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2000 DIGILAW 881 (MAD)

R. Ganesan v. Pooranam

2000-08-31

V.KANAGARAJ

body2000
Judgment : 1. The above second appeal filed by the defendant in the Original Suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated 112. 1998 made in A.S.No.98 of 1998 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga thereby reversing the judgment and decree dated 1. 1998 made in O.S.No.482 of 1992 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Sivaganga. 2. To trace the history of the case, it is the respondent herein, who has filed the suit in the trial Court in O.S.No.482 of 1992 thereby praying to grant the relief of declaration and permanent injunction restraining the defendant or his men from in any manner interfering with or disturbing her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. the suit property is a house site measuring 27’ × 22’. 3. Adverting to the facts of the case as alleged in the plaint filed before the trial court, wherein the plaintiff has submitted that she purchased the suit property by means of a sale deed dated 3. 1987 and from that date onwards, is also in possession and enjoyment of the same constructing a tiled cattle shed and putting up haystack therein with the fencing around; that already the plaintiff is residing adjacent to the suit property; that the defendant who also attempted to purchase the suit property prior to the purchase of the plaintiff having failed to knock off the same for a low price, ultimately started troubling the plaintiff in removing the fencing and trespassing into the suit property resulting in her filing the suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 4. On the part of the defendant, it would be pleaded that neither the sale deed dated 3. 1987 under which the plaintiff is alleged to have purchased the property from one Solaimalai is true and enforceable instrument nor did the said Solaimalai enjoy the title, so as to validly convey the same in favour of the plaintiff under the said sale deed nor were they both in possession or enjoyment of the same; that the sale deed dated 3. 1987 is a bogus and unenforceable instrument that there is no structure or haystack or fencing put up by the plaintiff as falsely alleged in the plaint; that the other allegations of the plaint are also either false or incorrect; that the suit property is the ancestral property of the defendant; that in the year 1979, the defendant pledging the suit property and his residential building obtained the loan of Rs.5,000; that moreover, being in enjoyment of the suit property for over the statutory period, since his residential building was on the South of the suit property, fencing the same, the defendant has perfected title to the suit property by means of adverse possession; that the defendant has been provided with the Natham Patta; that a belated appeal preferred against the grant of patta in favour of the defendant by the plaintiff had been dismissed; that the plaintiff had absolutely no title or right or interest in the suit property and on such grounds the defendant would pray to dismiss the suit. 5. Based onsuch pleadings, the trial court having framed five issues, had ordered the trial in which on the part of the plaintiff four witnesses have been examined as P.Ws.1 to 4 and two documents have been marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2 and on the part of the defendant, though no witness was examined 10 documents were marked as Exs.B-1 to B-10. 6. For reasons not revealed nor seen anywhere in the typed set of papers, this is a suit that had gone on appeal and remanded for retrial with certain remarks by the Appellate Court and thereafter additional evidence had been let in by both the parties, when the defendant had filed Ex.B-11, besides examining himself as D.W.1 and further the two Court Documents viz., Commissioners report and plan were also marked as Exs.C-1 and C-2. The trial court in consideration of the facts and circumstances encircling the whole case and having regard to the materials placed on record and the evidence let in by both parties and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, further appreciating the evidence in its own way had ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought for and accordingly had dismissed the suit without costs. 7. 7. Aggrieved, the plaintiff had preferred an appeal in the first Appellate Court, the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga on certain grounds and the said first Appellate Court having framed four points viz., “ 1. Whether the appellant is entitled to the suit property. 2. Whether the appellant is entitled to get the relief of Permanent Injunction. 3. Whether the respondent is entitled to the suit property. and 4. What relief, the parties are entitled to. and having gone into the oral and documentary evidence, would ultimately allow the appeal in full, thereby holding that the appellant/plaintiff was entitled to the suit property and further entitled to get the relief of permanent injunction and that the respondent/defendant is not entitled to any relief thus setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 8. Aggrieved, the defendant in the suit had come forward to prefer the above second appeal on grounds such as, .(i) that the Appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal on ground that except Ex.A-1 sale deed, which is not a conclusive proof that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit property, no other documentary evidence has been brought forth to the effect that the vendor Solaimalai was entitled to the suit property so as to convey a clear title in favour of the plaintiff; .(ii) that the lower Appellate Court has not properly considered Exs.B-1 to B-11, which conclusively prove that the suit property besides belonging to the appellant is also in possession and enjoyment of the appellant; (iii) that the lower Appellate Court has particularly failed to properly consider Ex.B-11 in and by which the appellant had mortgaged the suit property along with other properties in Sivaganga Co-operative Housing Society as early as in the year 1979. .(iv) that the lower Appellate Court has not properly considered the report of the Commissioner in the manner prescribed by law; and .(v) that the lower Appellate Court ought to have noted that the patta granted in favour of the appellant was confirmed in the appeal filed by the respondent under Exs.A-9 and A-10. On such grounds, the appellant would pray to set aside the judgment and decree made by the first Appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 9. On such grounds, the appellant would pray to set aside the judgment and decree made by the first Appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 9. Besides these grounds, the appellant has also brought out the following three substantial questions of law for determination of the above second appeal: 1. Whether lower Appellate Court can grant decree based on Ex.A-1o when admittedly, no other prior document has been produced to establish that the vendor has got title to the suit property. 2. Whether the lower Appellate Court can reject Exs.B-1 to B-11 which conclusively prove that the suit property has been in possession of the appellant herein and his rights have been recognised under those exhibits. 3. Whether the lower Appellate Court can reject the Commissioners report which categorically states that the suit property was mortgaged under Ex.B-11 to the Sivaganga Taluk Village Co-operative Housing Society. 10. In short, all the above three Substantial Questions of Law could be put together and dealt with simultaneously since all of them are connected to the appreciation of the documentary evidence in general and Exs.A-1 and B-1 to B-11 in particular. Barring these, there are also the court documents marked as Exs.C-1 to C-4 apart from the oral evidence let in by parties. 11. So far as the oral evidence is concerned, four witnesses have been examined on the part of the plaintiff/respondent besides the respondent examining herself as P.W.1 and on the part of the appellant/defendant, the defendant had only examined himself as D.W.1 as the sole witness and none else. From this scenario, appreciating the evidence, the trial court has arrived at the conclusion to dismiss the suit as filed by the plaintiff/respondent whereas quite contrarily the first Appellate Court has reversed the judgment of the trial Court in toto thereby allowing the appeal preferred by the plaintiff and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 12. During arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant would give a clear picture of the facts and circumstances of the case of the plaintiff and the defendant as put up before the trial Court and the evidence placed on record for appreciation of the Court. 12. During arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant would give a clear picture of the facts and circumstances of the case of the plaintiff and the defendant as put up before the trial Court and the evidence placed on record for appreciation of the Court. The learned counsel would also point out the manner in which the first Appellate Court was wrongly appreciated the court documents i.e., the report of the Commissioner, as given in para. No.9 of the Appellate Court judgment. The learned counsel would also particularly point out from the evidence of P.W.3 who deposed that he did not know as to who was in enjoyment of the suit property but to his knowledge it was one Sellamuthu, who was in enjoyment of the suit property (who is neither the plaintiff nor the defendant). On such arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant would pray for allowing the appeal. 13. On the part of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, he would point out certain paragraphs from the trial Court judgment and that of the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court pointing out in its judgment in paragraph No.12 certain facts and circumstances that have been brought forth in the oral evidence. The learned counsel would also point out that P.Ws.2 to 4 are neighbours of P.W.1 and they have spoken to the effect of the plaintiffs physical possession and enjoyment of the property and it is P.W.2 who has given sufficient oral evidence regarding his title acquired by long possession, so as to give the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.A-1. The learned counsel would further say that both the plaintiff and the defendant are related and are living adjacent to each other and would further say that the Ex.A-2 series of photographs submitted would clearly show that the plaintiff is in physical possession of the suit property. On such arguments the learned counsel would pray for dismissing the above second appeal. It is relevant to point out here that no precedent is cited by any of the parties in support of their respective cases. 14. On such arguments the learned counsel would pray for dismissing the above second appeal. It is relevant to point out here that no precedent is cited by any of the parties in support of their respective cases. 14. It is the appreciation of the evidence that is being testified not only in the grounds of the above second appeal but also in the Substantial Questions of Law urged on the part of the appellant wherein the appreciation of the documentary evidence by the lower Appellate Court has been questioned uppermost. 15. On the part of the respondent/plaintiff, besides examining four witnesses, the plaintiff herself entering into the box as P.W.1 has deposed to the facts of the case as projected in the plaint. The plaintiff also has examined her vendor as P.W.2 and two other witnesses in support of her case of whom, P.W.2 is the vital witness to be considered for the purpose of the case. On the other hand, on the part of the appellant/defendant, though only the defendant has entered into the box and deposed to the effect of his case put up contra to the case of the plaintiff, 11 documents have also marked as Exs.B-1 to B-11 in support of his case. 16. A careful study of the pleadings in the context of the evidence placed on record would reveal that the plaintiff/respondent has purchased the property under Ex.A-1 dated 3. 1987 from P.W.2 since the other documentary evidence put forth on the part of the plaintiff is only Ex.A-2, the photographs accompanied by the negatives showing the suit property, to know the pre-history of the suit property, the Court has to depend only upon the oral evidence let in by P.Ws.1 to 4, of whom the evidence of the vendor P.W.2 is vital. Of course, P.W.2 would come forward to depose that from the days of his grandfather, Solaimalai Konar, the suit property has been in their possession and enjoyment and in such capacity the suit property fell into his hands 35 years back and since the suit suit property was a vacant site, there had been no tax receipts or any other documents such as patta in proof of his long possession and enjoyment or by his predecessors in possession of the suit property. Ex.A-2 photographs cannot speak to the ownership or enjoyment of the suit property and hence the only other documents that are left with are the Court documents i.e., the two reports filed by each of the Court Commissioners and the sketches marked as Exs.C-1 to C-4. 17. But, on the contrary, on the part of the appellant/defendant, besides speaking to his claim of the suit property entering the box himself as D.W.1, he would also mark 11 documents as Exs.B-1 to B¬11, Ex.B-1 being the house site patta in Patta No.126, dated 312. 1991 issued by the Special Tahsildar, Natham Survey in favour of the defendant, Exs.B-2 to B-4 are respectively the receipts for having remitted the land tax for faslis 1403 to 1405, Ex.B-5 is the house tax receipt dated 13. 1976, Ex.B-6 is the house tax receipt dated 27. 1985 for having paid the tax for the year 1985-86, Ex.B-7 is the house tax receipt for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92, Ex.B-8 is the house tax receipt dated 11. 1985 for the years 1983-84 and 1984-85, Ex.B-9 dated 18. 1992 is the proceedings of the Special Tahsildar, Natham Land Tax pertaining to the suit property, Ex.B-10 dated 19. 1993 is the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in his proceeding in S.R.No.29/Sivaganga/92 (Natham) and Ex.B-11 dated 28. 1979 is the copy of the document wherein the defendant had pledged the suit property along with some other properties belonging to him for obtaining a Co¬operative loan in the Sivaganga Taluk Village Co-operative Housing Society Limited being a ‘A’ class member of the same. 18. Though from out of all these 11 documents, Exs.B-2 to B-4, B-9 and B-10 have come into existence after the filing of the suit, Exs.B-1, B-5 to B-8 and B-11 would clearly show that they have sprung up in the natural course and under the true circumstances, even prior to the filing of the suit. Out of these documents, Exs.B-1, dated 312. Out of these documents, Exs.B-1, dated 312. 1991 is the patta granted in favour of the defendant by the Special Tahsildar, Natham Survey and settlement based on the long possession and enjoyment of the suit property by him and Exs.B-5 to B-8 may not pointedly connect the suit property since they are the house tax receipts and the house of the defendant resides being located in the adjacent land to the suit property they could only go to show that the defendant is residing adjacent to the suit property and they cannot directly connect the defendant in any manner regarding his rights with the suit property. 19. However, Ex.B-10 proceedings of the Special Tahsildar (Settlement) and Ex.B-11, proof of the defendant having obtained a loan pledging the suit property along with other properties belonging to him stand very strongly in favour of the defendant especially when Ex.B-11 is a document that had come into existence even prior to the purchase of the suit property by the plaintiff from P.W.2, which was only in the year 1985, Ex.B-1 of the year 1991 cannot also be easily discarded since it is a patta issued by the Special Tahsildar (Settlement) in favour of the defendant pertaining to the suit property in recognition of his long possession and enjoyment. While such is the position, in appreciation of all these documents, since the plaintiff is equipped with only the sale deed given in his favour by P.W.2 and excepting for certain oral evidence adduced on the part of P.W.2 to the effect of the long possession of the suit property by himself, his father and grandfather, absolutely no supporting evidence is placed in proof of the fact that either the suit property had been in the long possession and enjoyment of the vendor of the plaintiff or his father and grandfather and solely relying upon the bare, unsupported oral evidence of P.W.2 and Ex.A-1, nothing could be concluded either regarding the title or possession of the vendor of the plaintiff so as to convey a valid title in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.A-1. Therefore, it is not only imprudent but also dangerous to conclude under any circumstances that the evidence let in on the part of the plaintiff is sufficient to prove either the ownership or possession of the vendor in order to say that the vendor had validly conveyed the suit property in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.A-1, as it has been wrongly concluded on the part of the first Appellate Court. 20. Quite contrary to the claim of the plaintiff, the appellant/defendant has not only produced the document to the effect that he mortgaged the suit property in the Co-operative House Building Society and obtained a loan of Rs.5,000 for the purpose of constructing a house as early as in the year 1979 itself, which has been found to be connecting the suit property along with some other properties belonging to the defendant by the trial Court, but also the Revenue Officials have granted patta in favour of the defendant under Ex.B-1 and they have rejected the plea of the plaintiff under Exs.B-9 and B-10 which weighs heavily against the case of the plaintiff but only in favour of the defendant. 21. Regarding far as the nature of claim made on the part of the parties, needless to point out that the property is a Government poramboke land over which based on possession any right could be established and the defendant is well within the norms required by the Revenue Department so as to be granted with the patta under Ex.B-1 rejecting the claim of the plaintiff under Exs.B-9 and B-10 thus clearly showing that the defendant is undoubtedly in physical possession and enjoyment of the property long prior to the grant of the patta in his favour under Ex.B-1. While such being the decision of the Revenue Department of the Government, which is originally the owner of the suit property, whether it is ownership by possession or the very physical possession of the suit property that are to be decided, it has been considered and decided only in favour of the defendant further clearly rejecting the case of the plaintiff and this recognition of the defendant by the Government has never been properly dealt with by the first Appellate Court while appreciating the Exs.B-1 to B-11 in comparison with that of Ex.A-1. 22. 22. So far as the Government and its officials dealing with such properties in recognising genuine occupiers, it has been unequivocally decided that it is the defendant, who is entitled to either for the title besides being in actual possession of the suit property. Just on account of a sale deed, said to have been obtained under Ex.A-1 from P.W.2 without any supporting evidence or circumstances favouring, it cannot bluntly be concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction sought for as it has been wrongly concluded by the first Appellate Court. 23. Moreover, the appreciation of evidence of the Commissioner by the first Appellate Court in Para. No.11 of its judgment is quite undesirable and improper. Neither the Commissioner, who has been warranted to inspect the suit locality and note the physical features and submit the report has any reason to comment on what he heard on things on land at the time of his visit and to reduce it into writing nor could the Court attach any importance for such remarks made by the Commissioner, as it has been freely done in the case in hand in para No.11 of the judgment by the first Appellate Court, which is highly deplorable and totally discredited and decried herein. The first Appellate Court seems to have been ignorant of the Code to the Commissioner close the ears and keep the eyes wide open, when the Commission is issued by the Court to note the physical features in and around the suit property. In wrongly appreciating the Commissioners Report, which is of little importance to decide the case in hand since the Commissioner has overstepped his jurisdiction acting out of scope of the commission, it has resulted for the first Appellate Court in arriving at the wrong decision to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit property and the permanent injunction as prayed for in the suit. The first Appellate Court had allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff further setting aside the judgment and decree that had been rightly passed by the trial Court in clear appreciation of the evidence in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case. 124. The first Appellate Court had allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff further setting aside the judgment and decree that had been rightly passed by the trial Court in clear appreciation of the evidence in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case. 124. It is a case in which the onus of proof is heavily on the plaintiff to prove his claim wherein the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the case put up by her even to the least extent so as to become entitled to the relief sought for. On the contrary, it is not only a very strong defence put up on the part of the defendant but the same has also been proved with proper evidence so as to demolish the very weak case put up by the plaintiff based on one and the only sale deed under Ex.A-1. Long back the law was settled that ‘one cannot convey better title than what he has’. P.W.2, the vendor of the plaintiff under Ex.A-1, excepting to barely state that himself and his father and grandfather had been in long possession and enjoyment of the suit property, is not able to establish anything in support of such oral evidence adduced on his part of create circumstances so as to be legal. Based on such unsupported oral evidence, nothing could be decided in favour of the plaintiff and the pleading that P.W. 2, who was entitled to the suit property conveyed the same in favour of the plaintiff is a big flop, which goes completely not proved throughout so as to believe that P.W.2 had conveyed a good title in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.A-1. 125. To put it in a nutshell, neither a strong case has been put up on the part of the plaintiff nor has it been proved in evidence even to the little extent so as to get the relief of declaration of the title to the suit property and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment much less to the extent as it is required under law resulting in the only conclusion that could be arrived at by any Court of law as it has been arrived at validly by the trial Court as per its judgment dated 1. 1998 thereby dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff as not proved. 1998 thereby dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff as not proved. The first Appellate Court appreciating the evidence on the wrong lines much against the expectations of law, has arrived at the wrong conclusion to allow the appeal preferred by the plaintiff setting aside the judgment and decree validly passed by the trial court. Patent errors of law and perversity in approach an writ large so far as the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is concerned. In these circumstances, this Court is left with no option but to necessarily cause its interference into the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court not only to set aside the same but also to restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In result, for all the above discussions held, .(i) the above second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed with costs throughout; .(ii) the judgment and decree dated 112. 1998 made in A.S.No.98 of 1998 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, is hereby set aside; and (iii) the judgment and decree dated 1. 1998 made in O.S.No.482 of 1992 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Sivaganga is restored. Consequently, C.M.P.No.7807 of 1999 is closed.