BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision has been filed against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge, tanuku dated 27th September, 1999. The learned Judge was deciding an application filed under Order 40, Rule 1 of CPC. Many arguments have been raised at the Bar but those arguments need not be gone into in view of what is to be stated by this Court herein below. A preliminary decree was granted in favour of the Bank on 30th March, 1994. Prior to that, in I. A. No. 500 of 1992 on 7-8-1992 the Court had appointed a receiver and had authorised him to conduct auction of lease hold rights of rice mill. He was further directed to deposit the lease amount into the Court. Thereafter another order was passed by the trial Court on 4-7-1994 directing the Receiver to hand over the rice mill to the owners who are petitioners in this petition. This order had been necessitated on the ground that the lessee had relinquished the property as he had not found it profitable. The Receiver issued notice to the petitioners on 13th december, 1994 and asked them to take delivery of possession of the rice mill on the appointed date. Thereafter, the Receiver received a Memo from petitioners advocate Sri G. Bhaskaramurthy stating that his clients could not take possession of the rice mill in the present condition. The advocate requested the Court to direct the receiver to hand over possession of the rice mill to the Bank. Thereafter, the Receiver filed a Memo before the Court and the Bank also filed a petition before the Court. The refusal of the present petitioners to take back the possession of the property necessitated the order of auction of the property. This case was heard earlier when it was found that Sri Tatineni Rama Rao who was purchaser in the auction was not party, then he was arrayed as party and the case was heard again. ( 2 ) RECEIVER was appointed which was not disputed by the petitioners. Thereafter, the property was given on lease, it was also not disputed by the petitioners. The lessee gave up the property as he did not find it profitable, the petitioners were asked to take back the property, they refused and thereafter sale was ordered. ( 2 ) RECEIVER was appointed which was not disputed by the petitioners. Thereafter, the property was given on lease, it was also not disputed by the petitioners. The lessee gave up the property as he did not find it profitable, the petitioners were asked to take back the property, they refused and thereafter sale was ordered. The petitioners did not complain, but it is only after confirmation of the sale that a grievance is being agitated. When the Receiver was appointed the petitioners did not agitate that it was violative of Order 34, Rules 4 and 5 of CPC. When the Court ordered the petitioners to take back the property they refused. Therefore, it can be safely said that the petitioners had no grievance to the appointment of the Receiver and property to be retained by the Bank. Therefore, it will not lie in their mouth at this stage to complain that the order of appointment of receiver and auction was contrary to rules 4 and 5 of Order 34 CPC. In the revision the only ground taken is that there was collusion between the Bank and one tatineni Rama Rao who was the purchaser. Suit was for recovery of money. Even otherwise Order 40 of Civil Procedure Code would empower the trial Court to order sale even before passing of a decree as is laid down by Judgment of Supreme Court in Industrial Credit and Investment corporation of India Ltd. vs. Karanataka Ball bearings Corporation Ltd. , paras 6 and 7 of the judgment are relevant and they are reproduced:"6. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of civil Procedure expressly provides for the appointment of a Receiver over a property whether before or after the decree and the Court may by an order confer on the Receiver all powers of realisation management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of civil Procedure expressly provides for the appointment of a Receiver over a property whether before or after the decree and the Court may by an order confer on the Receiver all powers of realisation management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property. Order 40, Rule l (d) specifically provides for realisation and the words "or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit"appealing in Order 40, Rule l (d) ought to be interpreted in a manner so as to give ful effect to the legislative intent in the matter of conferment of powers by the Court to preserve and maintain the property through the appointment of a Receiver, Needless to record here that there is existing a power which is totally unfettered in terms of the provisions of the statute. Law Courts, however, in the matter of appointment of a Receiver through a long catena of cases, imposed a self imposed restriction to the use of discretion in a manner which is in consonance with the concept of justice and to meet the need of the situation- "unfettered" does not and cannot mean unbridled or unrestrictive powers and though exercise of discretion is of the widest possible amplitude, but the same has to be exercised in a manner with care, caution and restraint so as to subserve the ends of justice. The law Courts are entrusted with this power under order 40, Rule 1 so as to bring about a feeling of securedness and to do complete justice between the parties. 7. The language of Order 40 thus being of the widest possible import, any restriction as regards the power of the court to direct a Receiver to effect a sale of immovable property prior to , the decree does not and cannot arise. Order 40, Rule 1 and various sub-rules thereunder unmistakably depict that the Court has unfettered powers in the event the Court feels that the sale of property would be just and convenient having due regard to the situation of the matter. ( 3 ) IF one goes by the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the discretion in this case has been exercised rightly. By keeping the property as it is both the parties would be suffering loss. The petitioners themselves are not ready to take back the property. ( 3 ) IF one goes by the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the discretion in this case has been exercised rightly. By keeping the property as it is both the parties would be suffering loss. The petitioners themselves are not ready to take back the property. The property is loosing its value. On the other hand, the interest is mounting up against the petitioners. Therefore, it would be in their interest also if the amount fetched from the sale is adjusted against their loan account. ( 4 ) THE suit is pending from 1989. Admittedly the petitioners had taken loan from the Bank and they have been successful for the last eleven years to defeat the decree and to make payment of loan, towards the Bank. As has been found by the trial Court there was no evidence produced before the Court below that there was any collusion between Mr. Tatineni Rama Rao and the Bank. It was also stated that mr. Tatineni Rama Rao had offered seven lakhs and odd but he had purchased the property for six lakhs and odd. No records have been furnished to prove that. It is not stated as to when Mr. Tatineni Rama Rao had offered an amount exceeding seven lakhs. May be he had offered it years before since the suit is pending for the last 11 years. The nature of the property is such that it would be losing value day after day. ( 5 ) FOR these reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.