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2000 DIGILAW 822 (KAR)

V. S. Reddy v. M. Jayakumar

2000-12-08

T.S.THAKUR

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ORDER Tirath S. Thakur, J.—Disputes relating to the termination of a contract for construction of a Telephone Exchange at Karisandra in Bangalore having arisen between the Petitioner-contractor and the Department of Telecommunications, a reference for adjudication of the same was made to Sri M. Jayakumar as sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference and after hearing both the parties, made an award, by which the claim made by the Petitioner was allowed only to the extent of Rs. 35,000/- besides an amount of Rs. 16,608/- towards interest. Future interest from the date of the award till date of payment at the rate of 12% p.a. was also awarded. An application purporting to be one under Section 33 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for interpretation of the award was then made by the Petitioner, which has been upon consideration rejected by the Arbitrator in terms of order dated 13th of October, 2000 impugned in this Petition. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the Arbitrator was not justified in rejecting the application as the Petitioner had made out an excellent case for interpretation. He urged that the order impugned was laconic, hence unsustainable in law and that this Court could under Article 226 of the Constitution interfere with the same with a direction to the Arbitrator to re-examine the matter. 3. Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for correction and interpretation of the awards. It runs thus: Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.-(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties- (a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award; (b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. (c) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under Sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award. (c) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under Sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award. (3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the arbitral award. (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with notice to the other party, may request, within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award. (5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under Sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from the receipt of such request. (6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, given an interpretation or make an additional arbitral award under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (5). (7) Section 31 shall apply to correction or interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional arbitral award made under this section. 4. A plain reading of the above would show that the provision envisages not only correction of any computation, clerical or typographical errors, but also interpretation of any specific point or part of the award. While Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 33 deals with correction of errors, Clause (b) provides for interpretation. The difference in the mechanism provided for invoking the said two provisions apparently is that while a request for correction of any computation, clerical or other error can be made by any party, a request for interpretation of any specific point or part of the award under Clause (b) is permissible only if the parties have so agreed. This follows a priori from the fact that the expression 'if so agreed by the parties' appearing in Sub-clause (b) is missing in Sub-clause (a) of Section 33(1). The omission is important hence cannot be ignored. Further Sub-section (2) requires the Arbitral Tribunal to make the correction or give an interpretation within the time specified therein if the request for the same is considered by it to be justified. The omission is important hence cannot be ignored. Further Sub-section (2) requires the Arbitral Tribunal to make the correction or give an interpretation within the time specified therein if the request for the same is considered by it to be justified. Any such interpretation has then to form a part of the arbitral award. Sub-section (3) empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any error of any type on its own initiative within thirty days from the date of the arbitral award, whereas Sub-section (4) deals with making of an additional award in regard to claims presented to the Arbitral Tribunal but omitted from the award made by it. 5. It is not in the instant case clear whether the agreement executed between the parties entitled them to apply for interpretation of the award under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act. A copy of the agreement has not been placed on record nor was it suggested that the same makes a provision for the parties to apply for interpretation of the award. It is also not the case of the Petitioner that any such agreement had been arrived at between the parties subsequent to the execution of the deed or at any stage before the making of application for interpretation. In the absence of an agreement between the contracting parties, the request for interpretation of the award was misconceived and could have been rejected on that ground alone. At any rate, the Arbitrator appears to have gone into the merits of the request and as is evident from a reading of the order made by him reconsidered the entire matter over again, but come to the conclusion that there was no room for invoking the powers vested in him under Section 33(1)(b). That view of the Arbitrator cannot be said to be so outrageously irrational as to call for interference by this Court under Article 226. As a matter of fact, the Arbitrator appears to have widened the scope of the proceedings arising from the request in which all that was required to be seen was whether any part of the award made by him called for an interpretation. An occasion to give an interpretation would in turn arise only if there was any ambiguity in the award or the conclusion drawn on any point. An occasion to give an interpretation would in turn arise only if there was any ambiguity in the award or the conclusion drawn on any point. No such ambiguity was however pointed out or existed in any part of the award made by the Arbitrator, which could have called for an interpretation to clear the confusion. It was wrong to assume that the power vested in the Arbitrator to give an interpretation of the award could be used or invoked as a power to review, redo or re-examine the entire exercise undertaken by the Arbitrator. The power was not meant to be used as a mechanism for asking the Arbitrator to re-examine the conclusion arrived at by him although the conclusion is not in itself vague or prone to contradictory interpretations. Suffice it to say that the request of the Petitioner seeking interpretation of the award made by the Arbitrator was in the facts and circumstances wholly misconceived and was therefore rightly rejected by the Arbitrator. There is therefore no room for this Court to interfere or issue any directions. If the Petitioner has any grievance against the award made by the Arbitrator, his remedy lies in making an application for setting aside the same under Section 34 of the Act. 6. There is no merit in this Petition, which fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.