Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 2957/79 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai, appellants 1 to 3 in the Second Appeal, filed the said suit for setting aside an earlier decree and judgment passed in O.S. No. 2/77 dated 20.9.1997 filed by the respondent herein against them on the following averments: The respondent herein originally leased out the schedule mentioned property in favour of the plaintiff under a registered lease deed dated 30.11.1972. They put up a superstructure with their own expense. They had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- as tenants for their residential purposes. The superstructure had been assessed separately in their names by the Municipality. They had been paying the property tax regularly as well as the electricity bills and municipal water tax. Though the period fixed under the lease agreement was two years, they continued even after the expiry of the lease period by holding over. While the respondent filed suit O.S. No. 2/77 before the District Munsifs Court, Tiruvannamalai, for recovery of possession against them. The counsel, who appeared for them in the said suit, omitted to invoke the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). If only he had filed the necessary application under Section 9(1) (a) (i) of the Act, there would have been a direction to the respondent to sell the site to them for the price fixed by the Court. As the counsel was not aware of the extension of the provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town, the point was not raised in the written statement filed in that suit. The suit was decreed on 20.9.1977 as a result of a compromise between the parties. On the strength of the decree, the respondent filed R.E.P. No. 334/79 in that suit for delivery. At this stage, the plaintiffs filed an application under Section 9 (1) (a) and Section 10(2) of the Act for a direction to the respondent to sell the property to them at a price fixed by the Court. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also was filed along with the application under Section 9(1) (a) (i). At this stage, the plaintiffs filed an application under Section 9 (1) (a) and Section 10(2) of the Act for a direction to the respondent to sell the property to them at a price fixed by the Court. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also was filed along with the application under Section 9(1) (a) (i). Yet another application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed to restore the suit, so that the plaintiffs could invoke the benefits of the Act. All the three applications were dismissed by the Executing Court. They filed C.R.P. No. 2647/79, which was dismissed on 15.11.1979 by this Court with an observation that if they were aggrieved by the decree on the ground that the compromise memo was entered into without their being aware of the extension of the Act to the area where the suit property was situate, then the proper course for them was to file a suit to have the compromise decree set aside and not by means of an application to restore the suit. The earlier decree would not have been passed if only the Court had been apprised of the legal position and the extension of the provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town. Failure to bring this legal position to the notice of the Court resulted in miscarriage of justice and the same had to be remedied. The compromise was hit by Section 12 of the Act. There could not be a contract contrary to the provisions of the Act and there was no estoppel against a statute. The plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits of the Act in spite of the decree passed in O.S. No. 2/77. Again, the plaintiffs had paid the rent upto 13.12.1979 and obtained a receipt from the respondent from the suit premises. In that view of the matter, the respondent had waived its rights accrued under the earlier decree. In fact, an advance amount of Rs. 400/- was with the respondent. It was therefore estopped by its conduct from contending that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefits of the Act. The present suit to set aside the earlier decree was filed in time. 2. In fact, an advance amount of Rs. 400/- was with the respondent. It was therefore estopped by its conduct from contending that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefits of the Act. The present suit to set aside the earlier decree was filed in time. 2. The respondent resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows; The plaintiffs had waived their rights to claim the benefits of the Act by entering into a compromise with the respondent and under the compromise, they were given 27 months time to remove the superstructure and surrender possession of the suit property. Under the provisions of the Act, a tenant claiming benefits under the act had to file an application under Section 9 within one month of the date with effect from which the act was introduced to the property or within one month after the service of summons in the suit for an order that the landlord might be directed to sell the property. The plaintiffs had not claimed the benefits of the act within the time prescribed. They were, therefore, precluded from claiming the benefits. They had accepted the compromise and after the expiry of 27 months granted in the compromise, the respondent filed the execution petition and after receiving notice in the said execution petition, the plaintiffs made an attempt to have the decree set aside on the ground that they were not aware of their rights under the Act. The objection was rightly rejected by the Court as they had not applied within the statutory period prescribed in the Act. The High Court also did not grant any liberty to file a fresh suit. A compromise decree could not be set aside on the ground of fraud or collusion. In the absence of any such averments in the plaint, the plaintiffs were not entitled to have the decree set aside. Their only plea was that their Counsel was not aware of the provisions of the Act. The decree could not be set aside on the ground of negligence. The decree in the earlier suit had been passed with the full and free consent of the parties and ignorance of law or ignorance of a right to claim the benefits of a statute could not be made a ground for setting aside a decree in the Civil Court. The tenants also under the Act were entitled to waive the benefits. The tenants also under the Act were entitled to waive the benefits. The plaintiffs had waived their rights and they could not be allowed to raise the questions all over again at a latter point of time. The requirements for setting aside a valid decree were not satisfied by the plaintiffs. Having failed to obtain an order under Section 9 of the Act, the plaintiffs could not circumvent the provisions of the Act and seek the reliefs by way of separate suit. The suit was not maintainable. Again, there was no estoppel operating against the respondent. The acceptance of rent would not amount to estoppel. The suit in O.S. No. 2/77 itself was for recovery of arrears of rent as well as for possession. 3. The learned District Munsif framed the necessary issues and on the materials produced, held that the earlier decree was a nullity and the omission or negligence on the part of the plaintiffs Counsel to invoke the provisions of the Act, could not be put against them. So holding by judgment and decree dated 21.2.1986, the learned District Munsif decreed the suit. However, on appeal by the respondent in A.S. No. 47/86, the learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruvannamlai, by Judgment and decree dated 25.8.1987 reversed the decision of the trial Court, set aside the decree and allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 4. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were raised for decision in the Second Appeal. 1) Whether the compromise decree in O.S. No. 2/77 was brought about by the landlerds suppressing the availability of the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act? and 2) In view of the mandatory provisions of Section 12 of the City Tenants Protection Act, Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed? 5. Pending the Second Appeal, the third appellant have died, his legal representatives have come on record as appellants 4 to 9. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the decree in the earlier suit came to be passed owing to the absence of knowledge of the existence of G.O.Ms. No. 49 Revenue, dated 8.1.1973 extending the beneficial provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai; there had therefore been miscarriage of justice; the decree passed in the earlier suit was a nullity. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the decree in the earlier suit came to be passed owing to the absence of knowledge of the existence of G.O.Ms. No. 49 Revenue, dated 8.1.1973 extending the beneficial provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai; there had therefore been miscarriage of justice; the decree passed in the earlier suit was a nullity. According to the learned counsel, the benefits of the provisions of Section 9 (1) (a) (i) of the Act had vested in the appellants on the date of the compromise decree in the earlier suit and the decree could not take away the benefits that had accrued to the appellants. When as a fact, on the date the earlier suit was instituted by the respondent, the provisions of the Act had been extended to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town, it was incumbent on the respondent to have issued the necessary notice under Section 11 of the Act and in as much as it had not been done, there had been suppression on the part of the respondent with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Act to the suit property and the decree in the earlier suit was a fraudulent one and a nullity. The learned counsel also relied on two judgments in support of his contentions. 1) T.N. Noor Mohammed v. S.V. Govindarajan (100 LW 1176) and 2) S.4. Ramachandran v. S. Neelavathy (1997 I SCC 767) 7. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellants had waived their rights and entered into the compromise in the earlier suit, had accepted the compromise and after enjoying the benefits under the compromise, it was not open to them now to turn round and say that the earlier compromise had been entered into overlooking the applicability of the Act to the suit property. According to the learned Counsel, there had been intentional relinquishment, the appellants had waived their claims as tenants and therefore, the present suit to set aside the earlier decree was not maintainable. In the contention of the learned Counsel, the decree in the earlier suit could not be termed to be a nullity, but a valid one and there could be no going back on the earlier decision. As to whether the earlier decree was a nullity, the learned Counsel relied on a number of decisions. In the contention of the learned Counsel, the decree in the earlier suit could not be termed to be a nullity, but a valid one and there could be no going back on the earlier decision. As to whether the earlier decree was a nullity, the learned Counsel relied on a number of decisions. (1) Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and Another ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ) (2) Dhirendra Nath v. Sidhir Chandra (AIR 1964 SC (1300) (3) Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Another (1996 8) Supreme 222) and (4) Som Dutt (Dead) By Lrs. v. Govind Ram (2000 II CTC 432) 8. The question for consideration now is whether the earlier decree could be stated to be a nullity and has to be ignored and set aside. In identical circumstances, a learned single Judge of this Court in T.N. Noor Mohamed v. S.V. Govindarajan (100 LW 1176) held that the previous compromise decree have its pound of flesh by pinning the appellants to their commitment in the compromise decree and would not allow them to contend that they were ignorant of the extension of the provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town, by the same token it would not be open for the respondent to contend that it was absolved of its obligations under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act to issue the mandatory statutory notice. In as much as the same had not been done, it would not lie in the mouth of the respondent to turn the table against the appellants and contend that they were estopped from seeking the benefits of the Act. 9. Once we cross this hurdle, then the question for further consideration would be whether the appellants had waived their rights under the Act and whether the same had been done intentionally. There are materials in the present case which show that the appellants and their Counsel were not aware of the extension of the provisions of the Act to the Municipal Town of Tiruvannamalai long prior to the filing of the earlier suit. For the principle of the waiver of statutory right to apply, there must be intentional relinquishment of such a right. By no stretch of imagination can it be contended that there was intentional waiver of the rights by the appellants, (sic) in that case was a nullity. For the principle of the waiver of statutory right to apply, there must be intentional relinquishment of such a right. By no stretch of imagination can it be contended that there was intentional waiver of the rights by the appellants, (sic) in that case was a nullity. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act were extended to Tiruvannamali Municipal Town long before the earlier suit came to be filed by the respondent. It is also not disputed that the appellants would be entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Act. The only ground on which the earlier decree is sought to be supported by the respondent herein is that the appellants had accepted and entered into a compromise with the respondent, taken 27 months time to vacate the premises, enjoyed the benefits under the compromise and after the period ended and when the respondent initiated execution proceedings, they chose to resist the application claiming the benefits under Section 9 of the Act. In as much as they had waived their rights, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent, they were estopped from going back on the compromise and claiming benefits under the Act. 10. Section 11 of the Act contemplates that the owner of the property has to issue notice to the tenant in occupation calling upon him to surrender possession and also offering him the value for the superstructure. Admittedly, the respondent had not issued any such notice under the Act. (Sic — When respondent wants to.) The very decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent in Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra ( AIR 1964 SC 1300 ) has laid down that to apply the doctrine of waiver, there must be intentional relinquishment of a right. To repeat, there has been no intentional relinquishment of the right by the appellants to claim the benefits of the Act. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey and another ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ) and submitted that where a Court having Jurisdiction over the subject matter and the party passes a decree, it cannot be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation even if the suit was one barred by time. 12. 12. Whartons Law Lexicon describes ‘nullity’ as a thing which is null and void; an error in litigation which is incurable. Ramanatha Iyers Law Lexicon defines ‘nullity’ as a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it or that is essentially defective or that is expressly declared to be a nullity by statute. 13. The Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction between a decree which is a nullity and a decree which is irregular. As pointed out in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and another ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ). “If the suit was barred by time and yet, the Court decreed it, the Court would be committing an illegality and therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. Courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities.” 14. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court as would be evident from what is to follow. 15. The next decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent in Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra ( AIR 1964 SC 1300 ). That case arose under Bengal Money Lenders Act (10 of 1940). In that case, the Judgment debtor received the notice of the proclamation, but did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation nor did he object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. That case arose under Bengal Money Lenders Act (10 of 1940). In that case, the Judgment debtor received the notice of the proclamation, but did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation nor did he object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. Still it was contended on his behalf in an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure that Section 35 of the said Act relating to the contents of the sale proclamation directing the Court to specify in the sale proclamation the property to be sold was not complied with and therefore, the sale was a nullity. It was held by the Supreme Court that “an objection that the sale proclamation did not conform to Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act could not avail a Judgment debtor in an application under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., if he was present at the drawing up of the sale proclamation and did not raise any such objection at the time nor could it avail a judgment debtor who after receiving notice did not attend at the drawing up of the sale proclamation at all.” It was in that connection, the Supreme Court considered as to what is the safest to do to determine, what is an irregularity and what is a nullity. The Supreme Court, observed that” The Court has to see whether the party can waive the objection if he can waive, but it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity and that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, but obviously an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived, for consent cannot give a Court jurisdiction where there is none. Where such jurisdiction is not wanting a directory provision can be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interest, but in the interest of the party that waives it. The Supreme Court further observed that even if it is assumed that the provisions of Section 35 are mandatory, on a true construction of that section, it was clear that it was intended only for the benefit of the judgment, debtor and therefore, he could waive the right conferred on him under that section. If that was the legal position, Order 21, Rule 90, was immediately attracted. 16. If that was the legal position, Order 21, Rule 90, was immediately attracted. 16. In Mahadeo Prasad Singh and another v. Ram Lochan and others ( AIR 1981 SC 416 1984 SCC 354 = 94 L.W. 1 SN it was held that, “If the power of the transferor Court to execute its own decree were in any respect restricted, the same restriction would attach to the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree; not withstanding the position that the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree were not so restricted.” In that case, Section 42 of the code which indicated the powers of the transferee court for executing a transferred decree, prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 24 of 1954, read as the court executing a decree sent to it, shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself.” The words “as if it had been passed by itself’ occurring in the first sentence of Sub-Section (1) of Section 42, U.P. Act 24 of 1954 substituted the words” as the Court which passed it.” According to the Supreme Court, the effect of such substitution was that the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree became coterminous with the powers of the Court which had passed it. The Amendment Act had taken away the power of the transferee Court to execute the transferred decree by attachment and sale of the immoveable property by making it coterminous with that of the transferor Court which, in that case, was the Small Cause Court, and in view of the prohibition contained in Order 21, Rule 82, C.P.C, the transferor court had no power to execute its decree by sale of immovable property and consequently, the transferee Court, which was the Court of District Munsif to whom the decree had been transferred, has also no jurisdiction to order sale of the immoveable property of the judgment debtor. The sale held pursuant to orders of the transferee District Munsif in the execution of the decree of the Court of Small Causes transferred to him, was held to be wholly without jurisdiction a nd a nullity.” The Supreme Court observed that, “a decree holder gets a right to execute the decree only in accordance with the procedure provided by law in force at the time the execution is sought. If a mode of procedure different from the one which obtained at the date of the passing of the decree, has been provided by law, the decree holder is bound to proceed in execution according to the altered procedure. If there was violation, whatever had been done pursuant to such violation would be without jurisdiction and a nullity.” 17. It has been held in Him Lal Patni v. Sri Kalinath ( AIR 1962 SC 199 ) that, “the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case. Competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” In the case before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff obtained leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and instituted a suit for recovery of certain amount due to him. The correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him. When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through Court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, raised by him in his written statement and thereby deprived himself of the right to question the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award. The defendant was, therefore, estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the arbitrator. He would be equally estopped from challenging the authority of the arbitrator to render the award. The defendant was, therefore, estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the arbitrator. He would be equally estopped from challenging the authority of the arbitrator to render the award. It was in the connection, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was taking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have season to the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it.” 18. It has been held in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu and another ( AIR 1966 SC 634 ) that, a defendant may waive an objection as to place of suing. Where the defendant allows the trial Court to proceed to judgment without raising the objection as to place of suing and takes the chance of a verdict in his favour, he waives the objection and will not be subsequently permitted to raise it. It is even possible to say that long and continued participation by the defendant in the proceedings without any protest may, in an appropriate case, amount to a waiver of the objectio n. The condition unless there has been a consequent failure of justice” mentioned in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, implies that at the time when the objection is taken in the appellate or revisional Court, the suit has already been tried on the merits. The section does not preclude the objection as to the place of suing, if the trial Court has not given a verdict on the merits at the time when the objection is taken in the appellate or revisional Court.” 19. In Hirallal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (1993 2 SCC 458) it has been held that, “a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, but mere error in passing decree does not make it a nullity. In Hirallal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (1993 2 SCC 458) it has been held that, “a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, but mere error in passing decree does not make it a nullity. A decree is said to be a nullity, if it is passed by a Court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a Court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing a decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the Court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree. Whenever there is any lawful agreement, the Court is bound to record the agreement or compromise. There is no provision in the Act which made Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to proceedings contemplated by the Act (Rent Control Act). Nor there is any provision in the Act which prohibits parties entering in to a compromise in the suit for eviction filed under the Act. Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to the proceedings.” 20. In Krishnan Lal v. State of J & K ( 1994 4 SCC 422 ) it has been held that, “When there is violation of mandatory provision and if the provision is for the benefit of an individual in his private capacity and does not serve any public purpose, interest or policy, such violation is an irregularity which can be waived by the individual concerned.” In that case, the requirement in the furnishing copy of enquiry proceedings under Section 17 (5) of the J & K (Government Servants) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1962, though mandatory, was for the benefit of the delinquent in his private capacity and hence could be waived. But, if the requirement was not waived by him, action in violation thereof would be a nullity. 21. The whole question in the instant case is as to whether the proceedings in the earlier suit ending in a compromise decree under which the appellant herein agreed to vacate the premises after 27 months was a valid decree and whether it can be enforced. It has already been noticed that Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act is mandatory. It has already been noticed that Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act is mandatory. The section requires the landlord to issue notice to the tenant before institution of suits or applications against him giving three months notice in writing calling upon the tenant to surrender possession of the land and building, and offering to pay compensation for the building and trees, if any, and stating the amount thereof. The section further requires that a copy of such notice shall at the same time be sent in the case of property situated in a Municipal Town to which this Act is extended to the executive authority of the Municipality or any other authority as may be notified by the Government. Section 12 of the Act provides that nothing in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his right under this Act. It is not disputed and it cannot also be disputed that Section 11 is mandatory and in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in S.A. Ramachandran v. S. Neelavathy (1997 I SCC 767) already referred to it has been held that, “If a suit is instituted without giving notice or if a notice is given but the suit is filed before the expiry of three months, it would be in violation of the prohibitions set out in Section 11. Such a suit cannot proceed. Even the cause of action, which consists of a bundle of facts, apart from other facts, would depend upon giving a notice to the tenant and waiting for a period of three months before instituting the suit. From the tenor of Section 11, it appears that in every suit instituted under Section 11 of the Act, it will have to be mentioned in the plaint that the plaintiff had given a notice (Contemplated by that section) in writing to the tenant and that the suit was being instituted after the expiry of three months from the notice. The prohibitions set out in the section work against the plaintiff. They also create a right in favour of the tenant so that he may not be directly drawn into litigation before a court. The prohibitions set out in the section work against the plaintiff. They also create a right in favour of the tenant so that he may not be directly drawn into litigation before a court. If an opportunity is given to him to surrender possession with the offer that he would be duly compensated for the building and the trees and the amount of compensation is also disclosed to him, he may, during the period of three months before the expiry of which the suit cannot be instituted, consider the offer and decide whether to litigate with the landlord or to quit. If he decides to contest the suit instituted against him he gets another opportunity under Section 9 of the Act by making an application to the court for a direction to the landlord to sell the property in his favour for a price which may be fixed by the court. Since the requirements under Section 11 are in the nature of conditions precedent which had to be complied with before instituting a suit in a court, the non-compliance would be fatal, such suit would be liable to be dismissed at the threshold.” 22. If we apply the ratio of this decision, it would immediately follow that the earlier suit instituted by the respondent/landlord was absolutely without jurisdiction. The suit itself was not maintainable. The mandatory requirements not having been complied with, it goes to the root of the matter and the entire proceedings were vitiated and a nullity. That the objection that a decree is a nullity can be raised at any stage is now well settled. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others ( AIR 1954 SC 340 1955 - I - SCR 117) it has been held that, “It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and whereever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties” This principle had been reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court. See: Hirala Patni v. Kali Nath (AIR 1962 2 SCR 747) and Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash ( AIR 1977 SC 1201 ). 23. The whole question now boils down to whether it could be said that the appellant had waived his right by consenting to have a compromise decree passed. The learned counsel for the respondent in this connection relied on the following two judgments of the Supreme Court. (1) Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. and another ( 1996 8 Supreme 222 ) and (2) Som Dutt (Dead) By L.RS. v. Govind Ram (2000 II CTC 432). 24. In the first of the cases, the appellants before the Supreme Court had agreed to hand over possession of suit land and the respondents were to deposit certain amount in the Court. There was default by the respondents in depositing the amount by the stipulated time. There was status quo order by the High Court. The High Court passed order accepting delayed payment by the respondents and directed the appellants to pay damages for use and occupation as might be determined by the Civil Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not correct in interfering with consent decree which could be disturbed or modified only if the parties concur to the same. In my view, the decision has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no waiver of any right involved which went to the root of the matter. 25. The other decision arose as follows: The suit for eviction of tenant was decreed by the trial Court. The tenant entered into a compromise with the landlord in the Appellate Court, as per the terms of which it was agreed that the tenants son was to remain possession of a portion of the building for ten years and thereafter he would vacate and surrender possession to the plaintiff and in default, the plaintiff could initiate execution proceedings. The tenant entered into a compromise with the landlord in the Appellate Court, as per the terms of which it was agreed that the tenants son was to remain possession of a portion of the building for ten years and thereafter he would vacate and surrender possession to the plaintiff and in default, the plaintiff could initiate execution proceedings. The tenants son was not a party to the compromise, but he continued in possession as per the compromise decree, but failed to deliver possession on the appointed date. Execution was initiated and the tenants son objected to such execution stating that the compromise created a new tenancy and the decree could not be executed. The Supreme Court held that,” the compromise was based on the tenants son vacating the property on the expiry of the specified period and he was estopped from raising any objections as to execution. 26. This decision also does not help the hrespondent in any way. There was no waiver of any right involved, the magnitude of which had been amply set out in the decision reported in S.A. Ramachandran v. S. Neelavathy (1997 I SCC 767) already referred to. We have already noticed that the waiver should be a conscious one and an intentional relinquishment. The applicability of the provision of the act to Tiruvannamalai was not brought to the notice of the Court. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that ignorance of law could be no excuse. This ignorance goes to the very root of the matter. As rightly pointed out by David Annoussamy J. in T.N. Noor Mohammed v. S.V. Govindarajan (100 L.W. 1176) by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in its proper context when he said in M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ). “waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express of implied from conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be “an intentional act with knowledge” per Lord Chelmisford, L.C. in Earl of Darnley v. London, Chatham and Dover Rly. Co. (1867 - H.L. 43 at P.57). There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it. Co. (1867 - H.L. 43 at P.57). There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it. Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every one is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement; there is no such maxim known to the law. Over a hundred and thirty years ago, Maule, J,. pointed out in Martiindale v. Falkners (1846 2 C.B. 796). “There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law: It would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so’. Scrutton, L.J. also once said: “It is impossible to know all statutory law, and not very possible to know all the common law.” But it was Lord Atkin who, as in so many other spheres, put the point in its proper context when he said in, Evans v. Bartlam (1937 AC 473). the fact is that there is not and never has been a presumption that every one knows the law. There is the rule that ignorance of the law does not excuse, a maxim of very different scope and application.” 27. If the respondent or its counsel was aware of the provisions of the Act, it was incumbent on them to have caused a notice to be issued under Section 11 of the Act. This had not been done. If the mandatory requirement has not been complied with, the suit itself was not maintainable and it was not entertainable by the court. The compromise decree in a suit, which should have been thrown out at the threshold has to be held to be a nullity. If, on the other hand, the respondent also was not aware of the extension of the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act to Tiruvannamalai as rightly pointed out by David Annoussamy. J., it would not be proper to impute knowledge to the appellant. There could not have been any conscious or intentional abandonment or relinquishment by the appellants. 28. For all the reasons stated above, the appellants are entitled to succeed. The substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants. The judgment and the decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. There could not have been any conscious or intentional abandonment or relinquishment by the appellants. 28. For all the reasons stated above, the appellants are entitled to succeed. The substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants. The judgment and the decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. There will be no order as to costs.