Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. Both these appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment The plaintiff is the appellant, and parties shall be described by this position in the trial Court. 2. First Appeal No. 102 of 1977 (R), arises out of judgment and decree dated 20th December, 1976, passed by Shri J.K. Prasad, First Additional Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur, in Money Suit No. 61 of 1966, whereby he dismissed the suit. The same was instituted, inter alia, for the following reliefs: (i) A declaration that the Central Excise and Salt Act of 1944 and the Rules thereunder are invalid insofar as they impose the obligation of payment of duty on articles as a condition of their removal without any machinery or procedure for assessment of disputed liabilities. (ii) A direction to the defendants to refund the disputed amount of Rs. 41,79,141.68 of Excise Duty levied which has been collected from the plaintiff along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit till date of realisation. (iii) A decree quashing the aforesaid orders passed (a) by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Jamshedpur; (b) by the Collector for Central Excise, Patna; and (c) by the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance. (iv) A direction cancelling the debit made in the current account of the plaintiff in respect of duty levied on steel ingot produced out of old steel skull scraps. (v) A decree for the costs of the suit may also be passed against the defendants with future interest. (vi) Such other reliefs as may appear fit and proper. 3. First Appeal No. 14 of 1979 (R) arises out of judgment and decree dated 11th September, 1978, passed by Sri Ram Chandra Prasad, Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur, in Money Suit No. 62/2 of 1966-1976, wherein the plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs: (i) A declaration that the Central Excise and Salt Act of 1944 and the Rules thereunder are invalid insofar as they impose the obligation of payment of duty on articles as a condition of their removal without any machinery or procedure for assessment of disputed liabilities. (ii) A decree quashing the orders passed (a) by the Assistant Collector or Central Excise, Jamshedpur; (b) by the Collector of Central Excise, Patna, and (c) by the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance referred to above. (iii) A direction to the defendants to refund the disputed amount Rs. 2,80,593.44 of Excise Duty levied which has been collected from the plaintiff along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit till date of realisation. (iv) Issue of directions cancelling the debit made in the current account of the plaintiff in respect of duty levied on steel ingot produced out of scrap obtained from paid steel ingots and products. (v) A decree for costs of the suit with future interest. (vi) Such other reliefs as may appear fit and proper. 4. Both the suits are identical, In view of the ultimate order which is going to be passed in these appeals, it is not necessary to deal with the facts of the case in detail. The main differences between the suit are that the two relate to two different periods, and the amounts sought to be recovered are different, otherwise all the rest are common including the evidence. According to the plaintiff, it manufactures steel ingots out of the iron and steel scraps collector from their slag dump. It is admitted case of the parties that the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Rule 8, Sub-rule (1) of the Central Excise Rules of 1944, issued Notification dated 24.4.1962, bearing No. G.S.R. 75 of 1962, whereby and whereunder certain exemption was granted in respect of payment of excise duties on steel ingots if the manufacture thereof is made out of duty-paid pig iron or out of old iron and steel scraps obtained from duty-paid products. 5. According to the plaintiff, it had been manufacturing steel ingots from duty paid steel skull scraps. It is admitted position that prior to 24.4.1962, excise duty was leviable on steel ingots manufactured out of the old steel scraps. 5. According to the plaintiff, it had been manufacturing steel ingots from duty paid steel skull scraps. It is admitted position that prior to 24.4.1962, excise duty was leviable on steel ingots manufactured out of the old steel scraps. It is the case of the plaintiff that the scraps arising out of the steel ingots are produced from skull scraps in admixture with other materials and the exemption granted in terms of the said Notification No. 75 of 1962, is available with respect to steel ingots made out of such scraps. 6. The further case of the plaintiff is that it employed Messrs Hacket Engineering Company, a company of United States of America for recovery of iron and steel scraps by their patented process for remelting the same into iron and steel ingots out of the scraps in the said dump as well as fresh scraps obtained as are result of the day-to-day manufacturing process. Messrs Hacket Engineering Company allegedly by their process made old scraps available to the plaintiff for remelting. It is also alleged in the plaintiff that Messrs Hacket Engineering Company had been maintaining registers in respect of steel and iron scraps showing the quantity of: (a) Fresh steel or iron scraps, (b) Steel or iron scraps from the dumps, (c) Steel or iron scraps given for remelting. According to the plaintiff, it has also been maintaining corresponding registers. 7 The Assistant Collector, Central Excise, allegedly by letter dated 12.12.1963, conveyed to the plaintiff as follows: (a) It has been decided to treat the scrap recovered from the dumps as pre-excise stock. Accordingly, if such skull scrap is cleared as such, no central excise duty will be leviable thereon; (b) If the said scraps from the dumps is melted in the plaintiffs factory, no central excise duty will similarly be leviable thereon; (c) Duty will be levied on steel ingots or steel products produced out of the skull scrap from the said dumps. It appears that there has been a series of correspondence between the Assistant Collector, Jamshedpur, and the plaintiff-company elating to the method as to how and in what manner the accounts with regard to the availability of the skull scraps and others scraps would be maintained. 8. It appears that there has been a series of correspondence between the Assistant Collector, Jamshedpur, and the plaintiff-company elating to the method as to how and in what manner the accounts with regard to the availability of the skull scraps and others scraps would be maintained. 8. The plaintiff claimed exemption from payment of excise duty purported to be in term of the aforesaid Notification bearing No. 75/62, as allegedly it had been manufacturing steel ingots from skull scraps and other old scraps or duty-paid iron and steel. The claim of the plaintiff was, however, rejected by the department and thereafter it filed a Writ petition in this Court which was registered as CWJC No. 1238 of 1965, which was allowed, and the Assistant Collector was directed to readmit the claim of the plaintiff for refund and to pass order according to law bearing in mind the observations recorded in the said judgment. The Writ petition was filed during the pendency of the suit. The Assistant Collector ejected the claim for refund of Rs. 41,79,141.60 paise. 9. The learned trial Court framed the following seven issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff has got cause of action and right to sue? (ii) Whether the suit is barred by time, waiver, acquiescence and estoppel? (iii) Whether exemption granted by impugned Notification No. 75/62 is available to the plaintiff. (iv) Whether on facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to the exemption and if so, to what extent? (v) Whether valid notice under Sec. 80, C.P.C. was duly served upon the defendant? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as claimed? (vii) Any other relief? 10. Insofar as First Appeal No. 14 of 1979 (R) is concerned, it appears that the plaintiff had instituted the aforementioned Money Suit No. 62/2 of 1966-1976, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,79,141.68 paise. The reliefs claimed in the said suit were also based on the aforesaid exemption Notification No. 75 of 1962, dated 24.4.1962. Originally, the plaintiff disclosed that during the relevant period, i.e. 24.4.1962 to 29.2.1964, the plaintiff had melted a total quantity of 1,11,034.364 M.T. old iron for manufacturing the steel ingots but the plaint was amended later on. The amended plaint stated that during the period in question, the aforesaid quantity of old steel scrap was melted. Originally, the plaintiff disclosed that during the relevant period, i.e. 24.4.1962 to 29.2.1964, the plaintiff had melted a total quantity of 1,11,034.364 M.T. old iron for manufacturing the steel ingots but the plaint was amended later on. The amended plaint stated that during the period in question, the aforesaid quantity of old steel scrap was melted. The defendants took the self-same plea as was taken in Money Suit No. 61/2 of 1966-76. It appears that in Money Suit No. 62/2 of 1966/1967, the plaintiff could not produce the original register and other documents which were filed in Money Suit No. 61/2 of 1966-76. The learned trial Court held that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of the aforesaid Notification, as it was not producing steel ingots exclusively from steel skull scraps. It further held that even on facts, the documents filed by the plaintiff could not be looked into because the same were merely office copies of the original documents and thus inadmissible in evidence. The trial Court dismissed the suit. 11. An important issue in the suits as well as in these appeals has been about the applicability of two rival Notifications namely, Notification dated 24.4.1962, and the subsequent Notification dated 1.3.1964. The plaintiffs case has been that the Notification dated 24.4.1962 is applicable, and that the subsequent Notification does not stand as a bar in construing the Notification dated 24.4.1962 in such a manner so as to enable the plaintiff to obtain exemption from payment of excise duty even if steel ingots were manufactured from old skull scraps in admixture with some other materials which was necessitated because of the processes involved in manufacture of steel ingots. The said Notifications read as under: Notification No. G.S.R. 75, Dated 24.4.1962 Government of India Ministry Of Finance (Department of Revenue) New Delhi, dated 24.4.1962. G.S.R. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1994, as in force in India and as applied to the State of Pondicherry, the Central Government hereby exempts steel ingots falling under item No. 26 of the 1st Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said table. __________________________________________________________________________ Sl. No. Description Duty __________________________________________________________________________ 1- If produced out of scrap obtained Rs. 30 per M.T. from duty paid pig iron. __________________________________________________________________________ Sl. No. Description Duty __________________________________________________________________________ 1- If produced out of scrap obtained Rs. 30 per M.T. from duty paid pig iron. 2- If produced out of old iron or steel Nil scrap or scraps obtained from duty paid steel ingots or products. __________________________________________________________________________ Notification No. 53/64 dated 1.3.1964 In exercise of the powers conferred in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts steel ingots falling under item No. 26 the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) product from fresh unused steel melting scraps, exclusively or in admixture with any other material so much of the duty of excise as is proved to have been paid on such fresh unused steel melting scrap under item No. 26 of the said schedule provided that no set-off of duty has already been availed of in respect of such scrap (M.F. (D.R.) C. Ex. Notification No. 53/64 dated 1.3.1964) 12. Thereafter both these appeals were laid before Hon ble Mr. Justice Satya Brata Sinha for hearing, who formulated the following three issues for consideration: (i) Whether the Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred by necessary implication in view of Secs. 35, 36 and 40 of the Central Excise and the Salt Act? (ii) Whether the exemption Notification No. 75/62 is applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as the plaintiff had been manufacturing steel ingots not exclusively out of old duty paid skull scraps but after admixturing certain other materials therewith? (iii) Whether the appellant has been able to prove its claim for recovery of the amount mentioned in the two suits? 13. On consideration of the entire materials on record, by his judgment dated 31.1.1989, S.B. Sinha, J. decided the first question in favour of the plaintiff and held that the suit is maintainable for recovery of the duties of excise illegally recovered by the defendants. As to the second question, he held that the aforesaid Notification No. 75/62, dated 24.4.1962, is applicable in the present cases and the plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the claim of exemption. As to the third question, he has held that the plaintiff had suffered prejudice at the hands of the trial Court on account of non-consideration of a number of material documents on record. As to the third question, he has held that the plaintiff had suffered prejudice at the hands of the trial Court on account of non-consideration of a number of material documents on record. In that view of the matter, the judgments of the trial Court were set aside, and the third issue was remitted back to the trial Court with the direction that after hearing the parties, it shall send its report to this Court upon assigning reason in support of its findings, while keeping these appeals pending. The trial Court was directed to try the two suits analogously, and the documents marked in one case should be considered in the other. 14. Pursuant to the remand order of S.B. Sinha, J. the trial Court gave fresh opportunity to the parties to bring further evidence on record and after hearing the parties and considering the entire materials on record, has submitted its report dated 16.12.1994 to this Court. Insofar as Money Suit No. 61 of 1966 is concerned, the trial Court has found that 1,22,961.16 M.T. of steel skull scraps was recovered from the dump and actually remelted during the two periods involved in that suit. Insofar as Money Suit No. 62 of 1966 is concerned, the trial Court has found that the plaintiff had melted 5,607 M.T. of heavy melting scraps, and 1,848 M.T. of light melting scraps, which were duty-paid scraps, being scraps obtained from duty-paid ingots or products. Consequently, the trial Court has found in its report that the plaintiff had paid by way of duties of excise the sum of Rs. 37,61,882.90 paise with respect to Money Suit No. 61 of 1966, and the sum of Rs. 2,72,575.75 paise insofar as Money Suit No. 62 of 1966 is concerned, which totalled up to Rs. 40,34,458.65 paise. 15. Consequently, the trial Court has found in its report that the plaintiff had paid by way of duties of excise the sum of Rs. 37,61,882.90 paise with respect to Money Suit No. 61 of 1966, and the sum of Rs. 2,72,575.75 paise insofar as Money Suit No. 62 of 1966 is concerned, which totalled up to Rs. 40,34,458.65 paise. 15. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted before me that insofar as the first two issues formulated by S.B. Sinha, J. are concerned, the same have become final by his judgment dated 31.1.1989, insofar as the present appeals are concerned, Insofar as the third issue is concerned, he submits that the trial Court has found that a total quantity of 1,22,961.16 M.T. of steel skull scrap was recovered from dump and actually remelted, insofar as Money Suit No. 61 of 1966 is concerned, and 5607 M.T. of heavy melting scrap and 1948 M.T. of light melting scrap (=7455 M.T.) were melted insofar as Money Suit No. 62 of 1966 is concerned, and the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of a total sum of Rs. 40,34,458.65p. from the defendants. He has also placed before me the evidence in support of the findings of the trial Court. 16. Mr. M.M. Prasad, Advocate and Sr. Panel Counsel for Union of India, raised a preliminary objection that a suit claiming refund of any duty of excise is no longer maintainable in view of the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sec. 11B(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He, therefore, submits that an appeal being a continuation of the suit, the present appeals have abated. He relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in -- Mafatlal Industries V/s. Union of India -- Assistant Collector of Customs V/s. Anam Electrical Manufacturing Co. and -- Collector of Central Excise V/s. LML Ltd. (Scooter Unit). He also submits that the plaintiff has also to discharge the onus in terms of Sec. 12B of the Act. He made various other submissions on the merits of the matter. 17. and -- Collector of Central Excise V/s. LML Ltd. (Scooter Unit). He also submits that the plaintiff has also to discharge the onus in terms of Sec. 12B of the Act. He made various other submissions on the merits of the matter. 17. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has in reply submitted that the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sec. 11B(3), as well as Sec. 12B of the Act, have been inserted by the Central Excise and Customs Laws (Amendment Act), 1991 (Central Act No. 40 of 1991), with effect from 20.9.91 and, therefore, are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the suits in question relate to refund of the amount of taxes for the years 1962 to 1964. He further submits that out of the three issues formulated for judgment in this appeal by S.B. Sinha, J., the first two have become final insofar as this appeal is concerned, and the third issue is concluded by the report dated 16.12.94 of the trial Court pursuant to the remand order of S.B. Sinha, J. 18. Having considered the rival submissions, I am of the view that in view of the amendments made in the Act by Central Act No. 40 of 1991, and the judgments cited by the respondents, the suits and consequently these appeals fail on the ground of maintainability and abate on account of automatic operation of the law. The relevant portion of Sec. 11B of the Act incorporating the amendments is set out. hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:- 11-B Claim for refund of duty ... ... (2) If, on receipt of any such application, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund: Provided that the amount of duty of excise as determined by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise under the foregoing provisions of this Sub-sec. shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to - ... ... shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to - ... ... (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in Sub-sec. (2). 12-B. Presumption that incidence of duty has been passed on to the buyer.- Every person who has paid the duty of excise on any goods under this Act shall, unless the contrary is proved by him, be deemed to have passed on the full incidence of such duty to the buyer of such goods. 19. The scope and ambit of the aforesaid insertions fell for consideration of a nine-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries V/s. Union of India (supra). The majority view comprises of Mr. Justice J.S. Verma, Mr. Justice S.C. Agrawal, Mr. Justice B.P. Jiwan Reddy, Mr. Justice A.S. Anand and Mr. Justice B.N. Kripal, which has been expressed through the judgment of Mr. Justice B.P. Jiwan Reddy. Mr. Justice A.M. Ahmadi, C.J., has substantially agreed with the majority view while expressing his dissent on two issues. The dissenting judgment has been delivered by Hon ble Mr. Justice K.S. Paripoornan who has also, however, agreed with the majority view on issue, but has recorded a different conclusion on the second aspect of the matter. Mr. Justice B.L. Hansaria and Mr. Justice S.C. Sen have entirely agreed with the views expressed by Mr. K.S. Paripoornan. The following is the ratio of the judgment insofar as relevant for the disposal of the present appeals:- (i) A claim for refund has necessarily to be preferred under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act inserting the amendment before the authorities specified thereunder and within the period of limitation prescribed therein. No such is maintainable in that behalf. While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of this Court, under Article 32 cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Act. No such is maintainable in that behalf. While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of this Court, under Article 32 cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Act. (ii) Sec. 72 of the Contract Act has no application to such a claim of refund and cannot form a basis for maintaining a suit or a Writ petition. All refund claims except those mentioned under Proposition (iii) below have to be and must be filed and adjudicated under the provisions of the Act. The Act provides a complete mechanism for correcting any errors whether of fact or law and that not only an appeal is provided to a Tribunal which is not a departmental organ but to this Court, which is a Civil Court. (iii) Where, however, a refund is claimed on the ground that the provision of the Act under which it was levied is or has been held to be unconstitutional, such a claim being a claim outside the purview of the enactment, can be made either by way of a suit or by way of a Writ petition. This principle is, however, subject to one exception not relevant in the present context. (iv) A claim for refund, whether made under the provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above, or in a suit or Writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition (iii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other persons in view of the provisions of Sec. 12-B of the Act. His refund claim shall be allowed or decreed only when he established that he has not passed on the burden of duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. (v) In all those cases, where it is not possible to refund the amount to the petitioner/plaintiff for one or the other reason, it is just and appropriate that the amount is retained by the State i.e. by the people. There is no impropriety or immorality involved in such a proposition. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. There is no impropriety or immorality involved in such a proposition. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched. It may incidentally be mentioned that the dissenting judgment expressed through Mr. Justice K.S. Paripoornan entirely agrees with this aspect of the matter. (vi) The amendments made and the provisions inserted by the Act of 40 of 1991 are constitutionally valid and are unexceptionable. (vii) The amendments made and the provisions inserted by Act 40 of 1991 applies to all pending proceedings notwithstanding the fact that duty may have been refunded to the petitioner/plaintiff pending the proceeding or under orders of the Court/Tribunal/Authority or otherwise. It is, of course, obvious that where refund proceedings are finally terminated in the sense that the appeal period has already expired before the commencement of Act 40 of 1991 on 19.9.91, they cannot be reopened and governed by the newly-inserted provisions. This, however, does not mean that the power of the appellate authority to condone delay in appropriate cases is affected in any manner. (viii) All Writ petitions /Writ appeals/suits claiming refund of excise duties pending as on the date of the judgment in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. are liable to fail on the ground of maintainability by virtue of the law declared therein. Since the law is being declared and clarified by this judgment on 19.12.96, and provided that if proceedings have not already been taken under the Act, it shall be open to the petitioners/appellants/plaintiffs to file application for refund under Sec. 11B within sixty days from the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The application so filed under Sec. 11B shall be disposed of under Sec. 11B in accordance with the interpretation given in the judgment and in accordance with law. The application so filed under Sec. 11B shall be disposed of under Sec. 11B in accordance with the interpretation given in the judgment and in accordance with law. It is obvious that if any such petitioner/appellant/plaintiff has already taken proceeding for refund under the Act and having failed therein either partly or wholly-have resorted to Writ petition or suit, they shall not be entitled to the benefit of this directions. 20. In the case of Assistant Collector V/s. Anam Electrical Manufacturing Co. (supra), it has been held by a Bench of two Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court comprising Mr. Justice B.P. Jiwan Reddy and Mr. Justice K. Venkataswamy that the petitioners/appellants onus under Sec. 12B of the Act can be decided on the basis of affidavit(s) evidence. It has further been held that the forum of appeal before CEGAT is available even in cases where the High Court or Civil Court is approached after exhausting the remedy of appeal to Collector (Appeals). He can file an appeal to CEGAT within sixty days of the judgment of the Supreme Court, after withdrawing the Writ petition or the suit, as the case may be. 21. It has been clarified in the case of Collector of Central Excise V/s. LML Ltd. (supra), that it is not for the Supreme Court to decide whether there has been unjust enrichment or not. The provisions of the Act, and Sec. 11D in particular, as well as the decision in the case of Mafatlal (supra), clearly postulate that the assessing authority will determine on facts whether refund, if granted, would result in unjust enrichment or not. 22. Learned Counsel for the Union of India has rightly pointed out that there are provisions in a number of Acts where the pending proceedings in the Civil Court or such other forum abate by automatic operation of law, and the parties are relevated to the newly-created forums. 22. Learned Counsel for the Union of India has rightly pointed out that there are provisions in a number of Acts where the pending proceedings in the Civil Court or such other forum abate by automatic operation of law, and the parties are relevated to the newly-created forums. For example, Sec. 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (Bihar Act 22 of 1956), provides that during the period commencing from the date of publication of the Notification under Sec. 3 to the date when the scheme of consolidation comes into operation under Sec. 14 in any notified area, all suits and proceedings pending in any Court in respect of any land in such area, shall abate, and shall thereafter be dealt with in conformity with the provisions of the Act. It was found by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in 1981 BBCJ 197 Rahmani Khatoon v Hakkoo Gope(Supreme Court Section), that Notification under Sec. 3(1) of the Act was issued during the pendency of the second appeal in the High Court, and it was accordingly held that not only the second appear abated but the judgment and decrees of the two Courts below also became non-est, leaving the consolidation authorities free to decide the proceedings before it. Sec. 8 of the Family Court Act, 1984 (Central Act No. 66 of 1984), provides that where a family Court has been established for any area, all matters covered by the Act pending in the Civil Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure on the date the Act came into force, and such a Family Court has been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established. Sec. 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Central Act 13 of 1985), provides transfer of pending cases to the Tribunal constituted under the Act. Similarly, Sec. 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Batiks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Central Act No. 51 of 1993), provides for transfer of pending cases before the Civil Court to the newly-constituted Tribunals under the Act subject to one exception. This was the subject matter of a judgment delivered by me and reported in 2000 (2) PLJR 122 Ram Lakshman Glass (P) Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar. 23. This was the subject matter of a judgment delivered by me and reported in 2000 (2) PLJR 122 Ram Lakshman Glass (P) Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar. 23. In view of the authorities pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is thus manifest that the present appeals must fail on the ground of maintainability. Both the suits and the appeals accordingly abate. The plaintiff is relegated to the statutory remedy, if any, available to them in law and interpreted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, inter alia, subject to the provisions of Sec. 12B of the Act. 24. Before I part with this judgment, I must record my appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Murli Manohar Prasad, Advocate, and Senior Panel Counsel for the Union of India. 25. In the result, the suits and these appeals fail on the ground of maintainability, and accordingly abate.