Judgment : 1. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.96 of 1993 has preferred the above second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18. 1998 made in A.S.No.69 of 1997 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 17. 1996 made in O.S.No.96 of 1993 by the Court of District Munsif, Manamadurai. 2. Ona perusal of the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both what comes to be known is that the appellant had filed the suit in O.S.No.96 of 1993 praying to declare his title to the suit property and to restrain the defendant and his men by means of permanent injunction from in any manner interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and for costs on averments that he sent a lawyers notice dated 27. 1989 requiring the defendant to vacate the suit property and since the defendant neither issued any reply to the said notice nor vacated the suit property, the plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.395 of 1989 praying for delivery of possession of the suit properties from the defendant, in which one Nachiar, who received the notice, appeared and filed an answer to the effect that the suit property was belonging to the defendant and that she was the tenant of the same and that yet another Sivagami who was also issued with the same notice sent a reply dated 37. 1989 to the effect that the place wherein she lived belonged to the defendant and as a tenant under the defendant, she was residing there. .3. Thefurther pleadings of plaint are that against the defendant and the said Sivagami, a suit in O.S.No.396 of 1989 had been filed in the same court for delivery of possession and in the written statement dated 11. .3. Thefurther pleadings of plaint are that against the defendant and the said Sivagami, a suit in O.S.No.396 of 1989 had been filed in the same court for delivery of possession and in the written statement dated 11. 1991, the defendant since claimed title to the suit property, the plaintiff vacated the tenants Nachinar and Sivagami besides dismantling the huts; that the plaintiff is in possession of the vacant site since it is adjoining his house; that in the said suit in O.S.No.396 of 1989, a commission was appointed who has also filed a report and plan in the court; that the prayers sought for in those two suits in O.S.Nos.395 and 396 of 1989 have been answered in the aforementioned manner even outside the court; that however, since the defendant is claiming title to the suit property, it has become necessary to file this suit, but the defendant has absolutely no right or title of any kind; that for being in occupation and enjoyment of the suit property for over the statutory period, the plaintiff has prescribed title by means of adverse possession and hence the plaintiff would pray for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction and for costs. 4. 4. Per contra, the defendant would file the written statement to the effect that S.No.391/11 in an extent of 0.03.5 hectares, which includes the suit property, also does not belong to the plaintiff but the plaintiff was entitled to only 5 cents of the land on the South of the suit property that too belonging to his wife; that in the suit property located North to the house of the plaintiff, he does not have any right or title; that the defendant having put up two huts in the suit property leased out the same in favour of one Nachiar and Sivagami and it is certainly false to allege on the part of the plaintiff that they were his tenants and on account of some family problems, they refused to vacate; that they both having vacated the huts, entrusted the suit property only with the defendant; that the earlier suits have nothing to do with the suit property or the tenants vacating the suit property; that the plaintiff has no right much less by means of adverse possession as he prescribed title; that the suit property and the other property lying on the North to the suit property were originally belonging to one Ramu Pillai, who for himself and on behalf of his minor sons sold the property on 7. 1989 in favour of the defendant for proper consideration; that the tenants Nachiar and Sivagami for seven years even prior to the sale deed dated 7. 1989 were tenants putting up the huts under Ramu Pillai; that from 7. 1989 onwards, the suit property and the other property lying on the North of the suit property are in possession and enjoyment of this defendant; that while the earlier suits were pending, the two tenants vacated the suit property and entrusted possession with this defendant which continues till date; that on false pretext, manipulating false theories, the plaintiff had obtained a patta in his favour for the suit property and that the suit is liable to be dismissed and would pray to dismiss the suit. 5. 5. Based on these pleadings, the trial court having framed seven issues has ordered trial of the suit, wherein on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff besides examining himself as P.W.1 also examined one Khader Mydeen as P.W.2 and marked eight documents as Exs.A-1 to A-8 and on behalf of the defendant, besides examining his power of attorney agent Pitchai as D.W.1, he also examined two witnesses as D.Ws.2 and 3 and marked seven documents as Exs.B-1 to B-7. .6. Onsuch evidence placed on record, the trial court remarking that the plaintiff in proof of his allegation that the suit property is ancestrally belonging to him, has not produced any evidence much less documentary evidence, that Ex.A-1 U.D.R. patta has no prior documents; that from the reply sent by Sivagami in Ex.A-4 to the notice of the plaintiff in Ex.A-3, the said Sivagami Ammal has made it clear that the hut put up and in her possession is in S.No.391/11 but the suit property is in S.No.391/8, which is also belonging to the defendant and that she was also paying rent only to the defendant; that prior to the purchase of the land by the defendant, the said Sivagami Ammal was a tenant under Ramu Pillai and thereafter was also paying rent to the defendant; that either in proof of the suit property being ancestral to the plaintiff or on what basis the U.D.R. patta had been issued in his favour, the plaintiff had not produced any evidence; that since mere patta cannot confer any title; that based on Ex.A-1 alone it is difficult to arrived at the conclusion regarding the title of the suit property to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has thoroughly failed to establish his ownership or possession and on such reasons the trial court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff with no order as to costs. 7. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.69 of 1997 before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga and the said court having framed two points for determination viz., “1. Whether the appeal could be allowed as prayed for by the appellant. and 2. 7. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.69 of 1997 before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga and the said court having framed two points for determination viz., “1. Whether the appeal could be allowed as prayed for by the appellant. and 2. What relief does the appellant become entitled to.” and further appointing a court commission to visit the spot and marking the Commissioners report and plan respectively as Exs.C-1 and C-2 and having its own discussion in the light of the evidence and the judgment of the trial court, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion that the appellant has failed to substantiate anything in the appeal and would not only dismiss the appeal with with costs but also confirm the decision of the trial court. 8. It is only against the concurrent findings thus rendered by both the courts below, the plaintiff in the suit has now come forward to prefer the above second appeal before this Court on grounds such as, .(i) that the courts below failed to note that the appellant has proved his title and possession in respect of the suit property under Exs.A-1 and A-2; .(ii) that the courts below have failed to consider that patta was issued in favour of the appellant in respect of the suit property and that he has paid the kist in respect of the same; (iii) that the appellate court has failed to consider the Advocate Commissioners report under Exs.C-1 and C-2, which clearly prove that the suit property is located in S.No.391/11-B1 but the respondent claimed title in respect of the land comprised in S.No.391/8-B; .(iv) that the courts, below have failed to consider that under Ex.B-2 one of the boundaries has been mentioned as land belonging to the appellant; .(v) that the courts below have not properly appreciated the oral evidence let in on the part of the appellant and that on unsound and unsustainable reasons, both the courts below have decided the matter. On such and such other minor grounds, the appellant would further bringforth two substantial questions of law for determination of the above second appeal. They are: 1. Whether the courts below have not committed an error of law in dismissing the suit when the appellant had proved the title and possession to the suit property under Exs.A-1, A-2, A-5 and A-8. 2. They are: 1. Whether the courts below have not committed an error of law in dismissing the suit when the appellant had proved the title and possession to the suit property under Exs.A-1, A-2, A-5 and A-8. 2. Whether the courts below have not committed an error of law in dismissing the suit when the respondent has claimed title to the land comprised in S.No.391/8B under Ex.B-2. 9. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the plaintiff is the appellant and he filed the suit for declaration of the title and for permanent injunction; that S.No.391/11-B is in an extent of 3 1/2 cents; that the plaintiffs case is that the suit property is ancestral and patta was granted in his favour in Ex.A-1 and that Exs.A-2 and A-6 to A-8 are the kist receipts; that the defendants case is that he purchased the suit property under Ex.B-2 dated 7. 1989 comprised in S.No.391/ 8B; that adjacent to suit property, the plaintiff has purchased the land and building in the name of his wife for which under Exs.B-6 and B-7, taxes have been paid in her name; that Ex.A-8 is also relating to the building purchased; that the trial court dismissed the suit on ground that the suit property was not property identified nor did the plaintiff prove the case with proper evidence; that on appeal, the appellant filed an application for appointment of the Commission and the same having been allowed, the Advocate Commissioner visited the spot and filed his report and plan under Exs.C-1 and C-2; that in the plan, the suit property is shown as ABCD; that there is no dispute regarding the superstructure; that according to the Commissioner, ABCD portion is in S.No.391/11B-1; that the case of the appellant that the suit property is the ancestral property and comprised in S.No.391/11B has been proved by the report of the Commissioner under Exs.C-1 and C-2; that further, the UDR patta under Ex.A-1, dated 17. 1984 stands in the name of the appellant and the appellant has paid the kist under Ex.A-2; that the appellants wife has purchased the property on the Southern side of the suit property under Ex.B-5; that in the sale deed dated 7. 1984 stands in the name of the appellant and the appellant has paid the kist under Ex.A-2; that the appellants wife has purchased the property on the Southern side of the suit property under Ex.B-5; that in the sale deed dated 7. 1989 under Ex.B-2, which stands in the name of the respondent, the Southern boundary has been shown as the land belonging to the appellant viz., the suit property; that the appellant has issued a notice under Ex.A-3 to Sivagami for eviction from the suit property; that the appellant has also filed O.S.Nos.395 and 396 of 1989 and since the said Sivagami vacated the suit property, both the suits were dismissed as not pressed; that the respondent has claimed title to the land comprised in S.No.391/8B under Ex.B-2; that the respondent cannot claim title in respect of land which is comprised in S.No.391/11B; that the appellant has proved title and possession to the suit property under Exs.A-1, A-2 and A-5 and that the respondent has failed to prove the land purchased under Ex.B-2 which forms part of the suit property; that the appellate Court after appointment of the commission had also dismissed the appeal without proper appreciate of the case of the appellant in the context of the evidence and would pray to allow the above second appeal. 10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would submit that as far as the plaintiff is concerned, he does not have any other document excepting the patta in Ex.A-1 and that no document is there to show that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and Sivagami Ammal and Nachiar, who were admittedly in possession of the suit properties, are the tenants of the respondent and that he removed the huts as alleged in the plaint. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondent would cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M.Papaiah and another Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M.Papaiah and another Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M.Papaiah and another , A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1809 wherein it is held that, “… So far the revenue records are concerned, the appellate court considered the same and held that they did not support the plaint. The High Court has reversed the finding saying that the interpretation of the first appellate court was erroneous. It is firmly established that the revenue records are not documents of title and the question of interpretation of a document not being a document of title is not a question of law. These errors have seriously vitiated the impugned judgment of the High Court which must be set aside”. 11. Yet another judgment would also be cited by the learned counsel for the respondent which is a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Ishwardass Jain (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal, (Dead) by L.Rs. Ishwardass Jain (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal, (Dead) by L.Rs. Ishwardass Jain (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal, (Dead) by L.Rs. (2000)1 Civil Law Times 45 wherein it is held that, “Under Sec.100, C.P.C. after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first Appellate Court without doing so. There are two situations in which inference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to Sec.100, C.P.C. after the 1976 amendment. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible.” 12. In consideration of the pleadings of parties and in further consideration of the judgments delivered by both the courts below and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what is disclosed is that it is the appellant, who filed the suit in O.S.No.96 of 1993 in the trial court praying to declare that he is entitled to the suit property and for a permanent injunction against the respondent from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and for costs. The trial court having framed seven issues would order the trial in which, on the part of the plaintiff, two witnesses would be examined and eight documents would be marked respectively as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.A-1 and A-8. Likewise, the defendant would also examine three witnesses as D.Ws.1 to 3 and would mark seven documents as Exs.B-1 to B-7. Both the trial court and the first appellate court as well have fairly discussed the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by parties. 13. To look into the evidence, the plaintiff having examined himself as P.W.1, has deposed about his case as put forth in the plaint through whom the documents have also been marked. P.W.2, one Khader Mydeen, has deposed that it is the plaintiff, who is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, buy he does not know in what capacity is he is such possession. So far as the documentary evidence placed on the part of the plaintiff is concerned, Ex.A-1 dated 17. 1984 is the patta granted in favour of the plaintiff; Ex.A-2 dated 16. 1989 is the kist receipt issued in favour of the plaintiff; Ex.A-3 dated 27. 1989 and Ex.A-4 dated 37. 1989 are respectively the notice issued to one Sivagami Ammal and the reply sent by her; Ex.A-5 dated 29. 1991 is the house site patta issued in favour of the plaintiff and Exs.A-6 to A-8 are the tax receipts of the years 1988, 1993 and 1994. 14. So far as the oral and documentary evidence placed on behalf of the defendant is concerned, the defendant besides examining his power of attorney agent as D.W.1, who speaks to the effect of his pleadings in the written statement, would also examine one Murugesa Pandian as D.W.2, who is the vendor of the land situate on the South of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs wife wherein they have constructed a house and are in enjoyment of the same. One Nachiammal was examined as D.W.3 and she deposed to the effect that herself and one Sivagami were residing as tenants in two huts in the suit property and were remitting the rents only to the defendant and that they vacated the suit property entrusting the same to the defendant. D.W.3 would also speak to the effect that the suit property is located on the North of the plaintiffs house in S.No.391/8B. D.W.3 would also speak to the effect that the suit property is located on the North of the plaintiffs house in S.No.391/8B. So far as the documentary evidence placed on the part of the defendant is concerned, seven documents would be marked as Exs.B-1 to B-7. Ex.B-1 dated 22. 1993 is the power of attorney executed by the defendant in favour of D.W.1, Ex.B-2 dated 7. 1989 is the sale deed executed by one Somupillai in favour of the plaintiff; Exs.B-3 and B-4 are the same as Exs.A-3 and A-4, the notice issued to and the reply issued by Sivagami Ammal; Ex.B-5 dated 2. 1984 is the sale deed executed by D.W.2 in favour of the wife of the plaintiff; Ex.B-6 dated 14. 1984 is yet another sale deed executed by one Narayanapillai in favour of D.W.2 and Ex.B-7 dated 20.7.1993 is a settlement deed executed in favour of Chidambaram Pillai. .15. 1984 is the sale deed executed by D.W.2 in favour of the wife of the plaintiff; Ex.B-6 dated 14. 1984 is yet another sale deed executed by one Narayanapillai in favour of D.W.2 and Ex.B-7 dated 20.7.1993 is a settlement deed executed in favour of Chidambaram Pillai. .15. The trial court remarking that it is S.No.391/11-B, which is claimed to be the ancestral property of the plaintiff, for which he has also been issued with the patta in the U.D.R. scheme, but the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that this property has been ancestrally belonging to him nor a mere patta obtained from the revenue officials would confer title as per the dictum of the upper forums of law; that under these circumstances, the plaintiff also has not taken the commission to ascertain the suit property and his physical enjoyment of the same; that though the onus is heavily on the plaintiff, proper evidence has not been placed on record; that the kist receipts in Exs.A-6 and A-7 are pertaining to the house of the plaintiffs wife, which is a different property; that from Ex.A-4, reply sent by Sivagami Ammal to the notice sent by the plaintiff under Ex.A-3, she has made it very clear that she has vacated the hut put up in the suit property and entrusted the same with the defendant; that herself and another Nachiar were only the tenants of the defendant and not that of the plaintiff; that further the very S.No.391/11-B to the suit property is denied on the part of the defendant and the Survey Number of the suit property would be attributed as 391/8 so far as the defendant is concerned and further arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish the case put up by him for declaration and injunction, had ultimately dismissed the suit without making any order as to costs. 16. The first appellate court allowing the plaintiff to take a commission, on application to the said effect, the court Commissioner had also inspected the spot and filed a report in Exs.C-1 and plan in C-2, both dated 7. 1998. 16. The first appellate court allowing the plaintiff to take a commission, on application to the said effect, the court Commissioner had also inspected the spot and filed a report in Exs.C-1 and plan in C-2, both dated 7. 1998. The first appellate Court affording such opportunity to the appellant/plaintiff and having framed two points for consideration has discussed in Para No.9 of its judgment not only the appointment of the commission but also the report submitted by him in order to identify the suit property and has remarked that in Ex.C-2, the plan submitted by the Commissioner, the suit property has been indicated in ABCD marking the same in red; that on the South of the ABCD portion, there is S.No.391/11-B2; that the ABCD portion is in S.No.391/11-B1; that the defendants property is located in S.No.391/8B; that on the West of the S.No.391/8B, S.No.319/8A is located; that on the West of 391/11-B1 and 391/11-B2, S.No.391/11A, S.No.391/10 and 391/9 are situated; that on the East of the plaintiffs wifes property, D.W.2 Murugesa Pandians land is located in S.No.391/12; that the ABCD portion measures 3 1/2 cents. 17. 17. The first appellate court further going into the the aspect whether this ABCD portion is noted in the defendants document of title deed and remarking that the Commissioner has only indicated the measurement of the suit property as 3 1/2 cents but has not given the measurements of any other property; that the patta for S.No.391/11-B is issued in favour of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff according to his pleadings had indicated that the suit property is in S.No.391/11-B1 and S.No.391/11-B2 but now has come forward to claim that the ABCD portion indicated in Ex.C-2 alone is the ancestral property thus acting against his own pleadings in the plaint and further having his own discussions on various other aspects of the case, considering the oral evidence of parties also and giving weightage to the deposition of D.W.3, who is admittedly the tenant of the suit property claimed to be the tenant of the plaintiff by him, but D.W.3 in no uncertain terms has deposed to the effect that she was a tenant of the defendant only and not the plaintiff and further giving weightage to the defence oral evidence in D.W.2 would ultimately arrive at the conclusion that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit property and that the plaintiff has failed to establish his case to the effect that the suit property was ancestral to him nor has it been proved that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same and would ultimately dismiss the appeal preferred by the plaintiff thus confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. .18. From the above discussion, it is clear that both the courts below have properly appreciated the evidence on clear discussion of each and every aspect of the case and have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove his title and possession to the suit property even under Exs.A-1, A-2, A-5 and A-8 as against the strong defence put up by the defendant and further in consideration of the Commissioners report and plan, it cannot under any circumstance be said that the first appellate court has not considered the Commissioners report and the plan or the other documents placed on record. Therefore, for both the substantial questions of law, it has to be answered that both the courts below have dismissed the suit only in due consideration of the vital documents said to have been placed in the part of the plaintiff especially Exs.A-1, A-2 and A-8. Even though the respondent might not have come forward to put up a definite case of his own, since the plaintiff is claiming declaration and injunction against the respondent, the onus cast on the plaintiff since being very heavy, both the courts have rightly arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish his case positively and hence they have arrived at the conclusion to dismiss the suit. 19. Moreover, in the recent judgment delivered in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others , (1999)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 105: A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2213 it has been held that, “The right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact.” “It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusion drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 20. In consideration of the above facts and circumstances and the evidence let in by parties, the judgments cited on the part of the respondent and the above judgment of the Apex Court, the conclusion that could be arrived at is that merely based on the revenue patta issued under Ex.A-1 by the Government in favour of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has become entitled to the suit property, unless his entitlement is strongly established on proper foundation. Hence, this second appellate court, in these circumstances, since is not able to find any patent errors of law or perversity in approach or lack of opportunity at the admission stage itself does not see any ground to interfere with the well considered and well merited judgments of both the courts below and the only counsel.