JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.:— By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has prayed for : (i) Quashing the FIR against the petitioner being FIR No. 81/93 dated 29.6.1993 registered by the Police of Police Station Kihar, District Chamba (HP); (ii) Ordering the Respondent to present Cancellation Report before the learned Designated Court without any further delay as no offence under TADA is made out against the petitioner; and (iii) To stay the proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and other suitable directions deemed appropriate be given including grant of bail. 2. Brief facts are as follows: 3. The petitioner was working as a Teacher in Dalhousie during the period 1990 to 1992 and thereafter joined as Editor-cum-Executive Director of Monthly Magazine Chankaya Bureau at Ghaziabad (U.P.). A F.I.R. under Section 307/34 IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of Indian Arms Act had been registered at Police Station Kihar, District Chamba, H.P. on 29.6.1993. The sum and substance of the F.I.R. is that police received a secret information on 29.6.1993 that six strangers carrying six large bags and telescope were noticed in suspicious circumstances in Adwar Chambi. On receipt of the information two constables were sent towards the concerned area. At about 4.30 p.m. three persons, namely, Abdul Latif, Mohammad Hafiz and Mohammad Yakum Khan of District Doda in J&K came to the police post Sanghani and informed that they had come from Bhadrawa and wanted to go to Rama Nand Pradhan as they were on friendly terms with him and wanted to get their names recorded in the police post as visitors. Their particulars were entered in the relevant register meant for making entries about the persons coming to the concerned area from Jammu and Kashmir. Thereafter, they were allowed to go. 10 minutes thereafter one of the constables who were deputed to go to Addwar Chambi, namely, Hem Raj returned to the Police Post and informed that there were certain strangers staying in village Jalari. On receipt of this information & police party proceeded to village Jalari and on the way came across Latif Hanif and Yakub who had come to the road from the house of Gul Mohamnad. Police made enquiries from them about the strangers noticed in the area. They denied any concern with such strangers. On receipt of this information & police party proceeded to village Jalari and on the way came across Latif Hanif and Yakub who had come to the road from the house of Gul Mohamnad. Police made enquiries from them about the strangers noticed in the area. They denied any concern with such strangers. Further inquiry and suspicion led the police officials to apprehend Latif. In the meanwhile, Shaffi Mohammad armed with a shot-gun arrived on the spot and asked Latif to raise his hands. Latif was pushed forward by the Incharge of the Police party and thereafter firing started from the house of Gula. In the firing one Shabeer was injured. On the threat from the accomplices of Latif who were constantly firing on unarmed police party, Latiff was let off and police party ran back towards the police post. On the way they met Jaswant and Hem Raj, Constables who had in the meanwhile brought arms from the police post. Thereafter, the police party was commanded by its Incharge to take cover and start counter firing. The Incharge and constable Man Singh returned to police post, informed the Headquarter about the incident. As a result, the aforesaid F.I.R. came into being. 4. During the course of investigation it was found that Abdul Latiff and Mohammad Yakum Khan started from Bhadarwa (J&K) towards Chamba and stayed in a terrorist camp at Bhalpadhari on 27.6.1993. There were 20 to 25 militants in the said camp. A plan was chalked out there to kidnap one Mohammad Iqbal of village Jawal who had purchased one A.K. 47 rifle from the terrorists about a year back but had failed to pay the price thereof. Hence, Shahid Malik, Ashik Hussain, Nadeem @ Haniff and Mohd. Islam, Abdul Latif and Mohd. Yakum Khan left the militants camp on 28.6.1993 and reached at the house of Gul Mohammad at Jalari on 29.6.1993. Their arrival was followed by the aforesaid incident, subject matter of the F.I.R. 5. During investigation, it was further found that the petitioner and Sanjeev Raj who were introduced to the alleged terrorists by one Vijay Kumar wanted to purchase a gun for which they were prepared to pay huge amount. Their arrival was followed by the aforesaid incident, subject matter of the F.I.R. 5. During investigation, it was further found that the petitioner and Sanjeev Raj who were introduced to the alleged terrorists by one Vijay Kumar wanted to purchase a gun for which they were prepared to pay huge amount. At the first instance one revolver was supplied to the petitioner for Rs.19,500/- which he returned to Iqbal Mohammad after a few days on the ground that it was out of order and asked him to arrange an A.K. 47 Rifle. On the request of Iqbal Mohammad Arif arranged such a rifle for Rs. 30.000/-. Iqbal Mohammad and Munir brought the said rifle from Bhadharwal to Chamba and then to Dalhousie and handedover the same to the petitioner. Subsequently, offences under Sections 3,4 and 5 of the TADA were also added to the ofences already mentioned in the F.I.R. 6. The case of the petitioner is that the FIR is false and in any case no case under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987(TADA), is made out against him. Police Station Kihar was declared a notified area on 1.11.1993 whereas the alleged occurrence had taken place much prior to that. Therefore, the previsions of TADA cannot be retrospectively invoked against the petitioner. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the relevant records. 8. Be it stated at the very outset that as submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General the case against the petitioner is yet at the stage of investigation. The investigation could not be completed because according to the prosecution the petitioner had absconded. It is admitted case that the proceedings for declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender had to be initiated in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba. Thus, the case is still at the stage of investigation. 9. The investigation could not be completed because according to the prosecution the petitioner had absconded. It is admitted case that the proceedings for declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender had to be initiated in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba. Thus, the case is still at the stage of investigation. 9. In case Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 1146, the Apex Court while dealing with the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (now Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) has held that where on the date of filing the petition under Section 561-A, no charge-sheet or a complaint has been laid down in Court and the matter is only at the stage of investigation by police, the Court cannot, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, interfere with the statutory powers of the police to investigate into the alleged offence, and quash the proceedings. Even assuming that the allegations in the F.I.R. are correct and constitute an offence so as to remove the legal bar to institute proceedings in Court, the Court cannot at that stage appraise the evidence collected by the police in their investigation. Any petition under Section 561-A at such a stage is, therefore, premature and incompetent. 10. Again in case M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar and another, (AIR 1992 SC 1930) the Apex Court has held as follows : "After going through the impugned order and other connected papers, we feel that the High Court was not justified in quashing the investigation which is still on its way. Needless to emphasise that the further investigation in the offence is legally permissible as contemplated by Section 173(8) of Criminal Procedure Code. The learned counsel appearing for the State when asked represents that the investigation is not yet complete and the State would come to a definite conclusion as to the culpability of the appellant only on the completion of the investigation. As repeatedly pointed out by various decision of this Court that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without any compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation." 11. As repeatedly pointed out by various decision of this Court that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without any compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation." 11. It is thus evident that in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court should not interfere when the matter is at the stage of investigation. The delay in the completion of investigation is because of the act and conduct of the petitioner himself who had to be declared a proclaimed offender in the case. The noninterference is further warranted for the reason that on the basis of perusal of the investigation records, it cannot be said ex-facie that the petitioner is not involved in the commission of any cognizable offence at all. Thus, the matter does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 12. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Court with powers of Superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is now firmly settled that such powers of Superintendence are not only administrative but also judicial, therefore, the High Court may in exercise of such powers interfere to set right gross mis-carriage of justice. However, as the Superintendence jurisdiction is over the Courts and Tribunals only, such a power can be exercised only over the Courts and the Tribunals. (See : Swaranjit Jain v. State of Punjab, 1982 CLJ (C&Cr) 276). It is only under Article 226 of the Constitution that the High Court can exercise powers and examine the legality of the orders/acts not only of the Courts and Tribunals but also of other bodies like the Government and its Departments. Thus, only the legality of the order declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender in this case can be examined by this Court. However, no material has been brought on record on the basis of which it may be concluded that the proceedings declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender are unwarranted, illegal and have resulted in miscarriage of justice. 13. There is yet another aspect of the matter. However, no material has been brought on record on the basis of which it may be concluded that the proceedings declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender are unwarranted, illegal and have resulted in miscarriage of justice. 13. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The petitioner admittedly filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 1 of 1995 titled Partap Malik v. State of H.P. In this petition under Articles 226 and 227 the petitioner had prayed for quashing the charge against him under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 as in the F.I.R. in question and for grant of anticipatory bail. The said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 5.4.1995 and is admittedly reported as 1995 (2) Sim. L.C. 302. The petition was dismissed on the grounds: (i) that the quashing of the F.I.R. was sought at the very outset which if allowed would result in throttling the investigation; (ii) that instead of rushing to the High Court to file a writ petition the proper course for the petitioner was to approach the Designated Court under TADA and seek appropriate orders from it which could further be appealed against under Section 19 of the said Act before the Apex Court; and (iii) the notification regarding declaring the concerned area as notified area though might have come in operation at a later stage than the occurrence of the incident which was as a consequence of purchase of A.K.47 rifle by the petitioner yet the investigating agency must be given a fair chance to investigate. Most of the submissions as made in this petition and orally contended for the petitioner stood considered and rejected by a Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. In my view when there are two equally efficacious remedies available under the Constitution to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of such remedy has already been availed of and exhausted, it would not be proper and judicious to exercise discretion to grant relief in the other proceedings in respect of the same relief which has earlier been denied. In view of this the relief which has already been refused to the petitioner by a larger Bench of this Court in a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot be granted by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless no-doubt such a change in the circumstances in this case is shown that non-cancellation of the RI.R. and continuation of the investigation in such circumstances is wholly unjustified in law and is resulting in grave mis-carriage of justice. The change in the circumstances as contended is that two of these six alleged terrorists who had come to kidnap Mohammad Iqbal had been tried by the designated Court, Kangra at Dharamshala for the Commission of the alleged offences and had been acquitted vide judgment dated 18.8.1995 Annexure P-20. Be it stated that it emerges from the judgment Annexure P-2 that the charge-sheet was submitted only against the aforesaid two accused persons as the case against others was under investigation. The said acquittal does not ipso facto amounts to acquittal of the other accomplices. It was pointed out that the name of the petitioner has not been mentioned in the said charge-sheet in any column. Even if so, the petitioner is involved in the purchase of unauthorised fire arm and in its transportation as is prima facie disclosed by the records. As already stated despite directions by a Division Bench of this Court the accused instead of approaching the Designated Court opted to elude the investigating agency resulting in initiation of proceedings to declare him as having absconded and delaying the completion of investigation against him. Thus, the alleged changed circumstance is also of no help to the petitioner. 14. As a result, I do not find any merit and substance in the present petition, which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.