Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 865 (MAD)

S. Jayalakshmi & Others v. S. P. Padmavathi

2000-08-29

B.AKBAR BASHA KHADIRI

body2000
Judgment : 1. Both the civil revision petitions have arisen in this way: One Sriramulu Naidu was the original owner of the property. Jayalakshmi, the first petitioner in C.R.P.No.2895 of 1998 herein, is the wife of Sriramulu Naidu. Sriramulu Naidu and Jayalakshmi had three sons by name Jayachandra Babu, Jayaraman and Mohan Babu. The second petitioner in C.R.P.No.1896 of 1999, Gunavathi, is the wife of Jayachandra Babu, the third petitioner Hemanthkumar Babu, the fourth petitioner N.J.Padmavathi, and the fifth petitioner N.J.Geetha (Minor) are the children of Jayachandra Babu. Apart from the three sons, Sriramulu Naidu had a daughter by name Sarojini, whose husband was one Balakrishnan. Regarding the property in dispute, Sriramulu Naidu executed a settlement deed in favour of Balakrishnan on 14. 1974. The settlement deed was attested by all his three sons. Sriramulu Naidu died during 1979. .2. Balakrishnan had leased out the property to his brother-in-law Jayaraman. Later, Balakrishnan instituted proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.277 of 1982 for wilful default in payment of rent. Eviction was ordered on 30.3.1983. Balakrishnan instituted execution proceedings in E.P.No.592 of 1983. Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu, namely, the widow and son of Sriramulu Naidu obstructed the delivery of possession. The decree-holder Balakrishnan instituted proceedings in M.P.No.995 of 1985 for removal of obstruction. On 30.1.1984. The bailiff reported to the court that the obstruction was removed and possession was delivered. The E.P. was terminated on 12. 1984. Meanwhile, Balakrishnan preferred a complaint to the police which culminated in C.C.No.2414 of 1984. According to Balakrishnan, subsequent to the delivery of possession, Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu broke open the lock put up by him and committed trespass into the property. The criminal case was tried and Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu were acquitted of the charges on 30.12.1985. 3. Meanwhile, on 12. 1985, Balakrishnan entered into an agreement for sale with Padmavathy the respondent herein. He had agreed to sell the property for Rs.2.75 lakhs. Later, he had not come forward to honour the agreement. Therefore, Padmavathy filed a suit for specific performance in C.S.No.245 of 1986. A decree was passed in her favour. Subsequently, Balakrishnan died on 19. 1988. Padmavathy, the purchaser, filed execution proceedings against the heirs of Balakrishnan for compliance of the decree. The heirs of Balakrishnan executed sale deed in favour of Padmavathy on 24. 1990. 4. Therefore, Padmavathy filed a suit for specific performance in C.S.No.245 of 1986. A decree was passed in her favour. Subsequently, Balakrishnan died on 19. 1988. Padmavathy, the purchaser, filed execution proceedings against the heirs of Balakrishnan for compliance of the decree. The heirs of Balakrishnan executed sale deed in favour of Padmavathy on 24. 1990. 4. Subsequent to the execution of the sale deed in her favour, Padmavathy filed M.P.No.662 of 1990 to implead herself as the petitioner in E.P.No.592 of 1983. She had also filed M.P.No.663 of 1990 for restoration of E.P.No.592 of 1993 on the ground that she was willing to accept that possession was not delivered by the obstructers to Balakrishnan and therefore, the E.P. should be resorted and delivery should be ordered. Both the petitions were allowed. The E.P. was restored to file. 5. In that E.P., Jayalakshmi, Jayachandra Babu and the legal heirs of late Jayaraman viz., petitioners 2 to 5 in C.R.P.No.1896 of 1999 preferred M.P.No.637 of 1991 under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereunder they have pleaded that the decree had already been executed and the execution proceedings was terminated as early as 12. 1984. They contended that though they are in possession of the property, they are not in possession as tenants or the legal representatives of the tenants, but they are in possession as trespassers and therefore, execution cannot be proceeded with. While disposing of the petition, the learned X Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, held that the petitioners therein were in joint possession of the property with the erstwhile her and viz., Jayaraman and therefore they can prefer an application under Sec.47, C.P.C. The learned Judge had also held that by virtue of the Bailiffs endorsement in the delivery warrant in E.P.No.592 of 1983, the execution proceedings in E.P.No.592 of 1983 had come to an end, that the petitioners in M.P.No.637 of 1991 are only trespassers and the decree having already been satisfied nothing is left for execution, and that the present purchaser, who has stepped into the shoes of the decree-holder, should file a suit for eviction and accordingly, M.P.No.637 of 1991 was allowed. 6. 6. Subsequent to the orders passed in M.P.No.637 of 1991, the decree holder Padmavathy instituted R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996 claiming herself as the landlord and alleging that the petitioners in M.P.No.637 of 1991 are her deemed tenants and as legal representatives of the erstwhile tenant, they are bound to pay rent due from May, 1990 to October, 1996, that is, for a period of 78 months at Rs.325 per month, which works out to Rs.26,000. .7. Pending R.C.O.P. proceedings, Padmavathy, the purchaser instituted M.P.No.55 of 1997 under Sec.11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, seeking direction to the tenants to deposit the rent. In the counter, the petitioners herein contended that there is no contractual relationship of tenant and landlord as existed between them and the petitioner therein. The learned Rent Controller (XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras) passed orders on 11. 1997 directing the petitioners herein to deposit the arrears of the rent. As against that order, two appeals were preferred, one by petitioners 1 and 2 herein and other by petitioners 2 to 5 herein, i.e., R.C.A.Nos.928 and 930 of 1997 respectively. 8. Pending R.C.As., Padmavathy, the purchaser, filed M.P.No.737 of 1997 stating that without complying with the order to deposit the arrears of the rent, the appellants, namely, Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu cannot proceed with the appeal. Here again, Jayalakshmi and her son contended that there is no jural relationship of the tenant and landlord existing between them and the petitioner therein, the contention of the petitioner therein was accepted by the appellate court and accordingly, the appellate court held that without depositing the arrears of rent, the petitioners herein viz. Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu cannot proceed with the appeal without depositing arrears is against that order Jayalakshmi and Jayachandra Babu preferred C.R.P.No.2895 of 1998 under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973. 9. Because M.P.No.737 of 1997 was allowed, as a consequence of the same, the appellate authority dismissed R.C.A.No.928 of 1997. Because R.C.A.No.928 of 1997 was dismissed and thus the ancillary proceedings have come to an end, the Rent Controller proceeded with R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996. The Rent Controller held that the respondents therein have committed wilful default and accordingly, ordered eviction on 13. 1998. Because R.C.A.No.928 of 1997 was dismissed and thus the ancillary proceedings have come to an end, the Rent Controller proceeded with R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996. The Rent Controller held that the respondents therein have committed wilful default and accordingly, ordered eviction on 13. 1998. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Rent Controller in R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996, Jayalakshmi and others, namely, the petitioner herein preferred R.C.A.No.285 of 1998. That was dismissed on 33. 1999 holding that without depositing the arrears, the appellants therein cannot prefer the appeal. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the appellate authority and the Rent Controller, Jayalakshmi and others preferred C.R.P.No.1896 of 1999. 10. So far as C.R.P.No.2598 of 1998 is concerned, the petitioners have raised the following grounds: .(i) Both the courts below failed to see that the jural relationship of the tenant and landlord did not exist between the petitioners and the respondents; .(ii) When that is so, the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the R.C.O.P. after all; and (iii) When the appeal was preferred against the order directing the petitioners herein to deposit the rent and when such direction to deposit is questioned, the appellate court ought not to have dismissed the appeal on the ground that without depositing the amount, the petitioners could not prefer the appeal. 11. In C.R.P.No.1896 of 1999, the petitioners had raised the following grounds: (i) The decision by the lower court under Sec.11(4) of the Act was only in the nature of a finding on a preliminary issue and irrespective of the result of the preliminary issue in R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996, the R.C.O.P. ought to have been considered on merits by the Rent Controller. But, the Rent Controller dismissed on the ground that R.C.A.No.298 of 1997 was dismissed. .(ii) Further, the Rent Controller while considering R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996 had simply the order of the appellate court without considering the matters on merits. 12. Per contra, the respondent raised objection that the petitioners cannot be considered as aggrieved persons as per Sec.25 of the Act and they have no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Rent Controller. 13. Heard both the sides. I will first deal with the objections raised by the respondent. 12. Per contra, the respondent raised objection that the petitioners cannot be considered as aggrieved persons as per Sec.25 of the Act and they have no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Rent Controller. 13. Heard both the sides. I will first deal with the objections raised by the respondent. Sec.25 of the Act recites under: “Revision: (1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority, call for and examine the record of the appellate authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. (2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under Sub-sec.(1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceedings to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant: Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not prefering the application within the time specified in this sub-section”. 14. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the terminology any person aggrieved’ would refer only to a person who has a subsisting right to possession of the property and that right should have been infringed by the impugned order. In the instant case, the learned counsel also pointed out that the test is whether the words person aggrieved’ includes a person who has genuine grievances, because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his right. According to the learned counsel, when the executing court had directed removal of the obstruction and even after removal of the obstruction, the obstructer resumed possession by re-entering, that amounts to violation of the order of the court and wilful disobedience of the order, which would not advance the cause of justice and therefore, they have no locus standi to appeal. It was also submitted that the petitioners have contended that there is no jural relationship of the landlord and tenant and claimed that their status is one of trespasser meaning a person in possession without any right and therefore, they cannot be considered as an aggrieved person. (i) In Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar , A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2092 at 2098 wherein the Apex Court had held as under: “…..Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one ‘a person aggrieved’. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words ‘a person aggrieved’ is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality.” .(ii) In J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578 at 586 the Apex Court have made the following observations: “38. To distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’, among them, some broad test may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed. Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of. Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public. Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action. Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public. Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action. If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usuration of jurisdiction on the part of the authority. Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community. Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals. 39. Now, let us apply these test to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of the individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, the expression ‘person aggrieved’ must receive a strict construction.” 15. The learned counsel for the respondent also referred to Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is in pari materia to Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter called in short as ‘Act’) and cited the decision reported in Chennichi alias Parilkkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar Parilkkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar Parilkkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar , (1970)1 MLJ. 234 wherein it has been held as under: “The exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code, is purely discretionary. The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper if such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction of the court is intended to secure and subserve and ends of justice and not to deny or defect it. If inference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction.” 16. The learned counsel also cited a decision reported in Jagmohandas v. Jamnadas, A.I.R. 1965 Guj. If inference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction.” 16. The learned counsel also cited a decision reported in Jagmohandas v. Jamnadas, A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 181 wherein it has been held as under: “37. It is therefore clear that the High Court is not bound to interfere in revision in all cases in which it is found that the Subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The High Court will exercise its revisional powers only in aid of justice and not merely to give effect to a technicality which will not further the ends of justice. If the interference of the High Court will bring about injustice or encourage abuse of the process of the court or promote mere technicality without advancing the cause of justice or be futile, the High Court will not interfere in revision, even though the conditions specified in any of the three clauses of the section are satisfied.” 17. To show that the revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Act can be invoked only to advance cause of justice, the learned counsel for the respondent refereed to the decision reported in M.S.Gnanasabapathi Mudaliar v. E.Sivagnam Pillai and another M.S.Gnanasabapathi Mudaliar v. E.Sivagnam Pillai and another M.S.Gnanasabapathi Mudaliar v. E.Sivagnam Pillai and another, 1955 MLJ. 286. 18. I feel the objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondent does not stand scrutiny. Most of the decisions referred to by the learned counsel were rendered in different circumstances, which could not have any bearing to the instant case. The decision reported in Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar Bar Council, Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar , A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2092 relates to a case under the Advocates Act, where in a case of alleged professional misconduct by an advocate, the Bar Council forwarded proceedings by referring the case of misconduct to the disciplinary committee, and when a plea was raised whether the Bar Council is an aggrieved person, it was held that the Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of the standard of professional conduct and ethics. 19. 19. The decision reported in J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578 relates to a case where a proprietor of a cinema theatre holding licence to exhibit cinema film tried to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of ex-debito justio to get ‘no objection certificate’ and a rival trader wanted to put forth objection. The Apex Court held that the objector is not a person who suffered any injury by the grant of ‘no objection certificate’ and therefore, he is not an aggrieved person. 20. The decision reported in Jagmohandas v. Jamnadas, A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 181 relates to appointment of trustees for a public charitable institution. 21. Adverting the attention to the facts of the instant case, the respondent had preferred R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996 against the petitioners herein alleging that they are her tenants and that they have committed wilful default in payment of rent. When the revision petitioners herein were parties to the proceedings, having sought relief against them, and both the courts below having passed orders adverse to the interest of the petitioners, it is not now open to the respondent to contend that because the petitioners have claimed that they are trespassers, they are not the aggrieved persons. Whether or not the petitioners are trespassers, order of eviction would certainly cause hardship and grievance and therefore, it cannot be said that they have no locus standi to prefer the revision petitions. 22. It would be useful to recall that both the civil revision petitions have arisen out of the common cause i.e., non-deposit of alleged arrears of rent. Whether or not the petitioners are trespassers, order of eviction would certainly cause hardship and grievance and therefore, it cannot be said that they have no locus standi to prefer the revision petitions. 22. It would be useful to recall that both the civil revision petitions have arisen out of the common cause i.e., non-deposit of alleged arrears of rent. Sec.11 of the Act recites as under: ”Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction: No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Sec.10 shall be entitled to contest the application before the controller under that section, or to prefer any appeal under Sec.23 against any order made by the Controller on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposits, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the controller or the appellate authority as the case may be. .(2) The deposit of rent under Sub-sec.(1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. .(3) Where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under Sub-sec.(1) the controller or the appellate authority as the case may be, shall on application made to him either by the tenant or by the landlord and after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. .(4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. .(5) Theamount deposited under Sub-sec.(1) may, subject to the such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him in that behalf to the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be.” 23. The respondent herein filed M.P.No.55 of 1997 under Sec.11(4) of the Act. .(5) Theamount deposited under Sub-sec.(1) may, subject to the such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him in that behalf to the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be.” 23. The respondent herein filed M.P.No.55 of 1997 under Sec.11(4) of the Act. She had mentioned about M.P.No.637 of 1991, the petition filed under Sec.47, C.P.C., in execution proceedings in E.P.No.592 of 1983. According to her, in that order, the learned Judge had observed that the petitioners herein should be deemed as the tenants. In paragraph 2 of her affidavit filed in M.P.No.55 of 1997, the petitioner therein, namely, the respondent herein stated that the respondents there are deemed to be the tenant in respect of the premises in question. In the counter, the petitioners herein have contended that there is no landlord and tenant relationship existed. Curiously, in the order passed in M.P.No.55 of 1997 the learned controller had not adverted his attention to the counter filed by the respondents therein, but picked holes in the case of the respondents that the respondents filed M.P.No.637 of 1991 under Sec.47, C.P.C. According to the learned Rent Controller, the provisions of Sec.47, C.P.C., can be invoked only by a person against whom a decree is passed or their representatives and thus by filing a petition under Sec.47, C.P.C., the respondents therein, namely, petitioners herein have accepted that they are representatives of the original tenant late Jayaraman. Reference have been also made by the learned Rent Controller to the earlier plaint filed by the second petitioner against Balakrishnan, the vendor of the respondent, wherein he had stated that the bailiff has made an endorsement that there was an obstruction and the obstruction was removed. These two grounds weighed in the mind of the learned Rent Controller very much for him to hold that the petitioners herein are the tenants and that they should deposit the rent. 24. When an application under Sec.11(4) is filed, the status of the tenants is very much in issue and till they are adjudicated as tenants, there can be no question of calling upon them to deposit whatever is lawful due within the meaning of section. It is not as if the petitions filed in M.P.Nos.662 and 663 of 1990 were not brought to the knowledge of the learned Judge. It is not as if the petitions filed in M.P.Nos.662 and 663 of 1990 were not brought to the knowledge of the learned Judge. The learned Rent Controller had occasion to go through the orders passed in M.P.No.637 of 1991 by the X Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. In fact, he has marked the same as Ex.P-4. The orders passed by the learned Rent Controller in M.P.No.55 of 1997 virtually amounts to reconsidering the orders passed by the learned X Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. In the orders passed in M.P.No.637 of 1991, the learned Judge though observed that the petitioners can be deemed as tenants, for the purpose of considering whether they can maintain a petition under Sec.47, C.P.C., ultimately the learned Judge had allowed the petition with an observation that therefore, the evidence and documents placed on the file would show that after execution of the decree for possession was made on 30.1.1984, petitioners 1 and 2 trespassed into the petition premises on 2. 1984, and therefore, the only way open to the present owner of the property is to file a civil suit for ejectment. In fact, the learned Judge has fully considered the aspect regarding the bailiffs report. 25. InG.Ramaswami v. Kurava Boyan and 2 others G.Ramaswami v. Kurava Boyan and 2 others G.Ramaswami v. Kurava Boyan and 2 others , (1991)1 MLJ. 244 M.Srinivasan, J. (as His Lordship then was) has clearly laid down that the plea that there had been only a paper delivery and that actual delivery was not effected ought not to be accepted and the evidence afforded by the court and bailiffs endorsement cannot be ignored in the absence of definite and specific plea of fraud. The learned X Judge, Small Causes Court has referred to the decision and held that the bailiffs endorsement has to be accepted and obstruction was removed and delivery of possession was effected on 30.1.1984. 26. I feel that while considering the application, the learned Rent Controller has thoroughly misguided himself. For the purpose of Sec.11 of the Act, the concerned statutory authority is to look into the prima facie materials available on record and if it be shown that the relationship of the landlord and tenant exists, then he should pass an order in favour of the landlord for deposit of the arrears of rent. For the purpose of Sec.11 of the Act, the concerned statutory authority is to look into the prima facie materials available on record and if it be shown that the relationship of the landlord and tenant exists, then he should pass an order in favour of the landlord for deposit of the arrears of rent. The learned Rent Controller thoroughly erred in not agreeing with the learned X Judge, Court of Small Causes, but reassessed the evidence and held that the petitioners are tenants. Even in the petition under Sec.11(4) of the Act, the petitioner therein had not stated that the petitioners are her tenants. She had only stated that they are deemed to be the tenants. Sec.2(8) of the Act defines as to who is the tenant. Sec.2(8) of the Act recites as under: “ ‘tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant…” The sine qua non to be a tenant is that the petitioners should have been living with the original tenant in the building as a number of the tenants family up to the death of the tenant. Of course, the petitioners herein are the mother and brother of the deceased tenant. By virtue of this provision they can be construed as tenants if they have continued to live in the premises after the death of the tenant and that has been shown in this case for certain time, but such deemed tenancy was also put an end on 30.1.1984 when delivery of possession was effected and the E.P. was terminated. Thus, the very basis on which the petitioners were directed to deposit rent is wrong. The wrong committed by the learned Rent Controller in disposing M.P.No.55 of 1997 was perpetuated in M.P.No.737 of 1997 in R.C.A.No.928 of 1997. Because the proceedings deviated from a right direction in tangential manner, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the petition for non-deposit of the rent and the appellate court also dismissed the appeal in R.C.A.No.285 of 1988. Thus, the whole proceedings have gone wrong. I feel, both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had gone wrong in holding that the petitioners are tenants. 27. Thus, the whole proceedings have gone wrong. I feel, both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had gone wrong in holding that the petitioners are tenants. 27. The next question is what is the course open to one and whether after set aside the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller in M.P.No.737 of 1997 and the rent control appellate authority in R.C.A.No.285 of 1998 and the matter should be sent back to the respective courts for reconsideration. But considering the aspect that the litigious atmosphere is prevailing between the parties right from 1982 and when it is very clear that there is no jural relationship of the landlord and tenant existed between the respondent and petitioner, I feel, no useful purpose would be served in sending the matters back to the respective courts. The only course open to me is to give a quietus to the matter. Accordingly, both the civil revision petitions are allowed and the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority are set aside and R.C.O.P.No.2506 of 1996 is dismissed. The petitioners herein are entitled to cost throughout in both the proceedings. Consequently, connected C.M.Ps. are closed.