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2000 DIGILAW 93 (HP)

PYARE LAI SEHGAL v. KAMLESH VERMA

2000-04-28

M.R.VERMA

body2000
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.: This revision petition under Section 24(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (here-after referred to as the Act) is directed against the order dated October 14, 1997 passed by the Appellate Authority (2), Shimla whereby the order dated August 22, 1994 passed by the learned Rent Controller (4), Shimla directing eviction of the petitioner /tenant (here-after referred to as the tenant) from the demised premises has been affirmed on the ground of tenant ceasing to occupy the premises. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of this petition are as follows. The respondent/landlady (hereafter referred to as the landlady) instituted an application for eviction of the tenant under Section 14 of the Act from the demised premises known as Eastern Side Set in G.F. of Shivkuti Building, Tutikandi Shimla on the grounds that he is in arrears of rent and has ceased to occupy the demised premises for a continuous period of twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the eviction petition without any reasonable cause. 3. The tenant resisted the eviction petition. In his reply he took the preliminary objections that the eviction petition is neither competent nor maintainable that the petition lacks material particulars and that the landlady is estopped to file the eviction due to her act, deed, conduct and acquiescence. On merits, the claim was denied. It was claimed that the tenant had been tendering the due rent but was not accepted by the landlady. It was also claimed that the tenant along with his family is residing in the premises in question and it has been specifically denied that he has creased to occupy the premises as claimed in the petition. It has been further clarified that because of the illness of the wife of the tenant, he had to remain out of Shimla in connection with her treatment and during winter months also he has to reside outside Shimla because his wife cannot reside in Shimla during winter months. Thus, the claim as made out in the eviction petition has been denied in toto. 4. The landlady filed the rejoinder wherein the grounds as taken in the reply were denied and the claim as made in the eviction petition was re-affirmed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues: "1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent? OPP 2. 4. The landlady filed the rejoinder wherein the grounds as taken in the reply were denied and the claim as made in the eviction petition was re-affirmed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues: "1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent? OPP 2. Whether the respondent has ceased to occupy the premises in dispute without any reasonable cause for a continuous period of 12 months preceding the date of filing of the petition? OPR 3. Whether the petition in the present form is not maintainable? OPR 4. Whether the petitioner is estopped to file the present petition due to her acts, deeds, conduct, acquiescence? OPR 5. Whether the reply filed by the respondent is not properly verified, if so, its effect? OPR 6. Relief. " 6. Vide order dated August 22,1994, the learned Rent Controller decided issues No. 1 and 2 in favour of the landlady and findings on the remaining issues were not recorded as those were not pressed. As a result the petiton was allowed and the tenant was ordered to be evicted from the demised premises. 7. The tenant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authorit which vide its judgment dated October 14, 1997 set aside the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on issue No. 1 regarding non-payment of rent but maintained the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issue No.2 and the consequential order of eviction. Hence, the present revision petition by the tenant. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 9. At the very outset the learned counsel for the tenant has pointed out that the tenant had moved an application for grant of permission to lead additional evidence which was relevant and material for proper and just adjudication of the dispute between the parties, but the said application was heard and decided along with the appeal whereas the same ought to have been decided before deciding the appeal. It was further contended that the additional evidence sought to be produced was material and necessary for the just determination of the dispute, therefore, ought to have been allowed by the Appellate Authority instead of being rejected. 10. There is nothing unusual to consider such application at the time of hearing of the appeal. It was further contended that the additional evidence sought to be produced was material and necessary for the just determination of the dispute, therefore, ought to have been allowed by the Appellate Authority instead of being rejected. 10. There is nothing unusual to consider such application at the time of hearing of the appeal. Only precaution to be taken by the Court/Tribunal such a situation is that if such Court/Tribunal is of the view that the application is to be allowed, it has to be allowed without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. If the application is to be rejected, the Court/Tribunal will reject it and pronounce judgment on the merits of the case simultaneously. 11. The application of the tenant to lead additional evidence has been rejected by the Appellate Authority on the grounds that such evidence was neither essential nor required by the Court to decide the appeal and that even in the event of allowing such evidence to be produced, the final outcome of the case is not going to be effected in view of the evidence already on the record. 12. The Appellate Authority has the powers to make such further enquiry into the dispute as it thinks fit provided that it finds that such inquiry is necessary. 13. The provisions of Section 24(3) of the Act empowers the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry in the dispute but the powers so conferred can be exercised by it only if it is necessary to do so. The scope of such inquiry will be as may be deemed fit by the Appellate Authority may permit a party to lead additional evidence if necessary to do so. Taking so such evidence by the Appellate Authority will be ‘necessary’ only if it is required in the interest of justice and for just and proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Needless to say that the purpose necessitating leading of such evidence can be achieved only if it is admissible, relevant and material for the determination of the dispute. 14. The documents sought to be produced and proved in additional evidence by the tenant are specified in para 5 of the application and copies there of have been filed with the application. 14. The documents sought to be produced and proved in additional evidence by the tenant are specified in para 5 of the application and copies there of have been filed with the application. Be it stated that the relevant period during which the tenant is alleged to have ceased to occupy the demised premises is 29.4.1991 to 28.4.1992. Therefore, the documents sought to be adduced in evidence with a view to prove that the tenant had not ceased to occupy the premises in question will be material and relevant if these may prove occupation of the premises by the tenant during the relevant period. The documents/witnesses mentioned at (l)(b), (2) (3) and (5) of para 5 in the application when read with the relevant copies filed, clearly show that they are not relevant and material to decide the controversy for the simple reason that these documents do not relate to the relevant period. The document mentioned at serial No. 1 (a) of para 5 of the application is ECG record of 22.2.1992 of the tenant. This record at the most may conclusively prove the mere fact that the tenant was in Shimla on 22.2.1992. Similarly, the documents mentioned at serial No.(4) of para 5 of the application and photo copy there of will only prove the existence of account which is a pensioners account for crediting the pension where in accounts are deposited by the payee and not the payer. Thus, the character of the evidence sought to be produced is not such which may tilt the balance in favour of the tenant. 15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is admitted by the tenant vide para 3 of the application that though certain material documents were in his possession but due to bona fide impression and over-sight, could not be produced in evidence. Vide para 4 he has further admitted that documents could not be produced under the bona fide impression that the evidence adduced by him is sufficient. In view of these admissions it is clear that the evidence now sough to be produced was in the knowledge and possession of the tenant even at the stage when he led the evidence. Before the learned Rent Controller the evidence of the tenant was recorded during the period 13.10.1993 to 22.6.1994, evidently there was enough time to produce the evidence if the party was acting diligently. Before the learned Rent Controller the evidence of the tenant was recorded during the period 13.10.1993 to 22.6.1994, evidently there was enough time to produce the evidence if the party was acting diligently. If a party being in possession or having the knowledge of existence of any evidence in its favour fails to adduce the same at the relevant time because of negligence or the belief that the evidence already produced by its sufficient, such party cannot be permitted at the stage of appeal to lead additional evidence on the plea that the evidence already led by it has not been believed, therefore, he may be allowed to lead further evidence. In case in such circumstances a party is permitted to lead additional evidence, it will simply be allowing it to fill in the lacuna in its evidence, which is not permissible in law. 16. In view of the above, the order of the Appellate Authority rejecting tenants application for grant of permission to lead additional evidence, cannot be held to be illegal or perverse and, therefore, does not call for any interference. 17. On merits, the learned counsel for the tenant has contended that the onus to prove that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises for a continuous period of twelve months before the presentation of the petition for eviction was on the landlady and that the landlady has failed to lead any cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence to prove the alleged cessation of occupation whereas on the other hand, it is fully and firmly established in view of the confidence inspiring evidence led by the tenant, that except for short intervals, when the tenant had to be out of station for treatment of his wife, he had been in continuous possession of the demised premises. It was further contended that both the Authorities below have misread and misconstrued the evidence on record resulting in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(5) of the Act which is much wider in scope than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Court may interfere to undue the injustice caused to the tenant. 18. Therefore, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(5) of the Act which is much wider in scope than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Court may interfere to undue the injustice caused to the tenant. 18. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlady while supporting the impugned order, has contended that there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Authorities below and such findings being based on correct appraisal of the evidence on record, does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 19. The rival contentions for the parties necessarily require examination of the scope of the power of High Court under Section 24(5) of the Act which read as follows: "24. Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government. (l)to(4) *** *** *** (5) The High court may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation there to as it may deem fit." 20. The emphasis is laid by the learned counsel for the tenant on the expression "propriety" as used in the aforesaid such-section and it was contended that powers of this Court to examine the propriety of an order has a wider scope than the examination of the legality, therefore, this Court reappraise the evidence on the record and come to its own conclusion. 21. The expression "propriety" has not been defined in the Act or in any other statute. In the Oxford Dictionary it has been stated to mean fitness, appropriateness, aptitude, suitability appropriateness to the circumstance or conditions, conformity with requirements, rules, or principle, lightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 22. Whatever the phraseology used in Section 24 (5) of the Act, the powers thereby conferred on High Court remain only the revisional powers. Therefore, the word "propriety" used in the Section has to be interpreted only to the extent that the powers to be exercised by the Court remain revisional and are not enlarged so as to enable the Court exercise the jurisdiction as an Appellate Court. Therefore, the word "propriety" used in the Section has to be interpreted only to the extent that the powers to be exercised by the Court remain revisional and are not enlarged so as to enable the Court exercise the jurisdiction as an Appellate Court. At the best, it can be said on the basis of the used of expression "propriety" in the Section that the powers thereby conferred are not as restricted as in other statutes, but the scope of the powers despite this will remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction, As a result, these powers can be exercised only in a case where the High Court finds that there has been gross miscarriage of justice by an act of impropriety or some illegality has been committed which must vitiate the order passed by the authority. 23. While dealing with the scope of the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 where in the expression "propriety" has been used amongst others for the purpose of examination of the records by the High Court, the Honble Supreme Court in case Ubaona v. Damodaran, (1995) 5 SCC 645 has held as follows: "3. Mr.K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on , a decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saraxdamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was under consideration. This Court after noticing the word "property" used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and vent the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed "even by the presence of the word propriety it cannot mean that there could be any re-appreciation of evidence". Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed "even by the presence of the word propriety it cannot mean that there could be any re-appreciation of evidence". The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on the first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision of this court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression "propriety" in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed." 24. Similarly, while dealing with the scope of the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which empowers the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order passed by the authority therein, the Honble Supreme Court in case Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bed and others (1999) 1 SCC 133 has held as follows: "8. The appellation given to the section makes it unmistakably clear the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means, it is a power of supervision. It is well- nigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality, regularity or propriety" of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely-worded frame of the section may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in the enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction. In a recent of decision, we had occasion to consider the scope of revisional jurisdiction under certain rent control enactments vide Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Reference was then made to a decision wherein similar words used under Section 25 of the. Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 we:-e considered (vide Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswany Chet-tiar). A two-Judge Bench has observed there in at SCC p. 262, para 3) that despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority." After advertising to it we have stated in Sarla Ahuja: "The High Court in the present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different findings as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact- finding court is wholly unreasonable." 25. It is, thus, clear from the above that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 24 (5) of the Act irrespective of the use of word "propriety" does not empower the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence as a Court of appeal. Therefore, it cannot substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions arrived at by the fact finding Authorities unless the conclusions are perverse or wholly unreasonable nor can the High Court ignore the conclusions of the fact finding Courts simply for the reason that a different conclusion is possible. 26. Therefore, it cannot substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions arrived at by the fact finding Authorities unless the conclusions are perverse or wholly unreasonable nor can the High Court ignore the conclusions of the fact finding Courts simply for the reason that a different conclusion is possible. 26. In the instant case, the learned Rent Controller in his order dated August 22, 1994 has discussed the relevant evidence led by the parties in support and rebuttal of issue regarding the alleged cessation of the tenant to occupy the demised premises vide paras 13 to 22 and vide para 23 had concluded that the tenant had failed to establish any reasonable cause for his absence from the premises in dispute continuously for a period of more than twelve months. Similarly, the Appellate Authority in the impugned judgment had discussed the relevant evidence in detail vide paras 17, 17 (another para so numbered in between paras 17 and 18) and 18 and vide para 21 of the impugned judgment, concluded that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises continuously for a period of twelve months before the institution of the petition before the learned Rent Controller and has, thus, concurred with findings of the learned Rent Controller. 27. On are-appraisal of the evidence on record, the aforesaid factual conclusions of the authorities below cannot be said to be perverse or wholly unreasonable. 28. There is no dispute that the wife of the tenant had installed a factory called Himalayan Spun Pipe at Sansarpur Terace in District Kangra and the tenant is her General Power of Attorney. A perusal of most of the documents placed on record in the form of Money Order receipts etc. reveals that such correspondence has been addressed by the tenant from Sansarpur Terace during the material period. Such receipts on the record are Ext. RW-12/4, PW-12/B, RW 124R and RW-12/U-2. It is admitted by the tenant (RW-12) in his statement that on April 24,1990 he took his wife to Ambala and Sansarpur Terace. At Sansarpur Terace his wife had heart attacks during the period from September 6,1991 to December 12,1991. He has further admitted that during the period from October 1990 to June 1991 and July 1991 to April 1992 he remained with his wife. At Sansarpur Terace his wife had heart attacks during the period from September 6,1991 to December 12,1991. He has further admitted that during the period from October 1990 to June 1991 and July 1991 to April 1992 he remained with his wife. What further emerges from his statement is that in between he came to Shimla along with his wife in the month of March 1992. However, this arrival admittedly was because of the advanced stage of pregnancy of his daughter and his wife was, therefore, required to be present with his daughter. His daughter, admittedly, had been residing in a different premises known as Dhingle Estate Shimla which is at a distance of about one- and-a-half or two kilometeres from the place where the demised premises are situated. The wife of the tenant after arrival to Shimal in March 1992 to look-after her pregnant daughter had, admittedly, been residing in her daughters house in the Dhingle Estate. She was treated for some ailment during this period and in the prescription slip she has given address as a resident of Dhingle Estate. The tenant though claims that after arrival to Shimla in March 1992 he had been residing in the demised premises, whereas the case of the landlady is that the tenant as and when came to Shimla, had been residing with his daughter. The case of the landlady cannot be disbelieved for the reason that it does not seem probable that when the daughter of the tenant was in an advanced stage of pregnancy and his wife was staying with her, he was staying all alone in the premises in question. 29. PW-3 B.R.Verma, Special Power of Attorney of the landlady who has been residing in a portion of the demised premises since October 1990, had throughout seen the demised premises locked and has not seen the tenant residing therein. Similarly, PW-4 Manmohan, who resides in the first floor of the building of which the demised premises forms a part, has stated that he had not been the tenant residing in the demised premises since 1990. Though he had seen him in the premises about a month before the making of the statement in the Court on July 22, 1993, however, this occupation is not material for the purpose of the present controversy. 30. Though he had seen him in the premises about a month before the making of the statement in the Court on July 22, 1993, however, this occupation is not material for the purpose of the present controversy. 30. PW-5 Pritam Chand is the newspaper vender who had been supplying newspapers to the tenant in the demised premises during the period 1982 to 1989. According to him, thereafter the premises remained locked and supply of the newspapers to the tenant was re-started in the year 1993. Thus, the fact that during the relevant period the premises remained vacant, is supported by the PW-5 Pritam Chand also. 31. There is no cogent and reliable rebuttal to the aforesaid evidence of the witnesses who are residing in the same building and one of when had been supplying newspapers to the tenant during the period when he remained in occupation of the premises. 32. The evidence led by the tenant attempt to establish his presence in Shimla on different dated and main reliance is on prescription slips etc. The prescription slips Exts. RW- I/A dated 20-2-1992, RW- 1/B dated 2-3-1992 and RW- 1/C dated 3-4-1992. AH these slips had been issued by the same doctor and are entered in the record. However, RW-1 had admitted that Ext. RW-l/A dated 20-2-1992. However, this slip dated 20-2-1992 bears the entry No. 13276 of the same dated. However, the corresponding entry in the relevant register is not in the name of the tenant. The prescription slip Ext. RW-l/C dated 3-4-1992 refers to BP dated 2-4-1992. It is unusual that tests of a patient had been token a day before the issues of prescription slip and advice of the doctor prescribing the treatment. In none of the slips address of the tenant at the time of treatment is given nor there is any direct evidence to show that these slips relate to the treatment of the tenant. The other document for the relevant period brought on record is a photo copy of an FDR. in the name of Pyare Lal and Nirmal Sehgal Ext. RW- 12/V-12. This FDR. is dated 31-3-1992 when the wife of the tenant was admittedly residing in Dhingle Lodge as already stated here-in-above. This document or RW-8 examined to prove the FDR. do not mention or state anything about the address of the depositors. in the name of Pyare Lal and Nirmal Sehgal Ext. RW- 12/V-12. This FDR. is dated 31-3-1992 when the wife of the tenant was admittedly residing in Dhingle Lodge as already stated here-in-above. This document or RW-8 examined to prove the FDR. do not mention or state anything about the address of the depositors. It is though admitted by RW-8 Deputy Manager of the concerned Bank that they take the local address of the depositor but the tenant was a customer of the Bank, therefore, his local address was not taken. It is unbelievable that record of the FDR. is maintained without address. Local containing such address of the depositors has not been produced. In view of the said admission and non-production of record containing the address of the depositors, the only inference which can be drawn is that the address of the depositors as given in the records was/is the address other than that of the demised premises. The Postal receipt Ext. RW-6/A is proved to have been issued by a local Post Office regarding a M.O. sent by someone to one Kamlesh. However, RW-4 has not given the date of the.receipt and the date thereof as in the stamp used is allegible. The hand-written dates of issues of the receipts as found on RW-6/A are not proved to have been given by any employee of the concerned Post Office. There are other writing also on this document clearly indicating that certain hand-written contents of this document had been inserted by some-one subsequent to the issue of the receipt. It may also be pointed out that documents Exts. RW-6/A and RW-l/A relate to the period prior to March 1992 when die tenant, as per his own admission, returned to Shimla along with his wife after remaining out of station in connection with the treatments of bio wife. Thus, these documents are of suspicious nature. In any case, they may suggest that at the time of coming into being of these documents the tenant was in Shimal but in no way they prove that the tenant was residing in the demised premises. The other evidence is equally unreliable. 33. The expression "occupation" conveys the idea of continuity, a continuous series of transactions and implies regularity. Further more time is a necessary ingredient which need not be protracted but should not be momentary. The other evidence is equally unreliable. 33. The expression "occupation" conveys the idea of continuity, a continuous series of transactions and implies regularity. Further more time is a necessary ingredient which need not be protracted but should not be momentary. Therefore, isolated, casual, semi- occasional or temporary possession will not be "occupation". Therefore, the expression "occupation" with reference to the context that is as used in Section 14(2)(v) of the Act does not mean more possession but actual user of the premises. 34. In view of the above, even is the tenant had been visiting Shimla casually with a view to see his daughter etc. that would not clothe him with a status of "in occupation of the premises". 35. It was contended for the tenant that the non-occupation of the demised premises for a short period was result of the illness of his wife who had to be treated outside Shimla and as per the medical advice she could not reside in Shimla. Therefore, the non- occupation is not proved to be without reasonable cause. 36. There is no doubt evidence on the record about the illness of the wife of the tenant However, neither the longer treatment and admission for such treatment co-relates to the period of non- occupation of the premises nor there is evidence to prove that the wife of the tenant could not be treated in Shimla and the alleged medical advice that in the interest of her health she could not reside in Shimla at the relevant time. During the relevant period the tenant and his wife had been residing either at Ambala or at Sansarpur Terrace where the wife of the tenant has instai led an industry and the tenant has been appointed her General Power of Attorney. In view of this, it will be wrong to held that the tenant and his wife remained out of Shimla due to illness as alleged. In fact as emerges from the evidence on record, they had been out of Shimla for a period longer than the requisite period of twelve months because of their residing in Sansarpur Terrace where ihe wife of the tenant has a factoty and the tenant being her General Power of Attorney, looks-after the affairs of the factory. In fact as emerges from the evidence on record, they had been out of Shimla for a period longer than the requisite period of twelve months because of their residing in Sansarpur Terrace where ihe wife of the tenant has a factoty and the tenant being her General Power of Attorney, looks-after the affairs of the factory. The cessation to occupy the demised premises cannot be said to be a result of temporary absence from Shimla amounting to a reasonable cause. 37. There is evidence on record to prove that after the institution of the petition for eviction, the tenant has started living in the demised premises. This act, however, cannot be permitted to defeat the right which had already accrued to the landlady. 38. In view of the above, the conclusions arrived at by the fact finding authorities below are supportable on the basis of the material on the record and cannot be held and unreasonable. Therefore, such conclusions and the consequential order for eviction of the tenant, do not all for interference by this Court. 39. As a result the revision petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed