Judgment : .1. Since the question raised is common in all the three writ petitions, they are being disposed of by the following common order. For the convenience, I shall refer the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.18576 of 1998. According to them, the petitioner is a dealer in petroleum products registered on the file of the first respondent under the provisions of the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Local Act’ and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Central Act”). The petitioner was allotted a sales-tax registration under the local Act as well as under the Central Act and they have been carrying on business since 1983. The first respondent issued a notice dated 12. 1996 stating that the petitioner had failed to file the monthly returns and pay tax for a few months and further certain cheques issued by the petitioner towards tax dues had returned dishonoured and therefore demanded security of Rs.1 crore to protect the interest of revenue. Since the petitioner has not complied with the demand, the first respondent had caused to issue further notice dated 15. 1997 to show cause as to why the registration under the local Act and the Central Act be not cancelled. The petitioner by reply dated 25. 1997 informed the first respondent that they were not able to produce the books of account because the same were seized by the income-tax authorities and requested the respondent not to resort to any coercive methods. But the first respondent proceeded to pass orders on 28. 1997 cancelling the sales tax registration of the petitioner. Against the order of the first respondent, the petitioner had preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Pondicherry. The said revision petition was allowed in favour of the petitioner with certain conditions. The petitioner had duly complied with the main condition. Since the petitioner failed to produce the records as demanded, the first respondent proceeded to pass a best judgment assessment by order dated 10. 1997. As against the order of the respondent, the petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT), Pondicherry. While so, the first respondent issued another notice dated 10. Since the petitioner failed to produce the records as demanded, the first respondent proceeded to pass a best judgment assessment by order dated 10. 1997. As against the order of the respondent, the petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT), Pondicherry. While so, the first respondent issued another notice dated 10. 1998 stating that for the months of May, June, July and August, 1998, the petitioner has filed the monthly returns belatedly and were also in arrears of tax and penalty. It is further stated that by the impugned order dated 111. 1998, the first respondent once again cancelled the registration of the petitioner both under the local Act and under the Central Act. The first respondent failed to follow the procedure contemplated under Sec.23 of the local Act. As per Sub-sec.(9) of Sec.23, no order under Sub-sec.(8) shall be made, unless the dealer concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard. Since the petitioner was not given an opportunity of personal hearing, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Since the first respondent has communicated the order of cancellation of licence to M/s.Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, they are threatening to cancel the licence given to the petitioner and in such event the petitioner would be forced to close their business. There is no effective remedy by way of appeal or revision. Hence, they approached this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for necessary relief. Similar averments have been made in the other two writ petitions. 2. The respondents have not filed counter affidavit in so far as the first writ petition, namely, W.P.No.18576 of 1998 is concerned. However, the Commercial Tax Officer, Mahe has filed a counter affidavit in the other 2 writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.18889 and 19156 of 1998. It is stated that the petitioners have filed revision before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes at Pondicherry. They have not availed the remedy prescribed under Sec.36 of the local Act. Inasmuch as the revisional authority is seised of the matter against the proceedings dated 211. 1998 of the first respondent, the present writ petitions challenging the same order which is already under challenge before the revisional authority are not proper and legal. There cannot be any two parallel proceedings against the order passed by the first respondent. On this ground, all the writ petitions are liable to be rejected. 1998 of the first respondent, the present writ petitions challenging the same order which is already under challenge before the revisional authority are not proper and legal. There cannot be any two parallel proceedings against the order passed by the first respondent. On this ground, all the writ petitions are liable to be rejected. It is always open to the petitioners to get a proper decision from the revisional authority. With these averments, the first respondent prays for dismissal of all the three writ petitions. 3. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as respondents. .4. Mr.K.Doraisami, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, by relying on Sec.23(8) and (9) of the local Act, would contend that inasmuch as the personal hearing is a mandatory one before cancelling the registration, in the absence of providing opportunity of being heard, the impugned order passed in all the 3 writ petitions is liable to be quashed. He further states that inasmuch as the first respondent failed to follow the mandatory provision, namely, Sec.23(9) of the local Act before cancelling the registration certificate, the petitioners are justified in filing writ petition before this Court irrespective of provision for revision before the revisional authority. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for Pondicherry would contend that inasmuch as the petitioners have filed revision before the revisional authority and the same are pending as on date, there cannot be any two parallel proceedings against the order passed by the first respondent and in this view of the matter, the writ petitions are liable to be rejected. 5. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 6. Theonly point for consideration in all the three writ petitions is whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of effective alternative remedy by way of revision or not. 7. In viewof the limited question raised, it is unnecessary for this Court to go into the merits of various orders passed including the assessment orders and the order of cancellation of registration certificates. It is true that the petitioner in each writ petition has raised various contentions and furnished more details regarding assessment orders etc. We are concerned with the orders of the respondent cancelling the registration certificates of the petitioners. It is true that the petitioner in each writ petition has raised various contentions and furnished more details regarding assessment orders etc. We are concerned with the orders of the respondent cancelling the registration certificates of the petitioners. There is no dispute that the petitioners are dealers in petroleum products, registered on the file of the first respondent under the provisions of local Act as well a the Central Act. Inasmuch as the petitioners were not able to file monthly returns, pay tax and furnish security as demanded, the first respondent, after issuance of show-cause notice, cancelled their registration certificates, Sec.23 of the local Act speaks about procedure for registration. As per Sub-sec.(8), prescribed authority is empowered to cancel, modify or amend any registration certificate issued by him. However, as per Sub-sec.(9), no order under Sub-sec.(8) shall be made, unless the dealer concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard. In order to appreciate the contention raised by both sides, it is relevant to refer the relevant clauses. “Sec.23(8): The prescribed authority shall have power for good and sufficient reasons: .(i) to cancel, modify or amend any registration certificate issued by him; and .(ii) to demand from any dealer who has been registered or has applied for registration under this sub-section, security for proper payment of taxed by him for an amount not exceeding one-half of the tax payable on the turnover of the dealer for the year as estimated by the prescribed authority. .(9) No application for registration or for a copy or duplicate of the certificate and no renewal under this section shall be refused and no order under Sub-sec.(8) shall be made, unless the dealer concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard.” A reading of the above provisions would show that the prescribed authority, namely, the first respondent is empowered to cancel, modify or amend any registration certificate issued by him for good and sufficient reasons. It is not disputed that all the 3 petitioners were granted registration certificates by the first respondent. It is incumbent on the part of the first respondent, before passing any order under Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.23 to afford an opportunity of being heard to the dealer concerned. Sub-Sec.(9) provides not only show-cause notice with regard to proposed action, namely, cancellation of registration certificate but the aggrieved person, namely, the dealer concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard. Sub-Sec.(9) provides not only show-cause notice with regard to proposed action, namely, cancellation of registration certificate but the aggrieved person, namely, the dealer concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard. Admittedly, the first respondent has not afforded personal hearing to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. Learned Government Pleader has brought to my notice that revision is provided before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes at Pondicherry and as a matter of fact, the petitioners have already availed that remedy, hence the present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Availability of alternative remedy namely, revision before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is not disputed. Sec.36 of the local Act enables the aggrieved person to file a revision before the Commissioner within a period of 30 days from the date on which a copy of the order or proceeding was served on him. Though the learned Government Pleader has stated that the petitioners have firstly filed revision petitions before the Commissioner and subsequently the above writ petitions before this court petitions the same was disputed by the petitioners by way of filing an affidavit. In Writ Petition Nos.18576 and 18889 of 98, the petitioners therein have filed an affidavit dated 18. 2000 wherein they furnished the details such as date of the order passed by the first respondent, date of filing of the writ petition and the date of filing of the revision before the revisional authority. Before considering those factual aspects, now I shall consider the various decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Government Pleader. I have already extracted the relevant provisions namely, Sub-secs.(8) and (9) of Sec.23 which deals with procedure to be followed before cancelling the registration certificate. With regard to the language used in Sub-sec.(9), it is not seriously disputed that the dealer concerned is entitled to personal hearing. By pointing out Sub-sec.(9), learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that act shall be done in the manner provided in the Statute. With regard to the language used in Sub-sec.(9), it is not seriously disputed that the dealer concerned is entitled to personal hearing. By pointing out Sub-sec.(9), learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that act shall be done in the manner provided in the Statute. In support of the above said contention, he very much relied on a decision in the case of (i) Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others , (1999)2 C.T.C. 722 and (ii) State of Gujarat v. Shantilal , A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634. In the first case namely, (1999)2 C.T.C. 722, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as follows: (paras. 31 and 32) “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor , (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426: 45 L.J.Ch. 373 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor , 71 MLJ. 473: (1936)63 I.A. 372: A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 who stated as under: ”Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.“ 32.This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. , A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 322: 1954 S.C.R. 1098 and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan , 1961 S.C. 1527: (1962)1 S.C.R. 662 These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh , A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 358: (1964) 1 S.C.W.R. 57 and the rule laid down in , 71 MLJ. 476: (1936)63 I.A. 372: A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253, was again upheld. 476: (1936)63 I.A. 372: A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253, was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law.” In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal , A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634 the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all: Taylor v. Taylor , (1875)1 Ch.D. 426. 8. It is clear that inasmuch as the power of cancellation being an ‘extreme power’ which visits the party with serious consequences, they should be exercised in the manner in which the legislature wants the officer to act. Even though Sub-sec.(9) enables the authority to provide an opportunity of being heard, he had not followed the said recourse. 9. In Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer , (1999)2 S.I.S.T.C. 143(Mad.) J.Kanakaraj, J., had an occasion to consider similar contention. In the writ petition before the learned Judge, the order of the first respondent dated 211. 1982 was sought to be quashed. By the said impugned order, the first respondent has purported to pass final orders cancelling the registration certificate under the Tamil Nadu General Tax Act, 1959 and under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. After referring to Sec.21(6) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act which is similar to Sec.23(8) and (9) of Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, the learned Judge has held thus: “6. No application for registration or for a copy or duplicate of the certificate and no renewal under this section shall be refused and no order under Sub-sec.(5) shall be made, unless the dealer concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard. It is not disputed that in this case that the first respondent never afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard of in the matter. Learned Government Advocate argues that when the notice dated 210. 1982 was issued, the petitioners had taken the opportunity to file their objections. Inasmuch as they had filed the objections it is not longer open to them to insist on a personal hearing. Learned Government Advocate argues that when the notice dated 210. 1982 was issued, the petitioners had taken the opportunity to file their objections. Inasmuch as they had filed the objections it is not longer open to them to insist on a personal hearing. I am unable to accept this contention of learned Government Advocate…” Again in para.7, it has been observed that: “…When a statute says that a personal hearing has to be afforded, no amount of argument can be heard to explain as to why such a personal hearing was not given. The power of cancellation being an ‘extreme power’ which visits the party with serious consequences they should be exercised in the manner in which the legislature wants the officer to act. This is precisely for the reason that cancellation is a serious punishment that the legislature thought that a personal hearing should be given in matters of cancellation.” The decision of the learned Judge fully supports the claim of the petitioners. In M/s.P.K.S.Threads v. The Commercial Tax Officer M/s.P.K.S.Threads v. The Commercial Tax Officer M/s.P.K.S.Threads v. The Commercial Tax Officer , (1993)4 M.T.C.R. 440 (Mad.), Janarthanam, J., had an occasion to consider similar provisions of Tamil Nadu General Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder. The contention before the learned Judge was that cancellation of the certificate of registration is an extreme action and it is obligatory on the part of the respondent Commercial Tax Officer, Mannadi, (East) Assessment Circle to give a personal hearing to the petitioner before ever, he passed the impugned order in accordance with the sanguine and salient provisions adumbrated under Sec.21(6) of the TNGST Act. However, the learned Government Advocate contended that there is no need to give a personal hearing in a case like this where the petitioner failed to take the necessary and requisite steps to renew the certificate of Registration and in such a situation, Certificate of Registration shall be deemed to have been cancelled under Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.21 of the TNGST Act. After referring the provision, namely, Sub-sec.(6) of Sec.21 of T.N.G.S.T. Act, the learned Judge has arrived at the following conclusion: “17. After referring the provision, namely, Sub-sec.(6) of Sec.21 of T.N.G.S.T. Act, the learned Judge has arrived at the following conclusion: “17. While considering the said sub-section, a learned Judge of this Court (J.Kanakaraj, J.,), in Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Azhagappa Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, (1990)2 S.I.S.T.C. 143 (Mad.) said thus: ”When a statute itself says that a personal hearing has to be afforded, no amount of argument can be heard to explain as to why such a personal hearing was not given. The power of cancellation being an ‘extreme power’ which visits the party with serious consequence, they (sic: it) should be exercised in the manner in which the legislature wants the Officer to act. This is precisely for the reason that cancellation is a serious punishment that the legislature thought that a personal hearing should be given in matters of cancellation. “ What has been stated by the said learned Judge is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. For the reasons above, it goes without saying that the impugned order cannot at all be stated to be sustainable in law and the same deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.” The conclusion of the learned Judge supports the stand of the petitioners. 10. In M/s.Meenakshisundaram Tex. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, W.P.No.11552 of 1993, dated 17. 1993, J.Kanakaraj, J., while considering an order passed under the provisions of the Central Sales Act, has concluded thus: “2. Before action can be taken under Sec.10-A of the Act, it is imperative on the part of the respondent to give a reasonable opportunity to the assessee of being heard. It necessarily means that there should be a date of hearing apart from a mere notice calling for objections. It is not disputed in this case that no such hearing was given and consequently the impugned order suffers from a material error. Inspite of driving the petitioner to seek redress by way of filing an appeal to the appropriate authority, I am of the opinion that relief can be afforded in the writ petition itself. Consequently after hearing the Government Pleader, I am inclined to set aside the order dated 30.4.1993 giving opportunity to the respondent to take fresh action in accordance with law. Consequently after hearing the Government Pleader, I am inclined to set aside the order dated 30.4.1993 giving opportunity to the respondent to take fresh action in accordance with law. The writ petition is allowed…” It is clear from the above decision that when a Statute itself states that personal hearing has to be afforded, in the absence of such compliance and the power of cancellation being an extreme power which visits the party with serious consequences, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 11. With regard to the contention that since the writ petitioners have filed revision under Sec.36 of the Local Act the present writ petitions are not maintainable, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has very much relied on a decision of the apex court in Collector of Customs, Cochin v. A.S.Bava Collector of Customs, Cochin v. A.S.Bava Collector of Customs, Cochin v. A.S.Bava, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 13. In the case before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the petitioner having availed of the remedy under Sec.129 of the Customs Act, he was debarred from challenging the impugned notification, dated May 4, 1963. Rejecting the said contention, Their Lordships have held that “it is settled that the presence of a remedy by way of revision does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.226.” 12. In M/s.Vorion Chemicals and Distilleries Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax etc. M/s.Vorion Chemicals and Distilleries Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax etc. M/s.Vorion Chemicals and Distilleries Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax etc. (1998)3 L.W. 667 , Jagadeesan, J., had an occasion to consider the plea of alternative remedy. The learned Judge after referring various provisions from the Income-tax Act as well as earlier decisions of this Court, has held thus: “17. It may be of worth to note two judgments of this Court where the assesses under the Sales Tax Act preferred the statutory appeal as well as the writ petition. Inspite of the fact that the appeal was pending before the Appellate Authority, a Division Bench of this Court has entertained the writ petition on merits and set aside the order of assessment directing the petitioner to withdraw the appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal. In Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Comml Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Comml Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. In Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Comml Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Comml Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Comml Tax Officer, 19 S.T.C. 221, the Division Bench has held as follows: ”We, therefore, direct that the writs would issue striking down the assessment and that the detailed explanations of the assessee now supplemented by further detailed statements, should be taken up and considered, and the assessments carried through again in due compliance with the requirements of law, and the principles of natural justice. The concerned assessee is directed to withdraw the appeals pending before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, view of the allowance of the writs. 18. Inyet another judgment reported in Ramana Reddy v. Joint Comml. Tax Officer Ramana Reddy v. Joint Comml. Tax Officer Ramana Reddy v. Joint Comml. Tax Officer, 28 S.T.C. 683 a single Judge has followed the same principle in the following passage: “In a case where the matter was pending with the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and where it was found that the principles of natural justice, in particular the principle of audi alteram partem was not observed, a Division Bench of this Court in Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer (1967)19 S.T.C. 221 set aside the original order of assessment and directed the concerned assessee to withdraw the appeal pending before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Following this decision, I direct the assessee to withdraw the appeal before the Appellate Authority and contemporaneously set aside the order of assessment which is impugned herein, as a full and fair trial has not been given to the petitioner when the order of assessment has been made.” After saying so, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and permitted the petition to withdraw T.C.No.397 of 1993 filed by them before this Court. 13. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)8 S.C.C. 1 , their Lordships have considered the power of this Court in such a circumstance, namely, instance of effective and efficacious remedy. The following observations of Their Lordships is relevant: “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The following observations of Their Lordships is relevant: “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose.” 15. Under Art.226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at lest three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the Constitutional law as they still hold the field. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 as under: “But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.” 18. This proposition was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V.Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Sadhwani A.V.Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Sadhwani A.V.Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Sadhwani , A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1506 and was affirmed and followed in the following words: “The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the board lines of the general principles on which the court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the court.” 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I.T.O. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I.T.O. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I.T.O., Companies District, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 372, laid down: “Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Court have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under Sec.34, Income Tax Act.” 20. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under Sec.34, Income Tax Act.” 20. Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.” 14. Though the revisional authority is empowered to give such direction as he thinks fit in regard to repayment of tax fee or other amount, on furnishing sufficient security in our case, the order passed by the original authority, namely, the first respondent is cancellation of registration certificate. Accordingly, the said provision cannot be availed of by the petitioners. Further, the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court would clearly show that revisional jurisdiction does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and filing of the revision is not a bar deciding writ petitions for the same relief. As a matter of fact, in some cases, this Court allowed the writ petitions and directed the petitioner therein not to press the appeal/revision petition pending before the concerned authorities. 15. Learned Government Pleader would contend that writ petitions are incompetent on account of preference of revision prior to writ petitions and petitioners cannot be permitted to abandon the remedy provided in the statute. He also contended that inasmuch as the Act contains provision for revision namely, under Sec.36 before the Commissioner and further remedy before the Government under Sec.39, and also of the fact that they are clothed with extensive jurisdiction in the matter of grant of stay, the petitions are liable to be dismissed. In support of the said contentions, he relied on a decision in BMRDA v. Gokak Patel Volkart, (1995)1 S.C.C. 642 . In support of the said contentions, he relied on a decision in BMRDA v. Gokak Patel Volkart, (1995)1 S.C.C. 642 . The following observation and conclusion in pressed into service: (paras. 12 and 13) “12. The contention of the appellant in this appeal is that in the first place the writ petition should not have been entertained. The writ petitioner had an adequate alternative statutory remedy. The writ petitioner had in fact already taken advantage of alternative remedy provided by the statute and had preferred an appeal against the judgment of the tribunal. While the said appeal was pending the writ petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court praying more or less the same remedy as was prayed in the appeal. 13. We are of the view that the point taken by the appellant is of substance. This is a case, where there is not only the existence of an alternative remedy but the writ petitioner actually had availed of that remedy. The writ petitioners appeal before the statutory authority was pending. In that view of the matter this writ petition should not have been entertained.” 16. In I.T.Commissioner, Lucknow v. U.P.Forest Corporation I.T.Commissioner, Lucknow v. U.P.Forest Corporation I.T.Commissioner, Lucknow v. U.P.Forest Corporation, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1125, while considering writ petitions challenging the correctness of the decision of the tribunal in respect of assessment years 1977-78 and 1980-81 and that of the assessment year 1984-85, their Lordships have observed thus: “14. These proceedings arise out of the writ petitions which have been filed challenging the correctness of the decision of the tribunal in respect of the assessment years 1977-78, 1980-81 and that of the Assessing Authority for the assessment year 1984-85. In our opinion, the proper course to adopt, while allowing these appeals, would be to require the assessing authority to examine the question as to whether the respondent is entitled to the benefit under Sec.11(1) of the Act. Before concluding, we would like to observe that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions when adequate alternative remedy was available to the respondent. Under peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and inasmuch as the litigation between the parties has been going on for a number of years, we do not think it will be appropriate to dismiss these appeals on his ground at this late stage. Under peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and inasmuch as the litigation between the parties has been going on for a number of years, we do not think it will be appropriate to dismiss these appeals on his ground at this late stage. We however, emphasis that petitioners should not normally short circuit the procedure provided by the taxing statute and seek the redress by filing a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India.” 17. In H.B.Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons H.B.Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons H.B.Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, (1992)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 312, their Lordships have held thus: “6. The constitutional validity of the provisions in Sub-sec.(5) of Sec.39 of the Act were not assailed in the writ petition. Similar provisions, accompanied by similar proviso, have been held valid. At the stage at which the respondents approached the High Court, what the respondents could have, if the facts so justified, assailed was the question of the refusal of the appellate authority to exercise the discretion under the proviso. When an hierarchy of appeals is envisaged by a taxing statute, it is generally to be insisted that an assessee must go through the statutory proceedings. In C.A.Abraham v. I.T.O. C.A.Abraham v. I.T.O. C.A.Abraham v. I.T.O., (1961)2 S.C.R. 765 : A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609, it was observed: “In our view the petition filed by the appellant should not have been entertained. The Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment of tax and imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the income tax authorities, and the appellant could not be permitted to abandon resort to that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the tribunal..” 18. In C.A.Abraham v. I.T.Officer C.A.Abraham v. I.T.Officer C.A.Abraham v. I.T.Officer, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609, the Supreme Court has held that a person who is aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner imposing a penalty, cannot be permitted to abandon resort to that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 when he had adequate remedy open to him by way of appeal to the tribunal. 19. 19. In Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 2279, their Lordships have held that the resort to Arts.226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is alternative remedy. Similar view in expressed in in Chanan Singh and Sons v. C.C.E. Chanan Singh and Sons v. C.C.E. Chanan Singh and Sons v. C.C.E., (1999)9 S.C.C. 17 ; and Todi Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Todi Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Todi Industries Ltd. v. Union of India , (1999)9 S.C.C. 230 . 20. Learned Government Pleader has relied on the following observation of K.Sampath, J., in H.D.Exporters v. Union of India and others H.D.Exporters v. Union of India and others H.D.Exporters v. Union of India and others, (1999)2 L.W. 343 : (para.15) “Having chosen to pursue his remedy by way of appeal, the writ petitioner ought to have either withdrawn the appeal or taken its chance in the writ petition. Having pursued it and having lost it, it is not open to the petitioner to say that he filed the appeal by way of abundant caution and that it was not an effective alternative remedy. The writ petitioner had deliberately chosen to pursue both the remedies. I am therefore of the clear view that the writ petition itself is not maintainable.” 21. It is true that the decisions referred to by the learned Government Pleader would go to show that when effective alternative remedy is available under the Statute, parties cannot be permitted to agitate the same before this Court invoking jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Pleader proceeded his argument and cited the said decisions on the basis of the factual information that after the impugned order of the first respondent, the petitioners have filed revision before the Commissioner under Sec.36 of the Act and thereafter filed the above writ petitions before this Court. The petitioners have filed an additional affidavit dated 18. 2000 disputing the statement made by the learned Government Pleader. In W.P.Nos.18576 and 18889 of 1998, the petitioners have furnished the following details and dates which prove that revision is prepared only subsequent to the filing of the writ petitions: “Writ Petition: W.P.No.18576 of 1998 W.P.No.18889 of 1998 1. Date of swearing of Writ: 211. 1898 211. 1998 2. Date of filing of Writ Petition: 211. 1998 30.11.1998 3. In W.P.Nos.18576 and 18889 of 1998, the petitioners have furnished the following details and dates which prove that revision is prepared only subsequent to the filing of the writ petitions: “Writ Petition: W.P.No.18576 of 1998 W.P.No.18889 of 1998 1. Date of swearing of Writ: 211. 1898 211. 1998 2. Date of filing of Writ Petition: 211. 1998 30.11.1998 3. Date on which Writ Petition has come up for admission and Notice of Motion was ordered: 211. 1998 12. 1998 Revision petition: 1. Date on which revision petition of 211. 1998 was sent by R.P.A.D. from Mahe to Revisional Authority at Pondicherry. (Mahe is 636 Km away from Pondicherry): 30.11.1998 30.11.1998 2. Date on which revision was received by the authority at Pondicherry as per Postal Acknowledgment: 12. 1998 12. 1998. It is clear that the respondent have relied on the date found in the revision petition to contend that Revision is prior to the writ petition. As rightly contended, it is only the date on which either the revision was sent from Mahe or it was received at Pondicherry which is material. Though the revision is dated 211. 1998 and 211. 1998, the same were not filed till the affidavit in support of the above writ petitions were signed and presented in Court. No doubt, the petitioner in W.P.No.19156 of 1998 has not filed similar affidavit mentioning the particulars as referred to in other writ petitions. However, in view of the legal position referred to above, it will not affect the case of the petitioner. 22. I have already referred to the salient features and opportunity to be afforded to the dealer before cancelling his registration certificate. I have also referred to that in terms of Sub-sec.(9) of Sec.23 of the Local Act, the petitioners are entitled to personal hearing before an order under Sub-sec.(8). This aspect has not been disputed. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babu Varghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999)2 C.T.C. 722, if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The said rule has been recognised as a salutary principle of Administrative Law. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babu Varghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999)2 C.T.C. 722, if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The said rule has been recognised as a salutary principle of Administrative Law. Further, the power of cancellation of registration certificate being an extreme which visits the party with serious consequences, the same should be exercised in the manner in which the Legislature wants the officer to act. Though the petitioners were given an opportunity to file their objection, inasmuch as the first respondent never afforded an opportunity to them to be heard in the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Likewise, existence remedy by way of revision did not bar jurisdiction of this Court for deciding writ petition since the same is not an effective and efficacious remedy and admittedly the first respondent failed to comply with the mandatory provision, namely, Sub-sec.(9) of Sec.23 of the Local Act. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998)8 S.C.C. 1 , where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice and also failure in complying with the mandatory provisions from the Statute, the alternative remedy would not operate as a bar and the aggrieved person can approach this Court to vindicate his grievance. 23. Under these circumstances, the impugned order of the first respondent is quashed and the first respondent is directed to restore the proceedings and pass fresh orders after affording “an opportunity of being heard” as contemplated under Sec.23(9) of the Pondicherry General Sales-tax Act, 1967. All the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. All the writ miscellaneous petitions are closed.