JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---This matter was on board earlier also when Counsel for the plaintiffs appelled for striking off the defence of the defendant No. 1 under Order XXXIX, Rule 11 of C.P.C. as per Bombay Amendment for non-compliance to the order of the Supreme Court dated 6-11-1992 in Special Leave Appeal No. 1301 of 1992 by which the Supreme Court had directed the defendant No. 1 to deposit an amount of Rs. 5.25,000/- with the Prothonotary and Senior Master within six weeks from the date of the order and also to furnish the Bank Guarantee for Rs. 10,00,000/- and to keep the Bank Guarantee alive till the suit is disposed of. 2. Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that even though this order is passed in 1992 and specific period for compliance was given by the Supreme Court, the defendant No. 1 has not till this date complied with any of these conditions and therefore under Order XXXIX, Rule 11 of C.P.C. Bombay Amendment, defence of the defendant No. 1 should be struck off. 3. This oral request of the plaintiff was strongly and vehemently argued by Mr. Makhija on behalf of defendant No. 1. He raised different contentions, firstly, such a prayer for striking off the defence should have been made if at all the plaintiffs were entitled to make it at the earliest after the order was passed by the Supreme Court. Secondly, there is an inordinate delay in making this prayer to the Court i.e. delay of about eight years. Thirdly, the notice of motion should have been taken out by the plaintiffs for this purpose in which case the defendant No. 1 could have been in a position to set out the defences and bring out circumstances on record as to why they could not comply with this order. Fourthly, he also contended that different provisions in C.P.C. e.g. Order XV-A, Order VIII, Rule 11(c), Order XVI, Rule 6 of C.P.C. which require the Court to issue notice to a defaulting defendant or defaulting party as to why action should not be taken as contemplated by these Rules and in the instant case therefore according to Mr. Makhija issuance of notice against defendant No. 1 is necessary. Mr. Makhija issuance of notice against defendant No. 1 is necessary. Mr. Makhija also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1657 (Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agarwal)1, wherein the Supreme Court has held that resort into remedies like striking off defence is the discretion of the Court and in the facts and circumstances on record do not justify passing of such orders the same should not be passed. Mr. Makhija also raised other contentions regarding the maintainability of the suit in its present form and therefore according to him this is not a case where the defence of the defendant No. 1 should be struck off and to the contrary this is a case where non-compliance to the order of the Supreme Court should not be viewed that seriously by the Court and prayer of the plaintiffs should be disregarded. 4. I do not find any merit in any of the submissions made by Mr. Makhija. On the contrary the conduct of the defendant No. 1 as revealed by the record is totally dishonest. Defendant No. 1's agreement with the plaintiffs is of 1971 and they were under statutory and legal obligation to perform certain duties. Defendant No. 1 has recovered additional amounts from the plaintiffs i.e. members of the plaintiffs society for converting the leasehold rights into a permanent rights in the property and for the last 29 years they have done nothing in that regard. I pointedly asked Mr. Makhija as to whether defendant No. 1 is even now ready and willing to deposit the amount as ordered by the Supreme Court but no willingness was shown in that regard. 5. So far as Order XXXIX, Rule 11 of C.P.C. Bombay Amendment is concerned, it is absolutely clear and it does not require this Court to issue any notice to defaulting party for seeking compliance. Other provisions of the C.P.C. referred to by Mr. Makhija cannot be pressed into service when there is a specific provision in the form of Order XXXIX, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. Bombay Amendment. Other provisions of the C.P.C. referred to by Mr. Makhija cannot be pressed into service when there is a specific provision in the form of Order XXXIX, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. Bombay Amendment. It is true that whether to strike off the defence is a discretion but not exercising such discretion in the matter like this would be against the settled provisions of law that defendant who deliberately defies the order of the Court who does not respect the agreement for 29 years, who does not discharge his legal and statutory duties cannot and should not be granted any protection from the Court. The submission of Mr. Makhija is that suit is filed by the society and there is no contractual relationship between the society and the defendant No. 1 is also without any substance. It was a legal obligation of the builder to help the purchasers of the flat to form a society if the builder does not discharge the duty then the purchasers in order to have their joint existence and legal existence are legally bound and/or entitled to form the society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. Thereafter if the society is formed that is admittedly and obviously for the protection of interest of each and every purchaser who is member of the said society. Therefore it does not the in the mouth of defendant No. 1 to contend that there is no contractual relationship between him and the plaintiffs. 6. Mr. Makhija also contended that defendant No. 1 could not deposit the amount because the original owner of the property has filed a suit against them. It is a matter of record that such a suit is filed in 1998 i.e. 27 years after the execution of the agreement. It is not that the suit was filed immediately after the order of the Supreme Court or before the order of the Supreme Court. Six years period has lapsed between the order of the Supreme Court and filing of the suit and that suit is also filed by the owner because defendant No. 1 even did not discharge its obligation of paying the leasehold amount of lease rent. Therefore as observed by me the conduct of the defendant No. 1 is totally dishonest as between the plaintiffs so far as this case is concerned. Therefore as observed by me the conduct of the defendant No. 1 is totally dishonest as between the plaintiffs so far as this case is concerned. Therefore, this is a just and proper case where the defence has to be struck off. Consequently the defence of the defendant No. 1 is struck off from the suit. Suit adjourned for two weeks. Prayer for operation of this order is rejected as the whole conduct of defendant No. 1 does not deserve such an indulgence by the Court. An ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate be supplied to the parties. Suit Adjoined. -----