Judgment Debiprasad Sengupta, J.: 1. This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against two orders dated 16.11.99 and 14.12.99 passed by the 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Howrah fixing production of the petitioners in court on 28th December, 1999 and 1st January, 2000 in total non-compliance of the provisions of law. 2. The present petitioners along with two others were made accused in a case being T.R. No.9 of 1999 (Crime No. 8/NCB/CAU99) which is now pending for commencement of trial in the court of 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Howrah. Charges have already been framed by the learned Judge for commission of offences under sections 21, 29, 31, 31A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). Cognizance of the offence was taken on the basis of the petition of complaint lodged by one Ranjit Kumar Dutta, Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Eastern Zonal Unit. 3. Both the petitioners were arrested in connection with the instant case on 1st May, 1999 and since then they are in custody. 4. Mr. Sekhar Basu learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that in conducting the proceeding the learned Judge has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of law and on more than one occasions the learned Judge has deviated from the compliance wit!. the procedure which are essential. Mr. Basu draws the attention of the court to the order dated 14th December, 1999. On the said date the petitioners and other two accused persons were produced before the learned Judge. On the said date a prayer was made on behalf of the accused petitioners for fixing the date of trial. The learned Judge after hearing the parties fixed dates for taking evidence starting from 11th January, 2000 and ending with 21st January, 2000. The learned Judge thereafter fixed 28th December, 1999 and 11th January, 2000 for production of the petitioners and other accused persons in court. Mr. Basu further submits that in both the orders there is no specific orde,r of remand. Even assuming that there is an order of remand, such order was passed for a period beyond 15 days, which is not permissible under the law. Mr. Mr. Basu further submits that in both the orders there is no specific orde,r of remand. Even assuming that there is an order of remand, such order was passed for a period beyond 15 days, which is not permissible under the law. Mr. Basu further points out that on 28th December, 1999 the concernce court did not sit and the petitioners and other accused persons were not produced in court. Presently the detention of the petitioners in jail is without any warrant of remand and apart from that the period of remand had already exceeded the permissible limit of 15 days. Mr. Basu also draws the attention of the court to the earlier order dated 16th November, 1999 which commits the same mischief and violation of the same procedure of law, as it was done in the order dated 14th December, 1999 as stated above. 5. Mr. Basu submits that the form prescribed for warranting detention of an under trial prisoner in jail pursuant to the order of the court is a part of the procedure established by law and if such procedure is not strictly complied with by any court the order of detention of the person would be against the concept of liberty and its procedural safeguard guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6. In support of his contention Mr. Basu relied on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1953 SC 277 , wherein it was held that detention of a person in custody after the expiry of the remand order, without any fresh order of remand committing him to further custody while adjourning the case under section 344 Cr.P. Code (section 309 of the New Code) is illegal. 7. Mr. Basu next relies on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1969 SC 1014 . He draws my attention to paragraphs 12 and 14 of the said judgment which runs as follows :- "As stated in Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 this court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously, observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release." "One it is shown that the arrests made by the police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do. The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have been made mechanically. All that Mr. Chagla has said is that if the arrested persons wanted to challenge their legality the High Court should have been moved under appropriate provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and others have, by moving this court under Article 32 of the Constitution, complained of detention or confinement in jail without compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions. If their detention in custody could not continue after their arrest because of the violation of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution they were entitled to be released forthwith. The orders of remand are not such as would cure the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the third contention of Madhu Limaye." 8. The next judgment cited by Mr. Basu is a decision of Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1958 All 578 where in it was held, inter alia, as follows :- "Section 344, Cr. P.C., requires that where a case is adjourned or postponed the court shall do so by written orders and state reasons also and shall be a warrant remand the accused in custody. Sub-section (2) says that every order made under this section by a court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding Judge or the Magistrate, Where although there were orders at different dates adjourning the case no order was recorded by the Magistrate remanding the petitioners to custody, it would be difficult to read those orders as orders of remand such as are contemplated by section 344. The detention therefore under those orders could not be said to be in accordance with the procedure established by law." 9. Mr. Ashim Roy, ld. Advocate appearing for the Narcotics Control Bureau in his usual fairness adimitted that there are irregularities in the impugned orders passed by the Trial Judge. The detention therefore under those orders could not be said to be in accordance with the procedure established by law." 9. Mr. Ashim Roy, ld. Advocate appearing for the Narcotics Control Bureau in his usual fairness adimitted that there are irregularities in the impugned orders passed by the Trial Judge. But, according to him only because of such irregularities the accused petitioners are not entitled to be released in such a case of grave offence. Mr. Roy relies on a judgment reported in 1991 .Calcutta Criminal Law Reporter page 90, wherein the Division Bench of this court held in paragraph 8 of the said judgment as follows :- "Mr.Dutta appearing on behalf of the accused opposite party, however, contended that even if the finding of the learned Sessions Judge, was not a proper one, still then the detention of the accused persons after 31.12.00 was illegal and unwarranted, as no order directing their remand was passed in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is true that no such order was made but then in our view, absence thereof did not make the remand of the opposite party in custody bad for he was remanded to custody by a warrant issued by the Magistrate, which is the only requirement of section 309 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 10. Mr. Roy next draws my attention to the orders issued by Smt. Reva Nayyar, Joint Secretary to the Government of India being F. No. 801/25/99PITNDPS and F.No. 80l/26/99-PITNDPS-both the orders are dated 3rd December, 1999. Mr. Roy submits that in view of the aforesaid two orders of "Preventive detention" the petitioners are detained under section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 and so the question of their being released does not arise at this stage in the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction. 11. It is true that the question of release of the petitioners does not arise at this stage. But under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this court has got ample power to judge the correctness, legality and propriety of an order which has been passed judicially in a judicial proceeding. If there is any error of law, apparent of the face of the record, in the impugned orders, this court has got ample power to interfere. 12. If there is any error of law, apparent of the face of the record, in the impugned orders, this court has got ample power to interfere. 12. I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge and in my considered opinion the impugned orders suffer from serious illegality. From the impugned order dated 14th December, 1999 it appears that both the petitioners were produced before the learned Judge on the said date. The learned Judge after hearing both the parties fixed the dates for taking evidence starting from 11th January, 2000 ending with 21st January, 2000. The learned Judge thereafter fixed 28th December, 1999 and 11th January, 2000 for production of the petitioners. It is really surprising to note that in the said order there is no specific order of remand. Even assuming the said order to be an order of remand, such order was passed for a period beyond 15 days which is not permissible under the law. It also becomes evident that on 28th December, 1999 the concerned court did not sit and the petitioners were not produced in court. In such circumstances the detention of the petitioners in jail is without any warrant of remand. Apart from that the period of remand had already exceeded the period of 15 days. It is also evident that similar mistake was committed by the learned Judge in the earlier order dated 16th November, 1999, which also indicates that there was no specific order of remand. 13. Section 309 Cr.P.C. requires a Magistrate or a Judge, if he wishes to adjourn a case, to remand by warrant the accused, if in custody and provides further that every order made under section 309 Cr.P.C. shall be in writing. Where a trying court adjourns a case by an order in writing, but there is nothing on record to show that he made an order remanding the accused to custody, the order suffers from serious illegality. It is settled law that the court must make the remand order addressed to the Jailor or the Supdt. of the jail for receiving the accused and for producing him on the next date. A detention without a valid order of remand is illegal. Every time the case is adjourned there must be a fresh order of remand to judicial custody. of the jail for receiving the accused and for producing him on the next date. A detention without a valid order of remand is illegal. Every time the case is adjourned there must be a fresh order of remand to judicial custody. Under section 309 Cr.P.C. custody of an accused in jail can be authorised and continued only by a warrant issued by the court and when there is no such warrant his confinement is illegal. 14. In view of the discussions made above I am of the opinion that both the orders dated 16.11.99 and 14.12.99 suffer from serious illegality. But since the present petitioners are at present under the Preventive Detention under the PITNDPS Act, 1988 the question of their being released does not arise at this stage. At the trial has already been started on and from 11.1.2000 in the court of the learned Judge, Special Court under the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, it will not be wise to interfere with the same. But I must say that the learned Judge should have been more careful while passing orders remanding the undertrial prisoner to judicial custody during trial and he should be more careful in complying with the mandatory provision of section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as indicated hereinabove. The application is accordingly disposed of. T.D.N. Application disposed of.