Judgment : 1. The civil revision petition has been filed against the order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil, in C.M.A.No.33 of 1996 in I.A.No.430 of 1996 in O.S.No.726 of 1996 confirming the order of the learned Additional District Munsif, Nagercoil, granting injunction pending suit in favour of the respondent. 2. The suit O.S.No.726 of 1996, itself has been filed for a permanent injunction restraining the revision petitioner/defendant from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the respondent/plaintiff as lessee over the plaint schedule property and from evicting her from the property by force or illegal or unlawful means or by any methods against law and Justice and from leasing out the plaint schedule property to any person other than heirs and also from conducting any lease auction, etc., by affecting her rights over the plaint schedule property. 3. There is an interesting background to the case and the background is only far too familiar. The property, subject matter of the proceedings, is a rice mill which had been taken by the respondent in an auction held in the year 1991 for a period of three years. Sealed tenders were called for and the plaintiffs offer was Rs.5,500 per month. She also deposited five months rent in a sum of Rs.27,500 on 16. 1991 as deposit and also submitted draft security bond for Rs.10,00,000. A fair security bond was also to be executed after the draft was approved. In the meantime, the revision petitioner/defendant issued a paper publication on 17. 1991 to lease out the plaint schedule property for the period of three years with effect from 8. 1991. There was a suit filed by the respondent in O.S.No.678 of 1991 before the District Munsifs Court, Nagercoil for injunction. An interim injunction was also obtained restraining the defendant from leasing out the schedule property to any person other than the plaintiff. There was an agreement reached between the parties and a compromise was effected and the suit was withdrawn on 19. 1991. There was a registered lease deed executed on 18. 1991 and the plaintiff got the lease for a period of two years from 9. 1991 to 38. 1993. There was some delay in getting the rice mill licence from the Government by the defendant and it was alleged that the plaintiff was not able to conduct her rice mill business with effect from 5. 1991 onwards. 1991 and the plaintiff got the lease for a period of two years from 9. 1991 to 38. 1993. There was some delay in getting the rice mill licence from the Government by the defendant and it was alleged that the plaintiff was not able to conduct her rice mill business with effect from 5. 1991 onwards. After the licence was given by the Government, the defendant executed another unregistered lease deed on 25. 1992 by extending the lease period from 6. 1992 to 35. 1994. Before the expiry of the Lease period, the defendant, according to the plaintiff, attempted to lease out the plaint schedule property to others and the plaintiff filed another suit in O.S.No.294 of 1994 and obtained an order of injunction. During the pendency of the said suit, the defendant agreed to extend the period of tenancy for a period of two years and hence the petition to withdraw the said suit was filed on 5. 1994. There was another lease deed executed on 17. 1994 extending the lease period by another two years from 6. 1994 to 35. 1996. The rent was also raised to Rs.7,500 and the deposit amount of Rs.37,500 by way of five months rent was paid to the defendant. It is the case of the respondent that without terminating the tenancy according to law, the different and was trying to lease out the property to others. The lease was for a manufacturing purpose and since the defendant was trying to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff by illegal and unlawful method, the present suit came to be filed. The defendant had given a paper publication on 15. 1996 inviting tenders for leasing out the plaint schedule property. 4. Pending the suit, an application in I.A.No.430 of 1996 was filed for temporary injunction. The learned District Munsif, by an order dated 7. 1996, made the interim injunction already granted absolute. This was confirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge in C.M.A.No.33 of 1996. 5. It is rather unfortunate that the plaintiff, whose period expired in the year 1996, has been successfully stalling the proceeding for auctioning of the property by the defendant. Whenever there was paper publication calling for tenders, the plaintiff approached the civil Court and obtained and interim injunction and when the purpose was served, the suit was withdrawn. 5. It is rather unfortunate that the plaintiff, whose period expired in the year 1996, has been successfully stalling the proceeding for auctioning of the property by the defendant. Whenever there was paper publication calling for tenders, the plaintiff approached the civil Court and obtained and interim injunction and when the purpose was served, the suit was withdrawn. It has been held that when once the period got over, the owner would be entitled to seek possession without the necessity of issuing a notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act vide: Pooran Chand v. Motilal and others Pooran Chand v. Motilal and others Pooran Chand v. Motilal and others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 461; Arulmighu Thandumariamman Thirukoil Even according to the lower appellate court, the period fixed under the agreement between the parties got over on 35. 1996. Now that by efflux of time, it had expired there was absolutely no embargo for the defendant in announcing fresh auction. The lower appellate Court has relied on a judgment of the Kerala High Court reported in (1999)1 K.L.J. 756 and confirmed the order of injunction granted by the first court. The Kerala High Court goes to the extent of saying that even if the tenancy expires by efflux of time, it is not the law in India that the landlord has the right of re-entry. The landlord has still to seek recovery of possession from the tenant whose tenancy has expired either be approaching the court concerned or the Tribunal concerned. If the landlord is allowed to re-enter the premises, it would be encouraging lawlessness and would be the very negation of rule. The decision, in my considered view, does not apply to the facts of the present case. The material question in the instant case is whether the agreement between the parties is lease or licence. In a recent judgment Delta International Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder, (1994) S.C.C. 545 the Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between lease and licence and held that the real test is to find out “the intention of the parties”. On the reading of the document Ex.R-2 and Ex.P.1, I have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the parties was to have a lease or licence. On the reading of the document Ex.R-2 and Ex.P.1, I have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the parties was to have a lease or licence. Even conceding that it was a lease of immovable property, once the period expired by efflux of time, there was no need for separate termination by issuance of notice under Sec.106 of Transfer of Property Act. The very publication of notice inviting new tenders would be sufficient notice. The courts below were in error in granting the prayer. 6. The practice of litigants in getting into properties belonging to public bodies or societies pursuant to calling for tenders or auctioning and thereafter successfully maintaining their possession by approaching the civil court and obtaining injunction must be discouraged and put down at any cost. In my view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there was absolutely no justification on the part of the courts below in granting injunction in favour of the respondent. 7. Consequently, the civil revision petition succeeds, the orders of the courts below are set aside and the injunction application will stand dismissed. No costs. I cannot help noting that that the defendant had been rather indifferent about wresting back possession from the plaintiff in the present suit. Being a cooperative society it is quite understandable. 8. C.M.P.No.9516 of 2000 is closed.