V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: The appeal is against the order of the learned single judge whereby, the learned judge has, while disposing of the writ petition by the original writ petitioner, directed that his suspension will not ensure beyond 5.4.1997. The learned Judge has also given the direction that the 2nd respondent shall pay full salary payable to the writ petitioner commencing from 6.4.1997 onwards till the date within four weeks from the date of judgment and the appellant is further directed to continue to pay full salary every month so long as the suspension continued. 2. A few facts will help us to understand the controversy: The first respondent herein was serving as a Chief Accounts Officer with the appellant. For some reasons, he was suspended by the appellant on 6.1.1997. As per the prevailing rule which governed the service conditions, which is bye-law No.2.17, a suspension order against an employee could last upto three months. The rule is peculiarly worded. It reads as follows: “The authority competent may suspend employee against whom action is proposed to be taken if in his opinion the attendance of the employee on duty during the period of charges are under the investigation against him, is likely to affect the proceedings. Further, no employee shall in any case be kept under suspension for a period exceeding three months at a time.” [Italics supplied] Since the 1st respondent herein was suspended on the ground that an enquiry into grave charges was pending against him, he expected his suspension to last, as per the aforementioned bye-law, only for three months and therefore, when he was not reinstated after the expiry period of three months from 6.1.1997, he chose to file the writ petition for quashing the order of suspension. In defence, however, the appellant pleaded that it had sustained a loss of Rs.9.3 crores on account of the acts on the part of the 1st respondent/writ petitioner and, therefore, he was suspended with a departmental enquiry in mind and that he was at the most entitled to a subsistence allowance at the rate of 25% of his last drawn salary in terms of special bye-law No.2/17(b) of the federation. It was pointed out that an enquiry officer was appointed and the 1st respondent had attended 16 sittings out of 19 and the enquiry had almost come to an end. It was pointed out that an enquiry officer was appointed and the 1st respondent had attended 16 sittings out of 19 and the enquiry had almost come to an end. It was pointed out that the 1st respondent’s request for revocation of suspension was examined and the orders were issued on 18.9.1998, rejecting the request. It was also pointed out that in the wake of the gravity of the charges, the order of the suspension was not liable to be interfered with. It was pointed out that as per the amended bye-laws, an employee could be placed under suspension for a period not exceeding one year without the approval of the registrar and for a period beyond one year, the approval of the Registrar had to be secured and a proposal was already sent for extending the period of suspension beyond one year by the letter of the appellant dated 11.11.1998. An objection was also raised about the tenability of the writ petition. However the learned Judge, relying on the reported decision by the Apex Court in Administrator, Konch Sakakari v. Sarnam Singh, (1997)2 S.C.C. 144, held that the writ petition was maintainable. 3. The only question that is argued by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the learned single Judge has erred in issuing a direction though the learned Judge has refused to interfere with the suspension order. 4. When we look at the findings given, the learned Judge has expressed and relied upon the unamended bye-law No.2.17(a), which we have already quoted, and has chosen to hold that the very language of the said bye-law suggested that no suspension under any circumstances, could be extended beyond a period of three months. The reason given by the learned Judge for refusing to interfere with the suspension is that it could be reasonably presumed that if the suspension was revoked and if the 1st respondent was allowed to enter the office, his very presence might interfere with the enquiry. We are in complete agreement with the learned Judge when he holds that the suspension could not be interfered with and there is no complaint made against this finding of the learned Judge also. However, learned counsel for the appellant tried to rely on the amended bye-laws. Unfortunately for the appellant, the amendment was effected only on 16.9.1998. We are in complete agreement with the learned Judge when he holds that the suspension could not be interfered with and there is no complaint made against this finding of the learned Judge also. However, learned counsel for the appellant tried to rely on the amended bye-laws. Unfortunately for the appellant, the amendment was effected only on 16.9.1998. Till then admittedly the old bye-law was holding the field. Therefore prima facie a suspension order which was brought into existence on 6.1.1997, would die it’s natural death on 5.4.1997 and the suspension itself would then be non-est. The learned Judge has also considered the amended bye-law and has pointed out that even under the amended bye-law the maximum period of suspension was extended upto one year and it is also specifically provided that any further extension of suspension would be only at the approval of the registrar. The fact remains that no such approval was given. It is an admitted position that no further fresh order of suspension was passed after the elapse of the three months of the suspension order originally passed on 6.1.1997. We have already pointed out that the effect of the elapse of the period of three months would be that the suspension shall become non-est. Under the circumstances the appellant could at the most pass any order on or after 6.4.1997 but, we find that no fresh order thereafter has been passed. If an action of suspension had become non-est, the suspension could be rejuvenated only by a proper method on the basis of the amended bye-laws. It is not as if the concerned person could not be suspended again. He could be certainly suspended but, there has to be tangible evidence to show that he was actually then suspended. Once the suspension had become non-est because of the elapse of time then, the suspension could be rejuvenated by only a fresh order, which has not been passed in time by the appellant. Even the extension of suspension has not been sought for in time and, therefore, in our opinion the learned Judge was absolutely right in taking the view that the suspension had become illegal. Even the extension of suspension has not been sought for in time and, therefore, in our opinion the learned Judge was absolutely right in taking the view that the suspension had become illegal. In our view, the direction given by the learned Judge was also absolutely correct where, in spite of the suspension becoming non-est, the appellant was of the opinion that the attendance of the 1st respondent was likely to be prejudicial to the enquiry. The learned Judge then proceeded to issue a direction of payment of full salary. In our opinion the direction cannot be faulted with. The learned single Judge has given good reasons in support of the course that he has undertaken and, in our opinion, the judgment is absolutely correct and needs no interference. 5. The appeal has no merits and is dismissed without any order as to the costs. Connected C.M.P. No.20696 of 1999 is closed.