JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---The petitioner, who has been detained pursuant to the detention order passed by Shri R.H. Mendonca, Commissioner of Police, Brihanmumbai dated 2-5-2000 under section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981, has taken exception to his detention in this petition. 2. The facts which are relevant for the adjudication of this petition are as follows: The impugned detention order was passed on 2-5-2000, while the petitioner was already in custody from 14-1-2000 in connection with some criminal cases to which reference has been made in the grounds of detention. The said order was duly approved by the State Government on 9-5-2000 whereas the same was served on the petitioner on 10-5-2000. The grounds of detention along with translation thereof in the language known to the detenu were however served on the petitioner on 13-5-2000. 3. The only contentions which are pressed at the time of arguments by Shri Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, are that firstly, the detention order is vitiated on the ground of delay in execution; secondly, the detention order was deliberately served on the petitioner after obtaining approval of the State Government so that the petitioner's invaluable right to make representation to the Detaining Authority is impaired; thirdly, there is delay in issuance of detention order in as much as the incidents in question relate to the period prior to his arrest on 14-1-2000 whereas the detention order has been passed on 2-5-2000. 4. While considering the first contention that there is delay in execution of the detention order, which has inevitably denuded the petitioner of his constitutional right guaranteeded to him by Article 22(5) to make representation to the Detaining Authority, the relevant facts are that the detention order was passed on 2-5-2000 whereas the same was served on the petitioner on 10-5-2000 and that the grounds along with the translation were served on him on 13-5-2000. To properly appreciate the plea it would be appropriate to advert to the relevant ground formulated in the writ petition, i.e. ground (B). The said ground is reproduced thus: "B. The petitioner says and submits that the order of detention is passed on 2-5-2000 while the detenu was in different criminal cases in judicial custody and was lodged at Bombay Central Prison at Mumbai. This fact was well aware to the Detaining Authority as disclosed in the grounds of detention. The said ground is reproduced thus: "B. The petitioner says and submits that the order of detention is passed on 2-5-2000 while the detenu was in different criminal cases in judicial custody and was lodged at Bombay Central Prison at Mumbai. This fact was well aware to the Detaining Authority as disclosed in the grounds of detention. The petitioner says and submits that the said impugned order of detention was executed and served upon the detenu alongwith the compilation of document on 13-5-2000 even though the sponsoring authority and Detaining Authority are well aware of the detenu's custody and bail position. The petitioner says and submits that this delay in execution has been done deliberately to deprive the petitioner from availing earliest opportunity to make representation to the Detaining Authority within first 12 days of order and before its approval by the State Government. The concerned executing authority is called upon to disclose and explain to this Hon'ble High Court why the executing authorities took 13 days to serve the detention when the detenu was available at a distance of only 3 km. away from the office of executing authority i.e. J.J. Marg Police Station at J.J. Road, Byculla. This shows clear negligence and lethargic attitude on the part of concerned authorities thereby affecting the right of detenu to make effective representation. The continued detention is illegal and bad in law, ought to be quashed and set aside." 5. As a matter of fact, ground (B), referred to above, encompasses the first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner which have already been adumbrated in the foregoing paragraph. Restricting our discussion to the first ground, that there is delay in execution of detention order, the response of the respondents is found in the affidavit of Shri S.M. Desai, Police Sub-Inspector attached to J.J. Marg Police Station, Mumbai. Paras 2 and 3 of the said affidavit indicate the reasons on account of which the detention order could be executed on the petitioner on 10-5-2000 though passed on 2-5-2000. It would be useful to reproduced the relevant extract of the said affidavit at pages 89-90. "2. I say that I was incharge of Externment Branch of the said Police Station at the relevant time. I say that this branch deals with all the externment matters, chapter cases, detention matters pertaining to the said police station. It would be useful to reproduced the relevant extract of the said affidavit at pages 89-90. "2. I say that I was incharge of Externment Branch of the said Police Station at the relevant time. I say that this branch deals with all the externment matters, chapter cases, detention matters pertaining to the said police station. I say that the said Externment Branch consists of Externment Officer i.e. myself at the relevant time and three or maximum 4 other police staff which includes Police Constable and Police Naik. I say that the order of detention dated 2-5-2000 was received by the J.J. Marg Police Station on 3-5-2000 in the evening for the purpose of service. This is to place on record that during the said period there were six detenus whose proposals were considered. 3. I say that since the present detenu was in judicial custody with respect to four CRs. vide CR. No. 26 of 2000 of Goregaon Police Station, CR. No. 14 and CR. No. 37 of 2000 of Nagpada Police Station, and CR. No. 7 of 2000 of J.J. Marg Police Station. I further say that after receiving the detention order on 4-5-2000 an application was moved before the Metropolitan Magistrate, at Borivali in CR. No. 26 of 2000 for executing the detention order on the detenu. However, it was learnt that the said CR. No. 26 of 2000 of Goregaon Police Station is committed to the Sessions Court and the said Record and Proceedings are sent to the Sessions Court, Br. Mumbai, on 15-3-2000. Thereafter, on 5-5-2000 the application was preferred before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 17th Court, Mazgaon, Mumbai with respect to CR. No. 14 of 2000 and CR. No. 37 of 2000. I say that on 6-5-2000 the order was passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, allowing the application for executing the order of detention on the detenu. I say that on 6-5-2000 with respect to CR. No. 7 of 2000, application was preferred before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 20th Court, Mumbai and on the very same day, it was learnt that CR. No. 7 of the 2000 was committed to the Sessions Court on 4-5-2000. I say that on 7-5-2000 was holiday being Sunday. I say that 8-5-2000 since CR. No. 7 of 2000, application was preferred before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 20th Court, Mumbai and on the very same day, it was learnt that CR. No. 7 of the 2000 was committed to the Sessions Court on 4-5-2000. I say that on 7-5-2000 was holiday being Sunday. I say that 8-5-2000 since CR. No. 7 and 26 of 2000 were committed to the Court of Sessions, application was preferred before the Sessions Court for executing the detention order on the detenu. On 9-5-2000 the said order was passed allowing the application preferred by us. On 10-5-2000 detention order was thereafter duly executed. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I deny that there was any delay in execution of the order of detention on the detenu." 6. On close examination of the events mentioned in the aforesaid affidavit, we have no hesitation in observing that, after the detention order was passed on 2-5-2000 and till the same was served on the detenu on 10-5-2000, the authorities were genuinely busy and did all that was necessary to ensure execution of the order of detention with promptness. In other words, there is sufficient explanation offered on affidavit about the time required between 2-5-2000 till 10-5-2000. We are, therefore, no impressed with the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner about the delay in execution of the order. In our view having regard to the facts on hand it is not possible to conclude that there is any delay, muchless of such a magnitude that the causal connection can be said to have been broken so as to vitiate the detention order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly accepts the proposition that delay ipso facto is not enough but the explanation offered by the authorities will have to be examined as to whether the same is satisfactory, tenable and reasonable. In this view of the matter we have no other option but to negate the plea taken by the petitioner that the impugned detention order is vitiated because of delay in execution. 7. Now we would turn to the second contention urged before us that, because of the deliberate delay in executing the detention order, invaluable right of the detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has been impaired. 7. Now we would turn to the second contention urged before us that, because of the deliberate delay in executing the detention order, invaluable right of the detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has been impaired. The submission proceeds on the premise that since the detention order was passed on 2-5-2000 it was incumbent upon the authorities to execute the same with promptitude and in any case before obtaining the approval of the State Government in which case the detenu would have got a right of making representation to the Detaining Authority. This submission is made by taking aid of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (State of Maharashtra others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya)1, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C)751 where it has been held that the detenu has a right to make representation to the detaining authority and it is the constitutional obligation on the Detaining Authority to consider the representation made by the detenu. In the first place this submission proceeds on the assumption that there is deliberate delay in execution so as to rob the petitioner's right of making representation to the Detaining Authority. Even assuming that the delay in execution of detention order is deliberate, as contended, even then the question is as to what are the legal consequences thereof? In this context, what is to be seen is what is the right available to the detenu and is it possible to hold that the said right of a detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority is so vital and indefeasible that deprivation of the same would entail in infraction of any constitutional right? This aspect can be straight away answered by referring to the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court, for it has concluded that the said right of the detenu is a limited one and enures only till the State Government accords approval to the detention order. This aspect can be straight away answered by referring to the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court, for it has concluded that the said right of the detenu is a limited one and enures only till the State Government accords approval to the detention order. This conclusion has been reached by the Apex Court in view of the purport of the relevant provision which postulate that if any order is made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, in that eventuality it is obligatory on the part of the officer to forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with grounds on which the order has been made and such particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter. The said decision also concludes the issue that an order passed by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 shall remain in force initially for a period of 12 days after making thereof unless in the meantime it is approved by the State Government. In other words, the mandate of section 3 is that if an order is made by the officer mentioned in sub-section (2) the same remains in operation only for a limited period of 12 days unless in the meantime it is approved by the State Government. This provision has been made only to safeguard the interest of the detenu and to restrict the power of the officers mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act to the extent that the order of delegate should operate for a limited duration, but the same gets merged in the approval order passed by the State Government in which case the period of detention gets automatically extended upto one year as provided in the said Act. Another facet which emanates from the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is that, no doubt the detenu's right to make representation to the Detaining Authority is a constitutional right, however, under the scheme of the Maharashtra Act the detention order passed by an officer under sub-section (2) gets assimilated in the approval order of the State Government and that on grant of approval the initial Detaining Authority becomes functus officio. In other words, the right to make representation to the Detaining Authority is not an unconditional or absolute one but obviously a limited one. In other words, the right to make representation to the Detaining Authority is not an unconditional or absolute one but obviously a limited one. The same is available to the detenu only when, for a period of 12 days from making of the detention order, provided the detention order is served on the detenu; and the same has not been approved by the State Government. Once the detention order receives approval from the State Government, in that situation, the law does not recognize any right of the detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority. Besides this there is no provision in any law that would prohibit obtaining of prior approval of the State Government before effecting service of the detention order passed by officers mentioned in section 3(2). No such provision has been brought to our notice. We have no hesitation in observing that assuming that even if there is deliberate delay in execution to deprive the detenu of his right to make representation to the Detaining Authority, even then it cannot affect the validity of the detention order, for it is not impermissible in law for the Detaining Authority to obtain prior approval of the State Government before serving the detention order on the detenu. On plain reading of the provisions of section 3 of the Act it would indicate that the officers (delegates) mentioned in sub-section (2) are also empowered to make detention order but the efficacy of such order would be only for a limited duration unless the State Government (Principal) accords approval thereto. There is nothing in the said provision that would preclude the officer in obtaining prior of the State Government to the order passed by him before effecting service of the said order. In the circumstances we are not impressed even with the second plea raised on behalf of the petitioner. 8. The Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patal v. Union of India others)2, reported 1995(4) Bom.C.R. 310 thereof, to contend that the detenu has right to make representation against the order of detention to the Detaining Authority. For the view which we have taken, in the present case, this decision of the Apex Court would be of no avail. For the view which we have taken, in the present case, this decision of the Apex Court would be of no avail. There can be no quarrel with the abovesaid proposition in as much as even in the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya (supra) the Apex Court has reiterated the said principle. However, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of MPDA Act has unambiguously observed that the said right of the detenu is available so long as the order of detention has not been approved by the State Government. In the circumstances we have no option but to negate even the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 9. Now, reverting to the third contention, the same can be culled out from ground (F) of the writ petition. The sum and substance of the said ground is that there is delay in passing the impugned order of detention in as much as the incidents and the materials which have been referred to for recording subjective satisfaction are of the period prior to the date of arrest of the detenue i.e. 14-1-2000, however, the detention order has been passed as late as on 2-5-2000. While dealing with this plea the affidavit filed by the respondents, of the Detaining Authority, has offered explanation. The said explanation can be found from pages 74 to 81 of the paper book. The substance of the explanation is that the proposal for detention of this detenu was submitted on 22-1-2000, on the basis of the several instances and materials referred to in the grounds of detention which had occurred just on or around 14-1-2000. The said proposal was scrutinized at different levels from 22-1-2000 till 16-2-2000 and decision was taken to pass order of detention. For the period between 16-2-2000 till 29-4-2000, the explanation offered is that the necessary formalities of typing, xeroxing, etc. were required to be completed. The Detaining Authority has also come out with a specific case that during the relevant time crucial issue was being considered by the Full Bench of this Court in Cri. Writ Petition No. 272 of 1999 and connected matters. The question involved in the said cases was as to whether the detenu, under the present act (i.e. MPDA Act), has a right to make representation to the Detaining Authority. Writ Petition No. 272 of 1999 and connected matters. The question involved in the said cases was as to whether the detenu, under the present act (i.e. MPDA Act), has a right to make representation to the Detaining Authority. It is stated that because of the pendency of the said matters and subsequent pendency of appeals filed by the State Government before the Apex Court, uncertainty on the said issue was prevailing and therefore passing of detention orders were deferred. It is further stated on affidavit that, after the Apex Court passed order on 20-4-2000, copy whereof was received by the Detaining Authority on 26-4-2000, the Detaining Authority again started re-examining the present matter. The affidavit further asserts that having considering all the relevant aspects, the Detaining Authority recorded its subjective satisfaction that nexus between the prejudicial activities and issuance of order of detention was not snapped in the present case and therefore it thought it appropriate to pass order of detention on 2-5-2000. The following extract from the said affidavit would indicate the said stand which is reproduced thus: "I say that copy of the said order was received on 26-4-2000. After going through the same, it was decided to review the matter which was pending before the Detaining Authority for issuance of the Detention Order. Accordingly, the Detaining Authority again started going through the said matters. The Detaining Authority went through the present matter and he was subjectively satisfied that nexus between the prejudicial activities and issuance of the order of Detention is maintained in the present case and hence, he issued the order of detention on 2-5-2000. I say that on 2-5-2000 the Detaining Authority once again carefully went through the proposal and papers accompanying the same and finalized Grounds of Detention and contemporaneously issued the order of Detention on 2-5-2000. I say that on 1-5-2000, there was holiday due to Maharashtra Day and hence, on that day and previous few days, the Detaining Authority alongwith other police officers were busy in parade and bandobast on account of Maharashtra Day. I say that on 1-5-2000, there was holiday due to Maharashtra Day and hence, on that day and previous few days, the Detaining Authority alongwith other police officers were busy in parade and bandobast on account of Maharashtra Day. It is denied that there is delay in issuing the order of Detention." The aforesaid stand taken on affidavit before us is also recorded in the grounds of detention in paras 5 and 6, where the Detaining Authority while recording his subjective satisfaction has taken into account the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the issuance of the order. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (P.N. Paturkar v. S. Ramamurthi)3, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 656, and contended that there was undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order on account of which the detention order should be frowned upon. We are afraid, having regard to the explanation which has been offered by the Detaining Authority, which, in our view, is not only satisfactory but also tenable and reasonable. It is, therefore, not possible to entertain the grievance made by the petitioner. Moreover, in the said decision, the Apex Court noticed its earlier decisions which have taken the view that when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order the Court has to scrutinise whether Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and offered a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. The said decision further proceeds to observe that when the authority is called upon to answer the delay and if any explanation is offered then the Court has to investigate whether causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, once the Court takes the view that the Detaining Authority was conscious and aware of the distance between the instances and the passing of the detention order and has recorded its subjective satisfaction even in respect of the factum of causal connection has not broken, then it is not open for the Court to sit over the subjective satisfaction so recorded by the Detaining Authority and take a contrary view. In other words, in our opinion, there is a perceptible difference between the test to be applied for considering whether the order of detention is vitiated because of delay in passing of the detention order than while considering the delay in the execution of the detention order. In so far as delay in passing detention order is concerned, when the Detaining Authority offers satisfactory, tenable and reasonable explanation for the delay and also points out that before recording subjective satisfaction the Detaining Authority was conscious and aware that causal connection has not been broken, in that situation it is not permissible for the Court to take a different view in the matter. Applying the said principle to the present case we find that the Detaining Authority has offered explanation with regard to delay in passing the detention order, which explanation, in our view, is not only satisfactory but tenable and reasonable. What we find is that, the Detaining Authority, after March, 2000, when the legal controversy regarding the right of detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority cropped up, decided to defer the issuance of detention order till the said matter was settled. It is only when the position was crystallized that the Detaining Authority decided to actually issue the detention order on being further satisfied after re-examining the entire material on record before it in the context of subsistence of causal connection. The said subjective satisfaction has been recorded in grounds of detention as also reiterated on affidavit before us. In other words, there is not only reasonable, tenable and sufficient cause shown by the Detaining Authority for the delay in passing of the detention order but even the factum of the causal connection or that the causal connection has not been broken has also been kept in mind. In the circumstances, even the third contention raised by the petitioner is devoid of merits. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the challenge to the impugned detention order should fail and therefore the petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly we see no reason to interfere in this writ petition and hence the same is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. Petition dismissed. -----