JUDGMENT 1. - By this second appeal the appellants who are the legal representatives of the original defendant tenant Pukhraj seek to assail the decree for eviction from the suit shop passed by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the learned lower Appellate Court. The original defendant had died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were duly substituted on record. 2. Plaintiff respondent filed the present suit for eviction and arrears of rent on 4-4-86 against the defendant seeking to evict him from the shop situated at old Bus Stand in the town of Bali which is in the tenancy at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month, alleging interalia the defendant to have committed default in payment of monthly rent and also alleged the suit shop to be personally required by him for his two sons Jaffar Hussain and Mohd. Majid for their starting 'Kirana' business. 3. The defendant contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the shop was initially taken on rent at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month which was subsequently increased to Rs. 50/-, the plaintiff did not receive the rent despite being tendered on the pretext that he wanted to increase the rent to Rs. 100/- per month. Arrears of rent was not disputed. However, it was contended that since the Bus Stand had been shifted, it had adversely affected his business. Under force of these circumstances he could not deposit the monthly rent. Regarding requirement the defendant contested that both the sons are minor and are taking education. It was also contended that the plaintiff has a business of operating taxi and has agricultural land also. Therefore, the plaintiff does not require the suit shop for the alleged 'Kirana' business. It was also contended that the plaintiff had other shop let out to one Ushman Bhai from whom he has got it evicted which is lying vacant. The defendant also contended, obviously for the purpose of highlighting comparative hardship that the defendant has no other shop for continuing his business in the township of Bali and it is also not possible for him to get alternative accommodation at bus stand. 4. During trial the evidence led by the parties consisted of the plaintiff Fateh Mohd and that of the present appellant No. 1 Punam Singh only. Thus no other evidence was led. 5. 4. During trial the evidence led by the parties consisted of the plaintiff Fateh Mohd and that of the present appellant No. 1 Punam Singh only. Thus no other evidence was led. 5. As stated above the learned trial Court while deciding all the issues against the defendant including the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction decreed the suit which decree has been affirmed by the learned lower Appellate Court. 6. Before me it was firstly contended that since the defendant has complied with the provisions of S. 13(3) and (4) Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 in view of the provisions of S. 13(6) no decree for eviction could be passed on the ground of default. 7. Suffice it to say that both the learned Courts below have simply affirmed the defendant to be defaulter and while decreeing the suit the learned trial Court has simply observed that the suit is liable to be decreed on the ground of evidence adduced by the defendant; true it is that in view of the provisions of S. 13(6) the decree for eviction could not be passed on the ground of default. 8. The question that still survives is that once the decree has been passed on another ground of alleged reasonable and bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiff also and by deciding the questions of comparative hardship and partial eviction against the defendant, until and unless findings on these issues are successfully assailed within the four corners of S. 100, CPC the mere fact that decree proceeds on an additional ground of default is of no material consequence. In this view of the matter the learned counsel then assailed the findings of the learned Courts below on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity. 9. I may mention here that defendant D.W. 4 in his statement had clearly admitted that partial eviction of the suit premises looking to its size and nature of business, is not possible and, therefore, the findings on this issue being No. 4 was not rightly assailed before me. Likewise no submissions have been made by the learned counsel for the appellant that finding recorded by the learned Courts below on issue No. 3 relating to comparative hardship. 10. Likewise no submissions have been made by the learned counsel for the appellant that finding recorded by the learned Courts below on issue No. 3 relating to comparative hardship. 10. Assailing the finding on issue No. 2 regarding reasonable and bona fide necessity it was firstly submitted that the pleading of the plaintiff do not plead the complete cause of action regarding the ground contemplated by S. 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The next submission made was that even according to the plaintiff the shop is alleged to be required by him for his two sons being Shri Zafar Mohd. and Mohd. Majid but they were never produced in the witness box, and for their requirement the plaintiff's evidence is no more than hearsay which is ultimately inadmissible and since the finding proceeds on such inadmissible evidence it is vitiated. The next submission made was that even according to the plaintiff he only wants his two sons mentioned above to start 'Kirana' business and thus the alleged requirement is no better than a 'mere desire' on the part of the plaintiff and does not travel to the field of 'requirement' as contemplated by S. 13(1)(h). 11. Elaborating the argument it has further been submitted that admittedly the two sons have no experience of 'Kirana' business, it is clear from the statement of the plaintiff himself that he has no arrangement for funds also and thus, the alleged requirement is not established himself that the arrangement for funds also and thus the alleged requirement is not established to be anything more than 'mere desire'. Relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. J. Ebenezer v. Velayudhan, AIR 1998 SC 746 it was contended that mere desire of the landlord is not sufficient to constitute bona fide need, the said desire is to be tested objectively and the burden lies on the landlord to establish that he bonafidely requires the accommodation for the purpose alleged. This judgment relies upon earlier judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muttulal v. Radhe Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596 . This judgment relies upon earlier judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muttulal v. Radhe Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596 . Relying upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagirath v. Ram Prasad Rajasthan (1987) 1 88 it was contended that merely because the defendant has not been able to prove by evidence that the plaintiff has filed the suit for oblique motive like increase of rent, the case of the plaintiff cannot be held to be proved for his bona fide need and the mere desire of the landlord is not sufficient rather Court has to examine objectively. It was also contended on the basis of this Bhagirath's case that as in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff has got sufficient funds or capital for starting new business and since on these considerations the need was negatived by this Court, it should be negatived in the present case as well. 12. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions, and have gone through the impugned judgment, the plaint and the evidence of the parties with the assistance of the learned counsel. Though as consistently rather repeatedly held by the Apex Court so also this Court that the finding on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity, comparative hardship and partial eviction are pure findings of fact, not capable of being interfered with in second appeal, still since the learned counsel sought to contend that the present is a case where even on the pleading and evidence of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's alleged reasonable and bona fide requirement could not be upheld and thus the findings are perverse, adopting a benevolent approach I have perused, scrutinised the pleadings as well as the evidence to satisfy my judicial conscience about existence of reasonable and bona fide necessity. Having re-appreciated the evidence of the parties and the pleading, I am satisfied that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below on issue No. 2 do not require any interference by me in this appeal. 13. Having re-appreciated the evidence of the parties and the pleading, I am satisfied that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below on issue No. 2 do not require any interference by me in this appeal. 13. Coming to the details of the submissions, pleading taken by the plaintiff with respect to bona fide necessity are contained in para 6 of the plaint which reads as under : " ;g gS fd oknxzLr nqdku dh oknh dks futh vko';drk gS& D;ksafd oknh ds yM+ds Jh eksgentQ~Qj o eksgenethn cM+s gks x;s ,oa vc mudks fdjk.ks dk /ka/kk vyx ls 'kq: djuk gS& ftlls ;g nqdku oknh vius nksuksa yM+dksa dks 'kkeyky esa /ka/kk djus ds fy, nsuk pkgrs gS& ftlls oknh izfroknh ls ;g nqdku vko';drk gksus ls [kkyh djokuk pkgrs gS& tcfd izfroknh us fooknxzLr nqdku ds lkeus ,d nqdku eksy [kjhndj yh gS vkSj mlesa ;gh /ka/kk 'kq: dj fn;k gS& ftlls oknh dks [kkyh ugha djkus ij vf/kd nqfo/kk gksxh&o izfroknh dks [kkyh djus esa dksbZ nqfo/kk ugha gSA ftlls [kkyh djkus nqdku dk okn oknh fo:) izfroknh is'k gSA " 14. A bare reading of this plea does make it very clear that the plaintiff has categorically pleaded that he requires the suit shop, and has detailed the purpose of requirement being to start 'Kirana' business by his two sons Zaffar Hussain and Mohd. Majid. On being pointed out this fact the learned counsel contended that the plaintiff does not plead that the requirement is "reasonable and bona fide" and since in view of the language of S. 13(1)(h) of the Act, according to the learned counsel, the plaintiff was required to plead this also, in absence of this pleading it cannot be said that the plaintiff has pleaded the complete cause of action. I am afraid that I cannot accept the contention. The learned counsel did not cite any decided case law on the question that non-mention of these words in the pleading would tantamount to not pleading complete cause of action. I am afraid that I cannot accept the contention. The learned counsel did not cite any decided case law on the question that non-mention of these words in the pleading would tantamount to not pleading complete cause of action. In my view the case law as has developed with respect to this language is that the plaintiff is to plead his requirement and thereafter it is for the Court, on the basis of the evidence that may be produced on record, to objectively judge as to whether the requirement is actual requirement or mere wish or desire, and if the Court finds it to be requirement then again to judge objectively as to whether it is reasonable and bona fide. Therefore, in my view the pleadings of the plaintiff as quoted above are sufficient in the circumstances of the present case. That apart there is yet another aspect of the matter viz. that on the pleading the learned trial Court framed issue No. 2 which reads as under : " D;k oknh dks fookfnr nqdku dh futh vius nks yM+dks ds fy, ;qfDr;qDr o ln~Hkkouk iwoZd vko';drk gSA " 15. A look at this language does show that it comprehends the controversy about the plaintiff's personal requirement of the suit shop for his two sons and the question about the requirement being reasonable and bona fide, the framing of this issue has never been assailed at any stage so far. Thus, the appellants were aware of the controversy which they are to meet. The parties had led evidence on the issue with the requisite consciousness inasmuch as the plaintiff was cross-examined in detail about his resources, his occupation, so also the occupation of the sons, their placement etc. to bring on record the material as to whether the alleged requirement is reasonable and bona fide or not. I may refer to a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kesho Lal Sharma v. Ram Singh Hooda, 2000 (1) Ren CJ 22 , wherein the plaintiff had pleaded that he had only two rooms out of which one is being used as store, the plaintiff has one married son who at the time when the petition was filed was likely to be transferred to Rohtak and accommodation with him is insufficient. Obviously it was not specifically pleaded as in the present case that the alleged requirement was reasonable and bona fide one. In that case the Court below had held that the necessary ingredients to show that the ground of eviction was available had not been pleaded. Setting aside that finding it was held in para 7 as under: "These facts show that necessary ingredients were not only pleaded out, the respondent was made aware pertaining to the ground of eviction and nature of requirement with correlated facts. It, therefore, cannot be termed that it was a case of defective pleading to reject the claim of the landlord." 16. In view of the totality of the above circumstances, the contention has no substance and is repelled. 17. Coming to the second contention about the alleged requirement being not a requirement but a mere desire. So far as the legal principle propounded is concerned, there is no dispute that in order to get a decree for eviction the plaintiff is to establish the requirement of the premises and cannot get eviction on his mere wish or desire. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in S. J. Ebenezer's case ( AIR 1998 SC 746 ) (supra) all that has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme in para 11 is "While considering the question of bona fides, what is necessary to bear in mind is that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. The desire must be tested objectively and not subjectively. The burden also lies upon the landlord to establish that he genuinely requires the accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business." Thus, even in view of this judgment the requirement of the plaintiff which, as described by the appellant is to be tested by the Court objectively and the Court is also to see as to whether the plaintiff had discharged the burden to establish that he bona fidely requires the accommodation. It is for the purpose of arriving at this decision that certain parameters have to be taken into account and it is for these parameters that the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagirath's case. 18. It is for the purpose of arriving at this decision that certain parameters have to be taken into account and it is for these parameters that the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagirath's case. 18. I may at once observe firstly that a bare reading of the pleading of the plaint as mentioned above does show that the plaintiff has not expressed his desire but has pleaded his requirement to establish his sons who have come up of age by making them to start the 'Kirana' business in the suit shop. Undisputedly the two sons have come up of age. The plaintiff is P.W. 1 has clearly deposed in the examination in chief as under - " eq>s fookfnr nqdku dh vko';drk gSA D;ksafd esjs iq= eksgEen tQj] eksgEen ewthQ mez 22 o"kZ nksuksa dh gS vkSj muds fy, nqdku dh vko';drk gSA nksuksa us Ldwy NksM+ fn;k gS vkSj /ka/kk djuk pkgrs gSA vHkh csdkj cSBs gSA " 19. This part of the testimony was attempted to be assailed in the cross-examination by attempting to put question about the plaintiff's owning a motor being No. RJT-5703 which the plaintiff has denied to be taxi and is alleged to be his private motor. In the cross-examination the plaintiff has also deposed that both the sons have left the school three years back and at the time of filing of the suit they were studying in 10th Class wherein they failed. He has also deposed that when they were studying they were not desirous to be educated further and were to be put in business. He has clearly denied the suggestion about his son being driving vehicle. The questions have been put about his financial resources, about the oblique motive of the plaintiff to increase the rent to Rs. 100/- per month and so on. As against this the defendant has deposed that the plaintiff forcibly wanted to evict him, regarding the sons he has chosen to depose that the plaintiff has two jeeps which are run on hire and are plied by both the sons of the plaintiff. Since in the cross-examination of the plaintiff he was suggested to be owning jeep No. RJT-5703, the defendant was cross-examined wherein he deposed the Jeeps to be bearing No. RJ 24/28 and 5707. Suffice it to say that this was not suggested to the plaintiff. Since in the cross-examination of the plaintiff he was suggested to be owning jeep No. RJT-5703, the defendant was cross-examined wherein he deposed the Jeeps to be bearing No. RJ 24/28 and 5707. Suffice it to say that this was not suggested to the plaintiff. Not a word has been deposed by the appellant about the alleged oblique motive of the plaintiff being to increase the monthly rent from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100/-. Suffice it further to say that except mere number of vehicle the defendant has also not led any evidence to substantiate that out of these vehicles which vehicle was being plied by his sons. Ownership of the Jeeps could very well be established by producing the record of the Registering Authority while plying of the Jeep could be proved by producing the record of the driving licence from the licensing authority or at least by the independent witnesses in the locality, who obviously must be seeing them regularly driving the Jeeps. In this view of the matter when admittedly the two sons of the plaintiff have come up of age and the evidence of the plaintiff about their sitting idle is not sufficiently rebutted, it cannot be said that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff remains in the realm of 'mere wish' or' desire' and does not travel to the field of 'requirement'. In my view it is thus clearly established that the plaintiff does require the suit shop for his two sons. 20. At this stage I may gainfully refer to a recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 5 JT (SC) 201 wherein dealing with the provisions of S. 14(1)(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Which is practically identical to provisions of S. 13(1)(h) of the Act, the question was considered at length as to what is the concept of bona fide requirement and it was held in para 12 as under : "12.......... What is a bona fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. 'Need' or 'requirement' qualified by word 'bona fide' or 'genuine' preceding as an adjective - is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. What is a bona fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. 'Need' or 'requirement' qualified by word 'bona fide' or 'genuine' preceding as an adjective - is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. 'Bona fide or genuine need' of the landlord or that the landlord 'genuinely requires' or 'requires bona fide' an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practise and carry the same meaning." 21. This is precisely what I have attempted to find out and I am satisfied that the plaintiff has sufficiently proved the reasonable and bona fide requirement. 22. The question then is as to whether the plaintiff's requirement is reasonable and bona fide or not? True it is that in Bhagirath's case it has been held that merely because the defendant has not been able to prove existence of oblique motive, the bona fide need cannot be held to be proved, but then in my view this position no more holds good in view of the subsequent decisions. Enough guidance is to be received from the judgment in Shiv Sarup Gupta's case (1999 (5) JT (SC) 201) (supra) referred to above inasmuch as it has further been held therein that for arriving at the objective determination, the Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its jurisdicial (judicial) assistance to the landlord. This clearly means, in my view, that once the landlord proves his need which in the estimation of the Court is reasonable then it is for the defendant to bring on record positive material to enable the Court to draw an inference that the reality was to the contrary and that the landlord was merely finding out pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant. Thus, it was for the defendant -appellant to prove the existence of the oblique motive. Likewise in Rena Drego (Mrs) v. Lal Chand Soni (1998) 3 SCC 341 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly observed to the effect that where the landlord say that she needs more accommodation for her family, there is no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the requirement, It was further held that the circumstances of the case raised a presumption that the requirement was bona fide and that "tenant has failed to show that the demand for eviction was made with any oblique motive". It was held that in the absence of such evidence by the tenant, the presumption of the bona fide need stood un-rebutted. In view of these judgments, the judgment rendered in Bhagirath's case (1987 (1) Rajasthan LR 88) cannot be said to be continuing to be a good law. Since the appellant had clearly pleaded and suggested the oblique motive of the plaintiff to increase the rent from Rs. 50/- to Rs. 100/- and since not a word has been deposed by D.W. 1 in his entire statement, it has to be concluded that the defendant has failed to prove any oblique motive. 23. Coming to the third aspect of the argument about the sons having no experience and the plaintiff having no resources, so also about the suggestion to the effect that the sons are plying taxi. At the outset I may observe even at the cost of repetition, that the defendant has failed to prove the plaintiff to be owning two taxies, so also the two sons to be plying the taxies. That apart, apart from again relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta's case (1999 (5) JT (SC) 201 and the principles propounded therein, I may also refer to yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by LRs. v. M/s. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. That apart, apart from again relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta's case (1999 (5) JT (SC) 201 and the principles propounded therein, I may also refer to yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by LRs. v. M/s. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. (2000 (1) Ren CJ 161 (SC) A perusal whereof is sufficient to repel all these contentions of the appellant. In this Raghunath's case the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction pleading that he was working in a Metal Box Company, there was a lock-out in that Company and he wanted to improve his livelihood by starting a grocery business. The learned trial Court in that case found that there was no proof of lock out, no proof of capital available for investment, no proof for preparation of business and that the plaintiff had no experience in the grocery business, and that the lock out did not put the plaintiff out of his job permanently, that the plaintiff is not resigning the job and accordingly dismissed the suit. The appeal against that order was dismissed and the matter was before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is in these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court went at length on the question of reasonableness, referred to various earlier judgments of the Apex Court, so also a few English decisions and in para 6 held as under:- "6. The word 'reasonable', in our view, connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word 'requirement' coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity Aitken v. Shaw, 1933 SLT 21 Nevile v. Hordy, (1921) 90 LJ Ch 158. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end: It may be a need in praesenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the words 'bona fide' is an additional requirement under S. 13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive." 24. The use of the words 'bona fide' is an additional requirement under S. 13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive." 24. Then by referring to the other judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273 and Yudhishtir v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204 and Mattulal v. Radhelal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 (supra) relied upon in S. J. Ebenezer, AIR 1998 SC 746 (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant held that the requirement to produce proof of preparation for starting new business such as making arrangements for capital investment etc. were "wholly irrelevant". In that background, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 went through the evidence of the plaintiff and then in para 10 recorded findings to the effect of setting aside the findings of the two Courts below by holding that the test applied by the learned Courts below is not the proper test rather the approach was held to be perverse and it was held as under : "......One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long drawn litigation........ So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise." 25. I am then also refer to another recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Smt. Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak, AIR 1999 SC 3089 , in para 11 whereof considering the contention of the tenant about the landlady's unemployed sons for whose alleged requirement of starting 'Kirana' shop, eviction is sought, had started doing the work as a contractor in construction field with the result that according to the tenant since the sons of landlady really unintended to take up 'Kirana' business he would have started business like that of contractor, it was held that taking up contract work in the meanwhile will not militate against his carrying on the business of construction. Though it was considered that the father of the boy was already carrying on 'Kirana' business so also his brother independently. Though it was considered that the father of the boy was already carrying on 'Kirana' business so also his brother independently. But then the fact remains that the fact of the boy taking up a business like that of 'Kirana' in the meantime, was not taken up a negative circumstance. 26. Thus this discussion in my humble view completely answers the contention of the learned counsel. 27. The net result is that even after a thorough re-appreciation of evidence I am of the view that the three issues being issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are required to be decided in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff's suit has been rightly decreed. 28. The appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed. 29. Before parting with the case I am to point out that while studying the matter I happened to read the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in (1999) 2 Rent CJ 388 wherein in the head note-II at page 390, according to the report head note reads like"..........Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose, the Court would in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need......."Then at page 396 of the report, this identical language has been reproduced in the ending part and the same language has been used. Since this language per se appeared to be wrong for missing negative but since it was not for me to speak on the correctness of the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Supreme Court I was supposed to follow the judgment as it is. Even though the language may bring incongruous re suit. Since this language per se appeared to be wrong for missing negative but since it was not for me to speak on the correctness of the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Supreme Court I was supposed to follow the judgment as it is. Even though the language may bring incongruous re suit. However, feeling that the Hon'ble Supreme Court must not have held like that I searched the judgments in other reports and the results were shocking inasmuch as this judgment is reported in (1999) 5 JT (SC) 201 wherein this part of the judgment of para 12 reads as para 13 at page 208 of the report in the second column as under: "......Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose, the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need." 30. In (1999) 6 SCC 222 , this part has been reported as para 13 at page 232 and 233, the same way as reported in (1999) 5 JT (SC) 201. The judgment has also been reported in AIR 1999 SC 2507 and the above portion has been reported as para 13 at page 2512, here again it is reported in the same way as reported in (1999) 5 JT (SC) 201. Thus, it appears that the reporting of Rent Control Journal is wrong. This act of negligence on the part of the publishers, if carried to the logical conclusion may amount to contempt of Court by misreporting the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court resulting into the Courts being misled, let the matter be reported to Hon'ble the Supreme Court by enclosing a photostat extract of the report of All India Rent Control Journal with a request to kindly take appropriate suitable action and if thought proper to ban citing of this Journal in the Courts. A copy of this part of the order be also sent to the publisher being Vinod Publications (P) Ltd. Post Box No. 1002, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi-110006.Appeal dismissed. *******