S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE first respondent herein while serving as Multipurpose Health Visitor submitted an application on 18-3-1999 to the 2nd petitioner herein seeking voluntary retirement on medical invalidation ground complaining that she is a cardiac patient and she was not in a position to perform regular duties and the field work attached to her post. On the basis of the above application, the first respondent was referred to the Superintendent, Government general Hospital,. Kakinada, who constituted a Medical Board on 22-5-1999 consisting of three Doctors. The Medical board so constituted issued a certificate on 25-6-1999 certifying that the first respondent is incapacitated permanently due to ischaemic heart disease and she is permanently incapacitated for further service of any kind as a consequence of the said heart disease. As required under the regulations the matter was referred to the district Level Committee presided over by the District Collector as the Chairman constituted in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 214. dated 9-6-1998. The 1st respondent was summoned to appear before the District level Committee and accordingly she appeared. It appears that to the District level Committee the first respondent appeared to be healthy and, therefore, the district Level Committee did not recommend for acceptance of the application of the first respondent seeking voluntary retirement on medical invalidation ground. Accordingly, the 2nd petitioner by his letter dated 24-1-2000 addressed to the first respondent informed her that her request was negatived by the district Collector and Chairman of the district Level Committee. It is relevant to notice the contents of the said letter. It reads:"smt. G. K. Jayalakshmi, MPHS (F), primary Health Centre, Virava, E. G. District and applied for Medical invalidation on voluntary basis is hereby informed that the District collector and Chairman of the District board, Kakinada, has negatived the medical Invalidation and stating that "she appeared, she is quite healthy and does not deserve voluntary retirement on medical invalidation. " ( 2 ) THE first respondent being aggrieved by the said communication instituted O. A. No. 683 of 2000 before the A. P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (the tribunal, for short ). " ( 2 ) THE first respondent being aggrieved by the said communication instituted O. A. No. 683 of 2000 before the A. P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (the tribunal, for short ). The Tribunal by its order dated 6-3-2000 allowed the O. A. , and set aside the impugned proceeding of the 2nd petitioner herein and held that the first respondent herein is entitled to be retired from service on medical invalidation ground in terms of Rule 455 of Annexure-HI to the A. P. Revised Pension Rules. Hence, this writ petition by the State authorities assailing the legality and validity of the above order passed by the Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader for services-I appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the first respondent on her own showing cannot be said to be a person suffering from cardiac disease and this position is abundantly reflected in the certificate issued by one dr. P. Rangaswamy, M. D. , D. M. , cardiologist, Kakinada (a copy of which is annexed to the writ petition at page 26 of the material papers ). Learned G. P. , also finds fault with the order of the Tribunal contending that the O. A. , filed by the first respondent came to be disposed of by the impugned order without proper notice and without proper opportunity to the petitioner-authorities to contest the claim of the first respondent. ( 4 ) LET us dispose of the second contention first. We have perused the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. It is not as if the Tribunal proceeded to pass the impugned order on the day of admission itself. Paragraph 3 of the order makes it abundantly clear that anterior to the date of the order, the learned G. P. , who appeared for the State authorities before the tribunal took notice for the authorities and sought time to receive instructions. In para-3 of the impugned order, it is stated that the learned G. P. , submitted to the tribunal that he had received necessary instructions from the 2nd petitioner herein and on that basis he made submissions also. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order was made in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order was made in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Be that as it may, if the G. P. thought it necessary to file counter-affidavit on behalf of the petitioners-State authorities, he ought to have requested the Tribunal to grant some more time and accordingly he would have filed the counter-affidavit. It is not the case of the petitioner-Authorities that such a request was made before the tribunal and it was rejected by the Tribunal unjustly. ( 5 ) COMING to the first contention of the learned G. P. for Services-I, let us preface with what the Apex Court had to observe in mohinder Singh Gill and another vs. Chief election Commissioner, New Delhiat para 8 of the above said judgment, which reads:". . . . . . WHEN a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) (at p. 18): "public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the setting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. "we thought it apposite to extract the above observations of the Supreme Court particularly in the context of the submission made by the learned G. P. The learned G. P. , would tell us that the Committee constituted by the Superintendent, government General Hospital, Kakinada did not consist of a Cardiologist, a Specialist as regards cardiac diseases. This point was never raised at any stage of the proceeding. This point was never raised at any stage of the proceeding. As could be seen from the impugned order of the Tribunal, this was not at all the contention of the learned G. P. , who appeared for the State authorities before the tribunal. In addition to this, even the communication of the 2nd petitioner dated 24-1-2000 extracted above, does not refer to the fact that the Medical Board did not consist of Cardiologist. On the other hand, the communication has incorporated verbatim the finding recorded by the district Level Committee. The only reason given by the authorities to reject the application of the petitioner is that the district Collector, who is the Chairman of the District Selection (sic. Level) Committee, felt that the first respondent is quite healthy and, therefore, she does not deserve voluntary retirement. We are at a loss to understand as to how the subjective satisfaction of the District Collector who could not be said to be an expert would be a base for rejecting the application of the petitioner, particularly, in the light of the certificate issued by the Medical Board constituted by the Superintendent, government General Hospital, Kakinada. It is not the case of the petitioner-authorities before the Tribunal that the Medical Board constituted by the Superintendent did not have a Cardiologist as a member. Be that as it may even before us in this writ, petition, nothing is placed to satisfy ourselves that the Medical Board constituted by the superintendent, Government General hospital, Kakinada, in fact, did not include a Cardiologist. Therefore, we do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal. ( 6 ) THE writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.