JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This appeal under section 378(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is directed against the judgment and order dated 19-4-1985 passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kolhapur in Sessions Case No. 22 of 1984 acquitting the respondent of the charge under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The respondent was charged that on 28-12-1982 between 8.00 p.m. and 9.00 in the vernadah of Jeevan Shikshan Vidya Mandir at Masud Male Tahsil Panhala committed rape on Akkatai d/o Keraba Bavadekar alias Chaugule and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The prosecution story as unfolded in the first information report (FIR) (Exh. 7) is that on 28-12-1982 Anubai Bavadekar, the complainant (P.W. 1) had returned to her house in the evening and asked her daughter Akkatai, the prosecutrix (P.W. 5) to go to the house of Babutai Gawali (P.W. 6) to collect the sale proceeds of the milk which was sold by her to Babutai. It is stated that at around 7.30 p.m. Akkatai went to the house of Babutai to collect the sale proceeds of the milk and returned home at about 9.30 p.m. and on returning home Akkatai straightway went to the middle room in her house and fell down in the second apartment. It is further stated that due to darkness in the house Anubai, mother of Akkatai, enquired of her as to what had happened, but Akkatai was not in a position to speak. Anubai thereafter covered Akkatai with a bed sheet and called Indubai (P.W. 11), wife of her husband's brother, who was staying in the neighbourhood. It is stated that Indubai was informed about what had happened and both of them attended to Akkatai. It is stated that they noticed blood where Akkatai was lying and on removing the bed sheet they found that Akkatai's frock was stained with blood. It is stated that on removing the bed sheet they found Akkatai's legs and frock stained with blood and blood oozing from her vagina. It is stated that thereafter they sent for Radhabai (P.W. 7), who was her mother's sister. On her arrival they sprinkled water on the face of Akkatai and wiped her face with wet hands whereupon Akkatai opened her eyes. It is stated that thereafter they sent for Radhabai (P.W. 7), who was her mother's sister. On her arrival they sprinkled water on the face of Akkatai and wiped her face with wet hands whereupon Akkatai opened her eyes. It is stated that they asked Akkatai as to what had happened and in response Akkatai told them that while she was returning from the house of Babutai Gawali near the school their Nana came out of shend (bushes) and he lifted her holding her mouth tightly and took her in the verandah of the school. It is stated that she further revealed that said Nana threatened her not to shout and thereafter removed his shorts and caused her to fall down and thereafter committed the alleged offences of rape. It is stated that Akkatai further revealed that thereafter said Nana told her not to tell about this incident to anyone and she walked her way back home and on reaching home she fell down as stated above. In the F.I.R. name of the accused has been mentioned as person having committed rape on Akkatai. 4. It is relevant to point out that the F.I.R. was lodged on 30-12-1982 at about noon at the instance of Anubai (P.W. 1). The prosecution has explained the delay in filing F.I.R. on the ground that Anubai was in contact with Sarpanch and was waiting for her husband to return and it is only after the Sarpanch told her to approach the Police Station on the next day that she came to the Police Station on 30-12-1982 at about noon along with Shamrao (P.W. 10) and Akkatai prosecutrix (P.W. 5). It is stated that Shamrao took Akkatai on his bicycle to the Police Station, Kodoli and Anubai went to the Police Station walking. There is some discrepancy in the evidence which has come on record as to who informed the police about the incident in question in the prior point of time. It is stated that Shamrao took Akkatai on his bicycle to the Police Station, Kodoli and Anubai went to the Police Station walking. There is some discrepancy in the evidence which has come on record as to who informed the police about the incident in question in the prior point of time. However, the matter has not proceeded before the Court below on this aspect, but if the prosecution version as appearing from the evidence of Akkatai P.W. 5 is accepted it would indicate that Akkatai and Shamrao reached the Police Station prior to Anubai and by the time Anubai had reached the Police Station Akkatai had already informed about the alleged incident to the concerned Police Officer and she was immediately sent for medical check up thereafter. On the other hand, the prosecution case is that investigation was commenced on the basis of the statement of Anubai (P.W. 1) which was recorded as F.I.R. 5. Without attaching much importance to this, for the time being, we would proceed to indicate the relevant facts. Besides sending the prosecutrix Akkatai P.W. 5 for medical check up the police thereafter arrested the accused and seized his blood stained clothes and semen. The respondent-accused was also sent for medical checking but no incriminating circumstance was noticed on the person during the medical check up by the doctor concerned. After completing the investigation charge-sheet came to be filed for offence under section 376 I.P.C. in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Panhale. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Kolhapur as the same was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. The respondent-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution in all examined 14 witnesses amongst them Anubai (P.W. 1) is the mother of the prosecutrix who is incidentally the complainant; Namdeo T. Tripane (P. W. 2), panch witness of Ex. 9 under which blood stained frock produced by Anubai was seized; Ghanshyam B. Chougule (P.W. 3) is also panch witness to the panchanama of the place of offence viz. 9 under which blood stained frock produced by Anubai was seized; Ghanshyam B. Chougule (P.W. 3) is also panch witness to the panchanama of the place of offence viz. verandah of the school where the alleged incident took place and also panch witness to the panchanama relating to the clothes recovered from the person of the accused; Krishnaji G. Deshpande (P.W. 4) is the Circle Inspector who drew the map of the site where the alleged incident took place; Akkatai K. Bavadekar (P.W. 5) is the prosecutrix; Babutai A. Patil (P.W. 6) is the witness from whom Akkatai had gone to collect the money as directed by her mother Anubai (P.W. 1); Radhabai R. Jadhav (P.W. 7) is the witness who was called by the complainant Anubai who is her mother's sister and who had helped Anubai in her attempt to regain consciousness of Akkatai; Vijay T. Burande (P.W. 8) is the Medical Officer who examined Akkatai and issued certificate; Vasant T. Salase (P.W. 9) is the Sarpanch of the village; Shamrao R. Jadhav (P.W. 10) is the brother of Anubai, Indu S. Bavadekar (P.W. 11) is the wife of Anubai's husband brother who stays in the neighbourhood of Anubai and was present when said Akkatai regained consciousness; Bapu A. Patil (P.W. 12) is the Investigating Officer who carried out major part of investigation; Nurmahamad. B. Naikwade (P.W. 13) is the Police Constable who submitted articles to the Chemical Anaylzer and Vasant Kashinath Dhandare (P.W. 14) is the Police Inspector who carried out the investigation in part and filed the charge-sheet against the accused. 7. After the prosecution adduced documentary and oral evidence the trial Court examined the same and concluded that Akkatai, the prosecutrix, was raped and that at the relevant time she was below 16 years of age when the alleged incident took place. This finding reached by the trial Court is not assailed before us by the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused. The trial Court, however, preferred to acquit the respondent of the alleged offence by recording more than one reason. The trial Court has observed that there was delay in recording the F.I.R. as the incident took place on 28-12-1982 whereas the F.I.R. was recorded on 30-12-1982. It is observed by the trial Court that there was clear improvement in the prosecution version about the identification of the accused. The trial Court has observed that there was delay in recording the F.I.R. as the incident took place on 28-12-1982 whereas the F.I.R. was recorded on 30-12-1982. It is observed by the trial Court that there was clear improvement in the prosecution version about the identification of the accused. The trial Court has placed emphasis on the evidence of Akkatai-prosecutrix which creates suspicion about the identify of the accused. The trial Court has referred to the fact that Akkatai in her evidence admitted that she always called the accused by name "Pandit Nana", that Babu Chougule who is the brother of accused is called by name "Nana"; that there is one Manohar Chougule who resides behind the school also called by name "Nana". In other words, the trial Court has taken into account the aforesaid admissions and also further admission given by Akkatai in her evidence that said Manohar Chougule resides in the neighbourhood and whereas "Pandit Nana" or "Pandu Nana" who is the present respondent-accused has always been understood as member of her family. Besides this, prosecutrix Akkatai P.W. 5 in her cross-examination has admitted that the person who was sitting in the bushes named "Nana" was the one residing in her neighbourhood. Relying on this admission the trial Court has observed that if the accused "Pandu Nana" is member of family of the Prosecutrix and the person who was sitting in the bushes was "Nana" residing in her neighbourhood then surely it cannot be conclusively said that the present respondent was the one who was in the bushes at the relevant time and responsible for the alleged act of rape. In other words, the evidence of prosecutrix would indicate that Manohar Chougule, who is also referred to as "Nana" staying in the neighbourhood, was waiting in the bushes as informed by her. The trial Court has therefore proceeded to observe that in all probability the accused was mistaken as the culprit as having committed rape on Akkatai, especially when the evidence of prosecutrix herself indicates that Nana living in the neighbourhood had come out of the bushes. Besides the aforesaid aspect the trial Court has also considered that Akkatai did not disclose the name of the person who committed rape on her as "Pandu Nana" or "Pandit Nana" in her statement before the police. Besides the aforesaid aspect the trial Court has also considered that Akkatai did not disclose the name of the person who committed rape on her as "Pandu Nana" or "Pandit Nana" in her statement before the police. The trial Court has also taken into account other circumstances to conclude that Akkatai was tutored witness. The trial Court has also placed emphasis on the fact that it was unnatural and improbable on the part of husband of Anubai, the father of Akkatai, to not to come to see condition of his daughter even after having received the message about his daughter having been ravished. The trial Court has also taken into account the crucial circumstance that during the medical examination of the respondent-accused by the Medical Officer nothing incriminating was found. In so far as the clothes recovered from the person of respondent-accused and reference to the blood stains and semen thereon, the trial Court has considered this aspect and disbelieved the theory that the respondent-accused would continue to wear the said clothes on the third day from the date of the alleged incident and that too without having cared to remove such incriminating evidence. Taking totality of the evidence on record the trial Court concluded that the evidence led by the prosecution was not convicting, particularly on the point of identification of the accused to hold that the respondent was the only person who had committed rape. The trial Court, by its judgment and order dated 19-4-1985, was pleased to record acquittal in favour of the respondent of the alleged offence under section 376 of I.P.C. The reasons which have weighed with the trial Court for recording acquittal can be culled out from paras 11 to 15 of the judgment under appeal. 8. It is this judgment which has been assailed before us in the present appeal by the State of Maharashtra praying for reversal of acquittal. Learned A.P.P. mainly contended that the trial Court totally misdirected itself in giving benefit to the respondent-accused in concluding that there was an error of grave suspicion about the identification of the real accused. The learned A.P.P. criticized the reasoning given by the trial Court and instead contended that besides the evidence of Akkatai (P.W. 5) the evidence of other witnesses would be relevant. According to him, evaluation of the evidence of Akkatai (P.W. 5) done by the trial Court was totally impermissible. The learned A.P.P. criticized the reasoning given by the trial Court and instead contended that besides the evidence of Akkatai (P.W. 5) the evidence of other witnesses would be relevant. According to him, evaluation of the evidence of Akkatai (P.W. 5) done by the trial Court was totally impermissible. The learned A.P.P. placed emphasis on the Chemical Analyser's report in respect of clothes belonging to the prosecutrix and the one recovered from the person of the accused. According to him, no satisfactory explanation could be offered and the said circumstance was sufficient to corroborate the prosecution case besides the ocular evidence of other witnesses. 9. On the other hand the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent fully supported the view taken by the trial Court in his submission adopted the reasons given by the trial Court as indicated in paras 11 to 15 of the judgment under challenge. According to him the trial Court has rightly analyzed the evidence on record while recording the acquittal in favour of the respondent. It is submitted that even if two views are possible on the evidence available on record this Court should not interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Court unless it is possible to conclude that the view taken by the Sessions Court was not a possible view. He submits that the view taken by the trial Court cannot be said to be so unreasonable or absurd that it would shock the conscience of this Court. On the other hand, according to him, to interfere with the findings recorded by the trial Court, which are fully supported by the evidence on record, this Court would be clearly exceeding the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, for, is well settled that the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings so reached by the trial Court even if it were possible to reach a different conclusion on the basis of material on record because the trial Court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and initial presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not weakened by his acquittal. He therefore submits that this Court should be slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court and if two views were reasonable and possible of the evidence on record, this Court should refuse to interfere simply because it feels that it would have taken a different view if the case has been tried by it. The submission made on behalf of the respondent with regard to the scope of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court is well settled. Instead of multiplying the authorities on this aspect reliance can straightway be placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat)1, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2035 which has reiterated the consistent view taken by the Apex Court on that issue. 10. We are conscious of the abovesaid well settled legal position regarding the scope of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court while entertaining an appeal against acquittal. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent, placing reliance on the abovementioned decision of the Apex Court, there can be no doubt that mere fact that a view other than one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the Appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence that by itself cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless this Court comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was palpably illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly unsustainable. The Apex Court has observed in the said decision that while sitting in a judgment over acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable; and if the Appellate Court was to answer these questions in the negative, the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Applying this principle we have examined the evidence on record in the present case. We have already indicated some of the circumstances which strongly weighed with the trial Court to give benefit to respondent-accused and record acquittal of the alleged charge. After having gone through the evidence on record, at the first blush, the submission made by the learned A.P.P. appeared to be attractive. We have already indicated some of the circumstances which strongly weighed with the trial Court to give benefit to respondent-accused and record acquittal of the alleged charge. After having gone through the evidence on record, at the first blush, the submission made by the learned A.P.P. appeared to be attractive. There could be no doubt from the evidence on record that the alleged incident had taken place on the fateful night of 28-12-1982. It is also not in dispute before us that the age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time was in any case less than 16 years as held by the trial Court. These findings have not been challenged before us. But the crucial question is as to who was responsible for the commission of the said heinous offence? This we had to examine in the context of the evidence which is on record. The learned A.P.P. no doubt tried to impress upon us by referring to the evidence of P.W. 1-Anubai and other witnesses that from their evidence it was obvious that the respondent accused was the person who had committed the alleged act of rape on the fateful night. However, we totally disagree on adopting such approach in the matter. In our view, it is only the evidence of the prosecutrix that would be decisive evidence, for the evidence of all other witnesses can be only used in aid of and to corroborate the prosecutrix's version. No other circumstances, in our view, would be relevant and can be said to be decisive to bring home the guilt. Unfortunately, in the present case, there is no eye-witness and it is only the prosecutrix who could unfold the real version regarding the incident that occurred on the fateful night. For the time being we do not wish to enter into the controversy as to whether P.W. 5-Akkatai the prosecutrix had first reached the Police Station and her statement was recorded in prior point of time and what prevented the Police Officer from treating her statement as F.I.R. instead of giving precedence to the statement of Anubai (P.W. 1) which came to be recorded subsequently. This question, no doubt will have a direct bearing. However, instead of examining the matter from this technical angle, we would prefer to straightway go to the evidence of the prosecutrix Akkatai P.W. 5. This question, no doubt will have a direct bearing. However, instead of examining the matter from this technical angle, we would prefer to straightway go to the evidence of the prosecutrix Akkatai P.W. 5. We would like to reproduce her admissions which have strongly weighed with the trial Court and we have no option but to accept the approach of the trial Court. Before making any comments we think it appropriate to reproduce the extract of the relevant portion from the evidence of Akkatai P.W. 5: "4............................... The brother of the accused is Baban Chougule. I call Baban as Nana. I know Manohar Chougule who resides behind the school. I call Manohar Chougule by name Nana. I always call the accused by name Pandit Nana. 5. ............................... In my statement before the police I had stated that Pandu was sitting in the bushes. I cannot say why it is not mentioned in my statement that the person sitting in the bushes was Pandu. It is true that Manohar Chougule resides in my neighbourhood. The accused Pandu Nana is member of our family. It is true that Nana residing in our neighbourhood was sitting in the bushes." From the aforesaid version, what appears to us is that there was clear improvement in the version given in the statement before the police and before the Court. Even if we were to ignore the various other reasons indicated by the trial Court with regard to identification, the fact remains that there is clear admission in the evidence of Akkatai P.W. 5 that she always called the accused by name "Pandit Nana"; whereas Baban Chougule brother of the accused was called as “Nana” so also one Manohar Chougle who was residing behind the school was also called by name "Nana". There is further admission in her evidence that Manohar Chougule resides in her neighbourhood. This admission assumes significance in the light of further admission by her that person who was sitting in bushes was Nana residing in her neighbourhood. Understood thus, the admission given by the prosecutrix Akkatai would only go to show that person referred to as "Nana" by her was one who was residing in the neighbourhood. She has also plainly accepted that the person named "Nana" residing in the neighbourhood was Manohar Chougule, whereas respondent-accused was known as "Pandit Nana" to their family. Understood thus, the admission given by the prosecutrix Akkatai would only go to show that person referred to as "Nana" by her was one who was residing in the neighbourhood. She has also plainly accepted that the person named "Nana" residing in the neighbourhood was Manohar Chougule, whereas respondent-accused was known as "Pandit Nana" to their family. On analyzing her evidence in this way it is not open to even look at any other evidence even though the F.I.R. which has been lodged by P.W. 1 Anubai indicates that "Amuchha Nana" of English version would mean "our Nana" as referred to in the F.I.R. One cannot take support of the F.I.R. to conclude that the prosecution has brought home the guilt particularly in the wake of admissions given by the prosecutrix who is the only witness who could have narrated about the involvement of the respondent. On the other hand, the evidence which has come before the Court would clearly indicate that "Nana" who was residing in the neighbourhood was sitting in the bushes. As such the respondent cannot be identified with "Nana" sitting in the bushes as his identify was that of "our Nana" or Nana of their family. It is, therefore, not possible to authoritatively conclude that the respondent was the person responsible for the heinous act on the fateful night. In other words, all other witnesses; or circumstances which have come on record, would be of no avail to the prosecution as the crucial evidence of the prosecutrix itself would not support the case that the respondent was involved in the commission of the alleged offence. Much was tried to be argued on the basis of Chemical Analyser's report with regard to the clothes seized from the person of the respondent-accused and the blood stains and semen stains found thereon. This aspect of the matter has been rightly negatived by the trial Court while concluding that it is improbable that the respondent-accused would keep the clothes stained with blood and semen on his person for such a long time for three days after the incident. The view taken by the trial Court on this aspect of the matter also cannot be said to be demonstrably unsustainable or manifestly wrong or erroneous. 11. The view taken by the trial Court on this aspect of the matter also cannot be said to be demonstrably unsustainable or manifestly wrong or erroneous. 11. We have already observed that the trial Court has given several circumstances in paras 11 to 15 of the judgment under challenge while concluding that the evidence regarding the point of identification of the respondent-accused having committed the offence was not convincing. Each of the reason so recorded by the trial Court, in our view, cannot be said to be palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. Thus applying the law enunciated by the Apex Court; and since we have answered the question in the negative, it will not be open for us to reverse the acquittal and instead record an order of conviction against the respondent. This would be wholly impermissible having regard to the nature of evidence on record. We do not wish to burden our judgment with each of the reason indicated by the trial Court, but fully endorse the view that has been taken by the trial Court while recording acquittal. Since there is serious doubt about the identification of the respondent having committed the alleged offence, by no stretch of imagination the order of acquittal can be interfered with by us in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The weakness in the prosecution evidence, particularly for the admissions given by the prosecutrix Akkatai-P.W. 5, will have to be viewed in the backdrop of the fact that F.I.R. came to be registered in this case almost after two days and delay sought to be explained by the prosecution is wholly unconvincing. Besides the delay we have also noticed that there is clear improvement in the evidence of P.W. 5-Akkatai in as much as she has not mentioned about the description or identity of the respondent-accused in her statement before the police as to having committed rape and on her own admission before the Court that the Nana referred to by her as having committed rape was one who was residing in the neighbourhood, which is not referable to the respondent-accused who was commonly known as Pandit Nana. In any case, in view of this serious discrepancies, benefit of doubt should necessarily go in favour of the respondent-accused. In any case, in view of this serious discrepancies, benefit of doubt should necessarily go in favour of the respondent-accused. Having examined the evidence in this perspective it is legally impermissible to record conviction against the respondent as it is not possible to conclude that the prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 12. Accordingly we find no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kolhapur dated 19-4-1985 in Sessions Case No. 22 of 1984 in respect of offence punishable under section 376 of I.P.C. In the circumstances appeal is dismissed. Bail bond of the respondent shall stand cancelled. Appeal dismissed. -----