JUDGMENT- S.A. BOBDE, J.:---These two petitions one filed on the Original Side and the other on the Appellate Side of this Court, challenge the appointment of Dr. Augustine Francis Pinto (hereinafter referred to as the 3rd respondent”) as the Sheriff of Mumbai. 2. Both these petitions claim to have been filed in public interest. O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 1328 of 2000 is filed by a body called “Forum for Fairness in Education” and three others claiming to be the President and a member of the Managing Committee of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 3 Prof. Sandeep Desai has appeared in person in support of the petition. Petitioner No. 4 is described as a social worker. The other petition i.e. Appellate Side Writ Petition No. 2626 of 2000 has been filed by Narendra Kanji Patel. 3. Since both these petitions challenge the appointment of the 3rd respondent as the Sheriff of Mumbai, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 4. So far as O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 1328 of 2000 is concerned, the main challenge in this petition is that the 3rd respondent was not suitable for being appointed because some cases are pending against him in the Court of Special Judge (P.C.A.) for Mumbai. According to the petitioners, two criminal cases are pending against the 3rd respondent and his wife, the 4th respondent. Further, according to the petitioners, the 3rd respondent is found to have concealed income from the Income Tax Department. The main contention of the petitioners is that in view of the cases referred to above, the 3rd respondent was disqualified from being appointed as the Sheriff of Mumbai. The petitioners have prayed for several reliefs in the matter of capitation fees said to be charged by the educational institutions run by the 3rd respondent. 5. Though final relief has not been claimed in respect thereof, the petitioners have prayed for an interim relief that the 3rd respondent be suspended from the post of Sheriff of Mumbai and the duties of the Sheriff should be directed to be performed by the Deputy Sheriff. 6. 5. Though final relief has not been claimed in respect thereof, the petitioners have prayed for an interim relief that the 3rd respondent be suspended from the post of Sheriff of Mumbai and the duties of the Sheriff should be directed to be performed by the Deputy Sheriff. 6. There are several other reliefs claimed in the petitions such as a direction to the State Government and the Union of India to submit a status report of the criminal cases pending against the 3rd respondent and his wife who is joined as respondent No. 4 and a direction to the Union of India to file copies of the income-tax returns of the 3rd respondent and his wife and the relevant assessment orders. The petitioners have also prayed for action against the 3rd respondent and his wife in case they are found guilty for violating the provisions of the series of Acts such as the Indian Trusts Act, 1882the Transfer of Management Act, 1971; and the Anti Capitation Fee Act, 1987. The petitioners have also prayed for a review of the minority status of all the trusts and institutions managed by the 3rd respondent and his wife. In fact, a perusal of the prayer clause itself reveals that the main intention of the petitioners is to seek reports from the authorities regarding the affairs of the 3rd respondent and pending submission of the report, suspend the 3rd respondent from the post of Sheriff of Mumbai. 7. The petitioners have also prayed for an inquiry into the affairs of one Smt. Sushiladevi School said to be managed by the respondent Chief Minister as Chairman and if any irregularities and malpractices are found, the same should be dealt with, in accordance with law. The only reason why this relief has been sought against the Chief Minister is that certain reports which appeared in newspaper in which it is reported that teachers of Smt. Sushiladevi School have been working without their salaries and others are being paid lesser salary. That the respondent-Chief Minister is associated with the school because a journalist has described him as Chairman of the school and that certain malpractices were brought to his notice. It is said to have stated that he does not look after the school and that he would call up the Principal and check. Besides a reference to this news report, there is nothing on record. It is said to have stated that he does not look after the school and that he would call up the Principal and check. Besides a reference to this news report, there is nothing on record. 8. The petitioners have not pointed out or relied upon any provision contained in any law which renders a person against whom a criminal case is pending or who is found to have not paid any tax due from him disqualified from being considered or appointed to the post of Sheriff of Mumbai. 9. We may, at the outset, point out that the petitioners have not relied upon any provision in any law showing how the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Sheriff of Mumbai is contrary to law. In fact, petitioner No. 3 Prof. Shandeep Desai who has been heard at length in support of this petition has also not pointed out any provisions of law which disqualifies a person against whom a criminal case is said to be pending or in respect of whose income an adverse order has been made by the income-tax department is disentitled to be appointed as Sheriff of Mumbai. We were, therefore, inclined to dispose of this petition for this short reason. 10. However, since a strenuous effort was made on the part of the petitioners to have the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Sheriff to Mumbai quashed and set aside we have examined the matter in some detail. 11. The main point canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is that the 3rd respondent is guilty of several malpractices in respect of the educational institutions being run by him and his wife charging capitation fees and concealment of income. According to the petitioners, two criminal cases in respect thereof are pending against the 3rd respondent and his wife and the 3rd respondent has been found to have concealed income as found by the income-tax authorities. The petitioners have annexed one receipt at Exhibit 'E' from which receipt the date and the name of the person who is said to have paid the amount are scored out. The receipt appears to be in the name of St. Xavier's Education Trust of which the 3rd respondents is the Chairman. The other document relied upon by the petitioners is an assessment order of St. The receipt appears to be in the name of St. Xavier's Education Trust of which the 3rd respondents is the Chairman. The other document relied upon by the petitioners is an assessment order of St. Xavier's Education Trust for the assessment year 1990-91 by which the Income tax authorities have initiated proceedings under section 271-IC of the Income tax Act for concealment of income. 12. We have heard Mr. Vahanvati, learned Advocate General, for the respondent-State and Mr. Pradhan, learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent and his wife Mrs. Grace Pinto and have also examined the material which they have produced before us. We are satisfied that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. As regards the capitation fee said to have been collected by the Trust, it is not possible for us from the mere perusal of the receipt of the year 1997, the relevant portions of which are all scored out, to infer that the 3rd respondent is guilty of collection of capitation fee and, therefore, disqualified to be appointed as Sheriff of Mumbai as claimed by the petitioners. Moreover, it appears from para 12 of the petition that this issue is subjudice in this Court in Writ Petition No. 1245 of 2000. 13. As regards the criminal cases said to be pending against the 3rd respondent, it appears that though the 3rd respondent and his wife are shown as accused in the two cases, the cases arise out of an alleged demand for a sum of money made by the two employees of St. Lawrence High School, Borivali. In fact, from the record produced before us by the Advocate General, it appears that the Anti-Corruption Bureau has filed a report dated 25-1-2000 stating that investigations reveal that the evidence collected does not show any nexus with the accused mentioned in the said report. Respondent Nos. 3 4 herein i.e. Mr. A.F. Pinto and his wife are two of the accused in respect of whom the said report is filed. It, however, appears that the learned Special Judge has not passed any order discharging the 3rd respondent and his wife from the proceedings on the ground that section 169 of the Cri.P.C. under which the said report is filed is not attracted at the stage of the proceedings when the report was filed. 14. Mr. Pradhan, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 14. Mr. Pradhan, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 3 4, has submitted that, in fact, the said respondents have not received any summons from the said Criminal Court where the aforesaid cases are said to be pending. He has further stated that, in fact, even a charge-sheet against the 3rd respondent and his wife has not been filed in the said proceedings. Mr. Pradhan has further submitted that it is a fact that the 3rd respondent did obtain anticipatory bail after he apprehended arrest by the police after the two employees of the St. Lawrence School were trapped by the Anti-Corruption Bureau. 15. From the above, it is clear to us that while the aforesaid two criminal cases can be said to be pending against the 3rd respondent and his wife, there is nothing in them which warrants interference by this Court in the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Sheriff of Mumbai. There is no reason for us to depart from the well-known presumption of innocence of an accused. While we do not propose to comment on the merits of the two cases, it is clear from the report filed by the Police Officer, Anti-Corruption Bureau before the Criminal Court that the prosecuting agency has itself stated that there is deficient evidence against the 3rd respondent and his wife. In fact, the statement in the report reads as follows:- “The whole of the evidence collected by me does not show any nexus with the above mentioned accused. It is further submitted that it appears to me that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding the accused to the Hon'ble Court.” 16. As regards the question of concealment of income, the 3rd respondent has filed an affidavit stating that an appeal had been filed against the said order referred to by the petitioners and that appeal has been allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). That the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has passed a reasoned order and communicated to the respondent by his letter dated 9-13-1996. The Appellate Authority has set aside the findings of the assessing authority. As a result, it is clear that there is no substance in the petitioners' contentions based on the alleged concealment of income by the 3rd respondent. 17. That the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has passed a reasoned order and communicated to the respondent by his letter dated 9-13-1996. The Appellate Authority has set aside the findings of the assessing authority. As a result, it is clear that there is no substance in the petitioners' contentions based on the alleged concealment of income by the 3rd respondent. 17. Even otherwise, it is clear that none of the allegations levelled by the petitioners constitute a ground for rendering a person disqualified from being appointed as Sheriff of Mumbai. 18. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the office of the Sheriff of Mumbai is governed by the Letters Patent of the Supreme Court, Bombay 1823, the Act for establishing High Courts in India, 1861; the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay, 1862; and the Amended Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay, 1865. The learned Advocate General submitted that the appointment of Sheriff is made for a period of one year by the Governor on the recommendation of the Government. We find from the Rules produced before us that no qualification or guideline has been prescribed by or under the Rules governing the office of the Sheriff. It is, therefore, not possible for us to treat the 3rd respondent as disqualified from holding the office of the Sheriff. 19. One of the contentions raised by the petitioners is that the appointment has been made in an arbitrary manner and not on the basis of any norms. We find that there are, in fact, no qualifications or norms laid down by the Government for appointing a person as Sheriff of Mumbai. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the power to make the appointment has been exercised arbitrarily in this case. There is no challenge before us on the ground that the absence of qualifications or guidelines for appointment to the post of Sheriff of Mumbai renders the power to make such an appointment itself unconstitutional. 20. At this stage, we must point out that this petition does not appear to us to be moved in public interest. There is no challenge before us on the ground that the absence of qualifications or guidelines for appointment to the post of Sheriff of Mumbai renders the power to make such an appointment itself unconstitutional. 20. At this stage, we must point out that this petition does not appear to us to be moved in public interest. There are several features about this petition which suggest that it is moved to settle some score or the other against respondent No. 1, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, and his appointee, the Sheriff of Mumbai :- (i) The petitioners are mainly from the field of education. Petitioner No. 1 is styled as the Forum for Fairness in Education. It is obvious from the petition itself that both the respondents referred to above are said to be associated with educational institutions. In fact, the 3rd respondent appears to have established several educational institutions which have gained prominence over the years and at present the total number of students studying in the institutions established by him are about 1,25,000. This petition appears to be a clear attempt to discredit the 3rd respondent i.e. A.F. Pinto. (ii) In fact, the 4th petitioner has even alleged that the 3rd respondent was at one time earning only about Rs. 150/- per month and how this petitioner helped him; and how, in an obvious imputation of ingratitude, he later on avoided meeting him. This petitioner is described in one of the documents as a Council Member of the Janata party. (iii) The 3rd respondent entered upon the office of Sheriff sometime or about 27-1-2000 whereas O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 1328 of 2000 has been filed on 23-6-2000 and Appellate Side Writ Petition No. 2626 of 2000 has been filed on 4-4-2000. We find no reasons as to why the petitioners should have waited for almost a period of six months before moving this Court, particularly when the tenure of the Sheriff of Mumbai is itself for a period of one year. (iv) The petitioners have stated in para 26 of the petition that they attempted to have the son of one Shiv Menon admitted in one of the schools run by respondent No. 3's Trust, without any donation that was asked for by the school. It is further stated in the petition that the petitioners warned the principal of the school that collection of donation was illegal. It is further stated in the petition that the petitioners warned the principal of the school that collection of donation was illegal. That in spite of this warning, the said son of Mr. Shiv Menon was not admitted. (v) Besides, had the petition been purely in public interest with a view to ensure the appointment of what the petitioners conceived to be a proper person to the post of Sheriff of Mumbai, there was no reason at all to join the 3rd respondent's wife as a party to this petition. No relief is claimed against her. Nonetheless, she has been joined as a party and several allegations extremely scandalous in nature have been made about her. The allegations pertain to her personal character and are highly offensive. The allegations themselves make it clear to us that the petition is moved with an oblique purpose of tarnishing the reputation of the 3rd respondent and more unfortunately, his wife, too. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 has rightly claimed that the allegations against respondent No. 4 i.e. the 3rd respondent's wife reproduced in para 5 of the petition be expunged. We, therefore, hereby direct that paras 5(i) and (ii) be expunged from the record. (vi) Particularly, we find that the allegations against the respondent-Chief Minister are completely without any evidence and merely based on certain newspaper reports regarding certain school with which he is said to be associated. We fail to see any propriety in making such allegations if the petition was a bona fide public interest litigation for challenging the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Sheriff of Mumbai. 21. We find that the petitioners have not acted bona fide, in public interest, for the reasons stated above and they have, therefore, no locus standi to approach this Court in this matter. We find that the directions of the Supreme Court in (Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary)1, reported in A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 892 relied upon by the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 3 4 are applicable to the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in (Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar)2, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 where it had observed that public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. 3 4 are applicable to the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in (Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar)2, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 where it had observed that public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. That such a petition would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from the Supreme Court. It was further observed :- “It is the duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation.” Their lordship further observed :- “.........the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other strenuous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system.” 22. We are of the considered view that this is not a petition moved genuinely in public interest for the reasons mentioned earlier. 23. In the circumstances, O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 1328 of 2000 is dismissed. In view of our findings that this is not a bona fide public interest litigation, for the reasons stated above, we consider it appropriate to impose exemplary costs on the petitioners. The petitioners shall, therefore, pay costs quantified at Rs. 25,000/- to respondent Nos. 3 4 within a period of one month from today. 24. In view of our findings that this is not a bona fide public interest litigation, for the reasons stated above, we consider it appropriate to impose exemplary costs on the petitioners. The petitioners shall, therefore, pay costs quantified at Rs. 25,000/- to respondent Nos. 3 4 within a period of one month from today. 24. Insofar as Appellate Side Writ Petition No. 2626 of 2000 is concerned, the only point argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this case is that respondent No. 2, Chief Minister of Maharashtra proceeded to appoint A.F. Pinto (respondent No. 4) inspite of the fact that the petitioner made a representation against his appointment to the Chief Minister. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the letter dated 12-1-2000 to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The learned Counsel, however, fairly accepted that he is not in a position to point out any legal duty or obligation on the part of the Chief Minister and the Governor of Maharashtra to give any hearing to a person who makes a representation against the appointment of a person to a public office such as that of the Sheriff of Mumbai. 25. Barring the allegation regarding the wife of respondent No. 4, which are absent here, we find that the objections to his appointment are similar to those which are dealt with in O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 1328 of 2000. 26. In parting, we would like to observe that the appointment to the post of Sheriff of Mumbai was challenged in this Court on two occasions, in the past. On both occasions, the challenge was repelled. On one occasion i.e. Writ Petition No. 325 of 1987 decided on 6-2-1987, one of the grounds of challenge was that since the Sheriff is an officer of this Court, he can only be appointed by this Court under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. The challenge that he was an officer of this Court since he has to perform certain duties assigned to him by this Court was not accepted. On the other occasion i.e. O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 458 of 1987 (Mrs. Pushpa Kalyanmal Singhvi v. Union of India)3, decided on 20-3-1987, the appointment of then Sheriff was challenged on the ground that the appointee had concealed their real income and had filed a revised assessment with a view to claim a lower rate of taxation. On the other occasion i.e. O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 458 of 1987 (Mrs. Pushpa Kalyanmal Singhvi v. Union of India)3, decided on 20-3-1987, the appointment of then Sheriff was challenged on the ground that the appointee had concealed their real income and had filed a revised assessment with a view to claim a lower rate of taxation. In that petition also, a prayer was made to this Court for a direction to the Union of India to produce the tax assessment record of the appointee. That petition was, inter alia, rejected on the ground of multifariousness. 27. There appears to us little doubt that the Sheriff does have several duties under the Latters Patent of this Court and the Original Side Rules. We, however, feel that it is time that steps are taken to lay down the qualifications of persons to be appointed to the post and procedure for making such an appointment. It is also timely to do so now, since the appointment of a new Sheriff would be due towards the end of December, 2000. 28. We, therefore, dismiss this petition also. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----