Judgment S.J.Mukhopadhaya, J. 1. The petitioner who was in the services of the State having removed from service, vide order dated 4th March, 1991 in view of conviction in criminal case, has challenged the same. 2. The brief fact of the case shows that the petitioner who was a Panchayat Sewak was made an accused in Terari P.S. Case No. 9 dated 17th July, 1976. In the said case, the informant alleged that while the informant with his brother returning back to their house, saw the accused persons including the petitioner ploughing the land in Plot No. 1204, which the informant had got by virtue of a deed of gift. While the brother of the informant Sachidanand Rai proceeded to unyoke the plough forcibly the accused Sheo Behari Rai (petitioner herein) gave a Farsa blow on the deceased Sachidanand Rai and other accused also assaulted. Later on, Sachidanand Rai succumbed to the injury. 3. In view of criminal case, the petitioner was taken into custody and was placed under suspension on 17th June, 1977. Subsequently, the trial court convicted the petitioner under different sections of l.P.C. including section 302 vide judgement dated 16th September, 1982. Against the judgment of the trial court, the petitioner along with his brother preferred Criminal Appeal No. 625/82, wherein this Court on hearing the perties, vide judgment and order dated 16th April, 1986 set aside the conviction of petitioner under sections 302/147 and 302/34 l.P.C. and convicted him under section 326/34 I.P.C The sentence of petitioner was reduced to the period already undergone. 4. In view of aforesaid judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No. 625/82, the same having become final, the authorities issued impugned order on 4th March, 1991, under proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of Constitution of India. 5. The main plea taken by the counsel is that the impugned order was issued on wrong presumption that the petitioner murdered. It was submitted that the conviction under section 302 I.P.C. having set aside, the Respondents should not have issued order on such ground. 6. Much reliance was placed on proviso (a) to Article 311(2) and it was submitted that the conduct of the petitioner was not taken into consideration, which relates to conviction. 7. It was submitted that the conviction under section 302 I.P.C. having set aside, the Respondents should not have issued order on such ground. 6. Much reliance was placed on proviso (a) to Article 311(2) and it was submitted that the conduct of the petitioner was not taken into consideration, which relates to conviction. 7. The counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment passed by this Court in the Criminal Appeal No. 625/82, wherein while conviction under section 302/147 I.P.C. was set aside, this Court convicted the petitioner under section 326/34 I.P.C. Placing reliance on the circumstances in which the petitioner had to assault the deceased, it was submitted that the petitioner has the right of personal defence and for that even if convicted under section 326, no punishment of removal/dismissal from service should have been inflicted. 8. Reliance was also placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Sarju Prasad Singh V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1987 P.L.J.R. 285 to show that the charge under section 326 I.P.C. does not involve a moral turpitude. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Allahabad High Court in Mangali V/s. Chhaki Lal and others reported in A.I.R. 1963 All. 527, wherein it is held that till (sicstill ?) the offence does not involve moral turpitude. 9. The definition of murder, as provided under criminal jurisprudence cannot be considered for the purpose of passing an order by an appointing authority in a civil proceeding under service jurisprudence. The sentence "HATYA KAY AAROP" cannot attribute to murder under section 302 l.P.C. The provision of section 326 I.P.C. relates to voluntary causing grievous hurts by dangerous weapons or means, which is likely to cause death. Though such death cannot be held to be a murder under section 302 I.P.C, can be taken into consideration to pass an appropriate order in accordance with Service Rule/Law. 10. In the case of Sarju Prasad Singh (supra), the Full Bench while discussed the words and phrases "moral turpitude", it held that the basic indicia of moral turpitude are : (1) something which is contrary to justice, honesty or good morals and involves a baseness of mind or attitude; (2) which shocks the moral conscience of justice in general; and (3) something which will attach a depravity of character to the person guilty thereof. In the case of Mangali (supra), the Allahabad High Court while held that no absolute standard can be laid down for decision whether a particular offence is to be considered one involve moral turpitude, held that the question necessarily depends on the circumstances in which offence is committed. 11. In the present case, this Court, vide its judgment dated 16th April, 1986 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 625/82, while took into consideration the relevant facts, held that the circumstances in which the appellant (including petitioner), exceeded the right of private defence, failed to justify the injuries as were found on the person of the deceased which resulted ultimately in his death. It was in the aforesaid background, this Court held the petitioner and others as guilty of offence under section 326/34 I.P.C. 12. Admittedly, one of the agnates of petititioner having caused grievous injury by petitioner which resulted to his death, it is not only shocking in general but will shock the society as a whole. Thus, I hold that the charge under section 326 I.P.C. may also involve moral turpitude, which may take into consideration by the appointing authority to dispense with the service of one or other employee. 13. In the circumstances, the petitioner having convicted under section 326/34 I.P.C, I find no illegality in the impugned order of removal. 14. There being no merit, the writ petition is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall, however, be no order, as to costs.