JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---By this writ petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the respondent No. 1 dated 29-9-1993 as well as the order of the Tribunal dated 13-9-1996 in Original Application No. 1084 of 1993. The petitioner has also prayed for a relief that the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits as to back wages with effect from 29-9-1993. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner was posted at E Division, Bombay in Executive Cadre at the relevant time in 1990. The petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector in the State Excise Department. The petitioner was however placed under suspension by an order dated 1-1-1992 of the Commissioner, Prohibition and State Excise, Mumbai. The order of suspension was followed by the disciplinary proceedings for the alleged misconduct of having failed to maintain absolute integrity and maintain devotion to duty. The petitioner was served with memorandum dated 7-2-1992 containing charges accompanied by statement of imputation. The original charges served upon the petitioner are in Marathi. 3. The substance of the said charges can be summed up as follows: that between 28-6-1990 to 31-12-1991, the petitioner, while working as Sub-Inspector, Executive Cadre, failed to collect samples of the country and foreign liquor, tadi and denatured spiritual preparation vending licences and send the same for analysis to the concerned Government analyzer and thus failed to perform his duty within the meaning of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Conduct Rules). The second charge was that during the relevant period the petitioner did not carry out the prescribed number of inspections of the licences in his jurisdiction and therefore failed to perform his duty within the meaning of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Conduct Rules. The third charge is that although the petitioner was expected to carry out inspection in respect of CL 3 licences within his jurisdiction atleast 6 times but did not do so deliberately and tried to evade on account of which failed to maintain absolute integrity with Government work and committed breach of Rule 3(1)(i) of the Conduct Rules. The third charge is that although the petitioner was expected to carry out inspection in respect of CL 3 licences within his jurisdiction atleast 6 times but did not do so deliberately and tried to evade on account of which failed to maintain absolute integrity with Government work and committed breach of Rule 3(1)(i) of the Conduct Rules. The fourth charge is that although the petitioner was expected to submit 19 monthly reports, submitted 16 reports which were delayed by period varying from 2 days to 1 month and 11 days and one was not submitted at all. Thus committed breach of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Conduct Rules. 4. As such, the charges against the petitioner were mainly that he failed to discharge his duty and to maintain devotion to duty. Only charge No. 3 can be said to be some what serious, for the petitioner deliberately avoided to do inspection, which obviously amounted to not maintaining absolute integrity. 5. The petitioner faced enquiry which was conducted by the Sub Divisional Commissioner, State Excise Department. No grievance is made by the petitioner at any stage; and even before this Court, that proper procedure was not followed during the enquiry. No doubt the petitioner submitted explanation to each of the above charge, however, the Enquiry Officer, after scrutinising the material on record, in his report dated 17-9-1992, observed that each of the charges have been established and proved against the petitioner. In so far as charge No. 1 is concerned, the Enquiry Officer has recorded that the petitioner has admitted that he did not collect the requisite number of samples. The Enquiry Officer has also recorded that it is possible that the petitioner has collected only good samples, though this is not a charge framed against the petitioner. As regards charge No. 2, the Enquiry Officer has recorded that the petitioner has admitted that he did not carry out requisite inspection and that even the explanation offered by the petitioner was not satisfactory. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer recorded that the petitioner has conceded that he has failed to discharge his official duty. In so far as charge No. 3 is concerned, what is to be seen is that the petitioner was charged that he had deliberately failed to carry out requisite inspections and evaded the same thus he failed to maintain absolute integrity within the meaning of Rule 3(1)(i). In so far as charge No. 3 is concerned, what is to be seen is that the petitioner was charged that he had deliberately failed to carry out requisite inspections and evaded the same thus he failed to maintain absolute integrity within the meaning of Rule 3(1)(i). However, the discussion in this behalf, by the Enquiry Officer, would only indicate that the petitioner had failed to carry out requisite inspections, but whether the failure was deliberate or not, there is no discussion or material on the basis of which this conclusion can be reached. For the time being we will not elaborately deal with this aspect. In so far as charge No. 4 is concerned, the Enquiry Officer has observed that even with regard to this charge the petitioner had accepted that monthly reports were not submitted as prescribed. Taking over all view of the matter the Enquiry Officer recommended penalty in the nature of stoppage of increments for 5 years. The Enquiry report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority viz. the Commissioner, Excise Department, Maharashtra State, Mumbai. 6. The Disciplinary Authority considered the said report as well as the explanation submitted on behalf of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the petitioner specifically contended before the Disciplinary Authority that no charge was framed against the petitioner about his nexus with the incident which took place in "Chhaya Bar" in which about 93 persons died due to consuming spurious liquor. The specific point that was raised before the Disciplinary Authority on behalf of the petitioner is that since no such charge was framed it would be wholly inappropriate to fasten responsibility on the petitioner in connection with the said incident, merely because the petitioner had committed some lapses in discharge of his duty. According to the petitioner, the charges, as framed against him, were very general and therefore harsh or major punishment was not warranted. One of the point raised on behalf of the petitioner, as noticed by the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order dated 23rd /29th September 1993, also mentions that Enquiry conducted by the Sub Divisional Commissioner was capable of being biased enquiry and the petitioner would not get justice. According to the petitioner, instead, the enquiry ought to have been undertaken by an officer of district level. According to the petitioner, instead, the enquiry ought to have been undertaken by an officer of district level. However, we find from the impugned order of the Commissioner that it is only the last contention referred to above viz. about the propriety of referring the enquiry to the officer at the district level that has been considered by the Commissioner and negatived on the ground that the same was never raised at the appropriate stage. What we find is that no other contention has been dealt with in the impugned order. The later part of the order is in the nature of conclusion reached by the Commissioner that the petitioner had failed to carry out necessary number of inspections or take samples on account of which the license holders were encouraged to indulge in illegal activities. After having recorded this conclusion the Commissioner went on to conclude that it is because of this lapse that the episode of Chhaya Bar between 31-12-1991 and 1-1-1992 took place in which 93 persons died due to spurious liquor. The Commissioner then records that since the incident was a serious one the punishment recommended by the Enquiry Officer was inadequate and instead preferred to impose punishment of petitioner's removal from service as per Rule 5(1)(viii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1979. 7. The aforesaid order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was challenged by the petitioner before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal by way of Original Application No. 1084 of 1993. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated 13-9-1996 was pleased to partly allow the application. In so far as the petitioner's challenge to the above order on merits, the Tribunal negatived the said plea, but allowed the application only on the question of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority of removal from service being excessive and instead converted the same to one of compulsory retirement under Rule 5(1)(vii). For interfering with the order of punishment, the Tribunal was mainly influenced by the fact that before the Enquiry Officer even the presenting officer representing the State had prayed that the petitioner be retired compulsorily from Government service. 8. Although, the original application has been partly allowed by the Tribunal and punishment converted from removal to one of compulsory retirement, even then the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Whereas, the respondents have accepted the Tribunal's decision of reducing the penalty. 8. Although, the original application has been partly allowed by the Tribunal and punishment converted from removal to one of compulsory retirement, even then the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Whereas, the respondents have accepted the Tribunal's decision of reducing the penalty. According to the petitioner, from the material on record, it is not possible to sustain the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority on merits. Further, that the petitioner was mislead by the tenor of the charges framed against him; for, admittedly no charge was framed that the petitioner had any nexus with the incident which had happened in Chhaya Bar, whereas even accepting the charges as they were, it would only indicate that the petitioner was charged only for having failed and neglected to discharge duty. In other words, what is contended before us is that no charge was framed against the petitioner so as to make him responsible for the incident that occurred in Chhaya Bar, therefore, reference made to the said incident by the Enquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority was wholly extraneous and that the same undoubtedly acted to the prejudice of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, because of the said incident, the petitioner has been held guilty and further that such a serious and harsh punishment has been imposed upon him. The petitioner also contends that on close examination of the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority it would appear that the Disciplinary Authority has not considered all the factual aspects or contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and in any case the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be sustained, as the same is tainted one, being influenced by extraneous considerations. The petitioner further argued that in any case the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and as modified by the order of Tribunal is excessive and disproportionate to the nature of charges faced by the petitioner. It was argued that the Disciplinary Authority was mainly influenced by the seriousness of the incident which occurred in Chhaya Bar, which obviously weighed on the Disciplinary Authority while imposing punishment. It was argued that the Disciplinary Authority was mainly influenced by the seriousness of the incident which occurred in Chhaya Bar, which obviously weighed on the Disciplinary Authority while imposing punishment. It is submitted that since the petitioner had no concern with the said incident or nexus with the said incident, therefore, the impugned action was vitiated being influenced by extraneous considerations taken into account by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner relies on the decision of the Apex Court to contend that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority; and as reduced by the Tribunal, was such that it would shock the conscience of the Court. And, therefore, this Court should interfere with the punishment imposed upon the petitioner. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1151 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and others)1, as well as judgment reported in 2000(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)658 (Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra)2, paras 53 and 54. 9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently supported the conclusions reached by the Tribunal. According to him, having regard to the background in which the proceedings came to be initiated against the petitioner, the order imposing punishment of compulsory retirement cannot be said to be excessive or disproportionate. It was submitted that, on merits, although the petitioner was not charged with any nexus with the incident of Chhaya Bar, but the fact remains that the said Chhaya Bar was within the jurisdiction of the petitioner. It is contended that since the petitioner failed to carry out inspection and take samples, that obviously encouraged the licence holders to indulge in illegal and unauthorised activities; and the incident in Chhaya Bar was the result of such illegal activities. The learned Counsel made an attempt to persuade us to take a view that though there was no specific charge about the nexus as abovesaid, but in view of the material which has come on record, the matter should be examined in that backdrop even while considering the other charges framed against the petitioner. The learned Counsel made an attempt to persuade us to take a view that though there was no specific charge about the nexus as abovesaid, but in view of the material which has come on record, the matter should be examined in that backdrop even while considering the other charges framed against the petitioner. With regard to the issue of disproportionality of punishment, the learned Counsel relies on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 300)3 to contend that the Court cannot substitute its own decision when the enquiry is held in accordance with the rules and punishment is imposed by the authorities considering the relevant circumstances and which the authority was entitled to impose. 10. Before dealing with the rival submissions we would like to reproduce the relevant Rules. Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979 reads thus : "3. Duty of Government servant to maintain integrity, devotion to duty, etc. (1) Every Government servant shall at all times- (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant. (2) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority; (3) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and shall, where he is acting under such direction, obtain the direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon thereafter as possible. (4) Nothing in sub-rules (3) shall be construed as empowering a Government servant to evade his responsibility by seeking instructions from, or approval of, a superior officer or authority when such instructions are not necessary under the scheme of distribution of powers and responsibilities". Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, as applicable to the present case, reads thus :- 5. Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, as applicable to the present case, reads thus :- 5. Penalties :- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter, provided, be imposed on a Government servant, namely- Minor Penalties (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of his promotion; (iii) Recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (iv) Withholding of increments of pay; Major Penalties (v) Reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the Government servant will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. (vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of a Government servant to the time-scale of pay, grade, post, or Service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or Service from which the Government servant was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that time-scale of pay, grade, post or Service; (vii) compulsory retirement; (viii) removal from Service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under Government; (ix) dismissal from Service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under Government; (Provided that, in every case in which the charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established, the penalty mentioned in Clause (viii) or Clause (ix) shall be imposed; Provided further that in any exceptional case and for special reasons recorded in writing any other penalty may be imposed). Explanation- The following shall not amount a penalty within the meaning of this rule, namely- (i) Withholding of increments of pay of Government servant for his failure to pass any departmental examination (or the Hindi and Marathi language examination) in accordance with the rules or orders governing the service to which he belongs or post which he holds or the terms of his appointment; (ii) stoppage of a Government servant at the efficiency bar in the time scale of pay on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar; (iii) non-promotion of a Government servant, whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, after consideration of his case, to a Service, grade or post for promotion to which he is eligible, on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct; (iv) reversion of a Government servant officiating in a higher service grade or post to a lower Service, grade or post, on the ground that is considered to be unsuitable for such higher Service, grade or post or on any administrative ground unconnected with his conduct; (v) reversion of a Government servant appointed on probation to any other Service, grade or post, to his permanent Service, grade or post during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation; (vi) replacement of the services of a Government servant, whose services had been borrowed from any Government in India or any authority under its control, at the disposal of such Government, or authority. (vii) compulsory retirement of a Government servant in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement; (viii) termination of the services,- (a) of a Government servant appointed on probation, during or at the end of the period of his probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation; or (b) of a temporary Government servant on grounds unconnected with his conduct; or (c) of a Government servant employed under an agreement, in accordance with the terms of such agreement. 2. 2. Where a penalty mentioned in item (v) or (vi) in sub-rule (1) is imposed on a Government servant, the authority imposing the penalty shall expressly state in the order imposing the penalty that the period for which the reduction is to be effective will be exclusive of any interval spent on leave before the period is completed." 11. On plain reading of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules it is obvious that Rule 3(1)(i) postulates that every Government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity. Failure to attend to the official work or neglecting to attend the official work cannot be equated with the ground stated in Rule 3(1)(i). The said rule would be attracted only when the Government servant fails to maintain absolute integrity. However, the case of failure or neglect to attend to the official work will at best attract Rule 3(1)(ii), for it postulates that every Government servant shall at all times maintain devotion to duty. Failure or neglect in discharge of ones duty ipso facto will not result in breach of maintaining absolute integrity unless there is clear evidence on record to show that the failure or neglect was conscious and deliberate to subserve quid pro quo. In other words, the act of omission should necessarily entail into some person being benefited or getting undue advantage. There should be clear nexus between the failure or neglect of duty with the actual benefit received or advantage taken by another person. We are unable to perceive any other situation where failure to discharge duty can amount to failure to maintain absolute integrity. In our view there is qualitative difference between Clause (i) and Clause (ii), necessarily they operate on separate fields and would apply to different fact situations. In other words, mere failure to do duty or failure to maintain devotion to duty per se cannot result into failure to maintain absolute integrity, unless there is further evidence or material to support the said charge. 12. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case what we find is that the petitioner was merely charged for having failed to collect samples and carry out inspections in prescribed numbers. 12. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case what we find is that the petitioner was merely charged for having failed to collect samples and carry out inspections in prescribed numbers. There is no dispute that the petitioner has admitted that he failed to carry out prescribed number of inspections as well as to take samples, but that by itself would not amount to the petitioner having failed to maintain absolute integrity expected of a Government servant. In our view, although the petitioner was charged (Charge No. 3) that he had deliberately failed and avoided to carry out prescribed inspections which tantamounts to the petitioner having failed to maintain integrity as per Rule 3(1)(i), however, no material has been placed on record during the enquiry that failure to carry out prescribed number of inspections or take samples was deliberate. At any rate, there was no charge against the petitioner that the petitioner had deliberately failed and neglected to inspect or take samples from Chhaya Bar, so as to encourage Chhaya Bar for indulging in sale of spurious liquor which resulted in the death of 93 persons. No such charge has been framed against the petitioner. We are afraid, we cannot, therefore, permit a situation so as to pronounce decision against the petitioner by referring to the said episode which happened in Chhaya Bar, although of serious nature. As we have already observed that the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority were obviously influenced and permitted themselves to be swayed away with the said episode to reach at the conclusion to record guilt against the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority, in its order, has made a reference to the contention raised by the petitioner in this behalf, but has not considered the same and instead straight way jumped to the conclusion, obviously being influenced by the episode of Chhaya Bar. In other words, the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to record finding of guilt against the petitioner for which the petitioner was not charged nor there is any material to substantiate the same. From the above discussion we are of the view that the Enquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority have misdirected themselves in being influenced by the episode of Chhaya Bar while considering charge No. 3. From the above discussion we are of the view that the Enquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority have misdirected themselves in being influenced by the episode of Chhaya Bar while considering charge No. 3. In our view, there is no material on record or even adverted to by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority which would go to show that failure of petitioner to carry out the prescribed inspections or take samples was deliberate and intentional. No presumption can be drawn in this behalf as it is a serious charge. The charge as framed therefore cannot be said to have been substantiated. Moreover, merely because a person has failed to carry out the prescribed number of inspections or take samples by itself would not be the same as having failed to maintain absolute integrity. To bring home the charge that the Government servant has failed to maintain absolute integrity, there should be positive material or evidence to show the nexus between the failure in discharging the duty so as to provide undue gain or benefit to some one. In our view, charge No. 3 as framed, cannot be substantiated on the basis of the material on record. Moreover, the disciplinary authority has merely recorded a finding that the petitioner had failed to carry out prescribed inspection and take samples, whereas no finding has been recorded by the Disciplinary Authority that the said failure was deliberate and intentional. Even on this count the charge as framed cannot be said to have been substantiated. All that the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded to record is that because of the said failure the license holders were encouraged in indulging in illegal activities and as a result of which the episode in Chhaya Bar took place between 31-12-1991 and 1-1-1992 causing death of 93 persons, which was a serious matter. Obviously this conclusion is based on pure surmises and conjectures and the authorities have committed serious error in drawing such adverse inference. On the other hand finding on this issue could be recorded only on the basis of positive evidence. Thus, this is a classic case where the department has failed to adduce evidence to substantiate the charge that the petitioner has deliberately failed to discharge duty, whereas no charge has been framed in respect of which finding has been recorded by the authorities as having been proved. Thus, this is a classic case where the department has failed to adduce evidence to substantiate the charge that the petitioner has deliberately failed to discharge duty, whereas no charge has been framed in respect of which finding has been recorded by the authorities as having been proved. In other words this is a case of no proof or evidence with regard to the charge as framed; and no charge framed in respect of which finding of guilt has been recorded. In either case the decision recorded by the authorities cannot be sustained in law, for it cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the inevitable effect is that the petitioner has suffered prejudice which has caused serious miscarriage of justice. 13. We are, therefore, now left with the other charges viz. charge Nos. 1, 2 4. In so far as the said charges are concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioner has candidly admitted of having failed to carry out requisite number of inspections, collect samples, as well as submission of monthly reports. We, therefore, proceed on the assumption that in so far as charge Nos. 1, 2 4 are concerned, they are duly proved against the petitioner. The question, however, that remains to be answered is whether the punishment imposed in the context of the said charges Nos. 1, 2 4 can be said to be just and proper or disproportionate. As we have observed that the Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment of removal from service as per Rule 5(1)(viii), whereas the same has been modified by the Tribunal to one of compulsory retirement under Rule 5(1)(vii). The Tribunal while modifying the punishment, by reducing the same to compulsory retirement, has merely proceeded on the concession of the presenting officer who appeared before the Enquiry Officer and had recommended punishment of compulsory retirement from service. We are of the view that this approach of the Tribunal is not appropriate. For, even though we are not entering into the controversy as to whether the Tribunal was right in substituting its own opinion to one reached by the Disciplinary Authority on the issue of punishment, in our view, the approach of the Tribunal in merely accepting the statement made by the Presenting Officer representing the State Government before the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be the correct approach. The Tribunal if at all wanted to interfere on the question of punishment should have applied its mind independently in the context of disproportionality. But this is not what has happened in the present case. In the circumstances, we have no option but to set aside even the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in modifying the punishment to one of the compulsory retirement. We are conscious of the fact that we are passing an order that would be adverse to the petitioner in his own writ petition, but that is inevitable; for the petitioner has challenged the said order before us in writ petition and we have permitted both the parties to address us on all the points involved in the present case. We, however, make it clear that the respondents have not challenged the decision of the Tribunal and have accepted the same reducing the punishment to one of compulsory retirement. 14. Since we have already taken a view that the approach of the Tribunal in interfering on the question of punishment is inappropriate, therefore, we now proceed to examine as to what would be the appropriate order that should be passed in the present petition. 15. Since charge Nos. 1, 2 4 are proved and established against the petitioner, there can be no doubt that some punishment will have to be imposed on the petitioner, for the said charges. While deciding on the quantum of punishment, the question that arises is whether the said charges would invite minor penalty or major penalty. Rule 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules is the enabling provision which deals with the matter of imposing different types of penalties. Even assuming that, in the present case, the nature of charges would not permit imposing of minor penalty, even then while imposing major penalty it will be necessary to consider the rationale behind imposing one amongst the several major penalties provided under the said Rule 5(1)(v) onwards. Undisputedly, various types of major penalties are permissible under the said Rule. As observed earlier, since the petitioner was not charged with the nexus of his failure to discharge duty with the episode in Chhaya Bar, it was not open to influence the decision of the punishment by taking the said fact into account. Undisputedly, various types of major penalties are permissible under the said Rule. As observed earlier, since the petitioner was not charged with the nexus of his failure to discharge duty with the episode in Chhaya Bar, it was not open to influence the decision of the punishment by taking the said fact into account. But, dehors the said episode it will be essential to examine as to which of the punishment should be warranted in the facts on hand. It is quite possible then to consider imposing of a minor penalty or even major penalty in terms of Rule 5(1)(v) or 5(1)(vi) and not necessarily of compulsory retirement under Rule 5(1)(vii). To undertake this exercise would tantamount to usurping the powers of the Disciplinary Authority. In the circumstances, instead of examining the question of quantum of punishment ourselves, we think it appropriate to leave the said issue open to be decided by the Disciplinary Authority. As we have preferred to adopt this course, the submission made by the respondents that the Court shall not substitute the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority on the question of punishment; and reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court to support this plea, does not survive for our consideration. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the petitioner has already suffered for so long and it would be expedient in the interest of justice that this Court should itself decide on the quantum of punishment to be imposed. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court to buttress this submission. However, we are afraid that it is not open for us to do so in the facts of this case. In both the decisions of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioner, the Court was more than convinced that there was absolutely no sufficient material on record to warrant any punishment that was imposed. However, in the present case we have observed that in so far as charges Nos. 1, 2 4 are concerned, the petitioner has admitted that he had failed to carry out necessary inspections, take samples or submit monthly reports. However, in the present case we have observed that in so far as charges Nos. 1, 2 4 are concerned, the petitioner has admitted that he had failed to carry out necessary inspections, take samples or submit monthly reports. In the circumstances, as observed in the decision of the Apex Court in Bagde's case (supra) that it is only when the Court finds that the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or finding of domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court to interfere in the matter on the question of punishment. However, in the present case it is not possible for us to record that there was absolutely no evidence on record or the finding with regard to the charges Nos. 1, 2 4 are perverse and not supported by evidence on record. In the circumstances, the appropriate order that could be passed in the present case is to remand the case to the Disciplinary Authority on the limited question of the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the petitioner. Needless to mention that the Disciplinary Authority will not take into account the findings with regard to charge No. 3 or the episode that occurred in Chhaya Bar which caused death of 93 persons, for we have already indicated that the petitioner was not charged for the same and there is no material on record regarding the nexus of the petitioner's failure with the said episode. The Disciplinary Authority shall take appropriate decision in the matter within 2 months from the date of receipt of the writ of the Court. We make it clear that it will be open for the Disciplinary Authority to take appropriate decision on the quantum of punishment without being influenced by his earlier decision or the one modified by the Tribunal, which order is under challenge before us. 17. At this stage we wish to place it on record that the Counsel for the petitioner had made an offer before us, on instructions of the petitioner, who is present in the Court, that the petitioner is willing to give up his entire back wages if he is reinstated in service and allowed to work till he would superannuate. 17. At this stage we wish to place it on record that the Counsel for the petitioner had made an offer before us, on instructions of the petitioner, who is present in the Court, that the petitioner is willing to give up his entire back wages if he is reinstated in service and allowed to work till he would superannuate. This submission was made to impress upon us that instead of remanding the matter back this Court may pass appropriate order in the above terms. The submission made on behalf of the petitioner has been noticed by us and we hope and trust that the Disciplinary Authority before passing appropriate order would take this offer into account. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority on the question of punishment is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass appropriate order on the quantum of punishment within two months in accordance with law and the observation made in this judgment. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs. Parties to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by Sheristedar of this Court. Writ pettion partly allowed. -----