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Gauhati High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 85 (GAU)

Union of India v. Fazu Ahmed

2000-02-28

A.P.SINGH

body2000
Both these appeals are directed against common judgment and award passed by Shri SN Bezbaruah, District Judge, Cachar and Hailakandi at Silchar in Misc. (LA) Case No. 361 of 1988 arising in Misc Case No. 22 of 1977 and in Misc (LA) Case No. 362 of 1988 arising from Misc Case No. 23 of 1977. Since both the appeals have from a common judgment and only one set of paper book has been filed in both the appeals proceed to decide both the appeals also by a common judgment. MA (F) No. 126 of 1993 shall be the leading case and copy of the judgment in MA (F) No. 126 of 1993 shall be placed on the record of MA / (F) No. l27 of 1993 also. 2. In total 136 bighas of agricultural land in both the cases situated in village Rakhal Khalerpar, District Cachar was subject matter of compulsory acquisition by the Collector under the provisions of Assam Requisition and Acquisition Act, 1964 read with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The claimant in both the cases have claimed compensation for the compulsory acquisition of their land at the rate of Rs. 2,500 per bigha. The Collector, however, awarded compensation to them at the rate of Rs. 1,200 per bigha. Against Collector's Award, reference was made in the Court of District Judge and two separate reference cases were registered. It is to be mentioned here that acquisition of land in question was made by the Collector for the purpose of the Union of India in the Department of Defence. Therefore, compensation payable for the land was to come from the Union of India in the Ministry of Defence. However, in the two reference cases filed in the Court Union of India, Ministry of Defence was not impleaded as party. The Court also did not endorse service of notice of the cases on that party (appellant herein). The Collector as acquiring authority contested the case and evidence was tendered both by claimant and the Collector. On consideration of the evidence available before it the Court has allowed the reference cases in past and has enhanced the rate of the land from Rs. 1,200 per bigha to Rs. 1,500. Apart from that some further relief was also granted. The Collector as acquiring authority contested the case and evidence was tendered both by claimant and the Collector. On consideration of the evidence available before it the Court has allowed the reference cases in past and has enhanced the rate of the land from Rs. 1,200 per bigha to Rs. 1,500. Apart from that some further relief was also granted. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree (Award) of the Court in both the reference cases above two first appeals have been filed by the Union of India. 3. The contention in both the appeals and also in the oral submission made by the learned counsel of the Union of India is that since the amount of compensation for the compulsory acquisition of the land which was the subject matter of the Misc LA Cases had to come from the Union of India it was legally necessary for the Court, before allowing the reference cases, to hear the Union of India and that for that purpose notice should have been issued to it to enable its participation in the proceeding before the Court. In support of the above contention of the Union of India reliance has been placed on UP Avas Vikas Parishad vs. G. Devi, (1995) 11 Supreme Court Cases 326. On the other hand, Sri DC Mahanta, learned Senior Advocate has opposed the contention made by the learned counsel for the Union of India and has contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in UP Avas Vikash Parishad (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case as the said judgment of the Supreme Court is peculiar to acquisition of land for local authorities and not for others. Whereas in the present case the acquisition of the land was not for the local authority but for the Union of India (Ministry of Defence). Sri Mahanta further contended that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is confined to the special facts of the case where acquisition is made for the local authority like UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others whose cases are covered by section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act as special right has been conferred on local authorities for being heard in the matter of determination of compensation for the acquired land. In that context the Supreme Court, has also held that the local authority from which the amount of compensation is payable must also be impleaded as party in the reference cases and the Reference Court must serve notice of the reference on the local authority concerned before deciding the reference case. In his rejoinder argument learned counsel for the appellant contended that though observation of the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikah Parishad vs. G. Devi (supra) may be to the cases of acquisition of land for local authorities and to the provisions of section 50 but the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case must be understood and should be applied in all the cases where compensation for the acquisition is payable by third person other than the Collector. Therefore, the reference Court should provide an opportunity of hearing to the person who-is likely to be adversely affected from the order of the Reference Court if the reference was to be allowed. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I do not find any justifiable reason for setting aside the impugned judgment and Award passed by the Court which is the subject matter appeal in the present two appeals. 5. The law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in UP Avas Evam Vikash Parishad is in context of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 50 creates special right in favour of the local authority for whose a purposes the land is being acquired. The said provision give right to the concerned local authority of being heard in the matter for the determination of compensation payable for the land either by the Collector or by the law. The only bar which has been imposed against the concerned local authority is that in cannot file reference against Collector's award but once the reference is filed by the person who is interested in the land, the local authority is required to be heard and obviously such hearing cannot be provided without the local authority concerned being made party in the reference case or without being served with the notice of the reference case. Unfortunately for the appellant no parallel provision in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as section 50 is available, conferring and identical right, on others. Unfortunately for the appellant no parallel provision in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as section 50 is available, conferring and identical right, on others. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the claimants/respondents were under legal obligation to implead the Union of India (Ministry of Defence) in the reference cases or that the Reference Court was under legal obligation to serve notice to the Union of India before proceeding to decide the reference cases. It, therefore, clearly follows that simply because no notice was served on the Union of India (Ministry of Defence) by the Court while deciding the reference cases or because the claimant did not implead the Union of India (Ministry of Defence) ^ in the reference cases the impugned judgment and award passed in the two reference cases can not be rendered illegal. Admittedly the appellant at no stage filed application before the Reference Court demanding the right of hearing in the reference cases, therefore that Court cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily or illegally in deciding the reference cases vide the impugned judgment in breach of the principle of natural justice. As a matter of fact, it would appear from the judgment under appeal that the Collector had represented the interest of the Union of India as he had been heard by the Reference Court, he had also adduced evidence in support of his contention as was raised before the Reference Court. For the above reasons I do not find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment in appeal is vitiated for the breach of the principles of natural justice or for any other similar reason as above. As a matter of fact, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. G. Devi (supra) has no application to the facts of the-present case. 6. Even before this Court appellants have not argued that the amount of compensation which has been awarded by the Reference Court is exorbitant. The appellants have not stated that they are possessed of exemplars which may show the market rate of the acquired or of the neighbouring land to be less than the amount which has been awarded in the impugned judgment. The appellants have not stated that they are possessed of exemplars which may show the market rate of the acquired or of the neighbouring land to be less than the amount which has been awarded in the impugned judgment. In case from available material this Court is satisfied that the award of compensation to respondents by the Reference Court was excessive or exorbitant then it would have no hesitation in setting, aside the impugned judgment and award. On the contrary I feel fully satisfied that the enhancement of the rate from Rs. 1,200 per bigha to Rs. 1,500 per bighas by the Court is based on correct principles as provided in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The available evidence in the record of the reference cases clearly showed that the market value of the a land in the near proximately of the land under acquisition and of the time of acquisition (date of issue of preliminary notification) was between Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 2,600 per bigha; the Court for cogent reasons has scaled it down to Rs. 1,500 per bigha, which cannot by any yardstick, be termed as arbitrary or exorbitant. Unless appellant is possessed of the material to suggest that market rate for the land in question has been fixed by the Court on much higher side than the actual market rate prevailing in the area and during the relevant time appeal cannot succeed on a mere technical plea of the alleged breach of the principles of natural justice on the strength of Supreme Court judgment which, as has earlier been seen has been given in wholly different context hence has no application. For the above reasons, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment award. 7. In the result both the appeals lack merit which are accordingly dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs of the case.