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2000 DIGILAW 867 (PAT)

Kali Pada Rabidas v. Umapada Bouri

2000-07-11

A.K.SINHA

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Judgment A.K.Sinha, J. 1. This appeal against acquittal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 11.1.1994 passed by Sri Mohan Prasad, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad, in C.P. Case No. 501/90 corresponding to T.R. No. 780/84 whereby and whereunder he acquitted the accused-respondents of the charge under Section 147, 447, 323 of the Indian Penal Code and accused Umapada Bouri, who was charged under Sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code was also Acquitted of that charge. 2. The instant appeal has been filed on the ground that learned trial Court failed to take into consideration the deposition of the witnesses and came to erroneous conclusion in giving benefit of doubt to the accused-respondents and thereby acquitting them of the respective charges. 3. It is the admitted position that initially, the complainant had filed a complaint case in Gram Kuthchery and trial was going on there. But, in the meantime, he filed a petition under Sec. 73 of the Gram Panchayat Act before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, who directed him to file a regular complaint in his Court after setting side the order of acquittal recorded by the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and on the basis of the complaint filed by the appellant cognizance was taken in the case and the trial proceeded. 4. It is a well settled principle of law as in the case of Kaptan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors. -- wherein it has been held as hereunder: ...though it was open to the High Court to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of the private parties the revisional jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when there was some glaring defect in the procedure or there was a manifest error on a point of law and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. This Court pointed out that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies but indicates some cases which would justify the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision. This Court pointed out that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies but indicates some cases which would justify the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision. The cases so indicated are; where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce or where the appeal Court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial Court as not admissible or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or by the appeal Court or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of an offence, which is invalid under law. In the other cases referred to above, Courts reiterated the principles laid down in Chnnaswamy and observed that the revisional jurisdiction when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal ought not to be exercised lightly and that it could be exercised only in exceptional case where the interests of public justice required interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. 5. In yet another decision in the case of Sambasivan and Ors. V/s. State of Kerala 1998 (2) PUR 174, the Apex Court held as follows: The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are well settled. The power of the Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But, where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the Appellate. Court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial Court. It is only when the approach of the Trial Court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal 6. Court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial Court. It is only when the approach of the Trial Court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal 6. In the case of Ramesh Babul Doshi V/s. State of Gujarat -- , the Apex Court observed in the following terms: This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the Appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. 7. Keeping in view the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the decisions quoted above, I will advert myself to the merit of the present case. It appears that the prosecution had examined five witnesses in the case, out of which, P.W. 5 Kalipada Das is the injured, who clearly admitted that when the assault was being made by the accused-persons, no body else was present at the place of occurrence except the assailants. The trial Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the evidence of P.W. 1, 2 and 3 who claimed themselves to be the eye witnesses to the alleged occurrence is not worth belief. So far the evidence of P.W. 4 (doctor), who is said to have examined P.W. 5, the trial Court found that the doctor did not state in his evidence about the nature of the weapon used and the evidence of P.W. 4 shows that the doctor has not clearly Written that whether the injury No. 1 was an incised wound or lacerated wound or what was the nature of the injury. The injury No. 2 was, no doubt, an abrasion of 2 cm × 2 cm on right shoulder which he has stated. The injury No. 2 was, no doubt, an abrasion of 2 cm × 2 cm on right shoulder which he has stated. The learned trial Court while examining the evidence of P.W. 5 (complainant) expressed the view that his evidence suffers with certain contradictions and, therefore, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court gave benefit of doubt to the accused-respondents. From the judgment of the trial Court, it appears the learned trial Court has considered the evidence of the witnesses and formed his opinion that it was a fit case in which benefit of doubt should be given to the accused-persons. Therefore, it is not such an exceptional case where the trial Court has acquitted the accused-persons without considering the evidence or materials on record resulting in miscarriage of justice. 8. Having considered the rival contentions of both the sides as also the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the principles enunciated by the Apex Court, as referred to above, I am of the view that it is not a fit case in which this Court can interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. 9. In the result, I, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which stands dismissed.