V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: The writ petition was filed by one Jacob Sebastian praying therein for a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent, committee constituted under Sec.2-A of the Tamil Nadu Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act, 1955 to issue permission to the petitioner, as prayed for in his application dated 4.5.1988, to cut and remove rose wood trees being the excessive shed trees in the coffee plantation in Survey No.556/1, Cherrangode Village, Gudalur Taluk, Nilgiris District. 2. The learned single Judge of this Court by the impugned judgment allowed this writ petition. In the writ petition the learned single Judge wholly relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in W.A. No.1312 of 1991 wherein the Division Bench had taken a view that there was no provision inhibiting such cutting of trees belonging to rose wood species. The Division Bench had also made a reference to G.O.Ms.No.512 which had set out the decision of the Government with regard to the shed regulations in the plantations amongst other species and the Division Bench further noted that 100 shed trees per hectare should be retained and it is only for reducing the number of excess trees over the figure of 100 trees, permission would be required from the concerned authorities. The Division Bench found that there was no distinction made in respect of any species so that the cutting of rose wood trees would be totally prohibited. The Division Bench in that case then went on to observe that since it was not claimed by the respondent, the forest department, that the cutting of 171 trees for which permission was sought would bring the number of trees below 100 trees per hectare, there was no question of refusing the permission even to cut rose wood species. It is only on that basis the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and granted the permission to cut three rose wood trees. 3. Mr.Titus Jesudoss, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant committee, first respondent in the writ petition, however brings to our notice that the afore mentioned judgment of the Division Bench was challenged by the committee before the Apex Court vide Civil Appeal No.9096 of 1995 arising out of S.L.P.No.22667 of 1995. 3. Mr.Titus Jesudoss, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant committee, first respondent in the writ petition, however brings to our notice that the afore mentioned judgment of the Division Bench was challenged by the committee before the Apex Court vide Civil Appeal No.9096 of 1995 arising out of S.L.P.No.22667 of 1995. He points out that the afore mentioned judgment of the Division Bench was set aside by the Apex Court and therefore the learned single Judge could not have relied upon that judgment. 4. We will not go into that question as to whether the learned single Judge should have relied upon the Division Bench Judgment because the fact remains that before the learned single Judge it was not pointed out that the judgment was upset by the Apex Court. As it is, from the judgment of the Apex Court, it is clear that before the Apex Court both the sides had agreed on some compromise, according to which the State Government offered to pay compensation on account of the loss caused to the coffee plantation because of the shed by the afore mentioned 164 rose wood trees for which permission was sought for by the petitioner and granted by the Division Bench. It seems that both the sides had agreed in as much as the petitioner therein, the owner of the trees, had agreed that he would not cut the rose wood trees if he receives the compensation for the loss caused by the shed of 164 rose wood trees. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, on this agreed proposal, went to assess the loss. Such is not the question involved in the present matter. The Supreme Court judgment would be of no help to the appellant herein as, firstly it was an agreed judgment and the Apex Court did not go into the question as to whether the permission was rightly granted by the Division Bench in that case. In fact, in paragraph 1 itself, the Supreme Court says: “This Court, without deciding the question of law arising in the appeal, granted to the respondents four weeks time to file an affidavit explaining its case about the trees in detail and stating why the offer of the state should not be accepted”. It is clear from this that the Supreme Court did not go into the correctness or otherwise of the Division Bench Judgment. It is clear from this that the Supreme Court did not go into the correctness or otherwise of the Division Bench Judgment. Therefore there would be no question of our holding that the learned single Judge should not have relied upon the Judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1312 of 1991. Ordinarily, therefore, the order of the learned single Judge could have been affirmed on account of the judgment in W.A.No.1312 of 1991. It will be seen in that judgment that the Division Bench had specifically observed, "There has been no distinction between one species of tree and the other. Hence, it is not possible to bring in the theory that in respect of rosewood trees, there cannot be cutting of them. It is not claimed by the respondents that the cutting of the 171 trees for which permission was negatived will bring the number of trees below 100 trees per hectare. Such being the position legal and factual, we are not able to subscribe our support to the line of thinking of the learned single Judge when he imposed a qualification with regard to the trees belonging to rosewood species. Accordingly, this writ appeal is allowed. [emphasis supplied] These observations in the Judgment of the Division Bench absolutely make it clear that the Division Bench had granted the permission in that case negativing the stand taken by the learned single Judge in that case that an exception could be made in the case of rose wood trees. The Division Bench therefore went on only with the question of the permissible number of trees which could be cut according to G.O.Ms. No.512. Unfortunately, the matter did not stop there. If the Division Bench’s judgment remains in the fray, ordinarily it would have been binding on us as the previous judgment. However, the legal situation has changed in as much as now there has been a complete ban on the cutting of the rose wood trees because of the Tamil Nadu Rosewood Trees (Conservation) Act, 1994 (Act 1 of 1995). Sec.3 of this Act specifically provides for a total prohibition of cutting etc. of Rosewood trees. Sec.3 reads as under: "Sec.3: Prohibition of cutting, etc. Sec.3 of this Act specifically provides for a total prohibition of cutting etc. of Rosewood trees. Sec.3 reads as under: "Sec.3: Prohibition of cutting, etc. of Rosewood trees: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, no person shall cut, fell, firdle, lop, tap, uproot or burn or otherwise damage any rosewood tree in any forest or do any act likely to endanger its existence or result in the extinction of its species: Provided that dead or fallen rosewood tree may be removed with the permission of the prescribed authority in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed". It is now therefore clear that a living rosewood tree cannot under any circumstance be cut and even a committee constituted under Sec.2-A of Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act would not be in a position to grant any such permission. It is an admitted position that the petitioner had sought permission to cut live rosewood trees and not merely dead wood. The prohibition is total in respect of the living trees of rosewood species. By Sec.12 of this Act, the provisions of the Act over-rule the other laws or any custom or usuage or contract or judgment/ decree or an order. Therefore, the ban of cutting of the rosewood trees is total and complete. Unfortunately, this Act was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge who disposed of the writ petition only on the basis of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court. The Judgment of the learned single Judge was given on 14.2.2000 and on this day, the Act was very much on the statute book. Therefore, there was a complete ban and further there is no question of application of the Division Bench Judgment rendered in W.A.No.1312 of 1991. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.Titus Jesudoss has pointed out that he has raised this question in the appeal. Unfortunately, for us the respondent is not present in spite of notice, nor is there any representation on this behalf. We had to therefore consider the question with the help of the learned counsel for the appellant only. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.Titus Jesudoss has pointed out that he has raised this question in the appeal. Unfortunately, for us the respondent is not present in spite of notice, nor is there any representation on this behalf. We had to therefore consider the question with the help of the learned counsel for the appellant only. 5. In view of the specific prohibition provided in Act 1 of 1995, vide Sec.3 and Sec.12, there would be no question now of giving any permission as has been done by the learned single Judge. The order of the learned single Judge is therefore to be set aside as per incurium of Act 1 of 1995, which would have the binding effect. Sec.1(3) of the Act specifically provides that the Act shall come into force at once and remain in force for a period of fifteen years. The Act was already there on the statute book when the matter was decided by the learned single Judge. The order would, therefore, have to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside and the writ petition has to be dismissed. The writ appeal is therefore allowed. The order/ judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is directed to be dismissed, but, in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. Connected C.M.P. is also closed.