JUDGMENT - D.K. DESHMUKH, J.:---By this petition the petitioner challenges the order dated 30th June, 1995 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 137 of 1994. The facts that are material and relevant, for deciding this petition are on 2-2-1994, the petitioner displayed a notice of lock-out with the statement of reasons stating therein their intention to effect the lock-out w.e.f. 21-2-1994. Though according to this notice, the lock-out was to be effective on 21-2-1994 the petitioner suspended work from 2-2-1994 itself. The reason given for suspension of work immediately on 2-2-1994 itself was the atmosphere of violence prevailing in the factory premises on that day. According to the petitioner, the petitioner was forced to suspend the work immediately from 2-2-1994 because it was not possible, due to the atmosphere of violence, to continue the manufacturing activity in the factory premises. The respondent No. 2 Union filed a Complaint under section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1971") making a grievance against the suspension of work as also the lock-out. It transpires that after the complaint was filed and while it was pending, the petitioner withdrew the lock-out on 23rd March, 1994. The complaint was decided by the Industrial Court by its order dated 30th June, 1995. The Industrial Court set aside the lock-out notice dated 2-2-1994. The Industrial Court held that suspension of operations effected from 2-2-1994 amounts to illegal lock-out and unfair labour practices. It also held that the lock-out declared w.e.f. 21-2-1994 till it was lifted on 22-3-1994 is illegal. The Industrial Court directed the petitioner to consider about payment of full wages for the period from 21-3-1994 to the date of lifting of the lock-out i.e. 21-3-1994. In substance the Industrial Court held that because the lock-out was effected w.e.f. 2-2-1994 without issuing 14 days notice as required by law, lock-out effected from 2-2-1994 is illegal. It held that the defect of effecting lock-out without notice will also not be cured on expiry of the period of 14 days from 2-2-1994 and, therefore, the Industrial Court held that the entire period of lock-out commencing from 2-2-1994 is illegal. 2. It held that the defect of effecting lock-out without notice will also not be cured on expiry of the period of 14 days from 2-2-1994 and, therefore, the Industrial Court held that the entire period of lock-out commencing from 2-2-1994 is illegal. 2. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. G.R. Sapre and others)1, 1981 Lab.I.C. 221 submits that though the lock-out was commenced on 2-2-1994, continuance of that lock-out till the expiry of the period of 14 days notice may be held to be illegal. However, the period of lock-out after expiry of the period of 14 days from the date of the publication of the notice i.e. 2-2-1994, cannot be held to be illegal because after expiry of the period of 14 days the lock-out becomes a lock-out effected after complying with the provisions of the law. The learned Counsel further submits that the employer can also not be held liable for payment of wages for the period of 14 days when either there was an illegal lock-out, in the sense that the lock-out was effected without notice, or there was suspension of work without payment of full wages to the employees or workers because, according to the learned Counsel, the petitioner was forced to suspend the work and effect the lock-out from 2-2-1994 because of the atmosphere of violence created by the workers. The learned Counsel further submits that in any case the petitioner cannot be held solely responsible for the acts of violence that were admittedly committed in the factory premises and, therefore, the Industrial Court was not justified in directing the petitioner to pay full wages to the employees. According to the learned Counsel, the workers have also contributed to the circumstances due to which the atmosphere of violence was created and, therefore, at least a part of their wages for the period of 14 days was liable to be denied to them. 3. At the hearing of the petition, none appeared on behalf of the respondents. 4. Now, in the light of the rival submissions, the record of the case is perused. It becomes clear that on 2-2-1994 a notice was given by the employer of its intention to effect lock-out w.e.f. 21-2-1994. 3. At the hearing of the petition, none appeared on behalf of the respondents. 4. Now, in the light of the rival submissions, the record of the case is perused. It becomes clear that on 2-2-1994 a notice was given by the employer of its intention to effect lock-out w.e.f. 21-2-1994. Law obliges an employer to give 14 days notice before effecting a lock-out. The employer, however, suspended work from 2-2-1994 itself though it intended originally to effect lock-out from 21-2-1994. Insofar as the facts in Premier Automobiles (supra) case are concerned, in that case on 15th December, 1978 the employer issued a notice indicating its intention to resort to lock-out at the Kurla Plant w.e.f. 3-1-1979. By another notice of the same date, they suspended the operations at the said plant w.e.f. 16-12-1978 on the allegation that it is impossible for the employer to continue the work due to the disruptive activities of the workmen. In this factual background, the observations of the Division Bench in its judgment in Premier Automobile's case in paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 are pertinent read as under : "22. The next question is whether the lock-out commenced illegally without notice in compliance with section 24(2)(a) can become legal, after compliance with it during its illegal continuance. In the present case, Notice Exhibit 'N' purporting to suspend work from 6-1-1979, was issued obviously in compliance with section 24(2)(a) on 15th December, 1978, itself, when Notice 'O' purporting such suspension with immediate effect on 16-12-1978, also was issued. Employer withdrew Notice, Exhibit 'O', on 6-1-1979, in the belief of Notice 'N' having become effective and stoppage of work being legal from that date even if such suspension is held to be lock-out. Mr. Khambatta, therefore, argued that there is nothing in the Act preventing the employer from complying with section 24(2)(a) during the continuance of illegal lock-out to make it legal from the stage of such compliance. In the Kamani Metallic Oxides Ltd., case, the illegal lock-out commenced on 3-4-1979 was sought to be made legal after 20-4-1979, by issuing notice to that effect on 6-4-1979. The workmen approached the Industrial Court on 4-6-1979, under section 28, i.e. long after 20-4-1979, Mr. K.K. Singhvi supports Mr. In the Kamani Metallic Oxides Ltd., case, the illegal lock-out commenced on 3-4-1979 was sought to be made legal after 20-4-1979, by issuing notice to that effect on 6-4-1979. The workmen approached the Industrial Court on 4-6-1979, under section 28, i.e. long after 20-4-1979, Mr. K.K. Singhvi supports Mr. Khambatta and contends no unfair labour practice existed at any rate on 4-6-1979, to justify the kind of interim relief granted, claim for compensation for the period of illegality altogether standing on the different footing. 23. Section 24(2) so far as relevant reads as follows : "24(2) "illegal lock-out" means a lock-out which is commenced or continued (a) without giving to the employees, a notice of lock-out in the prescribed form or within fourteen days of the giving of such notice." In other words, resorting to 'lock-out' by the employer by itself is not illegal. It is the non-compliance with the requirements of the above Clause (a) that makes it illegal. Under the above Clause (a) a lock-out will be illegal, if it is (1) commenced without giving a notice, or (2) commenced within 14 days of the notice, even if notice is given, or (3) continued from day-to-day if commenced without notice, or (4) so continued from day-to-day during the period of 14 days, even if notice is so given. Not mere commencement of lock-out without notice, but even continuance thereof without compliance with section 24(2)(a) appears to have been deliberately rendered illegal, in an anxiety to extend intended relief to the employees and expose the employer to legal consequences for the entire period of illegality. 24. But such an illegality can be brought to an end by discontinuing the lock-out, so commenced illegally and resuming the operations. The same result would follow after the expiry of 14 days of the notice, if notice is given, in compliance with section 24(2)(a), either at the commencement of such illegal lock-out, or during the pendency thereof with a view to get rid of such illegality. There is nothing in section 24 or any other provision militating against this." In paragraph 25 of the judgment, the Division Bench has held that the condition as to 14 days notice can be complied with by the employer even during the continuance of a lock-out which is commenced illegally in the sense that it is commenced without giving 14 days notice as required by law. The Division Bench has observed thus : "Any lock-out so commenced illegally without notice, would cease to be so illegal, from the day on which 14 days period expire. Illegality committed till that day may have its full effect and subsequent legality thereof may not relieve the employer of financial liabilities to which the illegality of this period exposes him such as paying compensation to workers even when they had not been worked for no fault of theirs." The Division Bench has further observed thus : "Illegal commencement of a lock-out can take place under variety of circumstances, including the ignorance of the legal position or doubtfulness of its being a 'lock-out' and, not necessarily out of vindictiveness, obstinacy or deliberate intention to flout the law. It is never too late to be wiser and to make amends. No one can claim vested interest in compelling a man to continue the illegality even when he is keen to remove it by complying with the law." Thus it is clear that the Division Bench has held that it is possible for an employer to cure the illegality by complying with law in a lock-out which at the commencement is illegal and the period of lock-out subsequent to the expiry of the period of 14 days will be a legal lock-out. Therefore, in my opinion, the Industrial Court was not justified in holding that the lock-out in the present case even after expiry of period of 14 days from 2-2-1994 would be illegal lock-out till it was lifted on 21-3-1994. 5. The Division Bench, however, in its judgment in Premier Automobile's case has held that in such a situation the employer would be liable to make payment for the period of 14 days during which the workers could not work. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that if the employer is compelled to suspend work due to the conduct of the workmen themselves employer cannot be held liable for making payment even for the 14 days notice period, the submission of the learned Counsel, no doubt gets support from the observations of the Division Bench in paragraph 25 of the judgment. Therefore, it becomes necessary to find out whether firstly this aspect of the matter has been examined by the Industrial Court and secondly if the Industrial Court has examined this aspect of the matter whether the Industrial Court has held that the worker are solely to be blamed for the situation due to which employer had ordered suspension of work. A perusal of the judgment of the Industrial Court shows that in paragraph 63 of its judgment, the Industrial Court has discussed the evidence for considering the situation that prevailed on 2-2-1994, the date on which the petitioner employer declared suspension of work. The Industrial Court after referring to the evidence on record in detail has held that the workers cannot be held entirely responsible for the violence that erupted in the factory premises on 2-2-1994. The finding that has been recorded by the Industrial Court in this regard is a finding of fact which is based on appraisal of the oral evidence on record and, therefore, there is no substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the workers are entirely to be held responsible for the violence that erupted on 2-2-1994 and, therefore, the employer cannot deny the liability to make payment for the 14 days notice period. The learned Counsel then submitted that even if the employer is to be held liable for making payment of the wages for 14 days to the workers then also the employer cannot be held liable to pay full wages to the workmen for the aforesaid period because, according to the learned Counsel, the workers have also contributed to the incidents that occurred on 2-2-1994. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel, if one peruses the observations of the Industrial Court in its order, it becomes clear that so as far as the incident taking place on 2-2-1994 is concerned, the employer has not examined any witness who has actually seen the incident that occurred and, therefore, the oral evidence tendered by the employer in relation to the incident dated 2-2-1994 has been rejected by the Industrial Court with the result only evidence that remained in the field on this aspect of the matter is the evidence on behalf of the complainant union and on the basis of that evidence the Industrial Court has found that the workers are not liable to forfeit or forego any part of their wages for the 14 days notice period. In my opinion, there is definite material on record for these findings recorded by the Industrial Court and considering the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in disturbing findings of fact, in my opinion, the finding of fact is not liable to be rejected. 6. In the result, therefore, the petition succeeds in part and is allowed. That part of the order of the Industrial Court impugned in the petition which declares the entire period of lock-out from 2-2-1994 to 21-3-1994 to be illegal is modified. It is declared that the lock-out commenced from 2-2-1994 till the expiry of the period of 14 days from 2-2-1994 would be illegal lock-out. However, the lock-out commenced from the date of expiry of the period of 14 days till the date it was lifted would be considered as legal lock-out. It is further declared that the petitioner would be liable to pay full wages to the workers for the period from 2-2-1994 till the expiry of the period of 14 days. Rule made absolute with no-order as to costs. Petition partly allowed. -----