Judgment : 1. The point for consideration in these appeals is as to the interpretation of the order of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 in W.P.(C) No.317 of 1993 as to whether the order is confined to the parties before the Supreme Court or to the generality of the institutions claiming minority status. 2. TheSupreme Court issued certain general directions in respect of educational institutions claiming minority status. The relevant portion of the order of the Supreme Court material for discussion in the second appeals runs as follows: “We have heard learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents. We issue the following general directions/orders in respect of the educational institutions which have been impleaded as respondents in the above I.A. .(i) We have been informed that some of the respondents institutions are operating as minority institutions on the strength of various orders/decrees obtained from the civil courts. We pass hereby a general order staying the operation of all the decrees/orders which may have been given by any civil court in respect of the minority status or otherwise of any of the institutions which have been arrayed as respondents in this I.A. All the respondents institutions shall be treated non-minority institutions till they comply with the direction given by us as Sl.No.2. .(ii) The Educational Institutions claiming minority status should approach the State Government and till the State Government issues an order declaring the institution to be a minority institution, it cannot operate as such.” 3. S.S.Surbamani, J. in The Correspondent St.Ignatius Higher Secondary School v. Director of School Education The Correspondent St.Ignatius Higher Secondary School v. Director of School Education The Correspondent St.Ignatius Higher Secondary School v. Director of School Education , (1999)1 C.T.C. 121 interpreting the decision of the Supreme Court held that the decision should be confined to such of those parties who were impleaded as respondents in the application before the Supreme Court. 4. I had occasion to consider an identical question in D.P.Amalraj v. Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary), Chennai-6, W.P.No.13326 of 1998 on 1. 1999. In that case the counsel for the petitioner wanted the court to read the second clause referred to supra disassociated from clause (i) and the preamble portion of the order. 4. I had occasion to consider an identical question in D.P.Amalraj v. Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary), Chennai-6, W.P.No.13326 of 1998 on 1. 1999. In that case the counsel for the petitioner wanted the court to read the second clause referred to supra disassociated from clause (i) and the preamble portion of the order. I took the view that it could not be done and in my opinion, such of those institutions which were not parties before the Supreme Court would not be governed by the directions contained in the order of the Supreme Court. 5. The learned Government Advocate brought to my notice three decisions of our High Court. The first of the decisions is by Shanmugam, J. in W.P.No.15517 of 1999 where by order dated 30.1.1999, while considering the merits of the case relating to the minority status of the institutions concerned, incidentally referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 already referred to. The learned Judge interpreted the order of the Supreme Court as empowering the Government to issue orders declaring the status of the institutions concerned. The learned Judge did not go into the question as to whether the directions of the Supreme Court would apply to all institutions or would be confined only to such of those institutions, which were impleaded as respondent in the matter before the Supreme Court. 6. The next decision relied on is by Sathasivam, J. in W.P.No.16570 of 1991. The learned Judge by order dated 16. 1999 relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court as covering all the institutions claiming minority status. 7. The next decision is by Venkatachalamoorthy, J. That arose in a second appeal. In that case the institution concerned filed a suit seeking declaration that it was a minority institution. The trial court dismissed the suit. However, the appellate court allowed the appeal and held that the school concerned was a minority school as contemplated under Sec.2(6) of Act 29 of 1974. In the second appeal the order of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 already referred to was relied on. The learned Judge took the view that the order of the Supreme Court was of a general nature and it would cover all the institutions claiming minority status and the decrees already obtained by the institutions would become null and void. .8. In the second appeal the order of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 already referred to was relied on. The learned Judge took the view that the order of the Supreme Court was of a general nature and it would cover all the institutions claiming minority status and the decrees already obtained by the institutions would become null and void. .8. TheGovernment interpreted the order of the Supreme Court as directing the Government to consider the claim of the institutions regarding their status and that this would apply to all institutions, even those institutions which had obtained declarations before the civil court regarding their minority status and which had not been made parties before the Supreme Court and passed the G.O. setting down the terms and conditions to be satisfied by the institutions claiming minority status for being so declared. No doubt, this G.O. was challenged and S.S.Subramani, J. in Rajalakshmi Educational Trust v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others Rajalakshmi Educational Trust v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others Rajalakshmi Educational Trust v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, 1999 Writ L.R. 728 upheld the validity of the said G.O. and this was confirmed by a Bench of this Court in W.A.Nos.1726 and 1727 of 1998 and the Bench decision came to be confirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.A.(C) No.8573 of 1999 on 112. 1999. 9. In respect of one of the writ petitions decided by S.S.Subramani, J, namely, W.P.No.12018 of 1998 there was a writ appeal in W.A.No.1259 of 1998 and the First Bench vacated the observations and findings of the learned single Judge to the extent that they related to the merits of the claim of the appellant before the Bench and at the same time giving liberty to the appellant to move the Government with a fresh representation enclosing all the relevant documents to prove its minority status. The Bench upheld the decision of the learned single Judge holding that the G.O. was valid. 10. In my view, these decisions, namely, the decision regarding the validity of the subsequent G.O. cannot be pressed into service for deciding the present second appeals in as much as the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 had not issued directions in respect of all the institutions claiming minority status. 10. In my view, these decisions, namely, the decision regarding the validity of the subsequent G.O. cannot be pressed into service for deciding the present second appeals in as much as the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 had not issued directions in respect of all the institutions claiming minority status. I respectfully disagree with the contrary view taken by Venkatachalamoorthy, J. and Sathasivam, J., So far as the view of Shanmugam, J. is concerned, the question did not arise before the learned Judge nor was it decided by him. 11. When once the conclusion is thus reached, then there should not be any embargo for holding that the decisions reached by civil courts with regard to the minority status of institutions before the passing of the new G.O. have to be upheld subject to their having found that the criteria for declaring a particular institution as a minority institution have been satisfied. .12. Now let us go to the individual cases. S.A.No.173 of 1997 arises out of a suit O.S.No.432 of 1989 filed by the respondent institution herein for declaration of its minority status. The trial court, namely, the District Munsifs Court, Srivilliputhur by judgment and decree dated 24. 1991 dismissed the suit. However on appeal by the respondent the learned District Judge, Srivilliputhur, in A.S.No.291 of 1993 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit declaring the minority status of the respondent institution. In coming to the conclusion the learned District Judge has adverted to all the requirements to be satisfied to claim minority status. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court clearly shows that there has been a proper application of mind by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge has found that on the materials, the respondent was entitled to a declaration as prayed for. The finding by the learned District Judge as to the minority status of the respondent is not challenged on facts on behalf of the appellants. The attack by the Government Pleader is on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 and the subsequent G.O. issued by the Government. The finding by the learned District Judge as to the minority status of the respondent is not challenged on facts on behalf of the appellants. The attack by the Government Pleader is on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in I.A.No.20 and the subsequent G.O. issued by the Government. In the view I have expressed that the subsequent G.O. would not make the civil court decree properly obtained as void or otiose, the substantial questions of law raised in the second appeal to the effect that whether the plaintiff institution is a minority institution and whether Rajapalayam Rajus are linguistic minorities, are therefore answered against the appellants. The second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 13. So far as S.A.Nos.641 to 643 of 1989 are concerned, it is seen that the trial court decreed the suits. The lower appellate court though found that the appellants in these cases are entitled to the relief of declamation however made is subject to the condition that they satisfied the educational authorities by producing endowment receipt for Rs.1 lakh for each of these schools and that they are not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction against the respondents in enforcing the provisions of Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act and Rules, 1973 except with regard to Secs.8(1) (a), 11(1) (b), 12(1), 14 to 18, 21(2) to 26, 31 to 33, 39(4) and 41 to 45 and 7, 9 except Clauses (e) and (k) of Sub-rules (2), 10 to 14, 16 to 18 and 22 to 24 of the abovesaid Act and Rules. 14. The only point questioned by the appellants in these second appeals is regarding the imposition of the condition relating to production of endowment receipt for Rs.1 lakh. 15. Mr.D.W.Stewart, learned counsel for the appellant in these appeals (S.A.Nos.641 to 643 of 1989) produced the receipts relating to endowment deposit. The learned counsel also brought to my notice a Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.567, dated 17. 1995 to the effect that G.O.Ms.No.371, Education, Science and Technology, dated 5. 1995 relating to grant of minority status to Educational Institutions though originally were made applicable to Professional Colleges/Technical Institutions which apply to Government claiming minority status and that the same modified so as to apply the guidelines in the said G.O. to Engineering Colleges only. The learned counsel also referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. .16. 1995 relating to grant of minority status to Educational Institutions though originally were made applicable to Professional Colleges/Technical Institutions which apply to Government claiming minority status and that the same modified so as to apply the guidelines in the said G.O. to Engineering Colleges only. The learned counsel also referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. .16. In M/s.Amar Nath Om Prakash and others v. State of Punjab and others M/s.Amar Nath Om Prakash and others v. State of Punjab and others M/s.Amar Nath Om Prakash and others v. State of Punjab and others , A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 218 it has been held that, .“Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.” .17. In Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another, (1985)2 S.C.C. 68 the Supreme Court reiterated the decision in , A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 218. The Supreme Court observed that, .“A judgment of a court on a particular aspect of a question cannot be read as a Holy Book covering all aspects of every question whether such questions and facets of such questions arose for consideration or not in that case.” 18. The learned counsel also relied on the decision in N.Ammad v. Manager, Emjay High School and others N.Ammad v. Manager, Emjay High School and others N.Ammad v. Manager, Emjay High School and others , (1998)6 S.C.C. 674 wherein the Supreme Court dealing with the Kerala Education Act, 1958 observed as follows: “12. Counsel for both sides conceded that there is no provision in the Act which enables the Government to declare a school as a minority school. If so, a school which is otherwise a minority school would continue to be so whether the Government declared it as such or not. Declaration by the Government is at best only a recognition of an existing fact. Art.30(1) of the Constitution reads thus: “30(1). If so, a school which is otherwise a minority school would continue to be so whether the Government declared it as such or not. Declaration by the Government is at best only a recognition of an existing fact. Art.30(1) of the Constitution reads thus: “30(1). All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” 13. When the Government declared the School as a minority school, it has recognised a factual position that the School was established and is being administered by a minority community. The declaration is only an open acceptance of a legal character which should necessarily have existed antecedent to such declaration. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention that the School can claim protection only after the Government declared it as a minority school on 8. 1994.” 19. It is not necessary to go into this aspect since the appellants have got declaration subject to certain conditions which are being satisfied by the appellants. The Government have not filed cross-objections or independent appeals questioning the finding by the courts below regarding the minority status of the institutions concerned in the three second appeals. Identical question is involved in all these appeals. No further orders are necessary. 20. There will be no order as to costs in all the second appeals.