JUDGMENT- B.B. VAGYANI, J.:---Heard Shri S.R. Barlinge, learned Advocate for the petitioner, Shri C.K. Shinde, learned A.G.P. for respondent State and Shri N.C. Garud, learned Advocate for the respondent. 2. In this writ petition, very interesting question is raised as to whether the Collector acting under sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1958) has power to condone the delay by pressing into service the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. The petitioner was the Sarpanch of village panchayat, Talegaon Dighe, Taluqa Sangamner, District Ahmednagar. The respondents Nos. 3 to 13 are the members of the village panchayat, Talegaon Dighe. 4. A motion of no-confidence was moved against the petitioner. The Tahsildar, Sangamner was pleased to call the meeting on 20th October, 2000. The petitioner could not remain present in the meeting as he was suffering from Hepatitis and was under medical treatment from 19-10-2000 to 3-11-2000. He recovered slightly from the ailment on 4-11-2000. Thereafter, the petitioner raised a dispute under sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Act of 1958 before the Additional Collector, Ahmednagar. In the said dispute, the petitioner presented an application for condonation of delay. But the learned Additional Collector dismissed the dispute on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Additional Collector has further held that there is no provision under the Act of 1958 for condonation of delay. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal passed by the Additional Collector, Ahmednagar, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Nasik Division, Nasik under sub-clause (3-C) of section 35 of the Act of 1958. The learned Additional Commissioner, Nasik vide his judgment and order dated 7-12-2000, dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The correctness of the dismissal order dated 6-11-2000 passed by the Additional Collector, Ahmednagar and the dismissal order dated 7-12-2000 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Nasik Division, Nasik is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. The learned Advocate Shri Barlinge forcefully submitted that the petitioner was prevented by his ailment to raise a dispute before the Collector within a period of seven days from the date on which the motion of no-confidence was carried. 6. The learned Advocate Shri Barlinge forcefully submitted that the petitioner was prevented by his ailment to raise a dispute before the Collector within a period of seven days from the date on which the motion of no-confidence was carried. According to him, if on account of genuine reasons, a person is prevented to raise a dispute within the prescribed time, the Collector has power to condone the delay by applying the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with section 29(2) of the aforesaid Act, if sufficient cause is shown. According to the learned Advocate Shri Barlinge, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not expressly excluded by the Act of 1958 and, therefore, both the authorities have failed to exercise their legitimate jurisdiction. He submitted further that both the authorities should have verified as to whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay and should not have dismissed the dispute raised by the petitioner at the threshold adopting a hypertechnical approach. 7. In order to buttress his submissions, the learned Advocate Shri Barlinge relied upon following rulings: 1. (Radheshyam v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)1, 1969 Mh.L.J. 689; 2. (Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi)2, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 105; 3. (Virendrakumar Khairulal Jaiswal v. K.L. Aney)3, 1975 Mh.L.J. 80 and 4. (Azizul Haq Kausar Naquvi v. The State)4, A.I.R. 1980 Allahabad 149. 8. On the other hand, the learned A.G.P. Shri Shinde argued that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the matter of condonation of delay cannot be pressed into service on the ground that the Competent Authority i.e. the Collector is not the Court. He points out that a dispute with regard to validity of the motion carried is required to be filed before the Collector within seven days from the date on which such motion was carried. The Collector thereafter shall decide the dispute as far as possible within 15 days from the date on which it was received by him and any such decision shall, subject to an appeal under sub-section (3-C) of section 35 of the Act of 1958, be final. In the instant case, the no-confidence motion was passed against the petitioner on 20-10-2000 and the petitioner raised the dispute before the Collector, Ahmednagar on 13-11-2000. In the instant case, the no-confidence motion was passed against the petitioner on 20-10-2000 and the petitioner raised the dispute before the Collector, Ahmednagar on 13-11-2000. According to Shri Shinde, learned A.G.P., the petitioner failed to raise the dispute before the Competent Authority within seven days from 20-10-2000 and, therefore, the Collector did not entertain the dispute raised by the petitioner. 9. The main thrust of the learned A.G.P. Shri Shinde is on the point that the Collector is not the Court and, therefore, the Collector has no jurisdiction to condone the delay and to entertain the dispute with regard to validity of the motion carried under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Act of 1958. In order to support his submissions, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Officer on Special Duty v. Shah Manilal Chandulal etc.)5, 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 609 . 10. The learned Advocate Shri Garud played the same tune. In order to support his submissions, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Sakuru v. Tanaji)6, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1279. 11. It is an admitted position that the petitioner did not raise the dispute with regard to validity of the motion carried under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Act of 1958 within seven days from the date on which the motion of no-confidence was passed. The no-confidence motion was passed against the petitioner on 20-10-2000. Therefore, it is beyond doubt clear that there was no valid dispute before the Collector. The Collector is under obligation to decide the dispute within 15 days from the date on which it was received by him. In the instant case, there was no valid dispute before the Collector and, therefore, the Collector refused to entertain the dispute which was raised beyond the period of limitation prescribed by sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Act of 1958. 12. The scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with the application pending before the courts. The word "Court" in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 signifies a "Court" in stricto sensu. The quasi judicial Tribunal and executive authorities are not "Courts". The authority referred in sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Act of 1958 is not the Court. The word "Court" in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 signifies a "Court" in stricto sensu. The quasi judicial Tribunal and executive authorities are not "Courts". The authority referred in sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Act of 1958 is not the Court. The dispute contemplated under sub-section (3-B) of section 35 of the Act of 1958 is not a proceeding in the Court. Therefore, it prima facie appears to me that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with section 29 sub-clause (2) of the aforesaid Act are not attracted to the facts of the present case. 13. In case of Sakuru (cited supra), the Supreme Court has observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "courts and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. 14. In the case of Officer on Special Duty (cited supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a question of limitation with regard to a reference under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Collector is a Court for the purpose of section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court has held that the Collector acts as a statutory authority. If the application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power to make reference. The Supreme Court further observed that though sub-section (3) of the section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by virtue of local amendment, treats the Collector as a Court for a limited purpose of exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to correct the errors of orders passed by the Collector under section 18, he cannot be considered to be a Court for the purposes of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court ultimately held that section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15. The Supreme Court ultimately held that section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15. The authorities relied upon by the learned Advocate Shri Barlinge have no direct bearing on the issue involved in the present petition. Therefore, these authorities do not help the petitioner in any manner. 16. Turning to the facts of the present case, I am of the clear opinion that the authority who is supposed to decide the validity of the motion carried under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Act of 1958, is a statutory authority and not the Court so as to attract the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the purpose of condonation of delay. Under the circumstances, I hold that both the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality. 17. In the result, writ petition stands dismissed in limine. Writ petition dismissed. -----