S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) INITIALLY in this writ petition, the petitioner had assailed the show-cause notice dated 29-8-2000 issued by the first respondent. During the pendency of the writ petition, the first respondent passed an order on 13-9-2000 cancelling the registration Certificate issued under the a. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (the Act, for short) purportedly in exercise of the power vested in him under Section 12 (17) of the Act. Thereafterwards the petitioner has filed W. P. M. P. No. 24627 of 2000 seeking amendment of the writ petition so as to seek quashing of the order of the first respondent dated 13-9-2000. We have allowed that application by a separate order. ( 2 ) THE writ petition as amended in w. P. No. 24627 of 2000 was finally heard by us with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. Sri. M. V. K. Murthy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner with usual vehemence would contend that there was absolutely no ground whatsoever for the first respondent to exercise the power under Section 12 (17) of the Act to cancel the registration Certificate. Elaborating this contention, the learned Counsel would contend that on a complaint made by the 2nd respondent, the predecessor in office of the 1st respondent-office had conducted an enquiry and concluded the matter by his proceedings dated 7-3-2000 directing the 2nd respondent to workout his remedies in a civil Court. Therefore, the first respondent being a quasi-judicial authority could not have again reopened the same issue and passed the impugned order dated 13-9-2000 and the action of the first respondent tantamounts to his reviewing the proceedings taken by the predecessor in office. The learned Counsel would maintain that the 1st respondent is not vested with any power under the Act to review the order. The learned Counsel would also alternatively maintain that the charge levelled against the petitioner that he secured the Registration Certificate by producing a bogus rent deed, in the fact- situation of the case, is not justified and that it is nobody s case that the petitioner concocted the rent deed and produced the same before the registering authority. The learned Counsel would also alternatively maintain that the charge levelled against the petitioner that he secured the Registration Certificate by producing a bogus rent deed, in the fact- situation of the case, is not justified and that it is nobody s case that the petitioner concocted the rent deed and produced the same before the registering authority. The learned Counsel also placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Smt. Samayamanthala Srihari and another vs. Commercial Tax Officer would maintain that the 2nd respondent being the third party had to workout the remedies before other forums and he has no say in the matter of either granting of Registration Certificate or cancellation of the Registration Certificate ( 3 ) THE impugned order dated 13-9-2000 is made in the purported exercise of the registering authority, the first respondent herein, under Section 12 (17) of the Act. Sub-section (17) of Section 12 of the Act reads as follows:"12 (17 ). The prescribed authority shall have power for good and sufficient reasons to cancel, modify or amend any certificate of registration issued by him. Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub-section without giving the dealer concerned an opportunity of being heard. "in the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned order was passed without notice to him and without giving any opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the only question that arises for our consideration and decision is whether the first respondent-registering authority had good and sufficient reasons to pass the impugned order cancelling the registration Certificate. Sri M. V. K. Murthy, the learned Counsel would emphatically say that there were no good and sufficient reasons. We do not agree with him. It is a matter of record and which is not disputed before us that the petitioner himself in his statement recorded by the first respondent has categorically admitted that the 2nd respondent did not sign the agreement produced before the registering authority but got it signed by some other . It is not the case of the petitioner that the so-called some other was the power of attorney holder of the 2nd respondent. In other words, the above admission of the petitioner undoubtedly reflects the position that the rent agreement produced before the registering authority was not signed by the 2nd respondent. It is not the case of the petitioner that the so-called some other was the power of attorney holder of the 2nd respondent. In other words, the above admission of the petitioner undoubtedly reflects the position that the rent agreement produced before the registering authority was not signed by the 2nd respondent. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the first respondent is well justified in observing that the petitioner knowing fully well that the rent agreement was not signed by the 2nd respondent, produced the same before him and got the Registration Certificate. Should it be noticed at this stage that the rent agreement produced by the petitioner before the registering authority undoubtedly is a relevant document though production of such document need not be a must or a condition precedent to get the registration Certificate. We say this because, but for the rent agreement, the petitioner would not trace his right to be in possession of the concerned shop in any other legal character. In other words, the petitioner went before the registering authority claiming that he is a sub-lessee of the 2nd respondent herein. If that is the factual position and if the registering authority subsequently comes to know that the petitioner does not possess the legal character of a sub-tenant, it cannot be said that the registering authority acted irrationally and arbitrarily or without good and sufficient reasons in cancelling the registration Certificate. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned action of the first respondent dated 13-9-2000 would tantamount to the first respondent reviewing the earlier conclusion arrived at by his predecessor in office does not merit our acceptance for more than one reason. The letter issued by the predecessor in office of the first respondent dated 7-3-2000 by no stretch of imagination could be treated as an order or conclusion or finding. It is only an intimation to the 2nd respondent to work out the remedies available to him before the other adjudicatory forums or Courts. Alternatively, even assuming that the proceedings issued by the predecessor in office of the first respondent on 7-3-2000 could be treated to be a finding on the controversy, even then we are at a loss to understand how that fact itself would come in the way of the first respondent exercising the statutory powers under Section 12 (17) of the Act. The limitation imposed by the courts on the power of the quasi-judicial authorities and Tribunals that they cannot exercise the review power unless granted by law is not applicable in the case of fraud. It is trite law that a quasi-judicial authority or a Tribunal has inherent power to recall its own order, to modify its own order and to set aside its own order if such a Court or forum or Tribunal has reason to satisfy itself that a particular order is secured or obtained by playing fraud. This principle does not admit any exception at all. Here is a case where on the petitioner s own showing he produced a bogus concocted document i. e. , a rent agreement before the registering authority and that was the basis for the registering authority to grant the registration Certificate. In the fact-situation of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the first respondent had sufficient and good reasons to exercise the statutory power conferred upon him. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action is irrational or arbitrary. ( 4 ) THE judgment of this Court supra would in no way advance the point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. That was a case where the writ petitioners claiming to be owner of the subject property and contending that the 3rd respondent was a tenant had filed the writ petition seeking cancellation of the Registration certificate. The Court dealing with that writ petition has opined that the enquiry contemplated under Rule 28 is intended only for the registering authority to find out whether the application seeking for application is or not and whether the particulars mentioned therein are correct or not and it is not open to any third party to question the validity of the certificate, that too by filing a writ petition. Should it be noticed that in the above case the Court was not called upon to review the statutory action taken by the first respondent. The limitation of the power should be found having due regard to the language employed in the enabling provision. As we have stated above, it is the power of the registering authority to cancel the registration Certificate if it has sufficient and good reasons. The concept of sufficient and good reasons would undoubtedly include the suppression of relevant materials or stating falsehood relating to relevant materials. As we have stated above, it is the power of the registering authority to cancel the registration Certificate if it has sufficient and good reasons. The concept of sufficient and good reasons would undoubtedly include the suppression of relevant materials or stating falsehood relating to relevant materials. We have already opined above that the rent agreement produced before the registering authority is a relevant material which is required to be considered by the registering authority though production of such an agreement cannot be said to be a condition precedent to grant the certificate of Registration. The principle that a person who approaches the Court should come with clean hands should equally apply to a party who approaches the public authorities seeking favourable statutory orders and they cannot afford to suppress material facts and relevant facts or positively state falsehood and if they resort to such methods, that single circumstance would itself be sufficient for the statutory authorities to nullify or cancel the statutory instrument issued by them. For all these reasons, we are not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order of the first respondent dated 13-9-2000. ( 5 ) BEFORE parting with the case a submission by the learned Counsel for the petitioner would be noted. Mr. Murthy, the learned Counsel would tell us that the petitioner was put into possession of the property in pursuance of a partnership agreement between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. We do not want to express any opinion about this claim. If the petitioner has a right to be in possession of the subject premises by virtue of the partnership deed, it is open for him to work out appropriate legal remedies available to him before an appropriate forum. We are not called upon to pronounce on the rights and obligations flowing from the so-called partnership deed. We leave that question open to be agitated by the parties in an appropriate legal proceedings. We make it clear that if the petitioner establishes his right before the competent Court of law that he is entitled to be in lawful and legal possession of the subject premises, in that event, it is open for him to apply for grant of fresh Registration Certificate, ( 6 ) THE writ petition is dismissed with the above observations. No costs.