Judgment :- Y. Venkatachalam, J. In these writ petitions, the subject matter involved and also the parties to the writ petitions are one and the same. Hence these writ petitions were taken up together and are disposed of by this common order with the consent of the parties. In support of the writ petitions, the petitioner herein has filed separate affidavits wherein he has narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced him to file these writ petitions and requested this Court to allow the writ petitions as prayed for. Per contra, though no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, the second respondent contested the matter and argued that the impugned orders herein are in order and in accordance with law and that therefore, there is no need for any interference with the same in these writ petitions and thus there is no merit in these writ petitions and accordingly they are liable to be dismissed. Invoking Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, these petitions have been filed by the petitioner herein to call for the records and to quash the award, dated 29 October 1991, in Complaint No. 1 of 1988 on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal, Madras (in W.P. No. 8157 of 1993) and to call for and to quash the order, dated 29 October 1991 in Petition No. 44 of 1988 on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in W.P. No. 8157 of 1993. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. I have persued the contents of the affidavits together with all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised and the decision relied on during the course of their arguments.In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the only point that arises for consideration is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow these writ petitions or not. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as seen from the affidavit are as follows : The second respondent herein who was working in the petitioners establishment as Junior Engineer accompanied the Corporation lorry to Tirunelveli to bring cement from Tirunelveli to Tuticorin on 18 March 1987. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as seen from the affidavit are as follows : The second respondent herein who was working in the petitioners establishment as Junior Engineer accompanied the Corporation lorry to Tirunelveli to bring cement from Tirunelveli to Tuticorin on 18 March 1987. After unloading cement in the Tuticorin depot while on the way to the Marthandam depot along with 10 bags of cement, the second respondent directed two bags of cement to be unloaded in Eranial for his domestic use and 8 bags of cement were brought to the Marthandam depot. Though it was evident from the security register that only 8 bags of cement have entered it was found in the issue and receipt register for cement that 10 bags of cement have been recorded as being received by the second respondent. The driver of the vehicle on the said date also gave a statement confirming the incidents and based on the same a charge-sheet, dated 10 April 1987, was issued to the second respondent. The second respondent was suspended pending the domestic enquiry. The second respondent submitted his explanation to the charge-memo. But however, the petitioner Corporation finding that the explanation was not satisfactory, decided to conduct domestic enquiry for which due notice was given to the second respondent. The second respondent took part in the enquiry in full. In the domestic enquiry, evidence was let in on both sides. On the completion of the enquiry proceedings, the enquiry officer submitted a detailed finding in which the enquiry officer found the second respondent guilty of the charges framed in the charge memo. A second show-cause notice was issued on 19 July 1987 to show cause as to why the second respondent should not be terminated from service. The second respondent submitted his explanation on 30 July 1987. The Petitioner-Corporation did not however, find the explanation satisfactory and dismissed the second respondent from from the services of the corporation on 17 August 1987. On the dismissal of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an application for approval before the first respondent herein, as a dispute was already pending before the first respondent. These papers were received in the office of the first respondent as early as on 14 December 1987 and numbered as A.P. No. 44 of 1988. On the dismissal of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an application for approval before the first respondent herein, as a dispute was already pending before the first respondent. These papers were received in the office of the first respondent as early as on 14 December 1987 and numbered as A.P. No. 44 of 1988. However the second respondent filed a complaint on 4 January 1988 which was duly numbered as complaint No. 1 of 1988. Both these matters were taken up together by the first respondent. The second respondent supressed that fact that an approval petition was pending while preferring the complaint. The petitioner in their counter to the complaint categorically state that an approval petition had been filed and that the second respondent was award of it. However, the first respondent chose not to take heed of his objection and after hearing the submission of both sides, decided the matter, and passed an award, dated 29 October 1991. He decided the matter on the short ground that the enquiry officer's finding were perverse and that therefore passed an award only in the complaint awarding reinstatement with full back-wages and attendant benefits. As far as the approval petition was concerned the first respondent held that in view of the award passed in the complaint, the approval petition stands dismissed. After passing of the award in Complaint No. 1 of 1988, the petitioner has now approached the Labour Court in C.P. No. 2080 of 1992 claiming the dues that were not paid to him from the date the second respondent was dismissed from service till date as allowed by the first respondent in it's award, dated 30 October 1991. Aggrieved by the order of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal, dated 29 October 1991, and having no other alternative remedy, the petitioner is constrained to approach this Court by filing W.P. No. 8157 of 1993. Aggrieved by the order of the first respondent, dated 29 October 1991 in A.P. No. 44 of 1988, W.P. No. 8158 of 1993 has been filed.Per contra, in the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent inter alia it is contended by him that he joined in the service of the writ petitioner as a work assistant on 18 June 1963 and consequently he was promoted as a Junior Engineer (Civil) from November 1985, and he has a long record of more than 24 years of service. He was dismissed from service by an order, dated 17 August 1987, based on the charge-memo, dated 10 April 1987. The charge memo alleges that he himself along with driver K. Rajagopalan took a lorry from Marthandam depot on 18 March 1987 to Tirunelveli depot and took 150 bags of cement and 140 cement bags were unloaded in Tirunelveli depot and out of the 10 bags remained in lorry, 2 bags were unloaded near Eranial Village for his personal use when the lorry came to Marthandam viz. Eranial. It was further alleged that the security guard recorded in the gate register that there were 8 bags of cement when the lorry entered the Marthandam depot. He submitted explanation denying the charges. He explained that he took the lorry from Marthandam depot to Tirunelveli depot on 18 March 1987 and took 150 cement bags there to Tuticorin depot and unloaded 140 bags there and proceeded towards Marthandam. The lorry reached Nagercoil depot at about 12.30 P.M. The driver told him that he would not drive further. Therefore he left to his village and asked the driver to take the lorry to Marthandam depot in the morning. When he went to the Marthandam depot at about 9.00 A.M. the lorry was inside the depot with cement bags and those bags were unloaded to store room. The said fact was recorded in the cement stock register. Later he handed over the bags to contractor and obtained receipt for the same. According to him, the entry in the gate register should have been done to malign by his enemies with bad intentions by using the security guard. However the petitioner decided to hold the enquiry. Based on the findings of the enquiry officer that he was guilty of the charges, he was dismissed from service. His case is that the writ petitioner corporation supplies cement and other materials for construction to the contractor and that the value of the supplied materials were recovered from the bill submitted by contractor for the construction work. In the case, the value for 10 cement bags were recovered from the bill submitted by the contractor. His grievance is that the writ-petitioner did not bother to examine the contractor about the controversy and the writ petitioner also failed to examine the security guard Ponnappan. They did not even get a statement from him. In the case, the value for 10 cement bags were recovered from the bill submitted by the contractor. His grievance is that the writ-petitioner did not bother to examine the contractor about the controversy and the writ petitioner also failed to examine the security guard Ponnappan. They did not even get a statement from him. The only evidence for the management was the driver who gave complaint after 17 days of the alleged incident, i.e., on 5 April 1987, further, the driver made a wrong entry in the trip sheet that the lorry had night halt at Tuticorin. The stock register had the entry of 10 cement bags. Further the writ petitioner recovered the value for 10 bags from the bill submitted by the contractor. The writ petitioner also did not complaint to the police, though in such cases they used to lodge police complaint. Therefore, it is his contention that the first respondent having taken into account aforesaid facts, rightly came to the conclusion that findings of the enquiry officer, based on which dismissal order was passed are perverse and dismissed the approval Application No. 44 of 1988 seeking approval for his dismissal under S.33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and allowed his Complaint No. 1 of 1988 by an award, dated 29 October 1991, directing writ-petitioner to reinstate him with backwages, continuity of service and other attendant benefits.Having seen the entire material available on record and from the facts and circumstances of these cases and also from the claims and counterclaims made by the rival parties, the following are the admitted facts. The second respondent herein was working in the petitioner establishment as Junior Engineer. There was charge against him that when delivering certain bags of cement to one of their depots, he unloaded two bags of cement for his domestic use. In this regard he was suspended pending domestic enquiry. On the completion of the enquiry proceedings, the enquiry officer found the second respondent guilty of the charges framed and consequently he was dismissed from service on 17 August 1987. On the dismissal of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an application for approval before the first respondent herein seeking its approval to dismiss the second respondent herein. The papers were received in the office of the first respondent as early as on 14 December 1987 and numbered as A.P. No. 44 of 1988. On the dismissal of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an application for approval before the first respondent herein seeking its approval to dismiss the second respondent herein. The papers were received in the office of the first respondent as early as on 14 December 1987 and numbered as A.P. No. 44 of 1988. The second respondent filed a complaint on 4 January 1988 which was numbered as Complaint No. 1 of 1988. Ultimately an award came to be passed in Complaint No. 1 of 1986 on 29 October 1991 on the ground that the enquiry's findings were perverse and therefore passed an award only in the complaint, awarding reinstatement with full back-wages and attendant benefits. As far as the approval petition was concerned, the first respondent held that in view of the award passed in the complaint, the approval petition stands dismissed. Aggrieved by the said award and order, these writ petitions have been filed. In these writ petitions, inter alia, it is contended by the petitioner herein that the order of the Tribunal, dated 30 October 1991, in dismissing the application for approval and allowing the complaint filed by the second respondent and directing reinstatement of the employee with continuity of service and backwages suffers from the errors apparent on the face of the record and hence it is liable to be set aside, and that the order of the Labour Court dismissing the approval petition and allowing the complaint is wholly without jurisdiction. They also contend that the Tribunal ought to have seen that a complaint would be maintainable only when an application for approval has not been filed for the dismissal of an employee in a dispute pending before the Tribunal and that therefore it is their case that in such circumstances when the application for approval had already been filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to take into file the complaint filed by the second respondent and adjudicate upon the same. Therefore, it is the categoric contention of the petitioners that this basic error of law has vitiated the entire award rendering it liable to be set aside. Therefore, it is the categoric contention of the petitioners that this basic error of law has vitiated the entire award rendering it liable to be set aside. It is their specific contention that the Tribunal ought to have taken the approval application for enquiry and on being satisfied that the same has been filed prior to the complaint ought to have confined its adjudication only to the question as to whether the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and prima facie view can be taken regarding the guilt of the employee. It is also contended by them that at any rate if the application for approval had already been filed notwithstanding the nature of the order passed in the application for approval the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint much less adjudicate the same. Therefore according to the petitioner having done the converse by embarking upon the adjudication of the complaint and dismissing the approval application based on the orders passed in the complaint, the Tribunal has committed a serious error of law rendering the award liable to be set aside. Further according to them the attempt of the Labour Court in rejecting the evidence of P.W. 1 and holding that the non-examination of the security guard who made the entry in the entry/Exit Register would be fatal to the enquiry clearly shows that while adjudicating the issues the standard of proof to be adopted in a domestic enquiry has not been kept in mind. They also contend that the Labour Court ought to have seen that the second respondent had clearly committed theft of two bags of cement belonging to the Petitioner-Corporation and manipulated the receipt register to show as if 10 bags were received where in fact only 8 bags of cement were received on the said date. When the bona fides of the entries in the security register was not questioned by the employee at any time it would not be open to the Labour Court to summarily reject the same on the only ground that the security guard who maintained the same was not examined in the domestic enquiry. When the bona fides of the entries in the security register was not questioned by the employee at any time it would not be open to the Labour Court to summarily reject the same on the only ground that the security guard who maintained the same was not examined in the domestic enquiry. Therefore it is rightly argued by the petitioner that what the Learned Judge ought to have done is to see whether the combined view of the entries in the security register and the receipt register and the evidence of P.W. 1 shows a reasonable probability of the culpability of the second respondent in respect of the charges levelled against him. Thus it is the categorical contention of the petitioner in this case that when the application for approval had already been filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to take into file the complaint filed by the second respondent and adjudicate upon the same and that therefore this basic error of law has vitiated the entire award rendering it liable to be set aside. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, I see every force in the above contention of the petitioner. Therefore I am of the clear view that on this short ground alone, the impugned award and the order herein have to be set aside.In support of their case, the petitioner herein relied on the following decision : (1) Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. It's workmen, wherein it has been held that the appropriate authority dealing with such approval application could not examine the fact as an appellate Court. It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider facts. But these consideration are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as under S.33(2)(b). It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider facts. But these consideration are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as under S.33(2)(b). (2) Sri Ranga Vilas Ginning, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Ltd., Coimbatore v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, and others, wherein it has been held that when the Industrial Tribunal refused the approval asked for on the sole ground that the concerned workmen were denied the opportunity of examining their witnesses in defence without examining the question as to whether a prima facie case has been made out against the concerned workman or not, its order must be quashed as one having been passed in excess of its jurisdiction under S. 33(2) of the Act. (3) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Digambar Bhimrao Gudadhe and another, 1990 (2) LLN 456], wherein it has been held that where the employer applying for approval under S. 33(2)(b) and the conciliation officer refusing to grant approval on grounds, inter alia that without ticket passengers were not examined during enquiry and that the authority issuing chargesheet was the same which passed order of dismissal in such circumstances of the case, the order refusing approval is quashed and set aside. Thus it is very clear that all the above three decisions clearly apply to the facts of the present case of the petitioner herein.On behalf of the second respondent also the following decisions were relied on : (1) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Judge, First Industrial Tribunal Jaipur 1986 (1) LLN 918] wherein it has been held that the application by employer to Tribunal for approval must comply with proviso and under proviso dismissal, payment of wages and application for approval must be simultaneous and if not so, refusal of approval by Tribunal would be justified. (2) Straw Board Manufacturing Company v. Govind, wherein it has been held that application for approval under the proviso to S. 33(2)(b) of the Central Act, if should be filed before the action covered by S. 33(2)(b) of the Central Act, is taken and scheme of the provisions of S. 33(2) and the proviso to S. 33(2)(b) of the Act explained, and such application for approval held should be filed immediately to show that it was part of the action for which the approval was sought for. (3) Poddar Mills Ltd. v. Bhagwan Singh & Anr. wherein it has been held thus : "The pleadings of the appellant were highly detective and did not contain any averment; which would support the case now sought to be made out. The facts stated in Para. 5 of the petition for special leave are entirely different from what was stated either in the application or in the rejoinder before the Tribunal. As a matter of fact if the workmen were served on the eighth and had received their wages simultaneously as stated in Para. 5 of the special leave petition, there is no reason or justification for these facts not being stated in the application for approval. We are unable to hold that the requirements of proviso to S. 33(2)(b) of the Act have been complied with. As one of the essential requirements of S. 33(2)(b) was not complied with the order of the Tribunal must be upheld.Thus it is clear that in the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the above decisions are not helpful to the case of the second respondent. Therefore for all the aforesaid reasons and in the facts and circumstances of the present cases and also in view of my above discussions with regard to the various aspects of these cases and also in the light of the various decisions relied on by the parties, I am of the clear view that the petitioner herein has clearly made out a case in their favour and that therefore, the award and order impugned in these writ petitions are liable to be quashed as prayed for. Thus the writ petitions succeed. In the result, both these writ petitions are allowed as prayed for. No costs.