BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THE Government of Karnataka and its servants being faced with an ex-parte money decree for Rs. 56,68,734/- have preferred this regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The impugned judgment and decree dated 27. 5. 2000 has been passed in O. S. No. 16255/1999 by Sri D. V. Shet, XXVth Additional city Civil Judge at Mayohall, Bangalore (CCH-20 ). ( 2 ) THE facts which have transpired during the hearing of the present appeal eloquently speaks as to how the manipulations, manoeuvering, latches and carelessness at various levels of State organs can result in grave abuse of process of the Court and imperil the public revenue. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 1, which is a private limited Company, had filed a suit in question seeking a decree in a sum of Rs. 56,91,734 with interest at 21% per annum against the appellants-State of karnataka through its Chief Secretary and others, who are defendants 1 to 4 in the Court below. Since according to the Court below, despite service of notices, defendants neither filed their written statements nor appeared on the dates fixed for hearing of the suit, therefore they were placed ex-parte and ultimately the suit was decreed in terms of the relief claimed by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) SINCE, in our opinion, for the reasons set out hereinafter, the impugned judgment and decree are not sustainable on the ground of serious procedural latches, we do not propose to express any opinion on the merits of the case, though the learned Advocate general appearing for the State, desired to impress upon us that the claims as made out by the plaintiff, are totally untenable both on facts and in law. ( 5 ) ONE of the grounds taken in the present appeal is that the trial Judge had not given proper opportunity to the appellants to putforth their case in the manner required by law. Since we were at a loss as to how despite service of notices on the appellants, the suit could have gone ex-parte against the Government, we called for lower Court records and also permitted each of the appellants to state on affidavit as to whether they had been duly served and had taken appropriate steps for appearance before the trial Court. Accordingly, personal affidavits have been filed by the Chief Secretary to the Government, Secretary to the Department of Women and Child development, the Director of Department of Women and Child development as also the Law Secretary to the Government. These affidavited statements have brought to light as to how the public interest can conveniently be defeated because of either deliberate inaction or apathetic negligence on the part of the Government functionaries and the Government Pleaders. ( 6 ) IN the present case, the plaint was presented on 14. 10. 1999 in the Mayo Hall unit of the City Civil Court, Bangalore. On 15. 10. 1999, the suit was registered as O. S. No. 16255/99. According to the administrative arrangements, it was assigned to Court Hall no. CCH-20, about the legality whereof, we have serious doubt. On 15. 10. 1999, the assignee Court directed for issuance of emergent notice to the defendants returnable on 27. 10. 1999. On the latter date, the case was adjourned to 22. 11. 1999 awaiting service report. But, on 29. 10. 1999, application was filed by the plaintiff for advancement for passing orders on the application for re-issue of emergent notice to defendants on LA. returnable by 22. 11. 1999. The trial Court considered the request and passed order accordingly. On 22. 11. 1999, defendants 3 to 5 were shown as present, defendant 2 was placed ex-parte and time was granted till 16. 12. 1999 for return of the process on defendants 1 and 6. On 16. 12. 1999, since nobody appeared for defendants 3 to 6, they were placed ex-parte. But the case was adjourned to 13. 1. 2000 for awaiting service of summons on defendant No. 1 i. e. State Government impleaded through its Chief secretary. The Order sheet of the trial Court surprisingly shows that after having passed the above order, at some latter part of the day, the file was again placed for orders with the following office note. "later D1 S/s and notice served on the office clerk. Endorsement kept in. " ( 7 ) ON seeing the above office note, the learned trial Judge passed one more order, on the very which is to the following effect-"d1 is called out. Absent-service held sufficient and set ex- parte. For plaintiff's evidence" ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, on 13. 1. 2000, 16. 2. 2000 and 18. 3. Endorsement kept in. " ( 7 ) ON seeing the above office note, the learned trial Judge passed one more order, on the very which is to the following effect-"d1 is called out. Absent-service held sufficient and set ex- parte. For plaintiff's evidence" ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, on 13. 1. 2000, 16. 2. 2000 and 18. 3. 2000, one witness was permitted to be examined on behalf of the plaintiff in support of its claim. On 25. 3. 2000, arguments were heard in the case and immediately thereafter on 27. 5. 2000 the impugned judgment was pronounced. ( 9 ) AT this stage we wish to state that on 16. 12. 1999, the learned trial judge had adjourned the case to 13. 1. 2000 with an order to await service on Defendant No. 1 through the Chief Secretary. Then subsequently, there was no occasion on his part to again call out the case at the instance of the office, which had reported that summons have already been served and accordingly place defendant no. 1 ex-parte. This approach of the trial judge is not understandable. Even if the office had subsequently reported about service of summons on the 1st defendant, the Court could have passed appropriate order only on the adjourned date i. e. on 13,12. 2000 and not earlier. ( 10 ) THE other important aspect which tells upon the conduct of the trial judge is that under Order 5 Rule 12 CPC, wherever it is practicable, service of summons has to be made on the defendants in person unless he has an agent empowered to accept the service, in which case service on the agent shall be sufficient. In the present case, as per the very office note, the summons meant for the 1st defendant, State of Karnataka through Chief Secretary, was served on some clerk in Vidhana Soudha. The trial judge could not have acted on such a report and placed the 1st defendant ex-parte without verifying and ascertaining as to whether the clerk who had received the summons can be said to be an authorized agent of the State of karnataka or its Chief Secretary. The trial judge could not have acted on such a report and placed the 1st defendant ex-parte without verifying and ascertaining as to whether the clerk who had received the summons can be said to be an authorized agent of the State of karnataka or its Chief Secretary. ( 11 ) FURTHER Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Karnataka Conduct of Government Litigation Rules, 1985, very clearly provided that "where a summon or notice in a case is addressed to the Chief Secretary to Government, the same shall be received by the Solicitor in the department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. There is admittedly a post of Solicitor in the Law Department of the State which is held by a judicial officer. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, the trial judge could not have held the service of summons on behalf of the 1st defendant on a clerk to be sufficient service and placed the said defendant ex parte. But, possibly the trial judge had no patience to do it and he was all in hurry to dispose of the case though it involved high public stake. ( 13 ) THE impatience of the trial Judge is also reflected from the fact that he had given hardly 7 days for service of summons and appearance of the defendants though the case did not warrant any such urgency. Apart from this, his undue haste was clearly contrary to the mandates contained under Rule 6 of Order V of C. P. C. and rule 41{1) of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice, 1967, which read as under. RI. 6. Fixing day for appearance of defendant - The day for the appearance of the defendant shall be fixed with reference to the current business of the Court, the place of residence of the defendant and the time necessary for the service of the summon: and the day shall be so fixed as to allow the defendant sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on such day. RI. 41. RI. 41. Summons or Notice to Government or Railway officials.- (1) Whenever a summons or notice is to be issued to any person in the service of Government or the Railway, the court issuing the same shall, having regard to the provisions of rule 6 of Order V and Rule 9 of Order XVI of the Code, fix such time for compliance as would enable such person to communicate with his official superiors for suitable arrangements being made for the discharge of his duties during his absence. ( 14 ) IN the present case, it is a matter of record that none of the appellants-defendants were served with summons as required under order 5 Rule 12 of the CPC which reads as under. Order V Rule 12. Service to be on defendant in person when practicable, or on his agent. Wherever it is practicable service shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept service, in which case service on such agent shall be sufficient. ( 15 ) SERVICE reports, which form part of the record, merely says" served on the office clerk". Now it has come on record that so far as defendants 2, 3 and 4 are concerned, summons had been served on some clerks in their office and acting thereon the said defendants had moved the Law Department for authorizing the DGP to appear on their behalf. It is also a matter of record that authorization dated 23. 12. 1999 was issued on their behalf requesting the DGP to appear in the suit. This authorisation had been received in the office of the dgp on 29. 12. 1999. As is apparent from the copy of the dispatch register placed at Annexure "b", the said authorisation was received by one Smt Irin D'souza in the office of the DGP and according to her, after receipt of the same she had placed it before the DGP for further needful action. The copies of the authorisation were also sent to the Directorate of Women and Child Development Department on 30. 12. 1999. Despite these facts, as borne out from the Court records neither the DGP nor the "litigation conducting officer" of the department took any step to defend the Government and the other defendants which let to passing of the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree. 12. 1999. Despite these facts, as borne out from the Court records neither the DGP nor the "litigation conducting officer" of the department took any step to defend the Government and the other defendants which let to passing of the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree. ( 16 ) THE law Secretary in his affidavit has stated that the Chief Secretary has already ordered for an inquiry appointing Additional chief Secretary-cum-Development Commissioner as the Inquiry officer to go in depth into all that has happened in the present case and fix the responsibility of the erring Government officials. He has further stated that pursuant to the said directions, the Additional Chief secretary has already initiated the enquiry. Since the matter is under inquiry in the administration side of the Government, we forbear from expressing any opinion as to for whose fault the impugned Judgment and decree came to be passed. But, nontheless it cannot be disputed that all that was required to be done at the Government level to defend the suit was done, but it all failed only at the level of DGP and the "litigation conducting officer". It has been stated by the learned Law Secretary appearing before us that for similar such latches, the DGP has already been removed from his assignments. In view of these aspects, we find sufficient ground to set aside the impugned Judgment and Decree. ( 17 ) BUT, before parting, we would like to place on record ourdis approval about the procedure followed for distribution of judicial work in the City Civil Court at Bangalore. The Bangalore City Civil court Act, 1979 (in short the 'act') came into fo;ce on 31. 8. 1979 clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2 of the Act defines the expressions "city of Bangalore" and "city Civil Court". These definitions read as under, (2) "city of Bangalore" means the area for the time being included in the Metropolitan area comprising the Bangalore City declared under Section 8 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) (3) "city Civil Court" means the Court established under subsection (1) of Section 3; ( 18 ) THE City Civil Court is established under Section 3 of the Act. The jurisdiction and the powers of the Judges and that of principal City Civil Judge has been specified in Section 3 and 5 of the Act. The jurisdiction and the powers of the Judges and that of principal City Civil Judge has been specified in Section 3 and 5 of the Act. The relevant provisions of these Sections are reproduced hereunder. 3. Establishment of a City Civil Court (1) As from the appointed date there shall be a City Civil Court for the City of Bangalore. (2) The City Civil Court shall consist of a Principal City Civil judge and such number of other City Civil Judges as the State government may, in consultation with the High Court, determine. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the City civil Court. (a) shall be deemed to be the Principe I Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the City of Bangalore. (b) shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature and arising within the City of Bangalore except suits or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court and the Court of Small Causes. 5. Powers of Judges. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, each of the Judges may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the City Civil Court by this Act or any other law for the time being in force. (2) The Principal City Civil Judge may, subject to the General or Special Orders of the High Court, from time to time, make such arrangement as he thinks fit for the distribution of the business of the City Civil Court among the Judges thereof. ( 19 ) FROM the above statutory provisions, it is absolutely clear that all City Civil Courts established under the Act have the original jurisdiction over the entire City of Bangalore and the jurisdiction so conferred cannot be diminished, curtaited or bifurcated by any administrative or executive order. The legislative intent is writ large on the very face of the statutory provisions. There is no ambiguity in the language employed by the Statute. ( 20 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 5 of the Act also very clearly declares that the Principal City Civil Judge of the City Civil Court, though subject to general or special orders of the High Court as issued from time to time, is the only competent judge who can make arrangements for distribution of judicial business of the City Civil court amongst the judges thereof. As of fact, we find that the then principal City Civil Judge had issued a Notification dated 21. 5. 1988 to the effect that all the suits and other civil proceedings to be instituted in Mayo Hall unit on or after 23. 5. 1988 shall be placed before the Principal City Civil Judge, Bangalore, for assignment. But surprisingly of-late, the successive Principal City Civil Judges appears to have tacitly conceded to pressures from various quarters in relation to jurisdiction and distribution of judicial business in derogation of statutory mandates contained in the Act. ( 21 ) AT present, 32 City Civil Courts are functioning at Bangalore. Out of these, 4th Additional City Civil Judge (CCH 21), 13th Additional city Civil Judge (CCH 22), 26th Additional City Civil Judge (CCH 20) and 28th Additional City Civil Judge are functioning in the premises known as Mayo Hall, whereas the remaining City Civil courts are functioning in the City Civil Court Complex, both being situate in the heart of Bangalore. ( 22 ) DURING the course of hearing of the present appeal, on being enquired from Mrs. Pramila Nesargi, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, as to how the present suit was filed and entertained by City Civil judge sitting in Mayo Hall and that too without any specific allocation of the case to him by the Principal City Civil Judge, she stated at the Bar that it is the practice in Bangalore that it lies within the discretion of the litigant to file his case either in Mayo Hall unit or in the Principal City Civil Court, subject to his convenience and desire and if the case is filed in Mayo Hall Unit, the same has to be heard by one of the City Civil Judges sitting in that unit only. This disclosure was rather shocking to us as the Act does not concede to any such convenience or discretion in any litigant or his representative. ( 23 ) A reading of the Act makes it abundantly clear that all the City Civil Courts established there under have the jurisdiction over the entire City of Bangalore as defined under Section 2 (2) of the act. ( 23 ) A reading of the Act makes it abundantly clear that all the City Civil Courts established there under have the jurisdiction over the entire City of Bangalore as defined under Section 2 (2) of the act. It is also clear that the arrangements for distribution of the cases among the existing City Civil Courts can be made only by Principal city Civil Judge and even if he so desires, he cannot abdicate this statutory power in favour of any of his additional City Civil Judges. ( 24 ) IN the case of VISHWANATHAN vs ABDUL WAJID, it has been held that. ". . . a litigant is not entitled to choose the personnel of the court to hear his case, nor can he insist upon an adjournment of the case because the date fixed for hearing is not convenient to his Counsel. Convenience of Counsel must subserve the larger interest of the administration of justice. " ( 25 ) IN our considered opinion, the above notification dated 21. 5. 1988 issued by the then Principal City Civil Judge was in absolute conformity with the provisions contained in the Act and the same ought to have been strictly adhered to. But we are told that because of certain pressures and consequent adoption of liberal attitude by the administration, led to impermissible dilutions frustrating the statutory requirements. ( 26 ) ACCORDINGLY, we hold and direct that henceforth all the cases filed before either of the two units of the City Civil Court should necessarily be placed before the Principal City Civil Judge for their assignments to the appropriate City Civil Court. We also hold that on the case being placed before him, the Principal City Civil Judge should assign those cases on the basis of identifiable and predictable norms laid down by him for assignment amongst the respective additional City Civil Judges ignoring the fact as to whether the case was filed in any one or the other units of its Court. We further direct that the principle of assignment so devised by him should be published publicly so that it may be a transparent exercise leaving no doubt in the minds of the public at large about its proper exercise. We further direct that the principle of assignment so devised by him should be published publicly so that it may be a transparent exercise leaving no doubt in the minds of the public at large about its proper exercise. ( 27 ) COMING to the fact of the present case, as already held by us in para 16 (supra) the impugned Judgment and decree can not be sustained and are accordingly set aside. The case is remitted to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. The Principal city Civil Judge, Bangalore, will withdraw the suit in O. S. No. 16255/ 99 on the file of the XXVI Additional City Civil Judge, (CCH-20), mayo Hall, Bangalore, and transfer it to some other City Civil Judge in the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore. The City Civil Judge to whom the suit is transferred will permit the defendants to file their written statements on or before 31. 01. 2001 and immediately thereafter by 15. 2. 2001 frame the issues and proceed with the hearing of the suit and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. ( 28 ) IN these terms, the appeal is allowed but without any costs. --- *** --- .