the respondent had sought for licence, the licence had not been given to him and, therefore, he cannot be proceeded with. He also further contended that the F.I.R. does not contain all the ingredients of the offence and, therefore, the High Court was right in quashing the F.I.R. It is seen that the complaint is self-explanatory and has specifically mentioned about the storage of oil and oil seeds without licence under the respective orders. It is not in dispute that the F.I.R. did not mention that he purchased and kept in store the above quantity. Thus, the ingredients have been specified. Whether he has applied for licence or not, we are not concerned with that controversy in this case. 11. The question then is whether the High Court is right in its exercise of inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C.? This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Pirthi Chand, Criminal Appeal No. 1752 of 1995, decided on 30.11.1995, reported in 1996 AIR SCW 422 at pp 425-26, held as under:- "It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinize the F.I.R./charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that F.I.R. is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that F.I.R. is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted and the charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the witness recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The Court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether Court could take cognizance of the offence, on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. It reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases, i.e., in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance process of criminal is availed of in laying a complaint or F.I.R. itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence-the Court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power. When remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is available. When the Court exercise its inherent power under Section 482 the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process of the Court. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the Court, further action should not be shortcircuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved in an economic offence destabilizes the economy and causes grave incursion on the economic planning of the State. When the Legislature entrusts the power to the police officer to prevent organized commission of the offence or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are entrusted with power to investigate into the crime in intractable terrains and secretive manner in a concert, greater circumspection and care and caution should be borne in mind by the High Court when it exercises its inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in jeopardy and to grave risk. The accused will have field day in destabilizing the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions. 12. In State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 1996, decided on 18.1.1996, reported in AIR 1996 SCW 591 , this Court observed as under (para 5):- "It has been held by this Court in several cases that the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the Court comes to the conclusions that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court, if such power is not exercised. So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned, the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged. At that stage it is not open for the Court either to shift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out." (73) In Mustaq Ahmad vs. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi, JT (1996) 1 (SC) 656: 1996 AIR SCW, this Court held as under (para 4 of AIR):– "According to the complaint, the respondents had thereby committed breach of trust of Government money. IN support of the above allegations made in the complaint copies of the salary statements of the relevant periods were produced. Habibur Rehman Faizi, JT (1996) 1 (SC) 656: 1996 AIR SCW, this Court held as under (para 4 of AIR):– "According to the complaint, the respondents had thereby committed breach of trust of Government money. IN support of the above allegations made in the complaint copies of the salary statements of the relevant periods were produced. IN spite of the fact that the complaint and the documents annexed thereto clearly made out a prima facie case for cheating, breach of trust and forgery, the High Court proceeded to consider the version of the respondent given out in their petition filed under Section 482, Cr. P.C. vis-a-vis that of the appellant and entered into the debatable area of deciding which of the version was true, a course wholly impermissible." 13. We accordingly hold that the High Court has committed grave error of law in quashing the F.I.R. The High Court should be loathe to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, as the case may be, and allow the law to take its own course. (74) Mr. Chaturvedi had relied on the decision in the case of M. Krishna Reddy vs. State Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, AIR 1993 SC 313 , in support of his contention that it is the failure to satisfactorily account for and not the acquisition of property that makes the possession objectionable as offending the law and thus constituting the offence. But the said decision was a decision on the question of conviction not at the stage of quashing of the F.I.R. The question of offence under Section 13 (1) (e) is definitely clear and unambiguous. Admittedly, acquisition of property disproportionate to one's known source of income itself is not an offence if it is satisfactorily accounted for. It becomes an offence only when the offender fails to satisfactorily account for such acquisition or possession. But that question can be gone into only at the trial stage in order to arrive at a conclusion of conviction or acquittal. At the stage of quashing the proceeding or preventing investigation, it is only the question whether the allegations made are sufficient to raise a suspicion enabling the police officer to suspect a commission of offence in order to initiate the investigation. At the stage of quashing the proceeding or preventing investigation, it is only the question whether the allegations made are sufficient to raise a suspicion enabling the police officer to suspect a commission of offence in order to initiate the investigation. If apparently, on the basis of the materials it suffices to suspect commission of an offence even though the ingredients disclosed may not indicate, it would lead to a conviction, the High Court cannot interfere with the investigation. It is not the accurate and exact technical aspect that has to be looked into. It is to be seen from the standpoint of a person, as to whether for an ordinary and prudent man the allegations made out is sufficient to make him suspect a commission of an offence. The omission to incorporate a phrase failure to account for can never be fatal at the stage of initiation of the investigation. It is the material available before the Court which, if uncontroverted is sufficient to raise a suspicion or makes out a case for suspicion for an ordinary and prudent man to suspect commission of an offence on the basis thereof in that event, the Court should not interfere with the investigation. (75) Inasmuch as, if there are materials to suspect a commission of an offence the investigation is initiated to collect materials and find out as to whether a charge can be framed or not. On investigation if sufficient materials are collected, charge may be framed. If sufficient material is not available and that the offender has been able to account for his possession then definitely, the investigation will end in a final report. As such the Court cannot prevent collection of materials merely on technicalities. An offender also is not permitted to take advantage of a situation merely on technicalities. It is not the question as to whether the allegation will lead to conviction, that will weigh with the Court. It is only the question whether the allegations are sufficient to suspect commission of an offence. If such a procedure is adopted in that event, on the face of widespread criminalisation of the society including the administrative field, which is a common knowledge of every people, cannot be contained. It is only the question whether the allegations are sufficient to suspect commission of an offence. If such a procedure is adopted in that event, on the face of widespread criminalisation of the society including the administrative field, which is a common knowledge of every people, cannot be contained. (76) It is an open secret and common knowledge that criminalisation pervaded the administration to such an extent that it had percolated to the entire body of the society and had spread like an epidemic spreading its germs all through the body politic and has thereby not only crippled the administration but the whole society. Unless efforts are made to contain the same, there will be a time when it will go to such an extent that there will be no remedy open and it will destroy the entire system by weakening the process from within. It is a common knowledge that corruption is spreading like cancer in the body of the administration to such an extent, which is already alarming. The Court cannot close its eyes and live in the Ivory Tower. It has to take stock of the situation and shall not be persuaded or swept away by inept drafting of the F.I.R. by a particular person who might have drawn it, either on account of his inefficiency or inability or who might have done it deliberately so as to keep loopholes open to help someone. Admittedly, no one takes the responsibility in the State's administration since he has nothing to loose or gain personally and may be callous enough to leave loopholes. Had there been a system of accountability for such inept drafting in that event, the matter would have been different. But the present situation in the administration is such that because of such inept drafting, the draftsman and the person responsible is not booked and goes scot-free. Therefore, much ado on such technicalities are to be avoided. A practical view has to be taken having regard to the material placed before the Court itself. (77) It is not possible to accept the proposition that the entire F.I.R. is based on a report of raid by the Income-tax Authorities, would be fatal. In as much as, the report is sufficient to raise a suspicion in the mind of a person that it may constitute an offence initially and is sufficient to disclose an offence. (77) It is not possible to accept the proposition that the entire F.I.R. is based on a report of raid by the Income-tax Authorities, would be fatal. In as much as, the report is sufficient to raise a suspicion in the mind of a person that it may constitute an offence initially and is sufficient to disclose an offence. On the basis of such report, it is open to a person to suspect commission of an offence and lodging an F.I.R. on the basis thereof. The investigation that is required is already made by the Income Tax Department. It is not necessary to make further enquiry. It is also not necessary to find out as to whether the allegation would lead to conviction. The only question is to be seen as to whether the materials are sufficient to make one suspect the commission of an offence. It remains relevant only after the investigation is initiated when the materials would be collected. Mere collection of materials when there are certain allegations, which may give rise to a suspicion, could not be a deterrent of personal liberty. (78) We are much concerned about the personal liberty of the offenders and less with those who silently suffers because of the corruption in the administration. Inasmuch as, it is the general people and the country as a whole who suffers because of this corruption in the administration. If the Government fails in its governance the sufferers are the silent mass who are the ordinary people, who had elected the Government for the governance of the country. If we talk much of the liberty of offenders then who will take care of the liberty of the silent mass who are suffering therefor. It is the judicial system that becomes the first casualty, if the power is exercised to prevent bringing offenders to book and allowing the offenders to abuse the process of the Court to their advantage to frustrate the investigation and to manipulate the matters so as to prevent the outcome of the investigation. It is now a common knowledge for the people as is available from the report in the newspaper and the present day experience, of which no one can be in oblivion that corruption is destroying the fabric of the administration. Even if it is of very insignificant percentage, it is eroding the credibility of the whole administration. It is now a common knowledge for the people as is available from the report in the newspaper and the present day experience, of which no one can be in oblivion that corruption is destroying the fabric of the administration. Even if it is of very insignificant percentage, it is eroding the credibility of the whole administration. It is not uncommon that corrupt officer might approach another officer for fabricating evidence to frustrate the investigation. For such purpose the offenders might need time and which I believe, should not be provided. The Court cannot interfere with the investigation or entertain such matter on the fall of a hat overlooking the note of caution sounded by the Apex Court while clarifying the proposition every time in all the successive decisions. It appears that the High Court are bound to follow the note of caution and the qualified observation about the proposition that it should be resorted to sparingly in the rarest of rare cases. This very observation indicates that the Court must be very cautious in its approach. If there is sufficient materials to suspect commission of the offence, the Court will allow the investigation to proceed. Therefore, the question of satisfactorily accounting for does not arise at the stage of suspicion. If it is so done in that event, it would be impossible to proceed against any officer. If the process is so used generally in that event, it would be counter-productive. In fact uncontrolled exercise of this jurisdiction would send a wrong signal and enable the offenders to evade investigation and to use the time obtained to their advantage either by interfering with the investigation or by creating or fabricating or destroying evidences. (79) The contention that unless it is mentioned in the F.I.R. that the offender has not been able to satisfactorily account for is fatal and that in absence of such statement, no offence is disclosed does not stand to reason. Inasmuch as it is not the same thing to state that there is no offence till public servant is able to account for the excess of the asset. If one possesses asset beyond his legitimate means it goes without saying that the excess is made of ill-gotten gain. Inasmuch as it is not the same thing to state that there is no offence till public servant is able to account for the excess of the asset. If one possesses asset beyond his legitimate means it goes without saying that the excess is made of ill-gotten gain. In K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India and others, JT 1991 (3) SC 198, the majority view of the Apex Court was that the assets are not drawn like Nitrogen from the air. It has to be acquired for which means are necessary. It is for the public servant to prove the source of income or the means by which he acquired the asset. The Apex Court proceeds further to state that the view that had been taken by it is to the nature of the offence created under clause (e), it may not be necessary to examine the contention relating to the ingredient of the offence. (80) In the case of Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi and others, JT 1999 (2) SC 112, while referring to the note of caution sounded in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court has observed as follows:- "9. It is not necessary that a complaint should varbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Setting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an F.I.R. (step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence." The contention of Mr. For quashing an F.I.R. (step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence." The contention of Mr. Ramendra Asthana, that if no offence is disclosed, the police have no authority to carry on the investigation relying on the decision in the case of Smt. Sandhya vs. SHO, P.S. Kotwali, Etawah and others, 1992 (19) ALR 273, does not help us in the present case. Inasmuch as the proposition that unless an offence is disclosed, the police has no authority to investigate is a settled proposition for which on more reference is necessary. In the said case, admittedly the girl was of 18 years old and as such the offence under Sections 366/368/364, I.P.C. was not made out since the girl had left the house voluntarily on her own and was married to one of the accused. Therefore, on the face of it no case was made in the F.I.R. But it is not a case with which we are dealing now. (81) Mr. Asthana relied on the decision in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another vs. Special Judge Magistrate and another, 1998 (5) SCC 749 , in order to contend that nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The High Court has power to quash a proceeding either under Article 226/227 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. There is no doubt about the said proposition. The Apex Court has consistently held that the High Court has such power but it had laid down the guideline when such powers are to be exercised in order to interfere with investigation at the initial stage. In the said case, it was laid down that exercise of such power would be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (82) Drawing the attention of the Court to the reasoning given in paragraph 29 of the said judgment, Mr. Asthana has sought to distinguish his case. But the facts remains that the facts involved in the case of Pepsi Food Ltd. (supra) are clearly distinct and different, where the Court had come to a finding that the F.I.R. did not disclose any offence which is not a fact in the present case where F.I.R. contains basic fact so as to form an opinion to suspect commission of the offence. In order to find further support for our above proposition, we may refer to the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others, AIR 1996 SC 722 , where it was held:- "15. In our opinion, there is a complete misreading of the aforesaid provision by the High Court. It is, no doubt true that a satisfactory explanation was required to be given by the delinquent officer. But this opportunity is only to be given during the course of the trial. It is no doubt true that evidence, had to be gathered and a prima facie opinion formed that the provisions of Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act are attracted before a first information report was lodged. During the course of gathering of the material, it does happen that the officer concerned or other person may be questioned or other queries made. For the formation of a prima facie opinion that an officer may be guilty of criminal misconduct leading to the filing of the first information report, there is no provision in law or otherwise which makes it obligatory of an opportunity of being heard to be given to a person against whom the report is to be lodged. For the formation of a prima facie opinion that an officer may be guilty of criminal misconduct leading to the filing of the first information report, there is no provision in law or otherwise which makes it obligatory of an opportunity of being heard to be given to a person against whom the report is to be lodged. That such satisfactory account had to be rendered before a court is also borne out from the judgment of this Court in Veeraswami's case (1991) (3) SCC 655, (supra), where referring to Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act at page 713 of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:- "Clause (e) creates a statutory offence which must be proved by the prosecution. It is for the prosecution to prove that the accused or any person on his behalf, has been in possession of pecuniary recourses or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. When that onus is discharged by the prosecution, it is for the accused to account satisfactory for the disproportionality of the properties possessed by him. The section makes available statutory defence which must be proved by the accused. It is a restricted defence that is accorded to the accused to account for the disproportionality of the assets over the income. But the legal burden of proof placed on the accused is not so onerous as that of the prosecution. However, it is just not throwing some doubt on the prosecution version. The Legislature has advisedly used the expression satisfactorily account. The emphasis must be on the word satisfactorily that means the accused has to satisfy the Court that his explanation is worthy of acceptance. The burden of proof placed on the accused is an evidential burden though not a persuasive burden. The accused, however, could discharge that burden of proof on the balance of probabilities either from the evidence for the prosecution and/or evidence from the defence. 16. The aforesaid passage leaves no manner of doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the delinquent officer under Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act of satisfactorily explaining about his assets and resources is before the Court when the trial commences and not at an earlier stage. 16. The aforesaid passage leaves no manner of doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the delinquent officer under Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act of satisfactorily explaining about his assets and resources is before the Court when the trial commences and not at an earlier stage. The conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge that principles of natural justice had been violated, as no opportunity was given before the registration of the case, is clearly unwarranted and contrary to the aforesaid observations of this Court in K. Veeraswami's case (supra). 17. Further the conclusion of the learned Judge that the opportunity of hearing must be granted and the non-grant of the same would vitiate the order of sanction is clearly contrary to the following observations of this Court in P.P. Sharma's case, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222 (supra), which reads as under:- "It is equally well settled that before granting sanction the authority or the appropriate Government must have before it the necessary report and the material facts which prima facie establish the commission of offence charged for and the appropriate Government would apply their mind to those facts. The order of sanction is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial one nor is lis involved. Therefore, the order of sanction need not contain detailed reasons in support thereof as was contended by Shri Jain. But the basic facts that constitute the offence must be apparent on the impugned order and the record must beat out the reasons in that regard. The question of giving an opportunity to the public servant at that stage as was contended for the respondents does not arise. Proper application of mind to the existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of the offence is only a precondition to grant or refuse to grant sanction. When the Government accorded sanction. Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act raises presumption that the official acts have been regularly performed. The burden is heavier on the accused to establish the contra to rebut that statutory presumption. Once that is done then it is the duty of the prosecution to produce necessary record to establish that after application of mind and consideration thereof to the subject the grant or refusal to grant sanction was made by the appropriate authority. The burden is heavier on the accused to establish the contra to rebut that statutory presumption. Once that is done then it is the duty of the prosecution to produce necessary record to establish that after application of mind and consideration thereof to the subject the grant or refusal to grant sanction was made by the appropriate authority. At any time before the Court takes cognizance of the offence the order of sanction could be made. It is settled law that issuance of the process to the accused to appear before the Court is sine qua non of taking cognizance of the offence. The emphasis of Section 197 (1) or other similar provisions that no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction "posits that before taking cognizance of the offence alleged there must be before the Court the prior sanction given by the competent authority. Therefore, at any time before taking cognizance of the offence it is open to the competent authority to grant sanction and the prosecution is entitled to produce the order of sanction. Filling of charge-sheet before the Court without sanction per se is not illegal, nor a condition precedent. A perusal of the sanction order clearly indicates that the Government appears to have applied its mind to the facts placed before it and considered them and then granted sanction. No evidence has been placed before us to come to a different conclusion. Accordingly we hold that the High Court committed manifest error of law to quash the charge-sheet on those grounds." (Emphasis added) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 22. In fact, the question of mala fides in a case like the present is not at all relevant. If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will have to be established in a Court of law, it is of no consequence that the complainant was a person who was inimical that he was guilty of mala fide. If the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or misconduct exist then, the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the complainant of the prosecution against the accused. Allegation of mala fide may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. Allegation of mala fide may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. In the instant case, specific averments of facts have been made whereby it was alleged that the respondent had disproportionately large assets. Mala fide intention of the appellant in launching prosecution against the respondent with a view to punish him cannot be a reason for preventing the Court of competent jurisdiction from examining the evidence which may be led before it, for coming to the conclusion whether an offence had been committed or not. Allegations of mala fides were also made in P.P. Sharma's case, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, (supra), against the informer. It was held by this Court that when an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the information would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings. 23. This Court has consistently taken the view that the Court should not, except in extra-ordinary circumstances, exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C. so as to quash the prosecution proceedings, after they have been launched. In K.P.S. Gill's case, 1995 AIR SCW 4100 (supra), it was inter alia, observed, that "we also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare case that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the first information report of the complaint and that the extra-ordinary or inherent power do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." 24. The position of law, in this regard has been very succinctly stated in the above said case that at the stage of quashing a first information report or complaint, the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. This is precisely what has been done by the learned Judge in the present case. The first information report having been lodged, the Government of Maharashtra having accorded sanction and thereafter, the charge having been filed, there was absolutely no justification for the High Court to have stopped the normal procedure of the trial being allowed to continue. It cannot be presumed that there was no application of mind when the First Information Report was prepared and the sanction of the Government obtained. The allegations as made in the First Information Report and the order granting sanction if true would clearly establish that the respondent was rightly prosecuted and was guilty of criminal misconduct. The truthfulness of the allegations and the establishment of the guilt can only take place when the trial proceeds without any interruption. There was no justification for the High Court to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. in quashing the prosecution. For the above said reasons, the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside." Which of the decision to be followed – (83) Referring to the decision in the case of Maharashtra and others vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others, AIR 1996 SC 722 , learned counsel Mr. Asthana had pointed out that this judgment did not notice Bhajanlal's case and that of S.N. Sharma's case referred to paragraph 93 of Bhajanlal's case. Both the bench is of equal strength. Therefore, the earlier judgment will hold the field. In support of his contention he had relied on the decision in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Ram Atri and others, JT 1998 (4) SC 362, in order to contend that in case of conflict in between the decisions of two co-ordinate benches of equal strength the matter should be referred to three Judges Bench. In support of his contention he had relied on the decision in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Ram Atri and others, JT 1998 (4) SC 362, in order to contend that in case of conflict in between the decisions of two co-ordinate benches of equal strength the matter should be referred to three Judges Bench. While he had referred to the decision in the case of Usha Kumar vs. State of Bihar and others, JT 1993 (4) SC 359, wherein it has held that in case of conflict decision by the two Division Bench, the same has to be referred to the Full Bench. Thus, alternatively he pleads that either the judgment of Bhajanlal's case is to be followed in case there is any conflict or it has to be resolved through a larger Bench. (84) This proposition is wholly misplaced. In view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the decision of the Apex Court is binding on the High Court. If there are conflicting decisions of two co-ordinate Benches of equal strength of the Apex Courts, it is not for this Court to seek a reference to the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. This Court is required to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. In case of conflict, the Apex Court had laid down three views. One view is that the latter judgment is to be followed and the other view is that the either judgment is to be followed and third view is that it is the judgment which appears to be better reasoned, according to the High Court, is to be followed. But that question would not be necessary for our present purpose. Inasmuch as in the discussion of the cases of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others (supra), Bhajanlal (supra) and S.N. Sharma (supra), made therein above. I have pointed out that the alleged conflict as has been sought to be pointed out by Mr. Asthana is a misnomer. There appears to be no conflict. If we read in between lines and try to understand properly, the principle is very clear and unambiguous and there appears to be no conflict at all. The view of the Supreme Court with regard to the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. Asthana is a misnomer. There appears to be no conflict. If we read in between lines and try to understand properly, the principle is very clear and unambiguous and there appears to be no conflict at all. The view of the Supreme Court with regard to the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is crystallized into a settled proposition of law about which there is no room for doubt. As discussed above, the proposition is clear and unambiguous to the extent that the life and liberty of a person cannot be interfered with by initiating an investigation against him except according to the procedure established by law. But this proposition is qualified to the extent that if investigation is initiated through a procedure established by law then even if the life or liberty of a person is interfered with he has no right to challenge the same. The ground on which the High Court may interfere are those where mala fide writ large on the basis of the materials available before the Court so as to enable it to come to a conclusion that there is hardly any possibility to rule out the existence of mala fide. High Court may also interfere with the investigation when on the face of the allegation there is an impediment in law in continuing with the investigation or that the allegation made does not disclose any offence. Unless an offence is disclosed there is no reason to initiate any investigation and the unfettered power of an Investigating Officer to investigate cannot be attracted to a case where no offence is disclosed. The power of the Investigating Officer is attracted when the offence is disclosed. Such power is unfettered and the Court cannot interfere with. It can do so on the ground mentioned above and that too sparingly in rarest of rare case where the material are so overwhelming in favour of the accused that the investigation should not be proceeded with, otherwise, the Court has no jurisdiction with the investigation, which has been conferred on the Investigating Officer without any role of the Court and unfettered by any restriction. Materials that are to be considered by the Court for quashing a proceeding or interfering with the investigation. Materials that are to be considered by the Court for quashing a proceeding or interfering with the investigation. High Court should be very slow to interfere with the investigation on the basis of F.I.R. if it contains the basic facts to suspect commission of an offence. The question is dependent on the uncontroverted materials that are before the Court for initiation of the investigation. The High Court cannot look into the affidavit or material produced by the accused which he may be using in defence because those materials are under gaze of judicial scrutiny which is undertaken at the trial stage after the charge-sheet is submitted. At a preliminary stage, the High Court cannot advert to such material and come to a conclusion that no offence is committed. In the case of State of Bihar and another vs. P.P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, the Supreme Court had deprecated interference by the High Court at a stage when the police report under Section 173, Cr. P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate after completion of the investigation and the material collected by the Investigating Officer is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny. The High Court would do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court fell into grave error in appreciating the documents and affidavits produced before it by treating them as evidence, delving into the disputed questions of fact in its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 and pronouncing the respondents to be innocent and quashing the criminal proceedings by converting itself into a trial court. This was not at all a case where High Court should have interfered in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The appreciation of evidence is the function of the criminal courts the Special Judge was seized of the matter. The commission of offence cannot be decided on affidavit evidence. The High Court has taken short course in annihilating the still born prosecution by going into the merits on the plea of proof of prima facie case and adverted to those facts and gave findings on merits. The commission of offence cannot be decided on affidavit evidence. The High Court has taken short course in annihilating the still born prosecution by going into the merits on the plea of proof of prima facie case and adverted to those facts and gave findings on merits. In Sapan Kumar Guha (supra) and Madhavrao J. Scindia, (supra), the Supreme Court has not laid down the proposition of law that in every case, the Court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegations, and should exercise the power under Section 482 or Article 226 of quash the proceedings of the charge-sheet. Extent of power of Investigating Officer. (85) In the case of State of Bihar and another vs. P.P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, the Supreme Court has laid down the extent of power of the Investigating Officer in the following observation:- "46. The Code demarcates the field of investigation exclusively to the executive to be vigilant over law and order. Police Officer has statutory power and right as a part (sic) to investigate the cognizable offence suspected to have been committed by an accused and bring the offender to book. IN respect thereof he needs no authority from a Magistrate of a Court except to the extent indicated in sub-section (3) of Section 156, the superintendence sparingly over the investigation and the matters incidental thereto, like enlarging the accused on bail or to secure his presence for further investigation to record judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code or to conduct identification parade of the accused or the articles of crime or recording dying declaration under Section 32 of Evidence Act. 47. The Investigating Officer is the arm of the law and plays pivotal role in the dispensation of criminal justice and maintenance of law and order. The police investigation is, therefore, the foundation stone on which the whole edifice of criminal trial rests-an error in its chain of investigation may result in miscarriage of justice and the prosecution entails (sic) with acquittal. The duty of the Investigating Officer, therefore, is to ascertain facts, to extract truth from half-truth or garbled version, connecting the chain of events. Investigation is a tardy and tedious process. The duty of the Investigating Officer, therefore, is to ascertain facts, to extract truth from half-truth or garbled version, connecting the chain of events. Investigation is a tardy and tedious process. Enough power, therefore, has been given to the police officer in the area of investigatory process, granting him or her great latitude to exercise his discretionary power to make a successful investigation. It is by his action that law becomes an actual positive force. Often crimes are committed in secrecy with dexterity and at high places. The Investigating Officer may have to obtain information from sources-disclosed or undisclosed and there is no set procedure to conduct investigation to connect every step in the chain of prosecution case by collecting the evidence except to the extent expressly prohibited by the Code or the Evidence Act or the Constitution. In view of the arduous task involved in the investigation he has been given free liberty to collect the necessary evidence in any manner he feels expedient, on the facts and in given circumstances. His/her primary focus is on the solution of the crime by intensive investigation. It is his duty to ferret out the truth. Labourious hard work and attention to the details, ability to sort through mountainous information, recognised behaviourial partners and above all, to co-ordinate the efforts of different people associated with various elements of the crime and the case, are essential. Diverse methods are, therefore, involved in making a successful completion of the investigation. 48. From this perspective, the function, of the judiciary in the course of investigation by the police should be complementary and full freedom should be accorded to the investigator to collect the evidence connection of the chain of events leading to the discovery of the truth viz. the proof of the commission of the crime. Often individual liberty of a witness or an accused person are involved and inconvenience is inescapable and unavoidable. The Investigating Officer would conduct in-depth investigation to discover truth while keeping in view the individual liberty with due observance of law. At the same time he has a duty to enforce criminal law as an integral process. No criminal justice system deserves respect if its wheels are turned by ignorances. It is never his business to fabricate the evidence to connect the suspect with the commission of the crime. Trustworthiness of the police is the primary insurance. At the same time he has a duty to enforce criminal law as an integral process. No criminal justice system deserves respect if its wheels are turned by ignorances. It is never his business to fabricate the evidence to connect the suspect with the commission of the crime. Trustworthiness of the police is the primary insurance. Reputation for investigative competence and individual honesty of the investigator are necessary to enthuse public confidence. Total support of the public also is necessary." MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED (86) In the case of Radhey Shyam Khemkas and another vs. State of Bihar, 1993 (3) SCC 54 , the Supreme Court has observed that seeking quashing of proceeding was a futile attempt to close the chapter before it has unfolded itself. It will be for the trial court to examine the matter on the material produced on behalf of the prosecution. That exercise cannot be performed either by the High Court or by the Apex Court. If accepting the allegations made and charges levelled on their face value, the Court had come to conclusion that no offence under the Penal Code was disclosed, the matter would have been different. The Apex Court repeatedly pointed out that the High Court should not while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court. The power under Section 482 of the Code has been vested in the High Court to quash a prosecution which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But that power cannot be exercised by the High Court to hold a parallel trial, only on the basis of the statements and documents collected during investigation or inquiry for the purpose of expressing an opinion whether the accused concerned is likely to be punished if the trial is allowed to proceed. Prayer for withdrawal of the Case Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 – In the case of B.P. Nilratna as pointed out earlier, Mr. P.P. Srivastava, senior advocate had prayed for dismissal of the application as withdrawn. The said prayer was allowed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh, learned Additional Advocate General has filed an application for recalling the said order. (87) All the cases were heard together as all these cases involved identical question. The prayer for withdrawal was made almost at the end of the hearing. The said prayer was allowed. Mr. P.M.N. Singh, learned Additional Advocate General has filed an application for recalling the said order. (87) All the cases were heard together as all these cases involved identical question. The prayer for withdrawal was made almost at the end of the hearing. It further appears that the said prayer was made on the ground that another petition was moved before the Lucknow Bench. The fact remains that the petition having been filed by the petitioner, it is his choice to press the petition or get it dismissed for non prosecution or he may prefer to get it dismissed as withdrawn. Though there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure similar to those of Order XXII, Rule 1 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure precluding a person from instituting a fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the matter which had since been withdrawn without the leave of the Court to institute a fresh suit in respect thereof in terms of sub-rule (3) of Order 22 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet in a proceeding under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. the principle may be attracted. Inasmuch as it is a principle of a public policy. In the present case it appears that after withdrawing this petition, the petitioner seeks to espouse the same cause in the other petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. on the same ground involved in this petition. In fact if the purpose is to abuse the process of court, then the Court cannot be a silent spectator nor can it close its eyes in order to allow a party to abuse process of Court. (88) If the Court permits withdrawal in that event it should be deemed to have permitted, unless specifically mentioned or leave is granted to espouse the same cause, withdrawal without leave, which preclude the petitioner from taking a recourse to a fresh proceeding based on the same cause which could have been determined in the present proceeding. (88) If the Court permits withdrawal in that event it should be deemed to have permitted, unless specifically mentioned or leave is granted to espouse the same cause, withdrawal without leave, which preclude the petitioner from taking a recourse to a fresh proceeding based on the same cause which could have been determined in the present proceeding. In such circumstances if such an order is passed, the Court is not powerless to recall such order in order to prevent abuse of process of court or in other words even if it is permitted to be withdrawn without the leave, in that event the petitioner would be preluded from agitating the self-same ground as are involved in the present proceeding. Subsequent proceeding cannot be based on the self-same ground involved in the present proceeding. Those part of subsequent proceeding would not be available to the petitioner any further. Be that as it may, in view of the stand taken at this stage, the prayer for withdrawal or dismissing the petition as withdrawn after the hearing neared the end and substantial part of the argument was over does not seem to be oriented by bona fide in view of the discussion about the conduct of these proceedings as made in the resume of the case. (89) Even if the order remains and the petition is permitted to be withdrawn or is dismissed as withdrawn, even then no leave having been granted, the petitioner would be precluded from agitating the self-same ground relating to the challenge with regard to the validity of the F.I.R. or the initiation of the investigation and the investigation carried on pursuant to the said F.I.R. in any subsequent proceeding. That part of the subsequent proceeding which relates to the issues involved in this proceeding would not be available any further and cannot form subject matter of any subsequent proceedings which could be maintainable to that extent. (90) A proceeding under Section 482 of the Code is in exercise of inherent power of the High Court. It is not an original criminal proceeding. An original criminal proceeding involving non compoundable offence cannot be compounded while those involving compoundable offence can be. Thus concept of withdrawal of dismissal of a criminal case even as not pressed is unknown in the Cr. P.C. But the inherent power exercised by the High Court is not an original criminal proceeding. It is not an original criminal proceeding. An original criminal proceeding involving non compoundable offence cannot be compounded while those involving compoundable offence can be. Thus concept of withdrawal of dismissal of a criminal case even as not pressed is unknown in the Cr. P.C. But the inherent power exercised by the High Court is not an original criminal proceeding. It can be withdrawn or dismissal as not pressed. Since the High Court exercises inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. it is empowered to pass such order that may be just and proper and advances the object of the cause of justice. Court cannot allow its inherent jurisdiction to be misused or abused. As a public policy the High Court can safeguard or protect its procedure from being abused or misused. It cannot permit invoking of its inherent jurisdiction at the whims of a party. In appropriate case it may refuse withdrawal of a proceeding. It may similarly not permit dismissal of a proceedings as not pressed after the argument or substantial part of it is over. It may even refuse leave to re-agitate the same point while permitting withdrawal. When it is dismissed as not pressed there is no scope for re-agitating the same point. Exercise of inherent power is not fettered by any shackles or procedure or technicalities. It may pass just and appropriate orders that advances the cause of justice and prevent abuse of its process. In a given facts, the Court is free to pass appropriate order according to its discretion which is to be exercised judiciously. The argument that have already been noted and dealt with and the question being identical the same would be governed by the decision and the finding arrived at herein. Thus, the recalling of the said order permitting withdrawal or dismissal of the petition as withdrawn thus loses its significance and becomes immaterial in the facts and circumstances of the case. This question would not be available to the petitioner any further. It may further be noted that after the hearing was over the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in order to avoid a decision and re-agitate the same question in a subsequent petition which is otherwise impermissible. Therefore, it is no more necessary to pass any order on the application filed by Mr. Mahendra Pratap Singh on behalf of the State in recalling the said order. Therefore, it is no more necessary to pass any order on the application filed by Mr. Mahendra Pratap Singh on behalf of the State in recalling the said order. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. (91) So far as the application for withdrawal as has been filed in this case is concerned, the matter was argued elaborately. After it was concluded by Mr. Prem Prakash it was re-argued by Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad though subsequently he did not appear in the case. Subsequently Mr. Prem Prakash had filed the application for withdrawal of the case. It appears that in this case every attempt was made for preventing this Court from hearing this matter. Once a prayer was made that this matter should be transmitted to the Lucknow Bench, when it was pointed that the matter having been nominated to this Court, it is not possible for this Court to transmit the record to the Lucknow Bench, in derogation to the order of nomination by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It appears that an application was made before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the same purpose in order to transmit the records to the Lucknow Bench. The said application was also placed before this Court for appropriate orders. When all these attempt failed, though hearing was concluded by Mr. Prem Prakash and was taken up for re-argument by Mr. Jogeshwar Prasad who continued for some time was not available inspite of his assurance to appear before the Court while seeking adjournment on personal ground. This speak volume of the deliberate instruction of the petitioner given to his counsel to thwart the process of the Court in serious abuse thereof only to delay the disposal and also to bid and win time. SO far as Cr. P.C. is concerned it does not contain any provision similar to those under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is no provision for permission to withdraw a case. In the application, the applicant had prayed for permission to withdraw the petition as not pressed. It is not prayed that the petition be dismissed as not pressed. On the other hand it is prayed that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the petition as not pressed. Be that as it may, since the argument of Mr. Prem Prakash was over and substantial part of the argument of Mr. It is not prayed that the petition be dismissed as not pressed. On the other hand it is prayed that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the petition as not pressed. Be that as it may, since the argument of Mr. Prem Prakash was over and substantial part of the argument of Mr. Jogeswar Prasad rearguing the case was also over it is not permissible at this stage when the reply of Mr. P.M.N. Singh is concluded, to allow the prayer for withdrawal of the petition as not pressed. Such prayer appears to have been made for avoiding a decision in this case only to facilitate re-agitating the same point which has since been challenged in another proceeding which was initiated by the applicant during the course of hearing of this case after its attempt to get the matter transferred to the Lucknow Bench has failed. Such a prayer is being made in a manner which itself speaks volume about the extent of absence of bona fide in the prayer as would be apparent from the resume of the cases discussed hereinbefore. (92) In such circumstances, I am not inclined to allow the application for withdrawal. Though, however, such withdrawal will preclude the petitioner to agitate the same point namely, quashing of F.I.R. on the ground mentioned in this petition, therefore, this matter is being decided on merit. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997. So far as the case represented by Mr. W.H. Khan is concerned though he was present in the Court occasionally and had been watching the proceeding but never asked for accommodation and neither had addressed the Court on any occasion and had come with an application to withdraw and has not argued the case at all. (93) All these matters being taken up together and the question being identical and Mr. W.H. Khan had not attempted to add any submission to that of the other counsel, I do not think that by reason of his abstaining from addressing the Court will in any way prejudice the petitioner. Mr. Khan had never indicated that what additional point or new point he would have taken in favour of the petitioner. W.H. Khan had not attempted to add any submission to that of the other counsel, I do not think that by reason of his abstaining from addressing the Court will in any way prejudice the petitioner. Mr. Khan had never indicated that what additional point or new point he would have taken in favour of the petitioner. (94) In the application, it was prayed that the petitioner may either be permitted to withdraw the petition or the came may be dismissed as not pressed since the charge-sheet has been filed, giving liberty to the applicant to raise the points before this Court where charge-sheet has been filed. Thus, in the present case the prayer for withdrawal with leave to agitate the same point are being asked for. Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for any such provision under which permission to withdraw or leave to re-agitate the point can be permitted. Nor there is any provision that after getting the matter dismissed as not pressed, the applicant can agitate the same point in a subsequent proceeding. It is not on account of any defect, technical or otherwise for which the leave is being sought for. In fact the leave is being sought for the purpose of re-agitating the same point in subsequent proceeding though involved in this case with a view to avoid a decision in this case in order to seek undue advantage which is against the public policy and is otherwise impermissible. Even if the application for withdrawal is allowed, in that event, the petitioner would be precluded to agitate the same point involved in this case with regard to the challenging of the F.I.R. therefore, that will not benefit him. However, he may proceed with subsequent petition at Lucknow Bench in respect of matter outside the scope and ambit of the present petition. But he will be precluded from agitating any of the questions involved in this petition. In such circumstances his application for withdrawal is also dismissed. However, he may proceed with subsequent petition at Lucknow Bench in respect of matter outside the scope and ambit of the present petition. But he will be precluded from agitating any of the questions involved in this petition. In such circumstances his application for withdrawal is also dismissed. (95) Resume of the case as has been noted earlier clearly indicates that how court's process has been taken advantage of by some of the petitioners in their favour to forestall the investigation and process of the Court though on the face of it, there was no ground for it and none of these cases fall within the exception of rarest of rare cases or that the facts alleged in the F.I.R. does not lay foundation so as to inspire suspicion about the commission of offence as such it clearly shows that the process has been abused which fact cannot be denied. Individual cases. (96) Now let us examine the each of these cases in the light of the discussion made above as to how far the principle enshrined in the matter of quashing of F.I.R. on the basis of facts of each case can be attracted. Then again though arrest was stayed, investigation was not stayed and in some of the cases investigation is over and charge-sheet is ready in some cases sanction has been obtained in some cases sanction is awaiting. In such circumstances the question of quashing of F.I.R. becomes irrelevant. It is contended that the charge-sheet has since been challenged. It is altogether a different stage. But then the decision in this case, if it goes against the petitioners would preclude them from espousing the same cause in the pending proceeding, without affecting their right to proceed with the quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground other than any of those involved in these cases or on the ground for quashing the charge-sheet on account of any infirmity in or validity of the F.I.R. for its being liable to be quashed on any ground whatsoever. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. (97) The F.I.R. being Annexure-12 to this petition, the contents of the F.I.R. reads as follows:- (98) The F.I.R. is the Annexure-12 to this writ petition, which was placed before this Court. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. (97) The F.I.R. being Annexure-12 to this petition, the contents of the F.I.R. reads as follows:- (98) The F.I.R. is the Annexure-12 to this writ petition, which was placed before this Court. In the said Annexure, it was mentioned that the Inspector Incharge, Hazarat Ganj Police Station, Lucknow was directed by the Government through its order dated 15.2.1997 for conducting the above enquiry in respect of the assets and properties disproportionate to his known source of income of the then Director, Mandi Parishad. In the enquiry, it was revealed that Mr. P.N. Mishra, P.C.S. had joined the service on 18.12.1964 and continued to remain in different posts as public servant during which from his own source of income, he had earned Rs. 23 lakhs. During the investigation, it was also revealed that in the month of January, 1997, his public houses were raided by the Income Tax Department from the report whereof it appears that from the Government residence No. 5, a cash amount of Rs. 3,25,000 and jewellery worth Rs. 12,11,291 and other assets of Rs. 3,93,017 were recovered from house No. 15 at Batlar Place. A sum of Rs. 50,000 in cash was recovered from his office at Mandi Parishad while a sum of Rs. 1 lakh was recovered from his ancestral house at Meja, Allahabad. From the house of his son at Delhi House No. 111/3057, Basant Kunj, a sum of Rs. 12,90,000, in cash and Indra Vikas Patra worth Rs. 6,45,000, Kisan Vikas Patra of Rs. 2,10,000 and jewellery worth Rs. 1,40,651 were recovered. From the locker No. 141 of his wife maintained with his son at Punjab National Bank E.C.E. House, New Delhi a cash of Rs. 1,19,472 and from the locker of the wife with his son and the wife of the accused, being number 493 in O.B.C.I., Talpur, Delhi a sum of Rs. 30,000 in cash and jewellery worth Rs. 3,34,879 were recovered. From the locker No. 553 maintained by the accused in the Benami of Smt. Manju, wife of M.N. Tewari at O.B.C., Mahipalpur, New Delhi a sum of Rs. 1,40,000 in cash and Indra Vikas Patra of Rs. 9,99,000 were recovered. From locker No. 465 maintained by the accused in the Benami of Sri M.N. Tewari at O.B.C., Mahipalpur, New Delhi, cash of Rs. 8,00,000, Indra Vikas Patra of Rs. 10.40,000 were recovered. 1,40,000 in cash and Indra Vikas Patra of Rs. 9,99,000 were recovered. From locker No. 465 maintained by the accused in the Benami of Sri M.N. Tewari at O.B.C., Mahipalpur, New Delhi, cash of Rs. 8,00,000, Indra Vikas Patra of Rs. 10.40,000 were recovered. Apart from these assets in the raid by the Income Tax Department, it was found that the value of the house of the accused being C.D. 11/2091, Basant Kunj, New Delhi was valued at Rs. 9,50,000 and that of his son being House No. CD 111/3057, Basant Kunj, New Delhi was valued at Rs. 8,00,000 and that there were agricultural lands in the name of Progesh Misra, Raj Tewari, father in law of Mr. P.N. Mishra, accused, Smt. Gyanwati Mishra and Sri Pradip Misra and agricultural land at Kishengarh, New Delhi valued at Rs. 7,20,000. Flat at Kishengarh in the name of Smt. Gyanwati Misra was valued at Rs. 4,78,968. The house of Pradip Misra and Smt. Gyanwati Misra being 1/90 Miswas Khand, Gomti Nagar was valued at Rs. 25 lakhs. Agricultural land at village Pursani, Tehsil Mohan Lal Ganj, District Lucknow was found in the name of Pradip Misra, Tulika Misra, wife of Progesh Misra valued at Rs. 15 lakhs and that there was farm house in the name of Rita Misra at Kishengarh, New Delhi and that there were land at Kaushambi, Ghaziabad in the name of Smt. Jayanti Devi, mother in law of P.N. Misra and a house of P.N. Misra being number 109 BDI at Meerapur, Patel Nager, Allahabad. It was also learnt that in July, 1984 one 1.92 bigha of land at Ram Dharampur Velpur, Unnao was purchased in 1986 in the name of his wife in Gram Jamal Tehsil Mahibabad, Lucknow and orchard of 8 bigha, 50 biswa was purchased. In 1990 in village Dharampur Tehsil Meja, Allahabad, 40 bighas of agricultural land was purchased in the name of Gyanwati Misra. In 1991, one bigha, 6 biswa agricultural land was purchased in Mehrauli, New Delhi on which there is a farm house and a garden, which was estimated at more than Rs. 25 lakhs. It also appears that there were several certificates and Kishan Vikas Patra worth Rs. 6,02,914 purchased in the name of the wife of the accused. He had also purchased Car No. 6993 at Rs. 9,45,699 and a mobile phone of Rs. 30,399. 25 lakhs. It also appears that there were several certificates and Kishan Vikas Patra worth Rs. 6,02,914 purchased in the name of the wife of the accused. He had also purchased Car No. 6993 at Rs. 9,45,699 and a mobile phone of Rs. 30,399. It was also found that in the Saving Bank Account No. 500, P.N.B. Mandi Bhawan, Gomiti Nagar, Lucknow between 11th July, 1993 and 28th February, 1997 Rs. 20,69,445 was deposited and Rs. 19,73,735.86 Paisa was withdrawn. It was also found that a sum of Rs. 1,37,915 was lying in deposit in different accounts of the accused. It was further learnt that he had acquired properties in Benami and the names of the members of his family and that there are other properties acquired by him. From the members of the family and the Benamidar, further cash of Rs. 28,72,815 and jewellery worth Rs. 18,06,296 and several certificates worth Rs. 39,89,931 were recovered and that the land and houses were worth Rs. 96,26,614 when the known source of income of P.N. Misra was Rs. 23,00,30 whereas Mr. P.N. Misra has spent some amount for purchasing various items in his house. Therefore, it appears prima facie that while holding post of public servant, the accused has misused his position through corrupt malpractices and had acquired property disproportionate to his known source of income within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the complaint may be registered and be enquired into by the vigilance department. A plain reading of the F.I.R. discloses a foundation to raise suspicion about the commission of offence. In other words, it discloses a case as discussed herein before. The absence of the expression with regard to failure to satisfactorily account cannot be said to be fatal having regard to the totality of the allegation contained in the F.I.R. (99) As such this application is decided against the applicant in view of the observation made and the grounds discussed hereinbefore. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997. The absence of the expression with regard to failure to satisfactorily account cannot be said to be fatal having regard to the totality of the allegation contained in the F.I.R. (99) As such this application is decided against the applicant in view of the observation made and the grounds discussed hereinbefore. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997. (100) The contents of the F.I.R. contained in Annexure-6 to this application is as follows:- "Vide the D.O. letter No. 382/Forty eight/3-97-10 (3)/97 dated 15.2.1997 of U.P. Government Vigilance Section-two orders were passed for conducting open enquiry/ investigation by U.P. Vigilance Establishment against Sri B.P. Nilratna, I.A.S. the erstwhile Vice Chairman, Agra Development Authority, for illegally acquiring disproportionate assets (moveable and 8 immovable). It transpired that Sri B.P. Nilratna joined Government service in the year 1982 and worked on different posts as public servant. From the enquiry conducted so far, it transpired that in his entire Government service period till date, Sri B.P. Nilratna I.A.S. earned approximately Rs. 14,50,000 from the known source of income. During the course of enquiry it also came to light that on date 21.1.1997 the Income Tax Department had conducted raids on different residence and bank lockers of Sri B.P. Nilratna in which, according to the information received from the Income Tax Department, cash amounting to Rs. 68,908 gold jewellery weighing 45,600 gms. worth approximately Rs. 88,872 and U.T.I. bonds worth Rs. 85,600 were recovered from the official residence No. D 11/15 Pandara Road, New Delhi occupied by Smt. Veena Nilratna wife of B.P. Nilratna, I.A.S. who works on the post of C.M.O. Safdarjung, New Delhi and jewellary worth approximately Rs. 03,22,727 were recovered from the locker in Punjab National Bank, Khan Market, New Delhi. THE above locker is jointly operated in the name of B.P. Nilratna and his wife Smt. Veena. Besides this cash amount of Rs. 38,305 and U.T.I. bonds worth approximately Rs. 1 lac in the name of minor children of B.P. Nilratna were recovered from the residence of B.P. Nilratna's father-in-law, Sri Hari Singh, situated at Jaipur House, Agra. On the basis of information received from the Income Tax Department and upon enquiry it has come to notice that in the year 1995 when B.P. Nilratna, I.A.S. was posted as District Magistrate Bulandshahr and Ghaziabad then in that period he had purchased 3 shed godowns for approximately Rs. On the basis of information received from the Income Tax Department and upon enquiry it has come to notice that in the year 1995 when B.P. Nilratna, I.A.S. was posted as District Magistrate Bulandshahr and Ghaziabad then in that period he had purchased 3 shed godowns for approximately Rs. 5 lacs in the names of Har Govind Singh and Narendra Charu, which are located at C-2, C-7, C-8 Sector 9 and appear to be Benami property of B. P. Nilratna. Upon enquiry it has come to notice that approximately an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs 36 thousand is balance in various bank accounts in the names of B.P. Nilratna, his wife Smt. Beena Nilratna and their minor children Abhiveva, Ms. Preetika and Ms. Amolika. In his annual property statement B.P. Nilratna, I.A.S. has informed the Government that he has purchased plot No. SF. 18 Sector 13 situated in Shastri Nagar, Ghaziabad measuring 455 square yards from the Ghaziabad Development Authority for an amount of Rs. 78,266. On this very plot he had constructed a house in the year 1994 whose valuation is Ra. 5,15,672. This house had been leased to Mandi Parishad, Ghaziabad in the year 1994. He had also purchased another plot measuring 450 sq. yards from Noida Development Authority for Rs. 5,00,000, out of which Rs, 3,96,923 had been deposited till January, 1997. Upon inquiry it has come to light that B. P. Nilratna had taken a loan of Rs. 2,95,000 from S.B.I. Bulandshahr and P.N.B. situated in Ghaziabad against which he has repaid the loan for an amount of Rs. 2,64,000. Upon inquiry it came to notice that in his property statement B. P. Nilratna had mentioned electrical appliances, computer, television (Sony), fridge, furniture etc. which approximately amount to Rs. one lakh forty thousand. It has also come to notice from the Income Tax Department that Nilratna has spend lot of amount on maintenance and on education of children. In this manner, B.P. Nilratna, who is a Government servant has misused his post while working on different posts and has acquired assets by corrupt and illegal means, disproportionate to his known source of income. Prima facie an offence is made out under Section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act. In this manner, B.P. Nilratna, who is a Government servant has misused his post while working on different posts and has acquired assets by corrupt and illegal means, disproportionate to his known source of income. Prima facie an offence is made out under Section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, kindly register a case under the above sections." A plain reading of the said F.I.R. can be answered in the same terms as has been answered in respect of the F.I.R. in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997 in the last but one paragraph. But this becomes immaterial in view of the discussion made with regard to the question of withdrawal of this case as observed hereinbefore on the condition mentioned therein, therefore, no order need be passed in the application which is dismissed as withdrawn, but without leave to re-agitate the points involved in this case. Criminal Misc. Application No. 7102 of 1997. (101) The contents of the F.I.R. contained in Annexure-12 reads as follows:- "Vide the D.O. letter No. 287/thirty nine/3-97-10 (b)/97, dated 15.2.1997 the U.P. Government had ordered for conduction of open enquiry/ investigation by U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Lucknow against Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta, Chief Engineer, Mandi Parishad, Lucknow on account of illegal acquisition of disproportionate movable and immovable assets. 2. It was found out that Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta had jointed Government service in September, 1970 and worked on different posts as public servant. Upon inquiry conducted by the U.P. Vigilance Establishment from dated 1.4.1988 against the above Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta regarding the assets acquired it transpired that from dated 1.4.1988 Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta has earned approximately Rs. 6,10,000 (Six lakh ten thousand) from his known source of income. 3. During the course of inquiry it was also found that on date 21.1.1997 the Income Tax Department had conducted raids on different premises of Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta is which, according to the information received from the Income Tax Department, cash amount of Rs. 2,35,000 (Two lakh thirty five thousand) and jewellery worth Rs. 28,05,251 (Twenty eight lakh five thousand two hundred and fifty one) were recovered from Suresh Chandra Gupta's house No. D 55 Sector A, Mahanagar, Lucknow. Similarly from Suresh Chandra Gupta's farm house situate at Kursi Road, Lucknow the Income Tax Department recovered an air conditioner worth Rs. 2,35,000 (Two lakh thirty five thousand) and jewellery worth Rs. 28,05,251 (Twenty eight lakh five thousand two hundred and fifty one) were recovered from Suresh Chandra Gupta's house No. D 55 Sector A, Mahanagar, Lucknow. Similarly from Suresh Chandra Gupta's farm house situate at Kursi Road, Lucknow the Income Tax Department recovered an air conditioner worth Rs. 30,000 (Thirty thousand), Generator of 60 KVA worth Rs. 75,000 (Seventy five thousand), Swimming Pool worth Rs. 5,00,000 (Five lakhs) two rooms with bath tub worth Rs. 1,00,000 (One lakh) swing (Jhoola) and other articles worth Rs. 50,000 (Fifty thousand) and trees worth Rs. 30,000 (Thirty thousand). The above farm house measuring ten bigha together with boundary has been found to be worth Rs. 30,00,000 (Thirty lakhs). From the above farm house of Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta besides the above items sofa, double bed and furniture worth Rs. 50,000 (Fifty thousand) were also recovered. Hence after dated 1.4.1988 Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta has acquired assets worth approximately Rs. 67,23,401.92 (Sixty seven lakhs twenty three thousand four hundred and paise ninety two). Apart from the amount spent over the above assets Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta has spent on his and his dependents maintenance, on Life Insurance Corporation of India and on shares etc., as well. It has been learnt that apart from the above assets Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta has acquired immense other assets as well. 4. In this manner, it is apparent that while working as public servant on different posts Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta has misused his post and by correct and illegal means has acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income which is prima facie an offence under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Kindly register a case under the above sections against Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta. The registered case shall be investigated by U.P. Vigilance Establishments." (102) A plain reading of the said contents of the F.I.R. shows that it discloses a case as observed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997 and is answered accordingly in similar terms as those of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. Application No. 6486 of 1997 and is answered accordingly in similar terms as those of Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6588 of 1997. The contents of the F.I.R. contained in Annexure-1 to this application reads as follows:- "Vide the D.O. Letter No. 387/Forth Eight 3/97-10(3)-9, dated 15.2.1997 the U.P. Government has ordered for conduction of open enquiry/ investigation by U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Lucknow against Sri Brijendra, I.A.S. (1971), the erstwhile Principal Secretary Administrative Reforms Department, on account of illegal acquisition of disproportionate assets. 2. It was found that Sri Brijendra, I.A.S. joined Government service in the year 1971 and worked on different posts as public servant. From the inquiry conducted so far, it transpired that it this period Sri Brijendra has earned approximately Rs. 10,00,000 from his known sources of income. 3. During the course of inquiry it was also found out that on dated 21.1.1997 the Income Tax Department had conducted raids at different premises of Sri Brijendra in which, according to the information received from the Income Tax Department, cash amount of Rs. 2,07,000, jewellary worth Rs. 8.91 were recovered from the New Delhi situated at Som Vihar Bhavan No. B 101 of Sri Brijendra, I.A.S. and jewellary worth Rs. 59,789 was recovered from locker No. 64/2 of State Bank of Patiala which is in the names of Sri Brijendra and his wife Smt. Nandini Yadav, jewellary worth Rs. 1,87,959 was recovered from locker No. 60/2 of Nehru Nagar, Agra branch of State Bank of Patiala which was in the names of Sri Brijendra and his wife, cash amount of Rs. 46,948 was recovered from account No. 1401/3 of Nehru Nagar, Agra branch of State Bank of Patiala which was in the names of Sri Brijendra and his wife Nandini Yadav and from the Gautam Palli, Lucknow situated official residence of the above Brijendra cash amount of Rs. 22,299, jewellery worth Rs. 5,53,445 other assets worth Rs. 2,55,600, 52,022.60 dollars and I.N.R. of 86,125 were recovered. 4. From the inquiry conducted so far it has also been found out that at some places Sri Brijendra, I.A.S. writes his name as only Sri Brijendra and at other places mentions it as Sri Brijendra Yadav, similarly his wife also somewhere mentions her name as Smt. Nandini and at other places mentions it as Smt. Nandini Yadav, Sri Brijendra's daughter Km. Rashmi at some places gives her name as only Rashmi and at other places mentions it as Rashmi Singh. It was also found out that an amount of Rs. 1,64,241.31 is balance in accounts of different banks which are in the names of Sri Brijendra, I.A.S. his wife Smt. Nandini and his daughter Km. Rashmi. In his annual property statement Sri Brijendra has informed the Government that he has purchased a shop No. 7C for Rs. 58 thousand in the name of his wife Smt. Nandini which is situated at Sector 15A Noida Ghaziabad. Besides, this he has purchased plot No. B-172 situated in Sector 51, Noida Ghaziabad, in the name of his wife Smt. Nandini. On inquiry it was also found out that Sri Brijendra has a house No. B-101, Som Bihar, New Delhi whose value is approximately Rs. 80 lakh and another house No. 2/170 Vishwas Khand Gomti Nagar, Lucknow whose approximate value is above Rs. 15 lakh which both are in form of benami property. It also came to notice that there are F.D.R's worth lac of rupee in the name of his wife Smt. Nandini at Bank of Baroda, Ghaziabad. It has also been learnt through sources that besides the above assets Sri Brijendra has acquired other assets as well. 5. In this way, while working as public servant on different posts, Sri Brijendra has misused his post and by corrupt and illegal means has acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income which is prima facie a punishable offence under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13 (2). Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 6. Kindly register a case under the above sections. This offence shall be investigated by U.P. Vigilance Establishments, Lucknow." (103) A plain reading of the said contents disclose a case on the same terms as has been observed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Accordingly this case will also be governed by the terms similar to those as has been observed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Accordingly this case will also be governed by the terms similar to those as has been observed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6525 of 1997. (104) The contents of the allegation made in the F.I.R. contained in Annexure-7 to the application reads thus:- "Vide D.O. letter No. 387/39-3-87-10 (3) 97 dated 15.2.1997 the U.P. Government had passed order for conduction of open inquiry/investigation by U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Lucknow against Sri Padam Singh, the erstwhile Secretary, Ghaziabad Development Authority, on account of illegal acquisition of disproportionate assets (moveable and immovable). Order for conduction of enquiry by Sector Meerut of U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Meerut was passed vide letter No. V. E./Anu-2-Su/ Investigation 58/97 of Vigilance Headquarter. It came to notice that Sri Padam Singh joined the provincial Administrative Service on dated 20.5.1978 and while working on different posts as public servant in this period the above named Padam Singh earned approximately Rs. 12,00,000 (Twelve lakhs) from his known sources of income. 3. During the course of enquiry it came to notice that on dated 21.1.1997 the Income Tax Department had conducted a raid at the residence of Sri Padam Singh which is situated at 315 New Gandhi Nagar, Ghaziabad in which, according to the information received from the Income Tax Department, cash amount of Rs. 34,823 (Thirty four thousand eight hundred and twenty three) jewellary worth approximately Rs. 3,97,121 (There lakh ninety seven thousand one hundred and twenty one) F.D.R.'s NSC's and bonds worth approximately Rs. 7,50,000 (Seven lakh fifty thousand) were recovered from the residence of Sri Padam Singh. Besides this on the basis of information received from the Income-Tax Department, we have also come to know that from this very house of the above-mentioned Padam Singh household items like fridge, TV, Washing Machine, VCR, Computer, Air Conditioner, Foreign Liquor etc, worth approximately, Rs. 3,00,000 (Three lakhs) were also recovered. An amount of approximately Rs. 6,50,600 (Six lakhs fifty thousand six hundred) was found to have been deposited in different banks in the name of his wife Sneh Lata and his sons Dushyant and Siddharth and besides the ornaments recovered from the above house gold jewellary worth thousands of rupees was also recovered from the locker No. 173 of Co-operative Bank, Begu Bridge, Meerut. 4. 6,50,600 (Six lakhs fifty thousand six hundred) was found to have been deposited in different banks in the name of his wife Sneh Lata and his sons Dushyant and Siddharth and besides the ornaments recovered from the above house gold jewellary worth thousands of rupees was also recovered from the locker No. 173 of Co-operative Bank, Begu Bridge, Meerut. 4. From enquiry this fact also come to light that in the raid conducted by the Income Tax Department on dated 21.1.1997 documents of a flat No 506 situated in Govardhan Kaushambi, District Ghaziabad were also found. The cost of this flat would be approximately Rs. 6,50,000 (Six lakhs fifty thousand) and has been purchased in the name of Angoori Devi, similarly another flat No. 87 situated in RDC Colony, Ghaziabad was initially allotted to Sri Krishna Kumar on installments. This flat has been allotted in the name of Smt. Chandra Prabha on payment of Rs. 2,25,000 (Two lakh twenty five thousand), Smt. Chandra Prabha is the real sister of Sri Padam Singh. In the Income Tax Department raid one Maruti Zen Car No. U.P. 13 F 003 and one Maruti 7800 Car No. U.P. 14 E 9000 have been recovered from the residence of the above Padam Singh and they appear to be benami property of Sri Padam Singh. 5. On enquiry it has also been found that flat No. A-72 cost approximately Rs. 6,50,000 situated in Kaushambi, Ghaziabad and another flat No. A-32 situated in Sector 23 of Sanjai Nagar, Ghaziabad, whose approximate value is Rs. 5,14,000 have both been purchased in the name of his wife Smt. Sneh Lata by the above Sri Padam Singh besides the above Sri Padam Singh has also spent on maintenance, children's education etc. 6. During the inquiry it was also found out through sources that besides the above assets Sri Padam Singh has also acquired various other assets. In this way it is clear that while working on different posts as public servant Sri Padam Singh has misused his post and by corrupt and illegal means has acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income which is prima facie a punishable offence under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. 7. Hence, kindly register a case under the above sections. 7. Hence, kindly register a case under the above sections. This offence shall be investigated by the Vigilance Establishment, Meerut Sector, Meerut." A plan reading of the said contents reflects that the same discloses a case on the terms similar to those as has been observed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. Accordingly, this case is also governed on the same terms as has been observed in the said Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997. CONCLUSION (105) Having regard to the facts and circumstances as discussed above each of the F.I.R. as mentioned hereinbefore discloses a case or in other words it discloses sufficient foundation to raise suspicion about the commission of offence. Having regard to the totality of the facts alleged in the F.I.R. clearly indicates sufficient foundation for suspecting commission of offence as alleged therein. Absence of expression failure to satisfactorily account for the assets and properties acquired or in possession disproportionate to the known source of income is not at all fatal as observed hereinbefore. Thus, none of these F.I.R.'s can be held to be invalid so as to empower the Court to quash the same and interfere with the investigation. DECISION (106) In the result, the Criminal Misc. Application No. 6486 of 1997 is hereby dismissed. Criminal Misc. Application No. 6487 of 1997 is dismissed as withdrawn in terms of order dated 12.1.2000 subject to the observation made hereinbefore precluding the applicant to re-agitate any of the points involved in this petition in any other subsequent proceeding as observed hereinbefore. Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 6525 of 1997, 6588 of 1997 and 7102 of 1997 are hereby dismissed.