Judgment :- 1. The minimal facts necessary to dispose of this Civil revision Petition are as follows:— The property viz., the Thottams comprised in S. Nos. 2373 and 2376, Nagore, belongs to the Nagore Dargah. The administration of the said Dargah vests with Board of Trustee appointed under the scheme Decree passed in O.S. No. 30 of 1946, as modified by the High Court, in A.S. Nos. 289 and 576 of 1948. The Board of Trustees resolved to lease out the said property to the Nagore Educational Trust, on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/- for a period of 99 years. On the basis of the said resolution dated 24.7.1997, the Managing Trustee of the Dargah N.S. Syed Abul Fatah Sahib moved the Scheme Court, East Thanjore at Nagapattinam for sanction and approval. But the District Judge viz., the Scheme Court by its order dated 2.9.1997, rejected the request, stating as follows:— “The request for permanent leasing rejected since there is no provision in the Scheme Decree for granting permission to such lease or to lease property by negotiation without conducting any public auction.” In spite of the order passed by the Scheme Court dated 2.9.97, and which order was communicated to the Managing trustee on 3.9.97, the Managing Trustee entered into a lease transaction with the said Nagore Educational Trust and get the lease deed registered on 10.9.97. One Saha Syed Sahib, a member of the Advisory Board of Nagore Dargah made a complaint on 27.4.1998, alleging that the proposed lease is a collusive transaction and the same is detrimental to the interest of the trust. On receiving the said complaint, the Scheme Court called for explanation of the same from the Managing Trustee and also required him to produce the lease deed for further action. The Scheme Court, thereafter, held that the lease is null and void and that it is a collusive transaction. Further, it directed the Dargha to take immediate possession of the property from the Nagore Educational Trust. Aggrieved by the said Order, the Managing Trustee of Nagore Dargah Thiru. Syed Abul Fatah Sahib preferred a Revision before this Court in C.R.P. No. 1897/98. The lessee viz., the Nagore Educational Trust also preferred a Revision in C.R.P. No. 2113 of 1998. Both the cases were heard by a Single Judge of this Court, who dismissed both the Revisions with costs. Syed Abul Fatah Sahib preferred a Revision before this Court in C.R.P. No. 1897/98. The lessee viz., the Nagore Educational Trust also preferred a Revision in C.R.P. No. 2113 of 1998. Both the cases were heard by a Single Judge of this Court, who dismissed both the Revisions with costs. In the course of his Judgment, S.S. Subramani, J. who disposed of both the Revisions had observed that the Managing Trustee has misused his power as a Managing Trustee and has betrayed the confidence reposed in him by the Trust and by the Board. It was further held by the learned Judge that the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court that there is collusion between the lessee and the Managing Trustee is correct and that the Managing Trustee has flouted his authority in entering into such transaction and therefore, he directed the District Court to consider whether the Managing Trustee is entitled to continue as such, since he has abused his position. Thereafter, the District Judge, Nagapattinam viz., the Scheme Judge issued a show cause notice to the Managing Trustee to show-cause as to why he should not be removed from his post as Managing Trustee of the Nagore Dargah since he has abused his possession. On receipt of the said notice, the Managing Trustee submitted his explanation. Thereafter, the Principal District Judge viz., the Scheme Judge, Nagapattinam, who after considering the materials placed before him, passed an order on 21.9.1998 holding that the Managing Trustee Syed Abul Fatah Sahib is unfit to continue as Managing Trustee and therefore, he will stand disqualified from the post of Managing Trustee and removed him from the said post forthwith. He further directed that he should not be elected for the post of Managing Trustee in future also. Aggrieved by the said decision, the present C.R.P. is filed by the Ex. Managing Trustee. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. V. Raghavachari submitted mainly three contentions. According to him, there is no provision in the scheme decree for removal of a trustee or a Managing Trustee and therefore, the order of the lower court is beyond its power and hence, it is not sustainable in law. Secondly, he contended that his act had not caused any loss to the Trust. V. Raghavachari submitted mainly three contentions. According to him, there is no provision in the scheme decree for removal of a trustee or a Managing Trustee and therefore, the order of the lower court is beyond its power and hence, it is not sustainable in law. Secondly, he contended that his act had not caused any loss to the Trust. On the other hand, the proposed lease would fetch higher income to the Trust and therefore, he has not committed any act detrimental to the interests of the Trust. Lastly, he contended that the order passed by the lower court has to be set aside, since the principles of natural justice have not been adhered to and that he has not been given sufficient opportunity to place his case before court. 3. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent Mr. S. Parthasarathy would counter these contentions by stating that any unauthorised act by a trustee would amount to misfeasance, and mel-feasance and proof of the same would entail the removal of a person from trusteeship. He further submitted that tying up of the trust property for. 99 years can never be said to be beneficial to the Trust and that it is only a collusive transaction. He further contended that the trustees being creatures of the Scheme Court hold the office only at the Will and pleasure of the Scheme Court and they can be removed at any time if the Scheme Court is satisfied that the interest of the Trust will suffer at the hands of a trustee. He further argued that all the procedural formalities have been complied with in this case and that there is no violation of principles of natural justice and that the Managing Trustee had been given the opportunity he is entitled to under law and therefore, the order does not suffer from any infirmity. 4. The Dargah at Nagore is considered by the Muslim Community all over Tamil Nadu as a sacred place. It attracts devotees from all over Tamil Nadu. The Dargah has considerable properties. For effective administration of the Dargah and its properties, a suit under Section 92, CPC for framing of scheme for administration of the Trust was filed in O.S. No. 30/46. It attracts devotees from all over Tamil Nadu. The Dargah has considerable properties. For effective administration of the Dargah and its properties, a suit under Section 92, CPC for framing of scheme for administration of the Trust was filed in O.S. No. 30/46. A scheme decree was framed by the lower court viz., by the district court, East Tanjore and aggrieved by the Scheme Decree passed by the District Court, East Tanjore and Nagapattinam, two appeals preferred against the same to the High Court in A.S. Nos. 280 of 1948 and 576 of 1948. On 16.3.1955, the High Court framed a Scheme Decree for the administration and Management of the Nagore Dargah and its properties. Eversince, the Dargah is managed in terms of the said Scheme Decree. 5. The Scheme Decree contemplates a Board of Trustees. The management and administration of the affairs of the Nagore Dargah at Nagore, East Tanjore District, and other Thakias and other Shrines connected therewith, thus come under the purview of the decree. The Scheme Decree mentions under schedule ‘A’ the following:— “(I) Kilvanjiyoor Durga (ii) Yahussain Palli (iii) Silladi Durga excluding rights declared in O.S. No. 183/1907, Dt. Munsifs Court, Nagapattinam. (iv) Madar Marcair Palli (v) Diwan Sahib Palli (vi) Darga Madarsa. 6. As pointed out already, under the Scheme Decree, a Board of Trustees has to be appointed. At the inception of scheme Decree, there were 8 trustees or Nattamaigars of the Dargah, who constituted the Board of Trustees. After their lifetime, the Trustee-ship would devolve on his next male heir in accordance with the custom/prevailing in respect of such office in the Dargah. The trustees will hold office for a term of three years. Besides the Board of Trustees, there was one Advisory Board constituted. It was to consist of 11 members, three of whom shall be elected by the Nattamaigars from among themselves, three elected by Kasupangu Sahibmars from among themselves and 5 nominated by this Court from among Mohammadan gentlemen residing within the limits of Nagapattinam Municipality as are neither Nattamaigars nor Kasupangudars provided that no Nattamaigar shall be entitled to stand for election as representative of the Kaspangudars. The scheme also provide for appointment of a Manger and Treasurer. The scheme also provide for appointment of a Manger and Treasurer. Clause-52 of the Scheme Decree provides that any of the Trustees of Kasupangudars or any members of the Advisory Board may apply to Court for all further orders or directions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the scheme and the Court shall have full power to give all such directions as may be necessary to effectuate and carry out the Scheme. 7. It being so, the Resolution was passed by the Board on 24.7.1997, on receiving a letter from Janab J. Abdul Hameed, Nagore Educational Trust. The Resolution was in effect, leasing out the property belonging to Dargha viz., the Thottams comprised in T.S. Nos. 2373 and 2376 situate in Nagore, East Tanjore at Nagapattinam for the purpose of putting up construction and starting Arts and Engineering College. The Resolution recommended lease in favour of Nagore Educational Trust for a period of 99 years. It provided that initial rent shall be Rs. 2,000/- per month which will be raised every year. It further provided that the transaction be entered into after obtaining legal opinion and after getting necessary sanction and approval of the Scheme Court. As stated already, this resolution was passed on 24.07.1997. 8. When sanction was sought for, the Scheme Court declined the sanction, stating that there is no provision in the Scheme Decree for granting permission to such lease or to lease property by negotiation without conducting any public auction. In the meanwhile, a member of the Advisory Board., Saha Syed Sahib filed an application before the Scheme Court, Nagapattinam, on 29.4.1998, alleging that the proposed lease is a collusive transaction and the same is detrimental to the interest of the Trust. The Scheme Court called for the explanation of the Managing Trustee and after obtaining a copy of the proposed lease, held it as a collusive transaction and further terming it as one not in the interest of the Trust, directed the Dargah to take possession of the properties. 9. On 02.09.1997, sanction was refused by the Scheme Court. But despite the same, a lease deed was executed by the Managing Trustee. Not only that, the same was got registered on 10.09.1997. The resolution is to the effect that the lease deed will be executed only after obtaining legal Opinion and obtaining sanction of the Scheme Court. 9. On 02.09.1997, sanction was refused by the Scheme Court. But despite the same, a lease deed was executed by the Managing Trustee. Not only that, the same was got registered on 10.09.1997. The resolution is to the effect that the lease deed will be executed only after obtaining legal Opinion and obtaining sanction of the Scheme Court. The Scheme Court rightly refused the sanction by its order dated 2.9.1997. But inspite of the same, the Managing Trustee not only executed the lease deed, but also had it registered on 10.09.1997. The Managing Trustee cannot feign ignorance of the order of rejection of the sanction. Having come to know of the refusal of sanction by the Scheme Court, the Managing Trustee had no business to pursue the matter further, either by executing a lease deed or by taking steps to have it registered and in getting it registered on 10.09.1997. The Managing Trustee is none but a nominee of the court. He cannot take upon himself to do things in his own way and override the order of the scheme Court, which is the appointing Authority. 10. It is needless to refer to any long catena of cases. It will suffice in this context to refer to few Rulings on this point. A Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 1925 Madras 1070 ( S. Veeraraghava v. V. Parthasarathy ) had this to say:— “It is highly regrettable that trusteeships of Temple and similar institutions should be looked upon as places of prestige and profit and that people should be found who are desperately anxious to be elected to such places or to continue to stick to them in spite of the onerous and serious responsibilities thereof. The true spirit in which such offices should be accepted or retained in the spirit of service and sacrifice in the interests of the public and of the institutions. So long as such offices are regarded not a posts of duty and responsibility, but as opportunities of personal aggrandizement, the affairs of such institutions are bound to be unsatisfactory. The true spirit in which such offices should be accepted or retained in the spirit of service and sacrifice in the interests of the public and of the institutions. So long as such offices are regarded not a posts of duty and responsibility, but as opportunities of personal aggrandizement, the affairs of such institutions are bound to be unsatisfactory. In this view no doubt, schemes under which there should be candidates for trusteeship and election to such offices are largely incompatible with the true spirit that should prevail, but it is the dream of democracy that there may be candidates who are pressed by public opinion to accept office if elected and that there may also be elections which truly reflect the highest principles of election. Once a person accepts an office of trusteeship the one governing consideration in his mind, the ruling motive for all actions, the one principle by reference to which all his acts should be determined, is the interest of the institution and that alone. Persons, who, though holding a fiduciary position allow their actions to be prompted by any other considerations, motives or principles are as much guilty of breach of trust as persons who may be found actually guilty of misappropriating property belongin g to the Trust. Even though the evidence in a case against the trustees may not be sufficient to warrant, generally Speaking, their removal from office on the ground of misconduct or negligence, still their removal may be ordered, if, in the opinion of the Court, such removal is necessary in the interests of the Trust to be administered.” 11. The Privy Council has held in the decision reported in AIR 1934 Privy Council 53=39 L.W. 478 ( Mahomed Ally v. Akberally ) as follows:— “In the case of a trust for public purposes of a charitable and religious nature, the primary duty of the Civil Court, is to consider the interest of the public, or that part of the public, for whose benefit the trust is created and the court is justified in deciding, in the exercise of its discretion, that the defendant mutawalis should be removed on account of their insolvency and mismanagement and keeping the charity in a deplorable condition.” 12. The above two Rulings would emphasise the need to have the right man in the right place. The above two Rulings would emphasise the need to have the right man in the right place. In case of a Trust of this nature, if a trustee is permitted to act according to his whims and fancies, then it will lead to deplorable deterioration, thereby affecting the very object of the Trust. 13. Now in this background let us now consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first and foremost submission, as I indicated already is that there is no power vested in the Scheme Court to order removal of the petitioner as Managing Trustee. According to Mr. V. Raghavachari, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Scheme Court is not possessed of any such power and therefore, the order passed by the Scheme Court is far beyond its powers, and hence, this court has to intervene under Section 115, CPC to set right the same. 14. Though the said argument at first glance appears to be of substance, a close scrutiny of the same would reveal the hollowness of this contention. In other words, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, if any remedy has to be sought, it can be only by initiating steps under Section 92 of CPC. I dont think that it can be stated so broadly as done by Mr. Raghavachari. We cannot ignore the Scheme Court or the provisions of the Scheme Decree. 15. The Trustee would hold the post as a Trustee only, at the Will and pleasure of the Scheme Court. There is no independent existence as a Trustee, but for the scheme. The Scheme Court will have all powers to regulate the conduct of business to administrate the Trust to the best of the interests of the Trust and see that the objects for which, the Trust was created, was properly carried out. As held in AIR 1934 Privy Council 53 (cited supra), the primary duty of the Court is to consider the interest of the public for whose benefit the trust is created and the court will be justified in deciding, in the exercise of its discretion, that the particular trustee should be removed for the act of mis-management of mis-feasance. 16. I do not accept the contention that there is no power vested with the Scheme Court to order removal of a Trustee. 16. I do not accept the contention that there is no power vested with the Scheme Court to order removal of a Trustee. It cannot be stated that if a trustee has to be removed relating to a trust, which is being controlled and administered under a scheme of the Court, that proceeding should be initiated under Section 92 of the Code. When the Scheme Court has power to appoint a Trustee, equally, the Court has power to remove the trustee. A trustee who is found unfit can always be removed by the Scheme Court. There is no need or necessity for obtaining sanction of the Advocate General under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court has also pointed out in the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 1206 approving the view of the Bombay High Court that a Scheme Court can modify the Scheme. 17. Here in this case, when sanction was refused by the District Judge viz., the Scheme Court, revision was filed against the same to this Court. This Court, while dismissing the revision, has stated as follows:— “It is apparent from the acts of the Managing Trustee that he has flouted even his authority and also the orders of the District Court. The District Court on receipt of a copy of this order, is directed to consider whether the Managing Trustee is entitled to continue as such since he has abused his position. The Court shall issue notice to the managing Trustee and also the Board of Trustees, and orders will be passed regarding disqualification of the Managing Trustee. I direct the District Court to consider this and pass necessary orders within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 18. The petitioner herein is a party to the said order. By the said order, this Court has directed the District Judge viz. the Scheme Court to consider whether the Managing Trustee is entitled to continue as such since he has abused his position and directed the Scheme Court to issue notice to the Managing Trustee and pass orders regarding disqualification of the Managing Trustee thereafter. Pursuant to the same steps have been taken by the Scheme Court viz., the District Judge, Nagapattinam to issue show-cause notice to the petitioner herein. Pursuant to the same steps have been taken by the Scheme Court viz., the District Judge, Nagapattinam to issue show-cause notice to the petitioner herein. After complying with the procedure, he has passed the orders finally, disqualifying the petitioner from holding the post of Managing Trustee. The Order passed by the District Judge is therefore not a suo moto order, in the sense that the Scheme Court itself took steps to disqualify the petitioner. Under Article 227 of the Constitution every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. In this case on hand, the High Court has issued directions. The High Court thus has powers of superintendence over the Scheme Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Further, since the party viz., the petitioner aggrieved by the order of the District Court viz., the Scheme Court refusing sanction, approached this Court by way of Revision, this Court as Revisional Court as well was seized of necessary jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, in exercise of such jurisdiction and power of superintendence the High Court has passed an order, directing the Scheme Court to initiate action. Thus, action was initiated by the Scheme Court not of its own motion but on the orders of this Court. Therefore, the question where there is any power with the Scheme Court for initiating action for removal or disqualifying the Trustee does not arise at all. Because it is an action pursuant to the orders of this court which order has been passed by this court, by virtue of its superintendence and revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, even assuming that there is no power vested in the Scheme Court to pass such order, it does not help the petitioner. 19. It is to be pointed out that the petitioner ought to have challenged the order passed by this Court in the Civil Revision Petition, directing the Scheme Court to take action against the petitioner on the ground that the Scheme Court has no power to initiate action against the petitioner. Therefore having been a party to the order and not having challenged it, the petitioner is estopped from contending about the want of power of the Scheme Court to pass such an order. Therefore having been a party to the order and not having challenged it, the petitioner is estopped from contending about the want of power of the Scheme Court to pass such an order. It is true that the question whether the petitioner has committed any act of misfeasance or mal-feasance did not arise directly for consideration in the C.R.P. But, in the C.R.P. a clear finding has been given that the Managing Trustee has flouted his authority and abused his position and power. It further observed that the transaction is a collusive one: Therefore, in that context, this Court directed the Scheme Court to initiate action for disqualification of the petitioner. Whether the act complained of would amount to an act mis-feasance or malfeasance, was of course not a point that came up for decision before this Court in the Civil Revision Petition. Therefore, to the extent, it may be contended that the said verdict is not binding upon the petitioner. But, a definite order has been passed by this Court, which of course was prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner in the sense that the Scheme Court has taken directed to initiate action against him for disqualification. When such an adverse order has been passed, the petitioner ought to have challenged it by taking up the matter further. Having not challenged it, the petitioner cannot now contend that the Scheme Court has no power to have proceeded against him. 20. It has been clearly held in 1996-2-L.W. 817 ( Hindustan Petroleum Cor. Ltd. & another v. K.M, Yakub (died) and others ) and AIR 1960 SC 941 ( Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debt ) that the principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial Court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Therefore, it follows that the petitioner cannot urge any argument on the ground of want of power in the Scheme Court to initiate action against him to disqualify him. 21. The other contention that has been strenuously pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is not guilty of any act of mis-feasance, malfeasance or non-feasance. Therefore, it follows that the petitioner cannot urge any argument on the ground of want of power in the Scheme Court to initiate action against him to disqualify him. 21. The other contention that has been strenuously pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is not guilty of any act of mis-feasance, malfeasance or non-feasance. According to him, the land proposed was fetching a very low rent. By reason of his act, in entering into the lease agreement, he was able to obtain higher rent for the property which would not only go to augment the income of the Trust but will also enrich the ‘Kasupangudars’. He further would submit that it is a R esolution passed by the Board and therefore, there is nothing wrong that has been done by him and that he has done yeomen service to the Trust and the Trust which was in precarious condition has now picked up due to this to his ceaseless efforts, and therefore, a guilty finger can never by pointed out at him and hence, there is no basis or ground at all to remove him from the trusteeship. 22. According to the Legal Dictionary, malfeasance means “evil doing, ill conduct, the doing of what one ought not to do, the commission of some act which is positively unlawful, the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful, the unjust performance of some act which the party had no right to do, or which he had contracted not to do.” Misfeasance is improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; a wrongful and injurious exercise of lawful authority, or the doing of the lawful act in an unlawful manner. Misfeasance may involve to some extent the idea of not doing as where an agent, while engaged in the performance of his undertaking, does not do something which it was his duty to do under the circumstances as, for instance, when he does not exercise that care which a due regard to the rights of others may require. The words ‘ any misfeasance or breach of trust etc. in Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act ought not to be construed otherwise than in its ordinary sense, and they unquestionabl y cover any misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty with reference to the Trust, as held in 10 M.L.J. 86. The words ‘ any misfeasance or breach of trust etc. in Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act ought not to be construed otherwise than in its ordinary sense, and they unquestionabl y cover any misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty with reference to the Trust, as held in 10 M.L.J. 86. Non feasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do. Thus, there is a distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. Now, let us see whether the act complained of here would fall within the definition of any of these legal maxim. 23. The Scheme Court passed an order on 2.9.1997, stating that the request for permanent lease is rejected, since there is no provision in the Scheme Decree for granting permission to such lease or to lease the property by negotiation without conducting any public auction. Thereafter, the petitioner ought to have kept’ quiet. But, what he did was, not only he executed a lease deed which is in violation of the order of the District Court, but had the lease deed registered on 10.09.1997. It cannot be stated that the Managing Trustee was not aware of the order of the Court passed on 2.9.1997. The Resolution of the Board of Trustees was passed on 24.7.1997 to lease out the Dharga thottams comprised in T.S. Nos. 2373 and 2376 to Nagoore Educational Trust. It was a permanent lease, the monthly rent being Rs. 2,000/-. Of course, there is a provision in the lease deed to raise the lease amount every year. The Resolution also provides that the transaction was to be entered into after getting the legal opinion and after obtaining necessary sanction and approval from the Scheme Court. The 1st respondent moved an application before the District Court, Nagapattinam on 29.4.1998, alleging that the lease was a collusive transaction. On this complaint, the Scheme Court issued a notice to the Managing Trustee to produce the copy of the permanent lease. But, even before that, on 2.9.1997 itself, the District court refused to give sanction for the transaction. Inspite of the said order, the petitioner went ahead by allowing the document to be registered on 10.9.1997 viz., after passing of the order. But, even before that, on 2.9.1997 itself, the District court refused to give sanction for the transaction. Inspite of the said order, the petitioner went ahead by allowing the document to be registered on 10.9.1997 viz., after passing of the order. Therefore, it is clear that the Managing Trustee, who is a creature of the Scheme Court and who is bound by the directions given by the Scheme Court, which is the guardian of the Trust, defying the orders of the Scheme Court not to lease out the property and inspite of the order, directing restoration of the possession to the Darga, the Managing Trustee viz., the petitioner herein went ahead and had it registered. 24. There is one other point to be noted in this connection. The trustees are acting only under the directions of the court. The trustees are appointed by the court. If sanction is refused, the person aggrieved is the proposed lessee. Therefore, one can appreciate if the proposed lessee challenges that order. But, what we find here is the Managing Trustee challenges the order passed by the Scheme Court. I dont think that it is competent for a Managing Trustee who is there as a representative of the Court to challenge the order. Nor he has right to challenge the same. Thus, these circumstances would clearly go to show that the act of the Managing Trustee in leasing out the property permanently for a period of 99 years is not at all in the interest of the Trust. Further, under Section 25 of the Trust Act, he has no power to execute a sale deed for a period beyond 25 years. Thus, the transaction is definitely a high-handed act. It cannot be justified on the ground of expediency or benefit to the Trust. It is definitely an act of misfeasance and malfeasance put together. The action of the Managing Trustee is thus opposed to the interests of the Trust. To tie up the Trust property for a period of 99 years is definitely not an act for the benefit of the Trust. Though the petitioner boasted of having done yeomen services to the Trust, excepting his interested version, we have no material before court to consider the same. To tie up the Trust property for a period of 99 years is definitely not an act for the benefit of the Trust. Though the petitioner boasted of having done yeomen services to the Trust, excepting his interested version, we have no material before court to consider the same. Even assuming that he has been doing good work for the Trust, it does not mean that he can take up on himself to act arbitrarily and deal with the trust property in the manner, he likes. One bad act would set at naught Hundred Good Deeds. It is not a matter of pride to say that he stole only once. Theft is theft, whether committed once or number of times. Thus, it is a clear case of malfeasance and misfeasance rolled together. 25. The property can be put to use by the Trust to improve its means. The Trust can put up its own building to augment its income. If really the Trust is of the view that the residents of the area should have some facility for higher education, whether it is in the field of Engineering, Medicine or general education, nothing prevents them to think of starting of a college of their own in the name of the Trust instead of allowing somebody else to take advantage of the property belonging to the Trust. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there was no engineering college nearby in that area and therefore, the starting of a college would benefit the public. We are concerned here only of the benefit of the Trust. The objects of the Trust should be carried out and there is no point in going for development at the cost of the Trust. It cannot also be stated that there are no facilities for education in that area, since the place is situate very near the District Head Quarters. There must be sufficient number of educational facilities for the commoners. Even then, that should not concern the Trustees. Collusion is also alleged in the transaction. Otherwise, where was the need for the trustee to challenge the order passed by the District Judge, declining the sanction. Therefore, on an analysis, I am satisfied that there is nothing for the petitioner to urge in this Civil Revision Petition. 27. Even then, that should not concern the Trustees. Collusion is also alleged in the transaction. Otherwise, where was the need for the trustee to challenge the order passed by the District Judge, declining the sanction. Therefore, on an analysis, I am satisfied that there is nothing for the petitioner to urge in this Civil Revision Petition. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner would strenuously contend that the order passed is only in the nature of an administrative order and that he has not been given any opportunity. I do not know what the counsel means by ‘opportunity’. a show-cause notice was given to which the petitioner had submitted his explanation. After the same, the order has been passed. In the explanation, he has not stated that he wanted to examine any witnesses or produce any documents to prove his innocence. In the nature of the case which ultimately rests upon documents, where is the need for any evidence. 28. The Supreme Court has also held in the decision reported in 1999 (1) SCC 332 ( Dharmarathnakarar Rai Bahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal), as follows:— “ Giving opportunity is a check and balance concept that no ones right be taken away without giving opportunity or without enquiry where statute so requires, but this is not necessary where allegations charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. No enquiry is necessary when one admits ones violations.” It was a case, where a lecturer was terminated from service for misconduct and where the misconduct was admitted. Here, the petitioner is a servant of the Scheme Court. He has admitted about the resolution being passed for leasing out the property for 99 years. It is also admitted that the District Court passed an order, refusing sanction. It is also admitted that the Resolution was passed to the effect that the lease was to be granted subject to the legal advice and sanction of the Court. The sanction was refused by the Scheme Court. There is nothing to show that any legal advice was obtained and the legal advisor gave an affirmative opinion. Having knowledge of the sanction having been refused by the Scheme Court, he permitted the lease deed to be registered. These are all facts of which, there is no controversy. The sanction was refused by the Scheme Court. There is nothing to show that any legal advice was obtained and the legal advisor gave an affirmative opinion. Having knowledge of the sanction having been refused by the Scheme Court, he permitted the lease deed to be registered. These are all facts of which, there is no controversy. When all these facts are admitted, where is the need for any more opportunity. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not given sufficient opportunity. He has been given sufficient opportunity. He received the show-cause notice and sent his explanation. 29. Learned counsel submitted that he would produce materials to show that he has done service to the Trust and that he has augmented the income of the Trust. Even assuming that there were materials to that effect with him and assuming that he had placed the same before the Court, those things could not have had any influence upon the nature of complaint against him. If he had done something good, it is not a thing of which he can be proud of. After all, he is appointed as a trustee to do good for the Trust and for discharging of ones duties, no reward can be solicited. One infraction of the Rule and a breach of Trust are sufficient to dispel the armature of glories. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any substance. 30. I am satisfied that the lower court viz., the Scheme Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction, nor any error of law. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits. 31. In the result, the C.R.P. is dismissed, with costs. Consequently, CMP. No. 18320 of 1998 shall stand dismissed. RR/VCS.