Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. The present writ appeal is against the order of the learned single Judge of this Court, reported in 2000 (3) LLN 221, whereby, he has allowed the writ petition filed by the present respondent. By impugned judgment, the order in favour of the appellant, reinstating him into service, passed by the Labour Court, was set aside and it was held that the petitioner (first respondent herein) was justified on facts in dismissing the workman. In this writ appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has severely criticised the order of the learned single Judge as depriving a workman of his rightful employment, which was favourably seen by the Labour Court. It is the contention that the Labour Court had used its discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the learned single Judge ought not to have interfered with the discretion granted under the provisions of the Act while exercising his jurisdiction under Art. 226. It was pointed out that the Labour Court was the best Judge under the circumstances to judge as to whether the punishment of dismissal was justified or not and after reading the whole evidence and considering the various facts, the Labour Court had not only exercised that discretion, but also had given sound reasons for exercising the same under such circumstances. The learned single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction under Art. 226 to interfere with the same. The only question before us is, therefore, as to whether the learned single Judge has erred in allowing the writ petition, setting aside the award of the Labour Court and thereby setting aside the reinstatement ordered by it and restoring the punishment of dismissal as ordered by the first respondent. Before we take up this issue, it will be better to see a few facts.The appellant was a workman with the first respondent-bank. Charge-memos were served on him. By the first charge, it was alleged that while he was working as Secretary, Chithayyan Kottai Society (where he was sent on deputation) he had misappropriated 331 bags of paddy without handing over them to his successor. It was alleged against him that he failed to protect the property of the society and he had also not kept the records relating to the jewel loans properly. It was alleged against him that he failed to protect the property of the society and he had also not kept the records relating to the jewel loans properly. One T. Ravichandran, an advocate, was appointed as an enquiry officer to go into the charges and, after enquiry, it was held that barring the first charge partly and the fifth charge partly, all the charges were proved. On account of that, his dismissal was ordered, for which be raised an industrial dispute. Before the Labour Court, the authorised representative of the petitioner made an endorsement that there was no oral evidence to be adduced and he had no objection regarding the personal enquiry conducted by the respondent-bank. He also filed a memo saying, he was not objecting to the personal enquiry, but was seeking the interference of the Court since the punishment of dismissal from service was disproportionate. On this backdrop, the Labour Court held that the enquiry was proper and in keeping with the rules of natural justice. The only question, therefore, which came before the Labour Court was as to whether the punishment was to be interfered with under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court took a view in the following words : "On the side of the management no files showing that the petitioner had any previous punishment have been filed. These mistakes had occurred while he was serving on other duty in another society. Taking into consideration that there is no previous punishment to the petitioner if the charges against the petitioner are examined. I find that the punishment of dismissal from service is too much. In the interest of justice, I think that the petitioner need not be given the back wages and that he need not be sent for other duty for a period of three years." It is this judgment which is challenged by the respondent-bank before the learned single Judge and the said petition came to be allowed holding that the Labour Court had wrongly set aside the dismissal. Sri Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, while assailing the judgment of the learned single Judge firstly pointed out that a criminal case was launched against the petitioner on the basis of misappropriation, with which he was charged, and he had been acquitted by the criminal Court. Sri Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, while assailing the judgment of the learned single Judge firstly pointed out that a criminal case was launched against the petitioner on the basis of misappropriation, with which he was charged, and he had been acquitted by the criminal Court. According to Sri Prasad, this was enough to upset the order of the learned single Judge. Very curiously we find that there is not even a whisper of this judgment before the learned single Judge though the writ petition is filed in the year 1992. Sri Prasad says that the judgment came after the writ petition was filed. That may be so, but atleast when the writ petition was argued in the year 1999, the said judgment could have been placed before the learned single Judge, which the appellant has not done. The writ petition was lying in this Court from 1992-1999. It is curious that the said judgment, which seems to have been passed on May 19, 1992, should not have been placed before this Court during the period of seven years that it is pending before this Court. We fail to understand as to why we should allow the said judgment to be used before us for the first time in the year 2000 when it could have been filed before the learned single Judge in the year 1992 itself. There is no explanation why the said judgment was not placed. That apart, it would be futile for us to go into that judgment because before the Labour Court there was no challan to the findings of the enquiry officer which is clear from the unambiguous language of the award. The only question that was argued before the Labour Court at the instance of the appellant, was whether the punishment of dismissal was a proper punishment for the proved misconduct. Sri Prasad very strenuously says that though the representative of the appellant had argued that as the only question, the Court should have gone into the question as to whether the worker was really guilty of the charges. It does not seem that the Labour Court was persuaded to take such a question into consideration. Sri Prasad very strenuously says that though the representative of the appellant had argued that as the only question, the Court should have gone into the question as to whether the worker was really guilty of the charges. It does not seem that the Labour Court was persuaded to take such a question into consideration. Not even a whisper was made before the Labour Court that the findings by the enquiry officer finding the worker guilty of the charges were in any way wrong or contrary to the record. The learned counsel then urged us to examine the findings. We are afraid, we cannot do so because that was not the argument of the workman before the learned single Judge. Again the only question that was argued before the learned single Judge was as to whether the Labour Court was right in setting aside the punishment of dismissal in the wake of the findings of the enquiry officer. For these reasons, we cannot persuade ourselves to go into the correctness of the findings of the enquiry officer on merits.The learned counsel then has contended that the Labour Court had given good reasons for setting aside the dismissal. We are of the clear opinion that the so called reasons given by the Labour Court were wholly untenable. The learned counsel urged that the petitioner had an "excellent" record of service. We do not find any document to that effect. All that the Labour Court says is that no files were put by the management before it showing that the delinquent workman had suffered any previous punishment and the fact that the delinquent was serving in the other society perhaps on deputation. We do not see as to how the Labour Court was justified in saying "though it could be seen through this that he could not attend to his duty with sole responsibility." There is nothing on record to justify such a wild remark by the Labour Court. Beyond saying that the charges against the petitioner were examined by it, the Labour Court gives no other reasons to set aside the punishment ordered by the respondent-bank. We cannot ignore the fact in this behalf that the appellant was charged, with the misappropriation of 331 bags of paddy and the said charge was held roved. The learned single Judge has made a specific reference to that effect. We cannot ignore the fact in this behalf that the appellant was charged, with the misappropriation of 331 bags of paddy and the said charge was held roved. The learned single Judge has made a specific reference to that effect. The learned single Judge has also relied upon the reported decisions of the Supreme Court reported in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow 1994-I-LLJ-872 and Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. A. K. Parul 1999-III-LLJ (Suppl)-1093. In our opinion, the finding is absolutely correct. We find that this charge of misappropriation was not the only charge. There were other charges on which the petitioner was held guilty, such as not maintaining the records of the society properly where he was working as the Secretary. He was also charged that he failed in protecting the property of the society and the pesticides purchased for the society, which were stored in the society, without selling them till the end of his service and without returning it to the society has become useless. It is also alleged against him that he had helped unsuitable members to get loans by producing false certificates. If the concerned person was found guilty on all these charges, in our opinion, the learned single Judge committed no illegality in restoring the punishment of dismissal particularly, when the Labour Court had given a finding though sketchy in nature and so skeleton like that, it could, not amount to a finding of fact with application of mind. It was obvious that the Labour Court had acted perversely in ordering the reinstatement and limiting the punishment only to the deprivation of the back wages. If the learned single Judge has taken a view that the Labour Court's finding regarding the punishment was without any material or reasons, according to us, the learned single Judge has committed no error either in law or on facts so as to justify the interference by us in this writ appeal. The writ appeal has no merits and has, therefore, to be dismissed but without any orders as to the costs. Connected C.M.P. Nos. 18353 and 19919 of 1999 are closed.