JUDGMENT : P. K. Misra, J. - The defendants have filed this appeal under the following circumstances : Plaintiff-respondent had filed T. M. S. No. 228/78 against the present appellants for realisation of certain amount. In the said suit, the appellants after having filed "their written statement were absent on 22-10.1987. The trial court set the defendants ex parte by order dated 22-1O-1987 and posted the suit for ex parte hearing on 23-11.1987. However, the defendants subsequently filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order. While the matter stood thus, on 23-11-1987 the suit itself was dismissed for default due to absence of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent filed Misc. Case No. 64 of 198.7 for restoration of the suit. Even though the trial court found that the cause shown by the plaintiff for absence was not sufficient, it directed for restoration, of the suit subject to payment of cost of Rs. 100/- by its order dated 3-9- 1993 and ultimately cost was paid on 17-9-1993. In view of payment of such cost the trial court restored the suit and directed that the suit shall be taken up for ex parte hearing. On the subsequent dates, the defendants remained absent arid ultimately on 12-10-1993, the suit was taken up for ex parte hearing and decreed ex parte. Thereafter, the present appellants filed Misc. Case No. 53/94 under Order 9, Rule 13 read with section 151 of the CPC (in short, the "C. P. C.") for setting aside the ex parte decree along with a petition for condonation of delay on 2-9-1994. Objection was filed on behalf of the present respondent. The trial court ultimately held that no sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of delay, nor any sufficient cause had been shown for absence of the defendants on the date on which the suit was taken up for ex parte hearing. Hence, the present appeal. 2. In the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C., the main contention of the appellants was relating to the untenability of the earlier order of the trial court dated 3-9-1993, whereunder the application of the plaintiff for restoration of the suit had been allowed. Hence, the present appeal. 2. In the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C., the main contention of the appellants was relating to the untenability of the earlier order of the trial court dated 3-9-1993, whereunder the application of the plaintiff for restoration of the suit had been allowed. It was contended before the trial court and repeated in this Court that the trial court on the earlier occasion had no jurisdiction to set aside the order relating to dismissal of the suit, as the trial court itself found that sufficient cause had not been established. Such contention has been rightly negatived by the trial court. The order dated 3-9-1993 had not been challenged by the appellants. As a matter of fact, subsequently the Associate Counsel of Shri P. K. Ray who was appearing for the defendants had accepted the court. It is not disputed by the defendants that the cost had been accepted on their behalf. Having accepted the cost, the defendants cannot question the legality of the order dated 3-9-1993 and that too in a collateral proceeding. 3. In the petition for condonation of' delay, it was indicated that Shri P. K. Ray, Advocate, appearing for the defendants was suffering from various ailments and as such steps could not be taken. In view of the statement of the counsel himself examined as p. w. I, it should be accepted that, in fact, Shri P. K. Ray was ailing. That however, cannot constitute sufficient cause for the defendants not to take any steps in the suit, as they could have taken steps through the junior of Shri P. K. Ray, or by engaging any other Advocate. In the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, it is nowhere stated that the defendants remainded absent due to illness of their counsel. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the earlier order of the trial court setting the defendants ex parte had merged with the order of restoration dated 3-9-1993 and as such the trial court committed an illegality by posting the suit for ex parte hearing by its subsequent order dated 17-9-1993. In this connection it is also contended that the defendants had already filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order and without dealing with such petition, the trial court should not have disposed of the suit. 5. In this connection it is also contended that the defendants had already filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order and without dealing with such petition, the trial court should not have disposed of the suit. 5. It is not stated in the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. or in the evidence of the Advocate himself that the defendants were prevented from appearing before the trial court on the date fixed for ex parte hearing merely because they had already been set ex parte. As a matter of fact, in law such earlier order fixing the case for ex parte hearing had no meaning at all as admittedly in the present case, the defendants had already filed their written statement and even if they were absent on a particular date they had every right in law to participate in the suit on any subsequent date. The question of filing an application for recalling the order relating a party ex parte would arise only when the patty intends to set the clock back. Where however, nothing is done on a date when the defendant remains absent and the case is posted to a future date, the defendant has every right to participate in such proceeding from the subsequent date. ' This position is well settled in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others. It is not the case of the defendants that though they wanted to appear, they were not allowed to do so merely because they had been set ex parte earlier. In the petition, under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C., the gravamen of the allegations was relating to the alleged illegality committed by the trial court in restoring the suit. Nowhere the defendants had tried to explain their absence on the date on which the case was taken up,for ex parte hearing. Even in the petition under Order 9. Rule 13, it is not stated that they were expecting their Advocate to take all steps and due to absence of the Advocate because of illness, no steps could be taken. Nowhere the defendants had tried to explain their absence on the date on which the case was taken up,for ex parte hearing. Even in the petition under Order 9. Rule 13, it is not stated that they were expecting their Advocate to take all steps and due to absence of the Advocate because of illness, no steps could be taken. Even though the application under Order 9, Rule 13 and consequently, an appeal arising from an order dismissing such petition are required to be considered liberally, unless sufficient cause, is shown for absence of a party on the date on which the suit is taken up for ex parte hearing, the ex parte decree cannot be set aside merely because the decree involves a substantial amount. Since the defendants have not shown any cause for their nonappearance on the date on which the case was taken up for ex parte hearing, the trial court was amply justified in rejecting the said application under order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. 6. Even the petition for condonation of delay had been rightly rejected by the trial court. A refusal of the application under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. and the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act reveals a peculiar feature. It appears from the,application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act as if the said petition had been drafted on 13-5-1994 It has been stated that the party came to know about the ex parte decree on 13-5-1994. In the said petition apparently drafted on 13-5-1995 (as such date has been put on the petition itself,) it was stated that the lawyer was ill. It is thus evident that by 13-5-1994, the lawyer must have recovered. Be that as it may, the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. was filed about three and half,months thereafter on 2-9-1994 and the petition, u/s 5 of the Limitation- Act apparently drafted earlier on 13-5-1994 was filed along with the petition under Order 9, Rule 13. If the defendants were aware of the ex parte decree on 13-5-1995, there is no reason as to why the application for restoration was not filed on that very date when the limitation petition had been drafted or at any rate soon thereafter, or even soon after the reopening of the Courts after Summer Vacation. If the defendants were aware of the ex parte decree on 13-5-1995, there is no reason as to why the application for restoration was not filed on that very date when the limitation petition had been drafted or at any rate soon thereafter, or even soon after the reopening of the Courts after Summer Vacation. There is no reason as to why the defendants waited for a long period of more than three months thereafter to file the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. 7. A ground had been taken in the petition under Order. 9, Rule 13 that notice of the suit after restoration had not been issued. However, it is apparent that the proceeding under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. had been contested by the defendants and the order of restoration had been passed in presence of counsels for the parties and, in fact, cost had been accepted thereafter. Since the order-sheet was being maintained from day to day and obviously in presence of the counsels for parties, there was no necessity for issuing fresh notice to the defendants after the suit was restored. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed