JUDGMENT 1. - This civil second appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Decree dated 3.8.98 in appeal No. 9/96 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bundi, whereby he upheld the judgment and decree dated 30.9.1994 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bundi in Civil Suit No. 9/88. 2. Brief facts leading to this appeal, are that plaintiff Kailash Chand Gupta (respondent) instituted a civil suit under Order 7 Rule 1 CPC, seeking decree to direct the defendant Housing Board Bundi (for short 'appellant Board') to allot a land measuring 60x40 sq. ft or alternatively two plots measuring 20 x 49 sq. ft on consideration of remaining balance of premium amount of Rs. 1500/- by getting registration of necessary document executed in his favour. In the plaint the plaintiff averred that upon his application, the Municipality Bundi (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) found him eligible for allotment of a plot measuring 60 x 40 sq. ft. in a residential colony known as Daulat Nagar Bundi, thereby he was directed to deposit 1/4th of premium/price of plot @ Rs. 500/- which was deposited by him on 6.12.83. However, rest of 3/4th amount of plot price to the tune of Rs. 1500/ was to be paid at the time of or before delivery of possession of the allotted plot. In January, 1987 the Municipality issued a notice renotifying the measurement of plot size as 25x64 sq. ft. with premium @.Rs. 100/- per sq. yard against previous notified premium for Daulat Nagar residential colony. It had also been notified that the applicants like plaintiff who had earlier deposited 1/4th premium amount; would be considered afresh upon their fresh application but with renotified premium and the earlier deposited 1/4th premium amount would be adjusted against security amount plus total premium amount of sale price of the plot. Against the said notice, the plaintiff under protest reserving his right to previously allotted plot measuring 60x40 sq. ft. had applied for allotment of plot measuring 20x49 ft. on 14.4.87 in accordance with renotified scheme of Daulatnagar, whereupon the Municipality by its notice dated 10.12.87 reallotted plot No. E/12 in Daulatnagar Colony in favour of the plaintiff on his application submitted under protest. On 15.1.88 the trial Court issued temporary injunction to keep one residential plot of size 60x40 sq. ft. reserved for plaintiff in Daulatnagar and not to allot the same to others. On 15.1.88 the trial Court issued temporary injunction to keep one residential plot of size 60x40 sq. ft. reserved for plaintiff in Daulatnagar and not to allot the same to others. 3. During the pendency of suit, residential colony of Daulatnagar was transferred by the defendant Municipality to the Housing Board defendant Nos. 3 and 4. The Municipality submitted written statement. However the order to proceed ex parte against the defendant No. 3 and 4 (Housing Board authorities present appellant) was passed on 6.4.92. Eight issues were framed. After leading the evidence by the parties, the trial Court heard both the parties and by its judgment decided all issues in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit, against which the Municipality and the Housing Board preferred two separate appeals which were transferred by the District Judge Bundi for their final disposal to the Additional Civil Judge (SD) Bundi who by common judgment dismissed both the appeals while concurring with the conclusions drawn by the trial Court. Hence this second appeal. 4. Shri Shyam Arya learned counsel for the appellant Housing Board contended that both the courts below failed to consider provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 50 of the Rajasthan Housing Board Act, 1970 (for short Board's Act'). He contended that the plaintiff has not given any notice to the Housing Board as required by Section 50 of the Board Act thereby the suit was not maintainable and that apart any contract between the plaintiff and the Municipality is not binding on the Housing Board and, therefore no such decree as sought for in the present suit could be passed by the courts below. Lastly Shri Arya contended that no issue regarding allotment of the plot to the plaintiff by the Board was framed by the trial Court hence it had no jurisdiction to decree the plaintiff's suit against the Board. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Board at the admission stage itself and perused the impugned judgments of the courts below. Having considered the contention of the appellant, prima facie, in my considered view, for disposal of this second appeal, following substantial questions of law are formulated : 1. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Board at the admission stage itself and perused the impugned judgments of the courts below. Having considered the contention of the appellant, prima facie, in my considered view, for disposal of this second appeal, following substantial questions of law are formulated : 1. Whether in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law arrived at by Courts below, there is non-consideration of provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and whether notice as required under Section 50 of the Board's Act was necessary to be given by the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case and failure to do so is fatal to the plaintiff ? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, issue as to the allotment of the plot by the Housing Board was necessarily to be framed ? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, contract in question between the plaintiff and the Municipality was binding on the Housing Board for its specific performance in a suit in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below ? 6. Section 50 of the Board's Act contemplates that no person shall commence any suit against the Board without giving it two months' previous notice in writing of the intended suit and of the cause thereof, nor after six months from the date of the act complained of. Admittedly, in the instant case the suit was instituted against the Municipality which during pendency of the suit transferred the land of residential colony in dispute to the Board inasmuch as thereupon the Board was also impleaded as party defendant to the suit itself and the notice was served upon the defendant Board. Surprisingly enough the Board absented from the proceedings conducted in the suit itself, resulting in proceeding ex parte against it under the orders of the trial Court and moreover no written statement raising any such objection has ever been filed by it. Keeping in view all these peculiar facts & circumstances of the case so also the concurrent findings of the Courts below. In my considered view, no notice as required under Section 50 of the Board's Act was necessary to be given to the Housing Board. Keeping in view all these peculiar facts & circumstances of the case so also the concurrent findings of the Courts below. In my considered view, no notice as required under Section 50 of the Board's Act was necessary to be given to the Housing Board. Similarly, even after impleadment of the Housing Board as party defendant to the suit, it did not choose to participate in the suit proceedings, rather had chosen to remain absent nor any written statement was filed to the suit itself, nor subsequently raised any such objection against the ex parte proceeding or the non-framing of the issues or failure to comply with provisions of Section 50 of the Board's Act prior to the conclusion of the trial before the trial Court. 7. Thus, for fault of the Housing Board the plaintiff cannot be blamed for any lapses and that apart in the absence of pleadings of the Housing Board as a result of failure to file written statement raising any such objections which are being raised at belated appellate stage, it cannot be held that the trial Court committed any error of law or jurisdictional error or illegality in not framing any issue as to the allotment of the plot by the Housing Board. Once it stands proved on record that during the pendency of the suit, the land of residential colony in dispute was transferred by the Municipality to the Housing Board, and the Housing Board was also impleaded as party defendant then it cannot be held that failure to give notice under section 50 of the Board's Act is fatal to the plaintiff because necessity to give notice under section 50 of the Board's Act could be possible in the instant case when the land in dispute would have been transferred to the Housing Board before the commencement of the suit. Therefore, as rightly held by the Courts below, upon the impleadment of the Housing Board as defendant party to the suit, requirement of notice under Section 50 of the Board's Act shall be deemed to have been exhausted. No benefit of Section 50 of the Board's Act can be extended to the appellant Board. No prejudice in my considered view would have caused to the Board in any manner. It can also not be said that rights of either party to the proceedings under a decree would have been adversely effected. 8. No benefit of Section 50 of the Board's Act can be extended to the appellant Board. No prejudice in my considered view would have caused to the Board in any manner. It can also not be said that rights of either party to the proceedings under a decree would have been adversely effected. 8. In S.G. Films v. Brijnath Singh, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1810, the Apex Court observed that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 merely gives statutory recognition to a well recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42. The Apex Court held that in the circumstances of the case, the declaration sought for could not be reasonably denied. The plaintiff had not only the rights of a mortgagee decree holder with regard to the suit property but he was also the assignee of the rights of the Bank which had got the property in question attached in execution of its decree. The Apex Court held as under : "18. The contention that the case fell outside the purview of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as the lease was executed in purported satisfaction of an antecedent claim rests upon the terms of an agreement of 1948, embodied in a letter, on the strength of which the defendant appellant had filed his suit for specific performance. We find that the terms of the compromise decree in that suit and lease deed of 1956 purported to confer upon the defendant appellant new rights. Indeed, there are good grounds for specific performance was adopted as a device to get round legal difficulties in the execution of the lease of 1956 in favour of the defendant company. We are unable to accept the argument, sought to be supported by the citation of Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838, that the lease was merely an enforcement of an antecedent or pre-existing right. We think that it purported to create entirely new rights pendente lite. We are unable to accept the argument, sought to be supported by the citation of Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838, that the lease was merely an enforcement of an antecedent or pre-existing right. We think that it purported to create entirely new rights pendente lite. It was, therefore, struck by the doctrine of lis pendens, as explained by this Court in Javaram Mudaliar v. Avvaswami, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 569, embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act." 8-A. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act makes it explicitly clear that in case of pendency of any suit or proceedings questioning therein directly or specifically any right to immovable property, the said property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the right of any other party thereto, except under the authority of the Court and on terms as it may impose. Thus viewed from this angle, it is settled law that the suit property can be transferred only after prior permission of the court where suit or proceedings are pending and not without authority of the court, otherwise also it would be struck by the doctrine of lis pendens as embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. In the. instant case, the Courts below have considered the provision of Section 52 of the Act qua the transfer of the suit property (land of residential colony in Daulat Nagar) by the Municipality to the appellant Housing Board, which was admittedly without authority of the Court where the suit proceedings were pending. 9. In the. instant case, the Courts below have considered the provision of Section 52 of the Act qua the transfer of the suit property (land of residential colony in Daulat Nagar) by the Municipality to the appellant Housing Board, which was admittedly without authority of the Court where the suit proceedings were pending. Therefore, in my considered view the contention of the appellant Board that in absence of any contract between the plaintiff and the defendant Board, the contract with the Municipality could not be binding on the Board by way of any decree or direction sought in the suit, is not sustainable in the eye of law and the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable thereby the decree in respect of the suit property which was transferred to the appellant Board without authority of the Court where suit was pending, was binding on the transferee i.e. Housing Board inasmuch as, after the transfer of the suit property the Board was also impleaded as party to the suit and served with notice, I do not find any merit in any of the contentions raised in this second appeal nor I find any error of law to disturb the concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below based on due appreciation of evidence on record. It is not a case to exercise jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code inasmuch as no substantial question of law is involved as against the concurrent findings of the courts below. No other point is pressed. 10. As a result of the discussion made above, this second appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed in limine.Appeal dismissed. *******