JUDGMENT V.M. Jain, J. - Accused petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code seeking blanket anticipatory bail for 2 days to enable them to approach a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain regular anticipatory bail. 2. In the petition, it was alleged that the petitioners had a dispute with respondent No. 2 Mulakh Raj and his family members, with regard to two partnership firms which were formed as a result of two partnership deeds and that the petitioners had obtained civil Court decree against the private respondents. It was alleged that the private respondents were threatening to implicate the petitioners in some false cases through their close relatives and goondas, at various places. It was accordingly prayed that the petitioner be granted anticipatory interim bail for a period of 3-4 days by directing the police to give seven days clear notice in writing to the petitioners to enable them to approach the court of competent jurisdiction to obtain regular anticipatory bail. 3. The various allegations made in the application have been controverted by respondents 2 to 6 by filing written reply. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in view of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the case reported as AIR 1980 SC 1632, Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. The State of Punjab and others, the petitioners were entitled to the grant of blanket anticipatory bail. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record, I find no merit in the present petition, for the grant of blanket anticipatory bail. In my opinion, the law laid down in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbias case (supra) would be of no help to the petitioners. 7. In AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1632, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under :- "36. ...We agree that a blanket order of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. This flows from the very language of the section which, as discussed above, requires the applicant to show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested. ...We agree that a blanket order of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. This flows from the very language of the section which, as discussed above, requires the applicant to show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicants apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. That is why, normally, a direction should not issue under Section 438(1) to the effect the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". That is what is meant by a blanket order of anticipatory bail, an order which serves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, in fact any eventuality, likely or unlikely regarding which no concrete information can possibly be had. The rationale of a direction under Section 438(1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw up his application with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section. But specific events and facts must be disclosed by the applicant in order to enable the court to judge the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the Section. 37. Apart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels this construction, there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, on the basis of which a direction under Section 438(1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided. A blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends alleged unlawful activity of any description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of this public. Such an order can then becomes a charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. Therefore, the Court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a vacuum." 8. In view of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, blanket order of anticipatory bail could not be passed just in routine. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, and in the absence of any material about the allegations on which the petitioners were apprehending their arrest, no case is made out for ordering blanket anticipatory bail to the petitioners. For the reasons recorded above, finding no merit in the present petition the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.