JUDGMENT - V.C. DAGA, J.:---Heard the parties. Rule returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service. 1. The present petition arises out of the interim order passed by the 3rd Family Court, Mumbai, in M.J. Petition No. A-1853/1997. By the said order the petition moved by the father for removal of minor child from the custody of mother was rejected, maintaining the order of access to the child operating in favour of the petitioner-father. The Family Court's decision is based on the ground that the welfare of the child would be best served by his mother. In order to test the legality of the impugned order, it is necessary to arrive at the crystalised legal position of law on the subject. LAW ON THE SUBJECT 2. Law on the subject is almost settled. The paramount consideration governing custody of the child is the welfare of the child and not legal rights of the parties. In normal circumstances natural guardian is entitled to have custody of the minor child and it is father, who has first right to have the custody of the child. However, father's right to have the custody of the child is neither absolute nor indefeasible. The question regarding the custody of a minor child cannot be decided on the basis of legal rights of the parties. The custody of the child has to be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of what would be best and in the interest of the minor child. The mother can be given custody of the minor if the child's welfare or interest requires it, even if father may be fit to act as a guardian. The issue involving the grant of custody always needs to be decided consistently with the wishes of minor provided it is not a product of tutoring or undue influence. FACTS IN BRIEF : 3. The following are the facts : The petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the respondent-wife on 10-11-1997 along with the application for grant of maintenance pendente lite. As a counterblast, the petitioner-husband moved an application claiming custody of the minor child called Harsh from the respondent-wife. The age of the minor child, the victim of a broken marriage is about 8 years. He is taking his primary education. He is in the custody of the mother. RIVAL CONTENTIONS : 4. As a counterblast, the petitioner-husband moved an application claiming custody of the minor child called Harsh from the respondent-wife. The age of the minor child, the victim of a broken marriage is about 8 years. He is taking his primary education. He is in the custody of the mother. RIVAL CONTENTIONS : 4. The contentions of the parties are as under : The petitioner-husband urged that the respondent-wife is engaged in the profession of taking tutions. According to him, she is required to leave her home for taking tutions at 7-30 a.m. She returns at about 2 p.m. She is again required to be away from her home, with the result she is not in a position to look after the minor child Harsha. As against this, he submitted that considering his working hours; which are in between 9 a.m. to 12 Noon and 4 p.m. to 10 p.m., he would be in a better position to look after the said minor child. He further submitted that in his absence, his mother and his brother's wife can look after the child. Apart from this, he further urged that his family has extensive accommodation as against the accommodation available with the respondent-wife. In his submission sufficient space would provide better facility and environment to the child for rest and study. He further submitted that good nursery schools are available in the vicinity of his house. In the light of this, he also urged that the child can be shifted to a nearby Nursery school so as to save him from hazards of heavy traffic of the city. 5. In order to meet the aforesaid submissions, the respondent-wife in reply filed an affidavit stating therein that she was taking tuition prior to April 2000. However, presently, she is not engaged in taking tuition classes. Apart from this, she further stated that petitioner-father is engaged in the business of transport and will hardly be in a position to devote any time to look after the child. She further stated that in her absence her mother looks after the child. On her behalf it was urged that considering the tender age of the child, she would be in a better position to look after the child, so far as his needs are concerned. She further stated that in her absence her mother looks after the child. On her behalf it was urged that considering the tender age of the child, she would be in a better position to look after the child, so far as his needs are concerned. Apart from this, learned Counsel for the respondent further contended that the Family Court has exercised discretion in favour of the respondent (mother of the child) on the sound principles of law and therefore, the impugned order should not be interfered with. 6 After having heard the parties, it is clear that the mother of the child is a teacher taking tutions, as against this the petitioner father of the child is engaged in the business of transport. He has to be away from home right from 9 a.m. to 10 p.m. barring a small period of lunch break of about 1 hour. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions and facts and circumstances of the case, following points arise for my consideration :- POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION (A) In whose custody interest of minor child Harsh would be better served? (B) who can devote more time to look after the minor child ? FINDINGS 7. According to medical research and investigation it has been proved that emotions of a pregnant woman affect the baby inside. This shows that learning process starts from the womb. A growing infant feels safe and happy in the hands of a mother. This feeling of security and happiness forms the basis on which the personality of the child develops. The role of mother is of greater importance than that of a father during the earlier years of a child. Therefore, it is for the mother to groom children. For this, mothers should be educated. Mothers can meet, exchange views, analyse problems posed by children and help them. 8. The basic education plays an important role in the formative age of the child. One must understand that education is not literacy alone. Literacy is only a part of it. Education is much more. It is the physical or biological, psychological or mental and the spiritual of ethical growth of a child. Only when these three function smoothly, one can say there is education. When viewed from this stand point, one can reach to the conclusion that in the formative years first teacher is the mother. Education is much more. It is the physical or biological, psychological or mental and the spiritual of ethical growth of a child. Only when these three function smoothly, one can say there is education. When viewed from this stand point, one can reach to the conclusion that in the formative years first teacher is the mother. Clean habits can easily be taught by the mother, to the extent it becomes a habit for the child. Interactions with the mother pays rich dividends. 9. In the case in hand, mother is already looking after the minor child Harsha. No attempts were made by the petitioner, the father of the child to pay maintenance to the child till application claiming maintenance for him was moved by the respondent, the mother of the child. Conduct of the father did not indicate that he was interested in the welfare of the child but now the anxiety of the father (petitioner) sees to be to seek custody of the child with a view to avoid payment of maintenance for the child. 10. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner made a complaint that the Marriage Counsellor took interview of the child Harsha behind the back of the petitioner. In her submission, the learned Judge ought to have interviewed the child personally. Consequently, she contended that the impugned order is vitiated being in breach of principles of natural justice. In these premises in her submission, the learned judge of the Family Court ought to have discarded the report of the Counsellor and should have ordered fresh interview that too by the Judge herself. 11. The above submissions made are devoid of any substance. It is needless to mention that a provision is made under the rules framed under Family Court's Act to seek assistance from the Marriage Counsellor. The Counsellors are trained persons. If deemed necessary, the presiding officer can seek assistance of the Counsellor. The Counsellor is entitled to interview relations, friends and the acquittances of the parties or any of them including the minor child, if it is a case of custody of the child. The Court can request the Counsellor to submit report. On the report of the Counsellor, the Court can pass necessary orders after notice to the parties relating to the custody of the child. The parties to the proceedings are entitled to a notice before order is passed. The Court can request the Counsellor to submit report. On the report of the Counsellor, the Court can pass necessary orders after notice to the parties relating to the custody of the child. The parties to the proceedings are entitled to a notice before order is passed. The presence of the parties at the time of interview is not necessary. In the instant case, the report submitted by the Counsellor is a balanced report. Neither the presence of the mother nor the absence of the father was influenced or affected it. The view taken by the Family Court on the report of the Counsellor will show that the same has not been construed against the father (petitioner). The Family Court has taken balanced view of the report. Thus the absence of the petitioner has not caused any prejudice to him. Merely because the child was not interviewed by the Presiding Officer herself cannot give any mileage to the petitioner-husband in this matter. 12. Apart from the merits of rival claims, one must bear in mind that whatever may be disputes between the parties, the Court has to consider in the present proceedings for grant of custody; what is in the best interest of the minor child? The minor child Master Harsha is in the exclusive custody of mother for last 3 years. In this background, I do not regard effluence of the petitioner's brother or mother to be a circumstance of such overwhelming importance so as to tilt the balance in favour of the father on the question of what is truly for welfare of the minor. At any rate, I do not agree that it will not be in the welfare of the minor child, if he lives with his mother. In my opinion, it would not be in the interest of minor to move him away from the mother's custody at this stage. Thus, taking overall view of the matter, considering welfare for the child, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the trial Court rightly taken into account all the relevant circumstances in para 6 of the impugned order so as to reach to the proper conclusion that the mother would be better custodian of the minor child. Thus, taking overall view of the matter, considering welfare for the child, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the trial Court rightly taken into account all the relevant circumstances in para 6 of the impugned order so as to reach to the proper conclusion that the mother would be better custodian of the minor child. It will be in the interest of minor to allow him to continue living with his mother considering her constant company with the child, and availability of educational environment in her custody. 13. Having said so, this Court cannot resist from mentioning that when there is a fight between the parents, the most affected persons are the children. Children resent fights. This resentment may slowly grow deeper into the child's psyche. When he grows into an adult, either he becomes a violent person hating the world or he withdraws into a shell avoiding everybody. In either case, the child is deprived of a normal life. Considering psychological or mental impact on the child, the parties to this petition should try to resolve their differences and deficiencies in the interest and welfare of the minor child Harsha. It is well said that : "The art of the life lies in a constant readjustments". 14. Turning to the second limb of the submission, assuming that the second view in the facts and circumstances of the case is possible, then a question would be: Can this Court act as a Court of appeal, while examining the impugned order of the Family Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227? Let me have a look to the scope of supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; so as to find out, to what extent this Court can interfere with the discretion exercised by the Family Court. The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is restricted to interference in the cases showing grave dereliction of duties or flagrant violation of law and is to be exercised sparingly in cases where grave injustice would be done unless High Court interferes. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. While interfering with the discretion exercised by the lower Court, the higher Court, especially the writ Court, is expected to be very slow. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. While interfering with the discretion exercised by the lower Court, the higher Court, especially the writ Court, is expected to be very slow. While dealing with the matter raised before it, the writ Court would not be justified in interfering with exercise of discretion solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage, might have come to a contrary conclusion. If conclusions drawn by the trial Court are reasonable and in judicial manner the fact that writ Court would have taken different view at the trial stage, may not justify interference with the orders of the courts below. 15. In my view, the view taken by the Court below in the impugned order, is one of the possible views and the discretion exercised by it is reasonable and the same has been exercised after taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances brought on record. Consequently, the discretion exercised by the Family Court needs no interference at the hands of this Court, especially, in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the circumstances, for the reasons stated hereinabove, petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. ----- 2001(2) Bom.C.R. 506 Before : V.C. Daga, J. Kashinath Baba Asbe (Shri) others .... Petitioners. Versus State of Maharashtra another .... Respondents. Writ Petition No. 1203 and 1204 of 1986, decided on 8-12-2000. Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, Sec. 32-P---Interpretation of statutes---Resumption of lands---After exclusion from Municipal limits---Proceedings whether can be initiated under section 32-P of the Act---Contention that section 32 applies to the lands which on tiller's day came under the Act and because disputed land on given day was within Municipal limits, provisions of section 32-P will not apply to it---Held, contention holds good. There is no provision under the Act for resumption of such lands and omission of the legislature in not providing provision similar to one under section 88-D(2) of the Act is deliberate and cannot be made good by the Court as its powers of interpretation cannot be extended too far to read something which is not provided in the Act. Proceedings initiated under section 32-P of the Act were therefore, without jurisdiction and of no effect. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362 referred to. Proceedings initiated under section 32-P of the Act were therefore, without jurisdiction and of no effect. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362 referred to. (Paras 21, 22, 23 27) Cases referred : 1. Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362. 2. Anandji Haridas and Co. v. Engg. Mazdoor Sangh, 1975(3) S.C.C. 862 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 946. 3. C.S.T. v. Parson Tools and Plants, 1975(4) S.C.C. 22 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039. Advocates appeared : D.B. Bhosale with S.G. Karandikar, for the petitioner. P.N. Joshi, for respondent No. 2-A. V.C. DAGA, J.:---The important question of law raised in these petitions is as under: Whether section 32-P of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ("Tenancy Act", for short) is applicable to the lands after exclusion thereof from the area of Municipal limits? FACE IN NUTSHELL The facts, necessary to appreciate the above question of law are taken from Writ Petition No. 1203/1986, in nutshell, are as under :- The petitioner are the legal heirs of the original tenant. The respondent Nos. 2 to 8 are the landlords of the lands in question bearing Survey Nos. 38/1, 39 and 43, situated at Village Gopalpur. Taluka-Pandharpur, District-Solapur (hereinafter referred as "suit lands", for short). There is no dispute about relationship of landlord and tenant inter se. The original respondent No. 2 Late Krishnaji Patwardhan, purchased suit lands in Court auction held on 13th November, 1963. He obtained symbolical possession thereof. He got his name mutated in the revenue records, after acquiring title to the suit lands. 2. The original respondent No. 2, after acquiring title to the suit lands, approached the Additional Tahsildar Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Pandharpur (hereinafter referred as "A.L.T."., for short), and prayed for an enquiry under section 32-O of the Tenancy Act. The A.L.T., initiated enquiry under section 32-O, and by an order, dated 16th April, 1966, declared the purchase ineffective. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the original tenant late Shri Annappa Baba Asbe filed appeal before the Appellate Authority, the Special Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals), Solapur. The said Appellate Authority set aside the impugned order vide its order, dated 23-11-1966, and remanded the case to A.L.T., for fixing purchase price as required under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the original landlord invoked revisional jurisdiction of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune ("Revenue Tribunal", for short). The said Appellate Authority set aside the impugned order vide its order, dated 23-11-1966, and remanded the case to A.L.T., for fixing purchase price as required under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the original landlord invoked revisional jurisdiction of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune ("Revenue Tribunal", for short). However, said revision came to be dismissed by an order, dated 30th December, 1968, with the result, the order, dated 23-11-1966, passed by Special Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals), Solapur, in absence of any further challenge to it, became final and binding on the parties. In view of this order, the A.L.T., Pandharpur, initiated enquiry under section 32-G of the Act. In the said enquiry, A.L.T. declared the purchase of the suit lands by the tenant effective under section 32-G of the Act and fixed the purchase price vide its order, dated 24th January, 1974. 5. The original landlord challenged the aforesaid order in appeal bearing Tenancy Appeal No. 34 of 1979. The Appellate Authority, after considering the rival contentions, vide its order, dated 24th December, 1980, allowed appeal and set aside the order of A.L.T., and held that since the suit lands were falling in the Municipal limits on the tiller's day, as such provisions of section 43-C of the Act were attracted. The applicant-tenant was therefore, not entitled to purchase the suits lands. 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, tenant invoked the revisional jurisdiction of Revenue Tribunal, Pune. The Revenue Tribunal dismissed revision by an order, dated 31st March, 1983. The Revenue Tribunal found that the lands, in question were included in the limits of Municipal Council, Pandharpur, in the year 1884, and continued to be the part thereof till it was excluded therefrom in the year 1961. Thus the suit lands were found to be part of the Municipal area on the tiller's day. Consequently, Tribunal found that in view of the provision of section 43-C, the provision of section 32-G could not have been applied to the facts of the present case. On this premise, the revenue tribunal confirmed the order of the lower appellate authority. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the Revenue Tribunal, the present petitioners preferred Writ Petition No. 5844 of 1983 before this Court. The same was dismissed in limine on 16th July, 1983. On this premise, the revenue tribunal confirmed the order of the lower appellate authority. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the Revenue Tribunal, the present petitioners preferred Writ Petition No. 5844 of 1983 before this Court. The same was dismissed in limine on 16th July, 1983. The original tenant carried Special Leave Petition to the Apex Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Apex Court, vide its order, dated 23-7-1984, dismissed the Special Leave Petition, and endorsed the view of the Revenue Tribunal, holding that the provisions of section 32-G of the Act were inapplicable to the lands in question in view of applicability of provisions of section 43-C of the Tenancy Act. Thus, the said question attained finality. 8. After the aforesaid first round of litigation, the respondent-landlords initiated fresh proceedings under section 32-P of the Act to resume possession of the suit lands. On being noticed, the legal heirs of the original tenant appeared and raised objection to the maintainability of the proceedings under section 32-P of the Act, on the premises that the amongst other provisions from sections 31 to 31-R (both inclusive) were inapplicable to the lands in question in view of applicability of section 43-C of the Tenancy Act. However, the Additional Tahsildar, Pandharpur, vide its order, dated 25th September, 1984, overruled the said objection and held that the purchase of suit lands, by tenant, became ineffective under section 32-G, consequently the proceedings under section 32-P were maintainable and also found that the petitioner tenants have no locus standi to appear and contest the said proceedings. 9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the heirs of the original tenant preferred an appeal before the Assistant Collector, Pandharpur, who concurred with the findings recorded by the Additional Tahsildar, and confirmed the said order, vide its order dated 26th October, 1984. 10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the authorities below, the heirs of the original tenant invoked revisional jurisdiction of Revenue Tribunal and contended that in the teeth of provision of section 43-C the applicability of section 32-P ought to have been ruled out by both the authorities below and the proceedings for resumption of possession of suit lands initiated by the landlord ought to have been dismissed. The said contention did not find favour with the Revenue Tribunal, with the result, revision was dismissed. 11. The said contention did not find favour with the Revenue Tribunal, with the result, revision was dismissed. 11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the Revenue Tribunal, writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution was invoked by the heirs of the original tenant. 12. The second petition being Writ Petition bearing No. 1204/1986 has been preferred by another tenant who is also agitating for protection of his tenancy rights in the lands bearing Survey No. 148/1 of village Gopalpur, Taluka-Pandharpur, admeasuring 19 acres and 14 Gunthas. 13. The tenants are different but landlords are same in both the petitions. The issue involved is common, as such both the petitions are heard together, and are being disposed of by this common judgment. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. 14. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the suit lands were included in the limits of Municipal Council, Pandharpur, in the year 1884, and continued to be so till its exclusion therefrom in the year 1961. The lands being part of the Municipal area of Pandharpur, it were within the sweep of section 43-C of the Act. He further urged that in view of section 43-C; the applicability of section 31 to 32-R were taken away by statute and, therefore, section 32-P of the Act for resumption of lands was not available to the landlord. In other words, the landlord could not have been allowed to initiate proceedings under section 32-P of the Act, as the said section was not at all applicable to the suit lands. 15. The learned Counsel for petitioners further contended that in the first round of litigation, the issue as to non-applicability of section 32-G was concluded right upto the Apex Court on the touchstone of section 43-C of the Act, as the suit lands were in the limits of Municipal Council, Pandharpur on the tiller's day. According to him, the contentions raised in the earlier round of litigation and the sweep of the findings recorded therein went to the extent of holding that even after exclusion of the lands from Municipal limits, the provisions of section 32-G were not revived. He, therefore, submitted that applying the same analogy Revenue Tribunal ought to have held that the provision of section 32-P was not revived, even after exclusion of the suit lands from Municipal area of Pandharpur. He, therefore, submitted that applying the same analogy Revenue Tribunal ought to have held that the provision of section 32-P was not revived, even after exclusion of the suit lands from Municipal area of Pandharpur. Thus, the assistance of section 32-P ought not to have been made available to the landlords for resumption of suit lands. 16. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner's further urged that omission to provide for provision under the Tenancy Act permitting the landlords to resume possession is deliberate and the same should not have been supplied by the Courts below by resorting to the process of interpretation. In his submission it is a firmly established rule that the Court is not at liberty to read words in a statute unless clear reason for it is found within the four corners of the Act itself or unless it is necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context. He further contended that Tenancy Act is a beneficial legislation meant for the benefit of tenants. As such it should have been construed while keeping the purpose of the Act in mind. In his submissions, omission to provide remedy in favour of landlords to resume possession is deliberate and, therefore, the same should not be supplied by the Courts. 17. The learned Counsel, in order to buttress his submission, took me through the scheme of the Act, and brought to my notice deletion of section 43-D of the Act by virtue of section 6 of Maharashtra Act No. 10 of 1977, which reads thus :--- "6. 17. The learned Counsel, in order to buttress his submission, took me through the scheme of the Act, and brought to my notice deletion of section 43-D of the Act by virtue of section 6 of Maharashtra Act No. 10 of 1977, which reads thus :--- "6. Notwithstanding the deletion of section 43-D of the Bombay Tenancy Act and of section 61 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, where proceedings for termination of tenancies are pending before the appropriate authority under any such Act and the landlord has taken possession of the land on, or before the date of introduction of the Maharashtra Tenancy Laws, and the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1976, in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, then such proceedings shall be continued and disposed of by such authority, as if, this Act had not been passed, in all other cases, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or authority, such pending proceedings, shall abate, and the tenant shall continue to hold the land in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, or as the case may be, the Vidarbha Tenancy Act." In his submission, reading of the aforesaid section 6 as a whole unequivocally makes it clear that proceedings initiated at the instance of the tenants and which were pending before the appropriate authority under the Act on the date of introduction of Maharashtra Tenancy Laws and the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1976 in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, were allowed to be continued and mandated disposal thereof, as if, this Act had not been passed, and in all other cases where the proceedings were initiated by the landlords were declared as abated notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or authority. The learned Counsel for the petitioner on the dissection of section 6, went on to spell out the legislative intent, and contended that by virtue of section 6 of Maharashtra Act No. 10 of 1977, the proceedings initiated by tenant for claiming possession from the landlord have been saved whereas the proceedings initiated by the landlords against the tenants have been declared as abated. Consequently, in his submission, deletion of section 43-D in view of section 6 of Maharashtra Act 10 of 1977, is one of the pointers to show that the legislature in their wisdom intended not to provide any remedy to the landlords for resumption of possession of tenanted lands falling within the limit of Municipalities or Cantonments. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, as an extended limb of the same submission, contended that there is no provision under the Act for claiming possession of the lands from the tenant if the lands are within the sweep of section 43-C of the Act. 18. The learned Counsel, in order to emphasise his submission, also tried to unfold the scheme of the Act, and tried to rely upon provisions of Chapter VIII in general and provisions of section 88 of the Tenancy Act, in particular. He pointed out that section 88 gives power to the State Government to exempt certain lands referred to therein from the operation of the Act. Similarly, he brought to my notice section 88-B which provides for exemption from the applicability of certain provisions of the Act to the lands owned by Local Authorities, Universities and Trusts. He also read section 88-C which grants exemption from the operation of the Act to the lands leased by the persons with the annual income not exceeding Rs. 1500/-. He also pointed out that the Tenancy Act, has given powers to the State Government via section 88-D to withdraw exemption and has simultaneously made a provision vide sub-section (2) of section 88-D, so as to provide consequences of withdrawal of such exemption. Therefore, in his submission wherever legislature wanted to provide consequences of withdrawing exemption, a specific provision has been made in that behalf. No such similar provision is to be found in Chapter III-B of the Act so as to provide for consequences after exclusion of the land from the Municipal Limits. Therefore, in his submission, omission to provide such specific provision on the part of legislature is deliberate and the same should not be supplied by the Courts. 19. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents (landlords) contended that the intention of the Act is to confer ownership on the tenant, and not to allow the tenant to continue to be an ordinary tenant in perpetuity. 19. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents (landlords) contended that the intention of the Act is to confer ownership on the tenant, and not to allow the tenant to continue to be an ordinary tenant in perpetuity. He, therefore, contended that there is no other provision other than section 32-P of the Act to resume possession of the lands in question. He further contended that after exclusion of the area from the Municipal limits section 32-P will get revived, and it would come to the aid of the respondents-landlords, so as to enable them to claim possession of the suit lands. He tried to place emphasis on the words "in case other than those" appearing in section 32-P of the Act, and contended that section 32-P has been enacted and phrased in a wide manner so as to take care of the cases in hand. He, therefore, tried to support the impugned orders passed by the authorities below, and prayed for dismissal of the petition. POINT FOR DETERMINATION. 20. In the above backdrop, the question, which need consideration, at the cost of repetition, is as under :--- Whether section 32-P of the Tenancy Act providing for resumption of possession of the lands from tenant is applicable to the lands after exclusion thereof from the areas of Municipal limits ? CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS 21. Having heard the rival submission, it will be profitable to turn to the provisions of section 43-C of the Act, the relevant part of which reads as under :--- "43-C. Certain provisions not to apply to Municipal or Cantonment areas.---Nothing in sections 31 to 32-R (both inclusive) 33-A, 33-B, 33-C and 43 shall apply to lands in the areas within the limits of --- (a) ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... (d) ... ... ... (e) ... ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... (d) ... ... ... (e) ... ... ... (f) any area included in a Town Planning Scheme under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 : Provided that, if any person has acquired any right as a tenant under this Act on or after the 28th December, 1948, the said right shall not be deemed to have been affected by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1952, or by the Amending Act, 1955, notwithstanding the fact that either of the said Acts has been made applicable to the area in which such lands is situate." The reading of the aforesaid provision unequivocally makes it clear that wherever section 43-C gets attracted, sections 31 to 32-R (both inclusive) together with sections 33-A, 33-B, 33-C and 43 are not to apply to the lands falling within the limits of Municipal Councils. The said section 43-C falls in Chapter III-B of the Act. The said Chapter does not provide for any provision for the lands which ceases to be so exempted. In other words, there is no provision in the Act to deal with the situation arising from the exclusion of the lands from the purview of the Municipal limits. 22. In order to find out the legislative intent and the scheme of the Tenancy Act, it will be useful to refer to Clause (2) of section 88-D of the Act, which thus reads :--- "88-D. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 88, 88-A, 88-B and 88-C, if the State Government is satisfied --- (i) ...... (ii) ...... (iii) ...... (iv) ...... (2) Where any such land or area ceases to be so exempted then in the case of a tenancy subsisting on the date specified in the order issued under sub-section (1), the landlord shall be entitled to terminate such tenancy under section 31, within one year from such date and the tenant, unless his tenancy is so terminated, shall have a right to purchase the land within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy. The provisions of sections 31 to 31-D (both inclusive) and sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such termination of tenancy and to the right of the tenant to purchase the land." In contrast to the aforesaid scheme engrafted in the aforesaid sections, if one turns to the scheme of Chapter III-B of the said Act, it will be clear that there is a specific provision under section 43-C, which provides that certain provisions referred to therein are not to be applied to the lands in the areas falling within the limits, amongst others, the Municipal areas. But no such similar provision akin to section 88(2) extracted (supra) is to be found in Chapter III-B of the Act. Therefore, omission on the part of the legislatures to provide for such contingency appears to be deliberate. The scheme of the Act shows that no provision has been made by the legislature to provide for consequences after removal of the lands from the areas of the Municipal Council or the Cantonment. Had the legislature wanted to provide for any remedy for taking possession or had it been intended by the legislature that after removal of the lands from the areas of Municipal Councils, the same should be allowed to be resumed by the landlords, then, in that event, a specific provision in that behalf would have been made as is made by the legislature under Chapter VIII via section 88-D(2) of the Tenancy Act. The said omission on the part of the legislature to provide for such provision appears to be deliberate and cannot be said to be an accidental one. 23. In the above backdrop it will be necessary to take note that a matter, which should have been, but has not been, provided for in a statute or in statutory rules cannot, as a general rule, be supplied by construction, as that will amount to legislation. No doubt, it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the word used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act, as has been ruled by the Apex Court in (Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur)1, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the word used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act, as has been ruled by the Apex Court in (Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur)1, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362. In constructing a statute the legislative intention must be sought in the language used therein contained with such helps as the canons of interpretation allow. But new language, or an entirely new provisions cannot be imported into a statute giving it a meaning not otherwise found therein. It is now a fairly well-accepted principle of construction of statutes that the Court must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is any defect in the phraseology used by the legislature the Court cannot make up the deficiency. Even where there is casus omissus it is for the legislature, and certainly not for the Court, to remedy the defect. The Court cannot supply omission by implication or analogy unless the existing provisions of a statute expressly or by necessary intendment compel Court to so construe. 24. There is no dispute to the settled legal position that the Courts only interpret the law and do not legislate it. Where the legislature's intention is clear, there is no scope of reading in between the lines or putting an interpretation contrary to the intention of the legislature. Adding to or providing for ancillary measures can be resorted to by the Courts only in grey areas and not in the covered fields. If on its true construction statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend or alter the law. Any other view, even based on howsoever high, cherished or pious desire cannot be the substitute of specific legislature indictment. 25. The Apex Court in (Anandji Haridas and Co. v. Engg. Any other view, even based on howsoever high, cherished or pious desire cannot be the substitute of specific legislature indictment. 25. The Apex Court in (Anandji Haridas and Co. v. Engg. Mazdoor Sangh)2, 1975(3) S.C.C. 862 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 946 held in para 9, as under :--- "As a general principle of interpretation where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as parliamentary debates, reports of the committees of the legislature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led to the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the legislature had in view in using the words in question." In (C.S.T. v. Parson Tools and Plants)3, 1975(4) S.C.C. 22 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039 it was held in paras 11 and 12 as under : "An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". "The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land and demands perfect obedience". "Judicial power is never exercised" said Marshall, C.J., of the United States, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or in other words to the will of the law." "If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a cassus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. To do so "would be entrenching upon the preserves of legislature" the primary function of a Court of law being jus decere and not just dare." 26. I am, therefore, convinced that the omission on the part of the legislature appears to be deliberate and, therefore, it cannot be held that provisions of section 32-P of the Act is available to the respondents-landlords to resume possession of the lands in question. The said conclusion reached by me also gets support from the provision of section 6 of Maharashtra Act No. 10 of 1977, whereby the proceedings initiated at the instance of the tenant and pending on the date of Bill were kept alive, whereas proceedings initiated at the instance of the landlord and pending on the said date were declared as abated. 27. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners also challenged the findings of the Revenue Tribunal to the effect that the holding of the tenants is in excess of the ceiling area and, therefore, they are not entitled to hold the same. In his submission section 34 has now been deleted with effect from 1961 with the commencement of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act and, therefore, there is no bar to hold the land in excess of the ceiling area under the Act. In view of this, the findings recorded by the Revenue Tribunal cannot be held to be good. Under these circumstances, the findings recorded by the Revenue Tribunal, in this behalf, on the face of deletion of section 34 of the Act are set aside including the impugned order passed by the Revenue Tribunal, dated 10th February, 1984 for the reasons stated hereinabove. I, therefore hold and held that the proceedings initiated under section 32-P of the Act are invalid and without jurisdiction as the assistance of the said section 32-P of the Tenancy Act is not available to the landlords for resuming or claiming possession of the lands from the tenant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 28. In the result, both the petitions are allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) with no order as to costs. Petitions allowed. -----