JUDGMENT - V.K. BARDE, J.:---The plaintiff from Regular Civil Suit No. 201/1977 filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nandurbar, has filed this writ petition challenging the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), dismissing his suit for possession of the premises leased to the tenant and the further judgment of the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Dhule, dismissing his appeal filed against the said judgment and decree. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit contending that the suit premises, the ground floor portion of the house City Survey No. 1100/1 being property No. 2417 of Nandurbar was leased to the defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 40/-. The month of tenancy begins on first of each month as per British calendar and ends at the end of each month of the British calendar. The defendant paid rent upto 30-9-1976. However, thereafter the defendant was avoiding to make payment of the rent by giving false excuses and he did not pay the rent till the time of notice. The plaintiff further contended that he was in service. But he wanted to leave his service because the salary was not sufficient for the maintenance of his family and he wanted to start a shop in the suit premises. 3. The plaintiff further contended that he and his family were residing on the first floor of the suit house and, therefore, it would be very convenient for the plaintiff to start a shop on the ground floor. The plaintiff also contended that the back side wall of the premises had become dilapidated and at that place new wall was required to be constructed. The Municipal Council, Nandurbar, had served a notice on the plaintiff for the repairs of the wall but as the defendant and other tenant, Chagan Chaudhary, were not vacating the premises which were in their possession as tenant, the plaintiff could not carry out the repairs and he has demanded the possession of the premises on that count also. 4. The plaintiff has also specifically mentioned in the plaint that the defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff of the period from 1-10-1976 to 31-5-1977 amounting to Rs. 320/- by Money Order sent on the address of his Advocate and, therefore, there was no claim for the arrears of the rent. 5. The defendant filed the written statement and contended that the monthly rent of Rs. 320/- by Money Order sent on the address of his Advocate and, therefore, there was no claim for the arrears of the rent. 5. The defendant filed the written statement and contended that the monthly rent of Rs. 40/- being charged by the plaintiff was not the standard rent of the premises. The rent of the premises was Rs. 25/- when it was taken on rent by the father of the defendant and he, therefore, prayed that the standard rent be fixed at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month. The defendant also denied the contention of the plaintiff that the plaintiff wanted to leave his service and wanted to start shop in the suit premises. He has contended that just to obtain possession of the suit premises, a false reason is being given by the plaintiff. 6. The defendant further contended that he is running his shop in the suit premises. He has no other premises to start his business. So, if he is evicted from the suit premises, he will suffer great hardship. There are six persons in his family and they are all dependent on him and the business of shop being run by him. The defendant also contended that no portion of the premises has become dilapidated. There was no need to carry out the repairs. The notice issued by the Municipal Council was not based on real condition of the building. The defendant also took the stand that if the plaintiff wanted to reconstruct the wall, the defendant had no objection and that work can be done without asking the defendant to vacate the premises and thus, the defendant prayed that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. 7. The learned Civil Judge recorded evidence of both sides on the issues framed and then came to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not require the suit premises bona fide. With respect to the issue of comparative hardship, the learned Civil Judge held that the issue did not survive because the plaintiff had failed to prove that his requirement was bona fide. The learned Civil Judge also held that there was no reason for the plaintiff to ask the possession of the suit premises for the purpose of repairs of the wall. So far as standard rent is concerned, the learned Civil Judge held that the rent of Rs. The learned Civil Judge also held that there was no reason for the plaintiff to ask the possession of the suit premises for the purpose of repairs of the wall. So far as standard rent is concerned, the learned Civil Judge held that the rent of Rs. 40/- per month was not excessive, it was reasonable and, therefore, turned down the contention of the defendant that the standard rent should be fixed at the rate of Rs. 25/- and he dismissed the suit with costs. 8. In the appeal, again the learned Extra Assistant Judge upheld the findings of the learned Civil Judge with respect to bona fide requirement. So far as comparative hardship is concerned, the learned Extra Assistant Judge held that the issue did not arise because the issue regarding bona fide requirement was answered against the plaintiff. However, he also recorded his finding that in case the issue arises, the comparative hardship would more to the plaintiff, if the decree for possession is not passed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. The appellant-plaintiff had raised the ground in the appeal memo that there ought to have been a decree by applying the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rent Act") because the defendant tenant had not paid the rent regularly during the pendency of the suit. The learned Extra Assistant Judge, therefore, framed one more point for determination as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to decree for possession as per the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. 10. Heard Counsel for both sides. 11. First I would like to take up contention of the plaintiff petitioner with respect to the claim of decree for possession on the ground as per the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff though had paid the rent, had not paid it regularly. The payments were sometimes by the gap of 2 or 3 months and sometimes even by more period. In the judgment of the learned Extra Assistant Judge, the table is given which indicates how much amount was paid, the date of payment, and the period for which the payment was made. The payments were sometimes by the gap of 2 or 3 months and sometimes even by more period. In the judgment of the learned Extra Assistant Judge, the table is given which indicates how much amount was paid, the date of payment, and the period for which the payment was made. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that this table clearly indicates that the defendant was never making payment of rent regularly when the matter was pending before the trail Court. He has, therefore, relied on the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act which reads as follows :- "In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court." 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the defendant had failed to pay the rent of the period more than six months, that means, of the period from 1-10-1976 to 30-4-1977. The notice was received by the tenant on 26th April, 1977 and the tenant had failed to pay the rent before expiry of the period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice. The plaintiff has not claimed the arrears of the rent only because after the expiry of the period of one month, the entire amount of rent was received by the plaintiff. Even for the sake of argument, it is held that the case does not fall under section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act because of the irregular payments during the pendency of the suit, the case falls under section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. He has contended that the suit is based on the notice of default given by the plaintiff and there was cause of action for the plaintiff to file suit under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. So, the provisions of section 12(3)(b) should be looked into to find out whether plaintiff can get the possession of the suit premises. 13. So, the provisions of section 12(3)(b) should be looked into to find out whether plaintiff can get the possession of the suit premises. 13. Here certain circumstances which are brought on record through evidence and also through the orders passed by the trial Court must be considered. 14. Before that, I would also like to refer to the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff petitioner that in the plaint it is specifically mentioned that the rent from 1-10-1976 was not paid and the defendant was in arrears of rent of the period of six months and he was defaulter. But in the written statement, the defendant has nowhere taken the stand that he had paid the rent within a period of one month after the receipt of the notice. So, the contention made by the plaintiff in the plaint is not specifically denied by the defendant and it should be presumed to be admitted by the defendant because of the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 15. I have purposely given above the recitals in the pleading. No doubt, the plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the rent was paid only upto 30-9-1976 and thereafter the defendant avoided to make the payment of rent till the time of notice. Now, this pleading by itself is not clear or sufficient to draw the conclusion that the plaintiff had not received the rent within a period of one month after the service of the notice. "Till the time of notice" is a very vague term. Whether the plaintiff wants to contend that the rent was not paid till the notice was given or whether the rent was not given till the expiry of period of one month after the service of the notice. 16. When the pleadings in the plaint itself are very vague on this crucial point to find out whether the plaintiff wants to make a case under section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, then silence of the defendant in the written statement would not be very material. No doubt, in the written statement the defendant had nowhere stated that he had paid the rent to the plaintiff before the expiry of the period of one month from the date of service of notice. No doubt, in the written statement the defendant had nowhere stated that he had paid the rent to the plaintiff before the expiry of the period of one month from the date of service of notice. It may be said that as there was no specific pleading with respect to this point in the plaint itself, the absence of pleading on this point regarding payment of rent within one month after the service of notice will not be very much material. 17. The defendant filed application Exhibit 21 before the trial Court that he had raised the point in para No. 4 of the written statement and there is no issue with respect to that point raised in the written statement and he also contended in the said application that the Issue No. 2 which was framed by the learned Civil Judge did not arise and, therefore, it should be deleted. 18. The contention in para No. 4 of the written statement is with respect to ownership of the suit house. The defendant has contended that the suit house was not owned by the plaintiff alone but it was owned by the plaintiff and his brothers and unless the brothers of the plaintiff were made party to suit, the suit was not tenable and the plaintiff alone had no right to file the suit. 19. The Issue No. 2 as per the issues framed by the learned Civil Judge on 26th September, 1978 was like this :- "Does the plaintiff prove that the defendant is in arrears of rent for more than six months and he is a defaulter? So, the Issue No. 2 was specifically with respect to default committed by the defendant in payment of rent of the period of six months. 20. To this application by the defendant, the plaintiff gave his say in the following words:- "Issues were framed on 26-9-1978 and this application is given at the stage of final hearing. So, the plaintiff objects to the request being granted." 21. After hearing both sides on this application, the learned Civil Judge has passed the order as below :- "Heard Shri Modak, Advocate, for the defendant and Shri Abhyankar, Advocate, for the plaintiff. As the plaintiff has no objection and the default ground is not pleaded. Hence, the Issue No. 2 be deleted. After hearing both sides on this application, the learned Civil Judge has passed the order as below :- "Heard Shri Modak, Advocate, for the defendant and Shri Abhyankar, Advocate, for the plaintiff. As the plaintiff has no objection and the default ground is not pleaded. Hence, the Issue No. 2 be deleted. However, issues as suggested be framed as there are allegations in the written statement in para No. 4 that the plaintiff alone is not owner of the suit premises. No order as to costs." 22. So, from this it appears that in the beginning there was specific issue with respect to default in payment of rent committed by the defendant. But this issue was deleted by the Court after hearing both the parties. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff petitioner has argued that though there was objection by the plaintiff, a wrong statement is made in the order made by the learned Civil Judge that there was no objection by the plaintiff. I have mentioned specifically what objection was taken by the plaintiff in the say given on this application. The only objection was that the application was filed at a very late stage. There was no objection that the Issue No. 2 was necessary and that it should not be deleted. In such circumstances, it can be presumed that after hearing the arguments of Advocates of both sides, the learned Civil Judge rightly observed that there was no objection on the part of the plaintiff to delete Issue No. 2 with respect to default. 23. The situation has arisen because, as it is pointed out in the plaint itself, there is no definite pleading that the plaintiff was bringing the suit for possession on the point of default committed by the defendant in the payment of rent even after service of the notice. Furthermore, there is evidence on record which indicates that the defendant had sent Money Order for Rs. 320/- being the rent of the period from 1-10-1976 to 31-5-1977 on 23-5-1977 and there is also evidence in the deposition of the defendant that he received back the Money Order with the postal endorsement that the addressee was not available. That particular Money Order Coupon was not on record when the matter was heard by the first Appellate Court. But it was on record at Exhibit 63 when the trial proceeded before the trial Court. That particular Money Order Coupon was not on record when the matter was heard by the first Appellate Court. But it was on record at Exhibit 63 when the trial proceeded before the trial Court. There is the postal receipt Exhibit 62 which indicates that the defendant had booked the Money Order on 23-5-1977 for Rs. 320/-. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are from Nandurbar. In ordinary course, the Money Order must have reached to the house of the plaintiff before the expiry of the period of one month from the receipt of notice by the defendant. There is reason to draw this conclusion because the plaintiff has nowhere stated in the plaint that he did not receive the amount within a period of one month from the date of service of the notice. 24. When the documents were produced on record by the defendant, plaintiff did not raise the point that the Money Order was not brought to his house before 26th May, 1977. If that had been the position, it would have so stated by the plaintiff at least in the deposition to indicate that rent was not tendered prior to the expiry of the period of one month from the date of service of notice. The learned Appellate Judge has, therefore, rightly drawn the conclusion that the Money Order must have reached to the plaintiff before 26th May, 1977 but as the plaintiff was not available to receive the Money Order, it was returned. 25. In this respect, one more circumstance has to be taken into consideration. That on 3rd July, 1977, the defendant sent another Money Order for Rs. 320/- but then on the address of the Advocate of the plaintiff and it was duly received by the Advocate of the plaintiff on 8-6-1977. Money Order receipt and Money Order coupon are there on record. So, as soon as the defendant received back the first Money Order, he had sent the another Money Order. Taking into consideration the time gap, it can very well presumed that the postman had been to the house of the plaintiff to tender the amount of rent prior to 26th May, 1977. So, as soon as the defendant received back the first Money Order, he had sent the another Money Order. Taking into consideration the time gap, it can very well presumed that the postman had been to the house of the plaintiff to tender the amount of rent prior to 26th May, 1977. As the plaintiff was not available, as mentioned by the defendant in his deposition, the amount could not be paid to him and, in such circumstances, it will have to be held that the defendant had tendered the amount of arrears of rent within a period of one month from the date of service of notice. But for one reason or the other, the plaintiff could not receive it. It was not fault of the defendant. So, in such circumstances, the question does not arise of considering the case under section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. The rent was tendered within a period of one month from the date of service of notice and the defendant had shown that he was ready and willing to pay the rent. 26. Now, coming to the other aspect of the case, as to whether because of failure to pay the rent regularly during the pendency of the suit, in the given circumstances, the plaintiff can ask for decree under section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that there was the cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit and, therefore, the case must be considered under section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. However, the learned Counsel for the defendant respondent has argued that once it is held that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the rent and that he had tendered the amount of rent within a period of one month from the date of service of notice, then the plaintiff had no subsisting cause of action to file suit under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. 27. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the defendant respondent has relied upon two rulings of this Court. The first one is in the matter of (Sau. Ayodhyabai Shri Vallabh Lahoti v. Sumanchand Rupchand Phulpagar (Shah), deceased by heirs)1, 1983(2) Bom.C.R. 368 . 27. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the defendant respondent has relied upon two rulings of this Court. The first one is in the matter of (Sau. Ayodhyabai Shri Vallabh Lahoti v. Sumanchand Rupchand Phulpagar (Shah), deceased by heirs)1, 1983(2) Bom.C.R. 368 . In this matter, the learned Single Judge has observed :- "Section 12(2) prohibits the landlord from instituting any suit against the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent unless a notice of demand is served. Under section 12(3)(a) the landlord is not entitled to any decree if the tenant pays the arrears of rent within a period of one month after the receipt of the notice issued under section 12(2) of the Rent Act. Therefore it is quite clear from the bare reading of these provisions that as soon as the tenant complies with the notice and makes the payment of arrears within a period of one month after the receipt of the notice under sub-section (2) of section 12, the cause of action for filing the suit under section 12(3)(a) read with section 12(2) comes to an end. In that case the plaintiff landlord is not entitled to file any suit against the defendant tenant on the ground that he had neglected to make payment of arrears of rent within the period of the one month after the receipt of demand notice under section 12(2) of the Act as the cause of action no longer survives. Section 12(3)(b) opens with the words "in any other case", and they lays down that non decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if the tenant satisfies the conditions laid down by the said sub-section. The use of the words "in any other case" and "in any such suit" are indicative of legislative intent. This clearly shows that a decree could be passed under section 12(3)(b) in a legally instituted suit passed on a proper cause of action. If the suit is instituted even without a semblance of cause of action, then at a later stage recourse cannot be taken to the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Act. The provision of section 12(3)(b) cannot be used by the landlord as a lever for the regular payment of rent, or for getting a decree on the ground of irregular payment, without instituting proper suit, based on a legally permissible cause of action. The provision of section 12(3)(b) cannot be used by the landlord as a lever for the regular payment of rent, or for getting a decree on the ground of irregular payment, without instituting proper suit, based on a legally permissible cause of action. If no rent is due on the date of the suit then section 12(3)(b) cannot be brought into operation obliquely." 28. The other ruling on which the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon is in the matter of (Narhar Damodar Wani v. Narmadabai T. Neve, deceased through L.Rs.)2, 1984 Bombay Rent Cases 220. This is the ruling by the Division Bench and the Division Bench has relied upon the earlier ruling in Ayodhyabai's case, 1983 Bombay Rent Cases 351 (supra). The observations in this ruling are as follows :- "In a case where the tenant has paid or must in law be deemed to have paid the amount demanded by the notice under section 12(2), not only are the provisions of section 12(3)(a) not attracted but there is no occasion to seek the provisions of section 12(3)(b), because even the provisions of section 12(3)(b) will be attracted only if there is a claim for recovery of possession. If by the compliance with the requirements of the notice under section 12(2) the landlord is disabled from filing a suit for recovery of possession, there is no question of the provisions of section 12(3)(b) being attracted at all." 29. Thus, once the tenant has tendered the rent within a period of one month after the date of service of notice, then the landlord has no cause of action to file a suit for possession of the premises on the ground of default on the part of the tenant in paying the rent. Section 12(1) of the Bombay Rent Act makes it clear by providing : "A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases ................" 30. So, the landlord is prohibited from filing suit for possession if the tenant is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases. So, the landlord is prohibited from filing suit for possession if the tenant is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases. The tenant has to prove his readiness and willingness to pay the rent by not giving any occasion to the landlord to serve a notice for demand for arrears of rent and if any such occasion has arisen, then by paying the rent within a period of one month from the service of the notice. If he satisfies the second condition of payment of rent within a period of one month from the service of notice of demand, then it is presumed that he is ready and willing to pay the rent and, therefore, the landlord has no right to claim possession of the premises only because at some later date or after filing the suit the tenant had not paid the rent regularly. If there is any such irregularity in payment of rent and the rent has remained in arrears of the period of six months or more, then that may give fresh cause of action to the landlord to serve notice and demand the rent and then follow the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 12. 31. So far as first notice given by the landlord, it served its purpose when the tenant paid the rent within a period of one month from the date of service of the notice. Then in a subsequent suit which might have been filed by the landlord, may be for claiming possession on some other grounds as contemplated under section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, the landlord cannot fall back and claim that as during the pendency of the suit the rent is not paid regularly, the provisions of section 12(3)(b) be brought in and the tenant be evicted. In the present matter, the landlord is asking for such a relief because his suit is based on the ground as contemplated under the provisions of section 13(1)(g), and 13(1)(h) of the Bombay Rent Act. The suit cannot be treated as suit under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act because the rent was tendered within a period of one month from the date of service of the notice. The suit cannot be treated as suit under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act because the rent was tendered within a period of one month from the date of service of the notice. The provisions of section 12(3)(b) cannot be enforced and the learned Extra Assistant Judge has, therefore, rightly rejected the claim of the appellant that there should have been decree as per the provisions of section 12(3)(b). 32. The next ground on which the landlords is claiming possession is that the premises has become dilapidated. There is a notice by the Municipal Council calling upon to pull down back side wall of the house and, therefore, he requires the premises to carry out the repairs, the ground mentioned under section 13(1)(h) of the Bombay Rent Act. 33. However, though the landlord has produced on record notice issued by the Municipal Council, he has not produced any evidence to show that wall cannot be repaired unless the tenant vacates the premises. On the contrary, the deposition given by the landlord before the Court indicates that such repairs can be carried out even without asking the tenant to vacate the premises. The bare word of the landlord, in such circumstances, that he requires the premises for carrying the repairs cannot be accepted. The plaintiff has utterly failed to make out this ground. The findings of the courts below are concurrent findings of facts and those cannot be disturbed in the given circumstances. 34. Then remains the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. It is pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint that his income from salary was not sufficient to maintain himself and his family and, therefore, he wanted to leave the service and to start a shop in the suit premises. If the plaintiff desires to leave the service and to start his own business, there is nothing wrong. It is contended that the plaintiff is not having sufficient experience or that he is not having sufficient capital to start business. But those matters are quite irrelevant. The plaintiff has right to decide what he should do and his judgment about his own case has to be accepted. So, if the plaintiff thinks that he should leave the service and start business, there is sufficient ground for the plaintiff to claim possession. But those matters are quite irrelevant. The plaintiff has right to decide what he should do and his judgment about his own case has to be accepted. So, if the plaintiff thinks that he should leave the service and start business, there is sufficient ground for the plaintiff to claim possession. But it must be made out by the plaintiff while leading evidence that all this intention is bona fide one and that can be ascertained from the evidence led on record. 35. In this respect, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court in the matter between (Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Company)3, 2000(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)9 : 1999(8) Supreme Court Cases 1. In the said matter, on the death of the original plaintiff, his legal representatives were brought on record and the legal representatives pleaded that the premises was required for himself for starting grocery business. There was lockout in the employer company where he was serving, so he was finding it difficult to maintain his family and wanted to improve his livelihood by starting a grocery shop. Their lordship, after considering all the factual aspects in the said matter and the various rulings, have observed:- "One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise." 36. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise." 36. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has argued that in the present matter, the plaintiff has stated in his deposition that he wanted to start a grocery business on getting possession of the suit premises. The facts in the present case are similar to the facts before the Supreme Court. The landlord has proved that his requirement is genuine and bona fide and so, the decree for possession ought to have been given in his favour especially when the learned Extra Assistant Judge has held that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if decree for possession were not given in his favour. 37. The question of bona fide requirement or reasonable requirement has to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Here the plaintiff has come before the Court pleading that the income from salary and income from rent was not sufficient to maintain his family. Therefore, he wanted to resign his job and to start business. Both the lower courts have specifically observed that in this pleading, the plaintiff has not mentioned that he wanted to start a grocery shop. Considering all the circumstances, in fact, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to give all particulars regarding what type of business he wanted to start. When he says that he wanted to start business, that was sufficient compliance as to why he requires the premises. So, on taking into consideration observation of the Apex Court in the above reported ruling, merely because the plaintiff had not stated in the plaint that he wanted to start a grocery business, it cannot be held that his requirement is not bona fide. 38. The other circumstance appearing in this matter is that the plaintiff pleaded that he wanted to resign and then to start his business. But while leading oral evidence, the plaintiff has nowhere stated that he wanted to resign and to start his business. On the contrary, the plaintiff has stated: "I am in service of Damji Gangi, Contractor of Forest. I am likely to be terminated at any time because of the scheme of Aadivasi Upayojana. I will be able to maintain myself only provided I open Kirana shop. At present. On the contrary, the plaintiff has stated: "I am in service of Damji Gangi, Contractor of Forest. I am likely to be terminated at any time because of the scheme of Aadivasi Upayojana. I will be able to maintain myself only provided I open Kirana shop. At present. I have to go outside to attend my duty." 39. So, here the plaintiff is not stating that he desires to leave his job and start his business. On the contrary, he says that because of some Government Scheme, his services were likely to be terminated, therefore, he had to seek another source of income. If this cause he would have mentioned in addition to the cause as pleaded in the plaint, there would have been no harm. But for the first time, he comes before the Court saying that his employer is likely to terminate his service because of the Government Scheme. Nowhere the plaintiff has made clear as to what is the Government Scheme and how it is likely to affect the business of his employer. 40. Can it be said that this is real reason for the plaintiff to claim possession? In the cross-examination, the plaintiff has stated: "My Master told me about said scheme before five years. I was orally informed about it but not in writing." So, this statement indicate that even before filing the suit in the year 1977, the employer of the plaintiff informed him that because of the scheme being implemented by the Government, his services were likely to terminated. If that was the knowledge of the plaintiff before filing of the suit, then he should have specifically stated so in the plaint. That would have been strong ground for the plaintiff to say that he wanted to start business in the suit premises. But even when as per his own statement in the cross-examination, he was aware that his services were likely to be terminated, he had not mentioned this fact in the plaint. On the contrary, he mentioned in the plaint that he was to retire voluntarily from his service to start his business. This creates doubt about the honesty of the plaintiff and as to whether he should be believed when he says that he intend to start his business. On the contrary, he mentioned in the plaint that he was to retire voluntarily from his service to start his business. This creates doubt about the honesty of the plaintiff and as to whether he should be believed when he says that he intend to start his business. It is true that it was not necessary for him to resign from the job before filing of the suit or before recording of the evidence in the matter. But he should have been consistent with respect to the case whether he wanted to resign from the job or his services were likely to be terminated. Completely different reason is being given by the plaintiff and that makes him unreliable. 41. Even if the plaintiff had not stated the nature of the scheme being implemented by the Government and how was it going to affect business of the contractor, it was at least necessary for him to plead so in the plaint that his employer was likely to terminate his services or that he should have stated in the deposition that not only he wanted to resign from the service but his services were likely to be terminated. But by giving go by to the pleading, a different case is made out by the plaintiff and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on his deposition. It is doubtful as to whether he really wants to start business or just he wants to evict the tenant from his premises. If looked from this angle, even though the reasons given by the two lower courts may not be sufficient, the ultimate conclusion drawn by the courts below can be upheld. It is therefore, held that the plaintiff has also failed to prove that his requirement is reasonable and bona fide that of starting business in the suit premises. So, on this count also, the plaintiff fails. 42. No doubt, there is finding by the learned Extra Assistant Judge that the hardship of the plaintiff will be more and this finding is based on the circumstance that this is only premises available to the plaintiff to start his business. The defendant has other premises where he can have his business, if he is asked to vacate the suit premises. But now in the circumstances, the issue regarding comparative hardship does not arise. 43. Hence, for all the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. The defendant has other premises where he can have his business, if he is asked to vacate the suit premises. But now in the circumstances, the issue regarding comparative hardship does not arise. 43. Hence, for all the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----