JUDGMENT T.N. Vallinayagam, J.—When the appeal came up at the interlocutory stage, taking into consideration the only point involved is the validity of the suit notice, both the Counsel wanted the case to be taken up for final disposal. Accordingly, the case is taken up for final disposal by consent of the parties. 2. The above Regular First Appeal is preferred by the Plaintiff in O.S. 10984 of 1996, a suit for possession of the suit schedule property against the dismissal of such suit by the trial Court. 3. Plaintiff is a People Charity Fund, a registered public Charitable Trust, formed for the sole purpose of promoting the welfare of the people at large irrespective of caste, creed or community. The Defendant became a tenant of the Plaintiff in the schedule property on monthly rent of Rs. 1,750/-. Originally he was engaged in the schedule premises as sub-tenant along with the godown constructed thereon by one S.V. Subramaniam and sons and the said S.V. Subramaniam and sons attorned the tenancy in favour of the Plaintiff- trust in view of the settlement decree passed in O.S. 802 of 1973. Plaintiff being a charitable trust requires the schedule premises for its bonafide use and occupation for the purpose of improving the property which was 75 years old and for demolishing the existing structure and putting up a commercial complex in order to augment the funds for utilising the same for the charitable purpose. Claiming that the Plaintiff as charitable trust has to put up the said commercial complex and that the Defendant will not suffer any hardship as the Defendant was using the premises only as godown; the Plaintiff demanded possession disclosing that they have fixed deposit receipts to meet the funds for the project. Thus, demonstrating the financial capacity by filing 44 fixed deposit receipts, a notice was given to the Defendant on 30.12.1995 and by reply dated 27.1.1996 the Defendant contended that it is not interested in handing over vacant possession as the same is required for its own use. 4. Apart from this, the building is old and dilapidated and found to be unfit. 4. Apart from this, the building is old and dilapidated and found to be unfit. Taking action under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation, the Bangalore Municipal Corporation has issued a notice under Section 322(I) on 8.5.1996, calling upon the Plaintiff to show cause as to why the schedule property should not be demolished since the same is in a dilapidated condition and under ruinous state. Having failed in his attempt to get possession from the Defendant, the Plaintiff came forward with the present suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen. 5. The contention put up by the Defendant in the written statement was, firstly the Plaintiff has no subsisting legal right over the suit schedule property and such a suit filed by the Plaintiff is not maintainable in law. Secondly, for the same property a suit for specific performance was decreed against the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Plaintiff has lost title over the property and thus illegally proceeded with the suit against the Defendant for taking possession. Thirdly, notice to quit was challenged as not being in accordance with law and fourthly the notice by the Corporation was issued with oblique purpose. Fifthly, the avowed object of the society to improve its property is not true. Finally, as the Defendant has been using the suit property as a godown since the last several years, the eviction will result in great hardship and inconvenience. 6. On the above pleadings, the Court framed as many as six issues, which are as follows: 1) Whether the Plaintiff proves that it has got right to file the present suit? 2) Whether the Defendant proves that the present suit of the Plaintiff is not maintainable as pleaded by him in para 2 of the written statement? 3) Whether the Plaintiff proves that the provisions of Karnataka Rent Control Act are not applicable to it/him with regard to eviction of the Defendant from the suit schedule property? 4) Whether the Plaintiff proves that it/he has validly and legally terminated the tenancy of the Defendant in respect of the suit schedule property? 5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of the suit schedule property from the Defendant? The trial Court answered the issues as follows: 1. Affirmative; 2. Does not survive; 3. Affirmative 4. Negative; 5. Negative; 7. 5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of the suit schedule property from the Defendant? The trial Court answered the issues as follows: 1. Affirmative; 2. Does not survive; 3. Affirmative 4. Negative; 5. Negative; 7. Evidence was recorded on behalf of the Plaintiff through PW-1 where PW-1 spoke about the main function of the Plaintiff, namely, to sponsor and provide scholarship to deserving poor students and the Plaintiff is running of three hostels for poor in Madras. PW-1 also spoke to the fact that the Defendant is occupying the suit premises in the godown for storing old and rejected electrical goods; the Defendant having come as a sub-tenant; the premises is a century old building and the building is required for augmenting the resources of the trust for the above object. PW-1 was cross-examined as to the title of the Plaintiff in asmuch as the suit for specific performance has been decreed against the trust. 8. On behalf of the Defendant, the Senior Commercial Officer of the Defendant-company was examined and he spoke about the property being used as a godown and seven workers working in that godown. He admitted having received the notice and the factum of the reply expressing inability to vacate. In the cross-examination, DW-1 after admitting the receipt of the notice merely stated that the Defendant is not in a position to pay more rent and advance and even alternative accommodations are not available in Bangalore. 9. It is seen that on framing of issue No. 2, the Defendant appears to have filed a memo on 12.6.2000 saying that he does not press issue No. 2 for adjudication. Accepting that memo, the trial Court did not adjudicate on issue No. 2 and other issues were answered in favour of the Plaintiff, except the question of notice. 10. Aggrieved by such a decision, the Plaintiff is before this Court in this appeal. 11. In the grounds of appeal, it is contended that the trust required additional income to meet charitable deeds and dispositions. The Respondent-company who has enjoyed the property for nearly 25 years at a meagre rent has kept the premises locked up to exploit the Appellant-trust. Aggrieved by such a decision, the Plaintiff is before this Court in this appeal. 11. In the grounds of appeal, it is contended that the trust required additional income to meet charitable deeds and dispositions. The Respondent-company who has enjoyed the property for nearly 25 years at a meagre rent has kept the premises locked up to exploit the Appellant-trust. There was Memo of Understanding (MoU) with Tata Housing Development Company (THDC) for developing the property in question and THDC will claim damages from the Appellant for continued delay in handing over the property for its development or withdraw from the project causing irreparable loss and income. The building is in a dilapidated condition. There are notices from the Corporation of the City of Bangalore pending for four years to demolish building. The Respondent also put the premises in question under lock and key, and cannot use the same as the building is in a very old and not in a fit condition to carry on any activities in the said premises. When there was a denial of title by the Defendant/Respondent there was no need to go into the question of validity of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for the reason that the Respondent has forfeited the tenancy by his own conduct and by his own plea and therefore there is no impediment in law to grant a decree for eviction. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in most of the States is not applicable to a trust for determination or for cancellation of tenancy. The Respondent has not made an application under Order 14, Rule 5(2). Therefore the question of not pressing the issue does not arise. 11(a). Having held that no notice to quit is required in a case where the tenant denies the title, the trial Court ought to have rejected the memo at the final stage of the Court proceeding. The procedure under Order 6, Rule 17 which is mandatory was not followed. The Memo for deletion of issue is belated and an after thought. The technical plea (absence of valid quit notice) cannot be allowed to be raised by way of amendment after long delays as held by the Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker Vs. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd. and Others, AIR 1972 SC 2091 . 11(b). The Memo for deletion of issue is belated and an after thought. The technical plea (absence of valid quit notice) cannot be allowed to be raised by way of amendment after long delays as held by the Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker Vs. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd. and Others, AIR 1972 SC 2091 . 11(b). An application supported by an affidavit under Order 6, Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure praying the Court to delete the portion covered by the issues in the written statement by giving sufficient reason must have been filed. Only after hearing both sides, the Court should have ordered for deletion of the portion of the written statement. The Defendant should carry out the amendment in his written statement and file a fresh amended written statement, which procedure has not been adhered to. 11(c). The Respondent, a wealthy multi national company having its offices all over India and abroad, can easily have alternate accommodation and have in fact taken on lease several properties in the city and therefore never justified the need to retain a redundant leased premises. 12. The learned Advocate General Mr. Jayaram desired to bring to the notice of the Court that the title to the property on the people charity fund, the Appellant, has been confirmed as early as in 1963 in the case of R. Viswanathan Vs. Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC 1 . In short one Ramalingam Mudaliar was the owner, inter alia, of the suit property. He disposed of the property including the suit property by a Will dated September 10, 1942. The avowed object mentioned in the Will was that "the balance of estate be invested in a fund, the income whereof be applied for encouragement and development of industries, education or medical research, diffusion of medical knowledge, including work in nutrition and dietaryby the grant of scholarship etc." The District Court, Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, in O.S. 2 of 1943 after rejecting the caveat granted probate on the Will on November 27, 1943. An appeal filed against the order to the Court of Resident in Mysore was dismissed on July 5, 1944. Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. An appeal filed against the order to the Court of Resident in Mysore was dismissed on July 5, 1944. Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. But by the order dated December 12, 1949, the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on merits holding that His Majesty-in-Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction and thus the order passed by the District Court granting probate accordingly became final and the validity of the Will in so far as it dealt with the property in the Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, is not liable to be challenged on any ground at all. Thus the Apex Court had held putting a finality and full stop to the question regarding the validity of the Will or ownership of the property of Ramalingam, the testator and the bequest made to the Appellant of this property among others. This is what the Supreme Court has held in the above decision in paragraph 2 of the judgment: Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. But by order dated December 12, 1949, the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on the merit, for, in view of the Board, since the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore was before the hearing of the appeal retroceded to H. H, the Maharaja of Mysore and was within the jurisdiction of his State at the date of the hearing of the appeal, His Majesty-in-Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction which was expressly surrendered and renounced. The order passed by the District Court granting probate accordingly became final and the validity of the Will in so far as it dealt with property in the Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, is not liable to be challenged on the ground of want of due execution. Applications for probate of the Will limited to property within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore and the Madras High Court were also filed and orders granting probate subject to the result of the proceedings before the Privy Council were made. 13. Applications for probate of the Will limited to property within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore and the Madras High Court were also filed and orders granting probate subject to the result of the proceedings before the Privy Council were made. 13. Though an attempt was made to question the Will for the second time before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held "succession to the estate of a person is governed by the lex situs in the case of immovables, and in the case of movables by the law of his domicile, but these appeals raise questions not about the law applicable to the devolution of the estate, but about title which the testator could devise by his Will. That title must be adjudicated upon in the case of immovables by the Courts of the country in which such immovables are situate and on evidence led in that Court". Thus, finally confirming the probate granted by the Court, the title in favour of the trust was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. In fact, the particular properties mentioned in the Will are: (1) Imperial Theatre, Residency Road, Bangalore; (2) Immovable property on No. 27 Dickenson Road, Bangalore and (3) Suit schedule property on old Madras Road and other properties as enumerated in the Will located in the erstwhile civil and military station of Bangalore, Bangalore District Court, Bangalore. Therefore, the Will having been confirmed and the affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case in Apren Joseph alias Current Kunjukunju and Others Vs. The State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1 , as mentioned above, it cannot be reagitated by any forum whatsoever by anybody. Once a finality is reached in respect of a property as such, any other way of challenge to the title or question the title does not lie in the mouth of any person and such a challenge made even amount to contempt in the eye of law or attempt to disobedience of the order of the highest Court in this country, namely, the Supreme Court of India. 14. Apart from reiterating the grounds of appeal Mr. Jayaram, learned Advocate General, submitted that in the teeth of denial of title, the question of notice does not arise and Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act has not been properly understood by the Court below. 14. Apart from reiterating the grounds of appeal Mr. Jayaram, learned Advocate General, submitted that in the teeth of denial of title, the question of notice does not arise and Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act has not been properly understood by the Court below. What is required is that the tenant should be sufficiently put on notice of termination. In this case, there has been no denial of acceptance of termination by the Respondent-Defendant that amounts to even estoppel as contemplated by the Supreme Court. Reliance was placed upon the dictum in Smt. Shanti Devi vs. Amal Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1981 SC 1550 , wherein the Apex Court held that "before deciding the validity of notice under Section 106, the Court should first decide whether Section 106 is applicable or not. The dictum in Idandas vs. Anant Ramchandra Phadke (dead) by L Rs. AIR 1982 SC 127 , to the following effect was also relied upon: We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the Plaintiffs suit. Before concluding we would like to add that with due respect that the judgment of the High Court is not very satisfactory as it has not made any real attempt to apply its mind to the substantial question of law that was involved in the case and seems to have rushed to its conclusions even without considering the authorities on the subject particularly the one referred to in the judgment as also the authoritative decision of this Court referred to above which was pronounced five years before the judgment of the High Court was given. From such a prestigious High Court as Bombay we do expect a more careful and cautious approach in a matter like this. As the Respondents have not appeared before us, we make no order as to costs in this Court. The Appellant will certainly be entitled to costs in the Courts below. 15. A very strong plea was urged before this Court quoting the decision reported in Majati Subbarao Vs. As the Respondents have not appeared before us, we make no order as to costs in this Court. The Appellant will certainly be entitled to costs in the Courts below. 15. A very strong plea was urged before this Court quoting the decision reported in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by LRs., AIR 1989 SC 2187 that notice must be deemed to be sufficient, which is as follows: It was argued by learned Counsel for the Appellant that even accepting that there was a denial of title by the Appellant and the result would be only that the Respondent-landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the every proceedings for eviction in the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction proceedings. In support of this argument learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore vs. Rukmani Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109: AIR 1919 PC 1 . In our view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non-obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlord's title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the Appellant must, therefore, be rejected. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the Appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We, find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlords title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon the very proceedings in which written statement containing the denial has been filed...As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement. 16. Reliance also was placed upon the dictum in The Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd., and Another Vs. Happy Homes (P) Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 471 , which is to the following effect: But, it was contended, the notice intimating an intention to quit at 3-30 P.M. on August 31, 1953, was not a notice "duly given" within the meaning of Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not necessary to decide for the purpose of this case whether the month of the tenancy of Allen Berry expired on the midnight of the first day of every calendar month, for, in our judgment a notice which is defective may still determine the tenancy, if it is accepted by the landlord. A notice which compels with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act operates to terminate the tenancy, whether or not the party served with the notice assents thereto. A notice which compels with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act operates to terminate the tenancy, whether or not the party served with the notice assents thereto. A notice which does not comply with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in that it does not expire with the end of the month of the tenancy, or the end of the year of the tenancy, as the case may be, or of which the duration is shorter than the duration contemplated by Section 106, may still be accepted by the party served with the notice and if that party accepts and acts upon it, the party serving the notice will be estopped from denying its validity. The defect in the notice served by one party may undoubtedly be relied upon by the other party and he may plead that the tenancy does not stand determined, but after the notice is accepted by the other party who acts upon it, the party serving the notice cannot contend that the notice served by him was defective, and on that account the tenancy was not determined. The reason of the rule is clear. A tenancy is determined by service of the notice in the manner prescribed by Section 111(h) read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the notice is duly given, the tenancy stands determined on the expiry of the period of the tenancy. Even if the party served with the notice does not assent thereto, the notice takes effect. If the notice is defective, it does not operate to terminate the tenancy by force of the statute. But a tenancy is founded in contract, and it is always open to the parties thereto to agree that the tenancy shall be determined otherwise than by notice served in the manner provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, or by a notice of a duration shorter than the period provided by the Act. If the parties so agree, the tenancy will come to an end. 17. The dictum in Palani Ammal vs. Viswanatha Chettiar, 1998 (2) LW 7 was cited for the proposition that the tenant who denies the title of the land incurs forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) and renounces his character as tenant when he sets up title in a third person or in himself. 17. The dictum in Palani Ammal vs. Viswanatha Chettiar, 1998 (2) LW 7 was cited for the proposition that the tenant who denies the title of the land incurs forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) and renounces his character as tenant when he sets up title in a third person or in himself. In that case the benefit of Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act was denied to the tenant as he denied the title of the landlord. The relevant portion of the decision is as follows: The aforesaid submission prima facie appeared to be attractive, but on a closer scrutiny it is found to be falling through as we will presently see. The scheme of the Protection Act as seen above furnishes an umbrella of statutory protection to the tenants of open lands who might have put up construction by incurring substantial costs. When they are sought to be evicted from these leased open lands, amongst others, two basic statutory protections are made available they can either enforce their statutory right of pre-emption of purchasing the land below their structure; or can enforce the statutory right of compensation to be paid to them in connection with the structure which may travel with the deemed land of the decree holder/landlord in case the suit gets decreed against them. These alternative statutory rights of protection are made available by the legislature to the contractual tenants and/or to the statutory tenants who by themselves have behaved as tenants and who on determination of contractual tenancy continue to remain in possession. In either case if the landlord determines the tenancy agreement such tenants cannot be said to have lost the statutory protection of the Act. Consequently, on the express language of Section 2 Sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act it must be held that the determination of tenancy agreement as envisaged by the said provision would be such determination as is referable to the unilateral act or omission on the part of the landlord which results in determination of the lease agreement for no fault of the lease tenant. It is under these circumstances that the statutory benefit available to such tenants, either contractual, or statutory would stand guaranteed by the legislative scheme envisaged by the Protection Act. It is under these circumstances that the statutory benefit available to such tenants, either contractual, or statutory would stand guaranteed by the legislative scheme envisaged by the Protection Act. In this connection when we turn to Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act on which reliance was placed by learned senior Counsel for the Defendant we find that the said provision deals with various modes of determination of lease. They are found from Clause (a) to (h) as under: 111. Determination of lease-A lease of immovable property determines. (a) by efllux of the time limited thereby; (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event-by the happening of such event; (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event by the happening of such event; (d) in case the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right; (e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease, to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. (f) by implied surrender; (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease; (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. These diverse modes of determination of lease as found in Section 111 show that the landlord's act or volition which results into determination of lease can be ascribed to modes (a) and (h) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. These diverse modes of determination of lease as found in Section 111 show that the landlord's act or volition which results into determination of lease can be ascribed to modes (a) and (h) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. A landlord who enters into a contractual lease with tenant of open land may allow the lease period to peter out and get exhausted and may not renew the lease. Thus by omission on the part of the landlord the lease gets determined by efflux of time as per Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Similarly, as per Section 111(h), by an express act of giving notice to determine the lease or to quit on the part of the landlord of such open land, the lease would get determined. It is, of course, true that Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates determination of lease by notice to determine or to quit that may be given either by the landlord or by the tenant but in the context of Section 2(4) of the Protection Act such determination of lease of open land under Section 111(h) of Transfer of Property Act would necessarily be limited to the notice to quit given by the landlord of such open land and not by his tenant as if the tenant gives notice to determine the lease or to quit there would remain no occasion for him to claim any protection under the Protection Act by submitting that he remains a statutory tenant as he will not be continued in possession thereafter by his own act. It must, therefore, be held that an erstwhile tenant of a contractual lease of land who can be said to be covered by the inclusive part of the definition of the term 'tenant' as found under Section 4(ii) of the Protection Act is one who has continued in possession of the land after his tenancy agreement is determined either under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act by the omission of the landlord to renew the lease and therefore, it gets determined by efflux of time or on the expiry of notice to quit given by the landlord to the tenant as per Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. Save and except these two modes of determination of tenancy agreement as envisaged by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, no other modes found in Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 111 can ever be said to be contemplated as attracted for getting telescoped in Section 2, Sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act for consideration of the scope of the phrase 'determination of tenancy agreement' as employed therein. Consequently, it must be held that the mode of determination of lease agreement by forfeiture as envisaged by Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is foreign to the scope of the definition of the term 'tenant' as found in Section 2(4) of the Protection Act. This conclusion on the statutory scheme of the Protection Act in the light of the definition of the term 'tenant' as found in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Protection Act gets further buttressed by the combined operation of Sections 9 and 13 of the Protection Act. Section 9 of the Protection Act enables the tenant of the open land to enforce his statutory right of compulsory purchase of the leased land below his structure. Once the tenant incurs forfeiture of the lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act by renouncing his character as tenant of the landlord by setting up a title in third person or in himself there would be no occasion for such a tenant to invoke Section 9 as Section 9 by itself pre-supposes that the tenant must accept the owner of the land as landlord and against whom he can claim appropriate relief by offering to purchase the land over which his structure stands on payment of price fixed by the Court to such landlord who then has to convey his right, title and interest in the land in favour of such tenant owning the structure. Consequently, it must be held that for operation of Section 9 an admitted relationship of landlord and tenant must exist. If the tenant alleges that landlord is not the real owner of the property, but somebody else is the owner or he himself is the owner, there would remain no occasion for him to offer any price of such land to such landlord whom he treats as a stranger to that land. If the tenant alleges that landlord is not the real owner of the property, but somebody else is the owner or he himself is the owner, there would remain no occasion for him to offer any price of such land to such landlord whom he treats as a stranger to that land. On such a stand taken by the tenant of the open land there would also remain no occasion for the so-called landlord to accept the price of the land and to convey his right, title and interest in the land and to convey his right, title and interest in the land pursuant to the order of the Court to such tenant. In this connection Section 13 of the Protection Act is also required to be noticed. If Section 9 can apply only when there is admitted relationship of landlord and tenant, contractual or statutory, between the parties, once such relationship is contra-indicated by denial of title of landlord by the tenant and consequently, mode of determination of tenancy under Section 111(g) is attracted, its applicability by itself will nullify and make Section 9 inoperative in such a case. In that eventuality, as per Section 13 of the Protection Act, such a provision of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, has to be treated as repealed. Sections 9 and 13 of the Protection Act leave no room for doubt that to the extent to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act cut across the operation of Section 9 the said provisions have to be treated to be repealed or modified so as to make the provisions of Section 9 fully effective. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of Section 2(4), Section 9 and Section 13 of the Protection Act, it has to held that determination of tenancy as envisaged under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act by forfeiture cannot get telescoped into Section 2 Sub-section (4) of the Protection Act and must be deemed to have been repealed or modified by the express provisions of Sections 9 and 13. In this connection one more contention of learned senior Counsel for the Respondents deserves to be noted. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act also contains a mode of forfeiture of tenancy by insolvency of tenant. In this connection one more contention of learned senior Counsel for the Respondents deserves to be noted. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act also contains a mode of forfeiture of tenancy by insolvency of tenant. In such a case an insolvent tenant can never by himself seek protection of Section 9 of the Protection Act as his estate is represented by Receiver in insolvency operating under the orders of the Court. If learned senior Counsel for the Defendant is right in his submission that Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act has to be read with Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act, then in such a case of insolvency of tenant which results into determination of lease by forfeiture. Section 9 can never be pressed in service by such an insolvent tenant. This is an additional reason for ruling out the applicability of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act to the provisions of Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act. Once that conclusion is reached, it is obvious that the Defendant in the present case who has admittedly and consistently denied the title of Plaintiff No. 3 cannot get any protection of statutory tenancy as envisaged by Section 2, Sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act. In other words she gets out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act meaning thereby she can neither claim benefit of Section 9 against Plaintiff No. 3 nor can she enforce Section 3 thereof against Plaintiff No. 3. It has also to be noted at this stage that there are two concurrent findings of all the Courts below that Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 have validly entered into a sale transaction of the suit land in favour of Plaintiff No. 3 and their sale deed dated 29th August, 1981 is valid and operative in law. Once that conclusion stares in the face of the Defendant it must be held that the Protection Act can be enforced if at all by the Defendant only against Plaintiff No. 3 and once she consistently says that Plaintiff No. 3 is a total stranger to this land there would remain no occasion for her to get the protection of any of the provisions of the Protection Act. Qua Plaintiff No. 3 she could not be said to be a statutory tenant. Qua Plaintiff No. 3 she could not be said to be a statutory tenant. Learned senior Counsel for the Defendant however was right when he contended that the definition of the term 'landlord' as found in Section 2(3) of the Protection Act would include even a transferee of the original landlords who were the lessors, namely, Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. However, that by itself would not advance the case of the Defendant as even if Plaintiff No. 3 is treated to be the landlord of the land qua Defendant he cannot be the landlord of the demised land for the purpose of the Protection Act as the Defendant does not accept him to be so and treats him consistently as a stranger and a non-entity. It must, therefore, be held that on account of the forfeiture of tenancy incurred by Defendant vis-a-vis Plaintiff No. 3 by denying his title she had walked out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act and tenancy agreement in her favour which was executed by the erstwhile owners/landlords Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be said to have been determined by Plaintiff No. 3 so as to enable the Defendant to claim the benefit of the said determination qua the former. 18. The dictum in Phulan Devi and Anr. Vs. Anand Saroop and Others, 1995 AIHC 1590 was relied upon for the proposition when the tenant denies the title of the landlord, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not required for determination of the termination of the lease. The following passage is relied upon. The Defendants have taken contradictory plea in their written statement. They have denied the ownership of the Plaintiffs over the suit land. They have further averred that in case the Plaintiff are found to be the owners of the suit land even then Defendants have acquired title by adverse possession to the knowledge of the Plaintiffs. The admissions made by Defendant Bhagat Ram in his statement Ext.PW-4/A is substantive evidence in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act. His adverse possession cannot start till he continues to be a tenant. He was let into possession by the Plaintiffs and as such, he cannot deny his landlord's title and is estopped to deny the title of its landlord. His adverse possession cannot start till he continues to be a tenant. He was let into possession by the Plaintiffs and as such, he cannot deny his landlord's title and is estopped to deny the title of its landlord. In the written statement the Defendants denied the title of the Plaintiffs, that is sufficient to disentitle the occupants to a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is settled law that a tenant denying tenancy and setting up adverse title in himself cannot plead want of notice to quit. 19. Similarly, the ruling of the Delhi High Court in Hari Krishan Gupta Vs. Jai Krishan Dass and Others, AIR 1990 Delhi 80, is to the following effect: Where the Court framed certain issue by accepting the application therefore and rejecting the objection of the other party that, on pleadings the issue does not arise, subsequent application by the objector praying that the issue be deleted as it does not arise from the pleadings would not be maintainable. A distinction has to be kept in mind in a case where issues are framed without any objection in respect of the pleadings and in a case where after rejecting the prayer that there are no pleadings, the issues are framed on a substantive application filed by one of the parties for the said purpose. In the first case, the Court would be justified in deleting the issue if it comes to the conclusion that it does not arise from the pleadings of the parties. In the second case, the aggrieved party, if permissible in law, may apply for the review of the order allowing the application of the opposite party and framing the issues but it cannot again reagitate the question of framing of issue in the same proceedings and on the same grounds by indirect method of filing application under Order 14, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. 20. On the duty of the judiciary to approach the modern problem, the Allahabad High Court has rendered the following dictum in Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir and Others, AIR 1972 All 273 . The question next falling for consideration is whether the Plaintiff and his two predecessors were not Hindu Sanyasis and therefore were not competent to assume or hold the office of Mahant. Mathura Ahir and Others, AIR 1972 All 273 . The question next falling for consideration is whether the Plaintiff and his two predecessors were not Hindu Sanyasis and therefore were not competent to assume or hold the office of Mahant. The finding of the Court below on this point is in Appellant's favour, the reason given therefore being that the Plaintiff failed to prove that he or his predecessors had performed Arma Sradh and uttered Pravesh Mantra as mandatorily prescribed by Hindu Law. The factual part of the finding, viz., the performance of the Sradh and the utterance of the Mantra, is binding in second appeal, but the conclusion drawn therefrom is one of law. I have generally considered the legal aspect of the matter earlier in my judgment and expressed views on a broader hypothesis which might appear to militate against judicial pronouncements which are binding on me. I have done so not in a spirit of defiance or impudence. My purpose was merely to indicate that the exigencies of the times and of the society sometimes demand, even from the judiciary, new unconventional and uninhibited approach to problems arising from impact of radical changes in the outlook of the people and the impact of changing standards or values in all important spheres of human activity. A Judge is very often helpless under such circumstances. He can interpret and expound the law and apply it as so interpreted and expounded judicially. It is not, however, given to him to make laws nor can he accede to a pressing or popular demand by resorting to a ruse under the garb of his role as interpreter of the law. But, if ever and when, an appropriate occasion arises, a Judge should not, in my opinion, hesitate to cast away old and rusted moorings and venture into new, and may be troubled waters of interpretation of laws to find out whether the particular law in question is so certain or inflexible as to be incapable of being adopted to meet the demands of the changed or changing society. He must exercise utmost caution and restraint; if he finds this can be done within the ambit of his jurisdiction, function and duty as a Judge he must go ahead, else he must leave it to the legislature or to the competent Court if confronted with judicial precedents binding on him. 21. He must exercise utmost caution and restraint; if he finds this can be done within the ambit of his jurisdiction, function and duty as a Judge he must go ahead, else he must leave it to the legislature or to the competent Court if confronted with judicial precedents binding on him. 21. The learned Advocate General further submitted that as against avowed object of the trust which is intending to help the poor and down-trodden, the Respondent-company who admittedly has Rs. 350 crores turnover of the company, is having only a small godown with dilapidated building, the justice is on the side of the Appellant. The very fact that the Corporation has taken note of the condition of the building and issued notice that the building should be demolished so that the safety of the people, men and material may be protected, should have been taken into consideration by the learned Civil Judge. 22. As against these submissions, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, submitted that notice should be strictly construed and it cannot be overlooked. He relied upon a dictum of the Supreme Court in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate Vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, AIR 1975 SC 1111 , which is as follows: Coming to the question of notice we would like to state at the outset that on the basis of the evidence in the case the Appellate Court took the view that the lease was not for a manufacturing purpose. The lease was for one year which expired on 9.4.1946. The tenant held over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Ext. P-12 did not mention the purpose of the lease. The learned District Judge was of the opinion that the Appellant started manufacturing Soda in a small portion of the demised premises after the lease for one year was taken. In any view of the matter the dominant purpose of the lease was not a manufacturing one but was the sale of aerated water. The High Court has affirmed this finding in revision. We do not feel inclined to upset the findings of the two Courts below in this regard. In any view of the matter the dominant purpose of the lease was not a manufacturing one but was the sale of aerated water. The High Court has affirmed this finding in revision. We do not feel inclined to upset the findings of the two Courts below in this regard. If the purpose of the lease was not a manufacturing one, then the holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act created a month-to-month tenancy terminable by 15 days' notice ending with the tenancy month given under Section 106 of the said Act. The view taken by the learned District Judge as also by the High Court that the one year's tenancy ended on the 8th April, 1946 when the tenant agreed to deliver possession on the 9th April and hence the monthly tenancy started from the 9th day of the month ending on the 8th day of the following month is clearly erroneous in law. That being so there was no valid and legal termination of the contractual tenancy. 23. Reliance was also placed in the dictum in K.S. Rangaiah Setty Vs. L.S. Vasudevamurthy, AIR 1977 Kar 50 , which is as follows: The foremost question to be considered in this case would be the validity of the notice to quit. That is so because the tenancy has been determined by taking recourse under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. As it was an admitted case between the parties that the tenancy commenced from 7th day of each month, it ended on the expiry of the 6th day of each month. But the notice to quit, Ext.P-1, definitely expired with the end of the 7th day of the month. That being so, the notice to quit did not expire with the end of the month of tenancy. In Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate Vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, AIR 1975 SC 1111 the Supreme Court found that the notice to quit did not expire with the end of the month of tenancy which was the 9th day and rather expired on the 8th day. The notice was held illegal with the natural inference that the tenancy was not determined. With that strict view taken by the Supreme Court with reference to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, I am afraid, a different view cannot be taken in the present case. The notice was held illegal with the natural inference that the tenancy was not determined. With that strict view taken by the Supreme Court with reference to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, I am afraid, a different view cannot be taken in the present case. The notice no doubt gave 24 hours more time for eviction but nevertheless it did not expire with the end of the month of tenancy. The notice being illegal, the tenancy was not determined. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlord contended that a technical view should not be taken for the notice. He referred to several decisions and made a particular reference to Gayaprasad Ganapatlal Vs. S.S. Munnilal, AIR 1952 Nag 101 which was almost a parallel case. In that case the monthly tenancy commenced from the 1st of each month and the tenant was asked to vacate not by the end of the month but by the first of next month. As such, 24 hours more were given to the tenant. It was held that the tenant was not left with any doubt as to the left with any doubt as to the of the month and the notice to quit was valid. But the difficulty is that the Supreme Court was dealing with the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the relevancy therein was a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decision of the Supreme Court being one under this very enactment and the importance of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was considered, it is not possible to deviate from that decision. Therefore, the strict view as to the notice to quit has got to be taken in a case under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. My finding therefore will be that the notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not valid and the tenancy contract very much continued even on the date of the death of the original tenant. 24. The dictum in Francis Jerone Fernandis Vs. Anthony Pedad Cardoza, AIR 1984 Kar 226 , is to the following effect: The notice Ex.P-1 is dated 28.3.1972. It was served upon the Defendant on 29.3.1972. 24. The dictum in Francis Jerone Fernandis Vs. Anthony Pedad Cardoza, AIR 1984 Kar 226 , is to the following effect: The notice Ex.P-1 is dated 28.3.1972. It was served upon the Defendant on 29.3.1972. It is stated in the notice Ex.P-1 as regards termination of the tenancy of the Defendant that the lease in respect of the suit premises has been terminated at the end of the tenancy month which will expire next after the end of the 15th day from the date of service of the notice. In other words, the termination of the tenancy as per this notice though stated at the end of the tenancy month, but the end of the tenancy month would expire next after the end of the 15th day from the date of service of the notice which would mean that the date of expiry of the end of the tenancy month would be a fluctuating one depending on the date on which the notice is served upon the Defendant. In other words, the Defendant was not told definitely as to when exactly his tenancy would come to an end which was corresponding to the expiry with the end of the tenancy month because what was stated in Ex.P-1 is that the end of the tenancy month would expire next after the end of the 15th day from the date of service of the notice What Is. 106 requires is that a lease from month to month is terminable on the part of either the lessor or the lessee by 15 days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. A legal termination of the monthly tenancy thus requires two conditions to be fulfilled viz; that there must be a notice terminating the tenancy giving 15 days notice and it must expire with the end of the tenancy month. A notice giving mere 15 days time by itself will not answer the requirement of Is. 106 but it must also indicate that the 15 days period must expire with the end of the tenancy month. A notice giving mere 15 days time by itself will not answer the requirement of Is. 106 but it must also indicate that the 15 days period must expire with the end of the tenancy month. Judged on these requirements of a valid notice, the suit notice appears to me to be wholly invalid because it fulfils only one of the conditions viz; that the Defendant was given 15 days notice but the remaining and the most essential ingredient that period should expire with the end of the tenancy month has not been fulfilled. Thus, I am inclined to hold that the suit notice is not valid in law as contended by the Defendant. In that view, the suit brought by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit premises and also for the recovery of the future mesne profits should fail. 25. Commenting on the authorities cited by the Appellant, the learned Counsel for the Respondent distinguished the dictum (a) in The Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd., and Another Vs. Happy Homes (P) Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 471 on the ground that it was a case where the tenant issued notice of quit and the landlord accepted it and thereafter when the tenant wanted to withdraw the quit notice and it was not agreed upon by the landlord. The facts of that case are not applicable to the present case; (b) In AIR 1995 All 1590, wherein the principle laid down was that no notice to quit is necessary when the tenant denies the title. But this case also is not applicable as the Respondent gave up the plea and the same was recorded; (c) So far as the ruling in Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir and Others, AIR 1972 All 273 , is concerned, this also will not arise as the Respondents have given up the plea regarding issue No. 2 and the same was recorded as having been abandoned; (d) In AIR 1983 All 450 , the judgment is not helpful to the Appellant. Para 17 of the judgment is in favour of the Respondent-tenant regarding termination notice; (e) The dictum in Majati Subbarao Vs. Para 17 of the judgment is in favour of the Respondent-tenant regarding termination notice; (e) The dictum in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by LRs., AIR 1989 SC 2187 is also not applicable as here again the plea of giving up the question of title has been accepted by filing a memo; (f) So also the decision in 1998 (2) Law W 7 and the dictum in Hari Krishan Gupta Vs. Jai Krishan Dass and Others, AIR 1990 Delhi 80 , in the light of the Defendant giving up the plea regarding the title. 26. On the question of abandonment of plea, reliance was placed in Wali Singh Vs. Sohan Singh, AIR 1954 SC 263 ; and the decision in Smt. Kaniz Fatima (deceased) and Another vs. Shah Naim Ashraf, AIR 1983 All 450 . 27. I have considered the submissions made by the respective Counsel. 28. Before dealing with the appeal, it is necessary to place on record the fact that the Appellant filed I.A.I praying to withdraw the appeal with a direction to the Court below that in the event of the Appellant filing another suit for ejectment the same may be disposed of within a period of two months from the date of filing of such suit, considering only the validity of issuance of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act since the Court below has held all the other issues in favour of the Appellant in the earlier suit. 29. In the affidavit filed in support of the application it was submitted that the Appellant-trust issued a notice on 30.12.1995 calling upon the Respondent to vacate the schedule premises as the trust has desired and decided to demolish the existing godown and develop the property to augment its resources. After the Court issued the notice to the Respondent, the Respondent denied the title and the said proceeding were pending before the City Civil Court for more than three years. After evidence was over a memo was filed on 12.6.2000 by the Respondent giving up the contention raised on issue No. 2. Though the suit was filed on 19.9.1999 such a memo came to be filed only on 12.6.2000 with the only object of delaying the proceedings and continue in possession for a longer period. After evidence was over a memo was filed on 12.6.2000 by the Respondent giving up the contention raised on issue No. 2. Though the suit was filed on 19.9.1999 such a memo came to be filed only on 12.6.2000 with the only object of delaying the proceedings and continue in possession for a longer period. It was further submitted that in view of the findings rendered by the Court below, the Trust being a non-profitable charitable trust engaged in several charitable activities, like free medical aid to the poor patients and runs a hostel catering to the needs of 300 out-patients every day in the city of Madras desired to have an early disposal. The trust also provides scholarship/donations to NG Os, empower and educate village women, run 61 churches and educational classes for poor children. The Appellant-trust has planned to increase its charitable activities to help poor and needy in South India and hence are constrained for want of funds. The Respondent-company is a multi crore company having a turn over of more than 1,000 crores and they are one of the leading manufacturers and distributors of the electrical goods in the country. The building is a very old building situated in a prime location in the city of Bangalore and was let out to the Defendant for a rent of Rs. 1,750/- in 1978. Today the rent fetchable would easily be Rs. One Lakh per month in view of the location of the property in the heart of the city. The suit property is situated across the road from Bowring Institute, next to India Garage Commercial Complex, St. Mark's Road, Bangalore, which is in a prime centre of the city. It was further submitted that the schedule premises is being kept under lock and key and the said building is very old and is not in a fit condition to carry on any activities and such building is in a dilapidated condition. 30. On the above allegations, the appeal was sought to be withdrawn. 31. This application was filed on 19.10.2000. Another application I.A. 2 came to be filed on 13.11.2000 seeking permission to withdraw I.A.I. It was mentioned in paragraph 5 of such an application that there was settlement talks going on between the parties and only in pursuance of such settlement the Appellant filed an application on 13.10.2000 for withdrawal of the above appeal. Another application I.A. 2 came to be filed on 13.11.2000 seeking permission to withdraw I.A.I. It was mentioned in paragraph 5 of such an application that there was settlement talks going on between the parties and only in pursuance of such settlement the Appellant filed an application on 13.10.2000 for withdrawal of the above appeal. As the talks of the settlement was not successful, the Appellant decided to prosecute the appeal. Hence, they prayed for withdrawal of that application. An application was also filed along with early hearing of the matter. 32. The Respondent who appeared through Counsel, filed objections to I. As. 1 to 8. In the objection statement filed to I.A.I, the Respondent expressed no objection for the Appellant to withdraw the appeal. But the Respondent was not prepared for any direction as sought for by the Appellant to dispose of the intended case within two months from the date of filing thereon. This is not permissible in law and the withdrawal can be only unconditional and not otherwise under Order 22, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. On the question of giving up the plea, it was contended that the Respondent has exercised the right to give up the plea at any stage. It is also claimed the turn over of the company was only Rs. 350 crores and not 1,000 crores. The keeping up of the godown under lock without use was also denied. 33. In the objection filed to I.A.2, the compromise talks were denied and again submitting that the turnover was only Rs. 350 crores and not 1,000 crores per annum; I.A. 2 was resisted. For the early hearing I.A. 3 the objection was filed pointing out that it is true as per the direction of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, the case, wherein the party is aged about 65 years, must be disposed of early. But that is not applicable to the present case because the trust is held to be not an individual and that the trustee's age as 69 cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of early disposal of the appeal. The other allegations were denied and the turnover also was stated to be only Rs. 350 crores. 34. After hearing the respective Counsel and taking into consideration the nature of the trust, I allowed I.A. 2. The other allegations were denied and the turnover also was stated to be only Rs. 350 crores. 34. After hearing the respective Counsel and taking into consideration the nature of the trust, I allowed I.A. 2. I.A. 3 also was allowed fixing the date as 27.11.2000 for hearing as both Counsel feel that the scope of the appeal is very limited. On that day, the parties were called upon either to report settlement or be ready for hearing of the cases. Paper book was filed in the Court though not in the office and it was served on the other side as well. 35. Having considered the submissions made in respect of the appeal by the learned Advocate General as well as the Counsel for the Respondent, I proceed to dispose of the appeal. 36. The points for determination in the appeal is: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession in the circumstances of the case and whether the judgment and decree of the Court below is sustainable? 37. Dealing with the question of title, it was specifically mentioned in para 2 of the plaint that the Plaintiff as a public charitable trust was owner of the property and the Defendant is a tenant under the Plaintiff. In the very first paragraph of the written statement, the title of the Plaintiff was denied. This is what paragraph 1 says: The Plaintiff has 'no subsisting legal right' over the suit schedule property. As such, suit filed by the Plaintiff is not maintainable in law. 38. This point is reiterated in para 2 as well. I.A. 3 begin with the words "without prejudice to the above contention". It is significant to note that the written statement remains unamended even till date. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the memo cannot be equated to amendment of the written statement and the points raised in the written statement in paras 1 and 2 cannot be construed to have been given up by filing a mere memo. The trial Court ought to have framed issue as to whether in the face of such denial of tenancy, notice of termination is necessary and depending upon the answer to the issue the other issue whether the Plaintiff is entitled to possession would arise. This should have been the true issue and ought to have been framed by the trial Court. 39. This should have been the true issue and ought to have been framed by the trial Court. 39. It is to be placed on record the fact that the title to the property on the people charity fund, the Appellant, has been confirmed as early as in 1963 in the case of R. Viswanathan Vs. Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC 1 . It happens that one Ramalingam Mudaliar was the owner, inter alia, of the suit property. He disposed of the property including the suit property by a Will dated September 10, 1942. The avowed object mentioned in the Will was that "the balance of estate be invested in a fund, (evidently the Plaintiff now), the income whereof be applied for encouragement and development of industries, education or medical research, diffusion of medical knowledge, including work in nutrition and dietary by the grant of Scholarship etc." The District Court, Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, in O.S. 2 of 1943 after rejecting the caveat granted probate on the Will on November 27, 1943. An appeal filed against the order to the Court of Resident in Mysore was dismissed on July 5, 1944. Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. But by the order dated December 12, 1949, the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on merits holding that His Majesty-in-Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction and thus the order passed by the District Court granting probate accordingly became final and the validity of the Will in so far as it dealt with the property in the Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, is not liable to be challenged on any ground at all. Thus the Apex Court had held putting a finality and full stop to the question regarding the validity of the Will or ownership of the property of Ramalingam, the testator and the bequest made to the Appellant of this property among others. This is what the Supreme Court has held in the above decision in paragraph 2 of the judgment: Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. This is what the Supreme Court has held in the above decision in paragraph 2 of the judgment: Leave to appeal against that order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. But by order dated December 12, 1949, the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on the merit, for, in view of the Board, since the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore was before the hearing of the appeal retroceded to H. H, the Maharaja of Mysore and was within the jurisdiction of his State at the date of the hearing of the appeal. His Majesty-in-Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction which was expressly surrendered and renounced. The order passed by the District Court granting probate accordingly became final and the validity of the Will in so far as it dealt with property in the Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, is not liable to be challenged on the ground of want of due execution. Applications for probate of the Will limited to property within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore and the Madras High Court were also filed and orders granting probate subject to the result of the proceedings before the Privy Council were made. 40. Though an attempt was made to question the Will for the second time before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held "succession to the estate of a person is governed by the lex situs in the case of immovables, and in the case of movables by the law of his domicile, but these appeals raise questions not about the law applicable to the devolution of the estate, but about title which the testator could devise by his Will. That title must be adjudicated upon in the case of immovables by the Courts of the country in which such immovables are situate and on evidence led in that Court". Thus, finally confirming the probate granted by the Court, the title in favour of the trust was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. In fact, the particular properties mentioned in the Will are: (1) Imperial Theatre, Residency Road, Bangalore; (2) Immovable property on No. 27 Dickenson Road, Bangalore and (3) Suit schedule property on old Madras Road and other properties as enumerated in the Will located in the erstwhile civil and military station of Bangalore, Bangalore District Court, Bangalore. In fact, the particular properties mentioned in the Will are: (1) Imperial Theatre, Residency Road, Bangalore; (2) Immovable property on No. 27 Dickenson Road, Bangalore and (3) Suit schedule property on old Madras Road and other properties as enumerated in the Will located in the erstwhile civil and military station of Bangalore, Bangalore District Court, Bangalore. Therefore, the Will having been confirmed and the affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case in Apren Joseph alias Current Kunjukunju and Others Vs. The State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1 , as mentioned above, it cannot be reagitated by any forum whatsoever by anybody. Once a finality is reached in respect of a property as such, any other way of challenge to the title or question the title does not lie in the mouth of any person and such a challenge made even amount to contempt in the eye of law or attempt to disobedience of the order of the highest Court in this country, namely, the Supreme Court of India. 41. The dictum in page 450 Smt. Kaniz Fatima (deceased) and Another Vs. Shah Naim Ashraf, AIR 1983 Allahabad referred to supra, makes it clear that though there is no specific issue framed by the trial Court on the question of denial of title and whether the notice is necessary, the evidence adduced clearly shows that there has been denial of title not only in the pleadings but in the evidence as such. In this case, the evidence of PW-1, regarding title was challenged in cross-examination by the Defendant questioning the title of the Plaintiff, which is as follows: It is true that a suit was filed against the trust for specific performance of contract. The said suit was decreed during April 1998 is true. The trust has filed appeal before Hon'ble High Court aggrieved by the said judgment. The judgment and decree were stayed and the matter is still pending for adjudication before the Hon'ble High Court. The Regular First Appeal number of that is 405 of 1998. Mahesh Centre is party before the Hon'ble High Court. But giving up such an issue and not rendering a finding without even deleting the issue is not legal as per the dictum of Delhi High Court referred in Hari Krishan Gupta Vs. The Regular First Appeal number of that is 405 of 1998. Mahesh Centre is party before the Hon'ble High Court. But giving up such an issue and not rendering a finding without even deleting the issue is not legal as per the dictum of Delhi High Court referred in Hari Krishan Gupta Vs. Jai Krishan Dass and Others, AIR 1990 Delhi 80 , which is to the following effect: Where the Court framed certain issue by accepting the application therefore and rejecting the objection of the other party that, on pleadings the issue does not arise, subsequent application by the objector praying that the issue be deleted as it does not arise from the pleadings would not be maintainable. A distinction has to be kept in mind in a case where issues are framed without any objection in respect of the pleadings and in a case where after rejecting the prayer that there are no pleadings, the issues are framed on a substantive application filed by one of the parties for the said purpose. In the first case, the Court would be justified in deleting the issue if it comes to the conclusion that it does not arise from the pleadings of the parties. In the second case, the aggrieved party, if permissible in law, may apply for the review of the order allowing the application of the opposite party and framing the issues but it cannot again reagitate the question of framing of issue in the same proceedings and on the same grounds by indirect method of filing application under Order 14, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. 42. Thus, it is necessary to hold that the memo cannot be accepted and the issue could not have been deleted. As the facts are not disputed and the parties went to trial, clearly understanding the scope of their respective defence, issue No. 2 ought to have been answered by the trial Court in favour of the Plaintiff and also holding that the Defendant's denial of the title is not bonafide and true. 43. As the facts are not disputed and the parties went to trial, clearly understanding the scope of their respective defence, issue No. 2 ought to have been answered by the trial Court in favour of the Plaintiff and also holding that the Defendant's denial of the title is not bonafide and true. 43. Once it is seen on facts in the face of the legal position, the Plaintiff's title has been denied and Defendant as a tenant is not entitled to question the title within the meaning of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, then we have got to decide as to whether in such an event notice of termination is necessary in view of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act? 44. Here again coming to the factual position in paragraph 8, the Plaintiff has referred to issue of legal notice dated 30.12.1995 and the Defendant replied on 27.1.1996 stating that it is not interested in handing over vacant possession of the property to the Plaintiff. 45. In the written statement, though in para 3, the notice is questioned as not a proper notice in the eye of law, the allegation of improvement of property and charitable purpose are generally denied and it was further contended that the Plaintiff has no wherewithal to provide for the funds. The only words used therein are "if eviction order is granted against the Defendant, the Defendant would suffer greater hardship and inconvenience". It is significant to note that except questioning the technicality of the notice they have not rejected the notice but accepted the same. It is not their case that any hardship was caused to them by such notice that they have not been given sufficient time to vacate etc; or they were not aware of the purpose of the notice. It was also the specific stand of the Plaintiff's witness in para 2 of the deposition that "notice was issued calling upon the Defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit schedule premises within 15 days as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act". In fact in the evidence of DW-1 nothing is spoken about the validity or invalidity of the notice and what has been stated is only "we have received the quit notice got issued by the Plaintiff, but we have issued reply notice expressing inability to vacate. In fact in the evidence of DW-1 nothing is spoken about the validity or invalidity of the notice and what has been stated is only "we have received the quit notice got issued by the Plaintiff, but we have issued reply notice expressing inability to vacate. Again in the cross-examination it is mentioned that "it is true that the Defendant has received termination of tenancy notice. Since the Defendant is not in a position to pay more rent and advance even if an alternative accommodation is available in Bangalore". Thus it will be seen that the notice has been given and it is duly accepted by the party. Though demand to vacate was refused, the validity cannot be questioned. The dictum of the Supreme Court in The Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd., and Another Vs. Happy Homes (P) Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 471 mentioned above, is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. In this case another factor to be noted is that the Respondent-Defendant is only a sub-tenant having became a tenant under the chief tenant one S.V. Subramaniam. This position is not disputed. In this case, it is also not disputed that notice is duly given and the tenancy stands determined on the expiry of the period of tenancy. No loss or anxiety is caused to them. 46. In fact in Solomon Vs. Orwel, 1954 1 All ER 874, Denning L.J., in dealing with the provisions of the landlord and tenant rules: When a statutory tenant sub-lets a part of the premises, he does not thereby confer any estate or interest on the sub-tenant. A statutory tenant has no estate or interest in himself, and he cannot carve something out of nothing. The sub-tenant like the statutory tenant has, only a personal right or privilege. The question is: What is the position of the sub-tenant when the statutory tenancy comes to an end? A statutory tenancy may, of course, come to an end without a notice to quit, or by delivery up of the premises to the landlord. When the statutory tenancy comes to an end, the sub-tenant's right automatically comes to an end unless there is some statutory protection afforded to him. A statutory tenancy may, of course, come to an end without a notice to quit, or by delivery up of the premises to the landlord. When the statutory tenancy comes to an end, the sub-tenant's right automatically comes to an end unless there is some statutory protection afforded to him. In the above case the position of sub-tenancy was considered by the Supreme Court in West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, it is mentioned "if a tenant has sublet the premises let to him in his entirety he loses the protection of Section 12. If he has sub-let a major portion of the premises for more than seven consecutive months, he also loses the protection. In paragraph 15 of the above case, the Supreme Court has considered as follows: We are unable to agree with the contention raised by counsel for the Respondent. In our view, since a statutory tenant has merely a personal right to protect his possession, and has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him, he cannot convey an estate or interest which he does not possess. A statutory tenant by parting with possession forfeits the protection of the Act, and unless the statute expressly provides or clearly implies otherwise, the person inducted by him cannot claim the protection of the Act. Though the above decision is based on a Tenancy Act, the principle evaluated therein can be applied to the facts of this case. In the plaint it is mentioned "the Defendant was inducted into the schedule premises as sub-tenant in the leasehold premises by S.V. Subramaniam and Sons who were the erstwhile lessees of the building. There was an attornment of tenancy by S.V. Subramaniam in favour of the Plaintiff-trust who executed an assignment of lease in favour of the Plaintiff in view of the settlement and decree passed in Regular Second Appeal No. 802 of 1973". This paragraph has not been either denied by way of general denial or specifically in the written statement filed by the Defendant. It is also seen that S.V. Subramaniam has been referred to as original lessee thereby meaning that he had vacated the premises and only the sub-tenant is occupying. In such an event, the question of issuing notice to the sub-tenant may not arise in the strict sense of law. 47. It is also seen that S.V. Subramaniam has been referred to as original lessee thereby meaning that he had vacated the premises and only the sub-tenant is occupying. In such an event, the question of issuing notice to the sub-tenant may not arise in the strict sense of law. 47. The next point to be considered is: Whether in the light of denial by the Defendant of the title of the Plaintiff, notice of termination is necessary or not? 48. There is no dispute about the fact, as mentioned supra, that there has been a clear denial of the title of the Defendant. We also seen that by mere filing a memo and without amending the written statement, such a plea cannot be given up and therefore it cannot be deemed to have been given up, as has been contended by the Respondent. In the case of Palani Ammal Vs. Viswanatha Chettiar, 1998 (2) LW 7, the Supreme Court, as mentioned supra, has held, applying Section 111(g), that the tenant must accept the owner of the building as landlord by renouncing his character as tenant of the landlord by setting up a title in third person or in himself otherwise, he ceases to be a tenant. The Apex Court has clearly held that the umbrella given to the tenant under the Transfer of Property Act or under any other law can no longer come to his aid and by denying title the tenant had walked out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act. That is a case where in the suit filed for ejectment, the title was denied in the written statement as well as in the additional written statement. Ultimately, holding that the denial having been made in the course of the pleadings, the question of further intimating the tenant about such denial by a fresh notice and giving further notice does not arise and consequently the tenant goes out of the protective umbrella and not entitled to protection of Section 106. In fact that is what is reiterated by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Phulan Devi vs. Anand Saroop 1995 AIHC 1590, referred to supra. That was also a case of denial of title occurring in the pleadings and consequently the question of giving further notice did not arise. 49. In fact that is what is reiterated by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Phulan Devi vs. Anand Saroop 1995 AIHC 1590, referred to supra. That was also a case of denial of title occurring in the pleadings and consequently the question of giving further notice did not arise. 49. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that these decisions will not come to the aid of the Appellant, in as much as those decisions are on different points cannot be countenanced. Such submission is not correct. The Apex Court's ruling and dicta in The Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd. and Another Vs. Happy Homes (P) Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 471 ; Phulan Devi vs. Anand Saroop, AIR 1995 HC 1590; Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir and Others, AIR 1972 All 273 and finally AIR 1983 All. 450 (Smt. Kaniz Fatima (deceased) vs. Shah Naim Ashraf) are directly on the point regarding the denial of title during the course of the pleading. In fact, the dictum in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs., AIR 1989 SC 2187 and 1998 (2) LW 7 (Palani Anmal vs. Viswanatha Chettiar) are also in favour of the Appellant. The giving up of plea also has been considered in Hari Krishan Gupta Vs. Jai Krishan Dass and Others, AIR 1990 Delhi 80, mentioned above. 50. Thus considering the various ruling on the point, it is necessary to hold that (1) the plea of denial of title cannot be given up by mere filing a memo and without amending the written statement; (2) the plea having been made in the course of the pleadings, disentitled the Defendant to have the benefit of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; (3) even sufficiency of the notice notwithstanding it is a technical defect, has been accepted by the Defendant or if not denied in full by the Defendant. 51. Another aspect to be noted is that in a Court of law, justice should not only be done but also seen to be done. Here is a Defendant who has got an admitted turnover of Rs. 350 crores per year and alleged turnover of Rs. 1,000/- crores per year, who wants to retain the godown which is in a very dilapidated condition. Here is a Defendant who has got an admitted turnover of Rs. 350 crores per year and alleged turnover of Rs. 1,000/- crores per year, who wants to retain the godown which is in a very dilapidated condition. The condition of the building though denied has not been disputed and the fact remains that the Corporation has given notice for the demolition having been satisfied about the nature of the building after inspection by the authorities within the four corners of the Municipal Corporation Act. Such a godown is sought to be retained by the multi crore company as against the avowed object of a charitable trust who wants to augment the resources for the purpose of doing some good service to the public, especially poor and downtrodden and to impart education to the needy. In the circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to have the possession of the premises both in justice, equity and good conscience and in law. 52. At this juncture it is necessary to place on record the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Rattan Lal Vs. Shri Vardesh Chander and Others, AIR 1976 SC 588 , the Supreme Court has said as follows: A statutory technicality, such as notice in writing prescribed under Section 111(g) is not a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and, as regards cases before the extension of the section to a particular area, the mere institution of a legal proceedings for eviction fulfils the requirement of law. The conscience of the Court needs nothing more and nothing else. 53. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit of the Plaintiff is decreed. In the circumstances, there shall be no costs throughout.