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2000 DIGILAW 930 (MAD)

S. Ravi v. The President, the Gandhi Nagar Club, Adayar and Others

2000-09-19

A.S.VENKATACHALA MOORTHY, K.GNANAPRAKASAM

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Judgment :- A.S. VENKATACHALAMOORTHY, J. The above appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 11102 of 2000, dismissing the same on the ground that the writ petition is not maintainable and further the writ petitioner has an effective remedy of a civil suit. 2. The appellant filed the writ petition No. 11103 of 2000 against the respondents herein and the relevant facts may be stated as hereunder : The appellant became a permanent member of Gandhi Nagar Club, Adayar in the year 1995 on making a remittance of Rs. 60,000/-. He was also paying annual subscription as per rules. That apart, the appellant was also advised to pay children membership fee on the assurance that if he pays a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per child, his children would be given full-fledged membership on their attaining the age of 21 and on that basis, he also paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, expecting his son and daughter would be made members on their completing 21 years in the year 2003 and 2008 respectively. The appellant stated that there was some delay in settling the bills for the month of January, February and March, as there were lot of commitments for him. The appellant gave a cheque for the above bills and immediately he went abroad. As he could not make necessary collection and deposit the amount, there were no sufficient funds in the Bank and with the result, the cheque was dishonoured. The appellant further stated that he received a communication, addressed to him, which was received by his servant on 15th May and he actually saw the same only on 20th May, 2000. Only then, he came to know that the cheques issued had been returned. The letter received by the appellant reads thus : "Dated 12th May 2000. Final Notice Dear Sir, Please refer to bill No. 9381 dated 5-1-2000, Bill No. 10475 dated 28-1-2000, 11613 dated 29-2-2000 and 12784 dated 5-4-2000 amounting to Rs. 42,724.40. Notice Rule 5 clause 3 of the Gandhinagar Club is given to you that you are in default of payment of your dues to the club for more than three months. Hence your name was put upon the club notice board simultaneously please note that this letter is also being put upon our club notice board. 42,724.40. Notice Rule 5 clause 3 of the Gandhinagar Club is given to you that you are in default of payment of your dues to the club for more than three months. Hence your name was put upon the club notice board simultaneously please note that this letter is also being put upon our club notice board. The General committee has taken the final decision to terminate your membership without any further notice in this matter unless we receive your payment immediately by cash. Please also note that your cheque number 776246 dated 25-3-2000 drawn on Standard Chartered Bank. Mylapore, Chennai 14 for Rupees 30,266.20 has been returned due to insufficient fund, by your bankers. Hence the club has decided not to accept any cheques from you in future and only cash/DD will be accepted towards payment from you. We have been advised by our lawyers to take criminal action against you under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, further saddling you with all costs and consequences thereof. Thanking you Sd. B. Ramkumar." According to the appellant, the entire text of the above letter is false.It is the further grievance of the appellant that many persons, who did not pay the dues for more than five months, whose names were displayed in the notice board, paid their dues in the sixth month, were accepted and they were allowed to continue to use the club and no drastic action as in the case of the appellant was taken. The further case of the appellant is that he replied on 20th May offering to settle the dues on 10th June, 2000, but however, he was successfully prevented from making the payment and ultimately, he received the impugned order dated 20th June. According to the appellant, the 2nd respondent is behind the whole episode and he has a grievance against the appellant because when the 2nd respondent abused a lady member, this appellant came to her rescue and reacted to the said act of the 2nd respondent with vociferous condemnation for a longer time and only due to this conduct of the appellant, the 2nd respondent had nursed a vengeance and wreaked it by being responsible for passing the impugned order. 3. We are clearly of the opinion that it is unnecessary to take up the exercise of considering the issue whether a writ is maintainable in the present case. 3. We are clearly of the opinion that it is unnecessary to take up the exercise of considering the issue whether a writ is maintainable in the present case. This is because, we are of the view evenassuming the writ petition is maintainable, this Court will not entertain the same when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available and a party may not be allowed to bypass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. In this context, we are inclined to refer the ruling of the Apex Court in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, the Apex Court held thus (at pp. 762 and 763 of AIR) : "When any citizen or person is wronged, the High Court will step in to protect him, be that wrong be done by the State, an Instrumentality of the State, a company or a co-operative society or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or even an individual. Right that is infringed may be under Part III of the Constitution or any other right which the law validly made might confer upon him. But then the power conferred upon the High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution is so vast, this Court has laid down certain guidelines and self-imposed limitations have been put there subject to which the High Courts would exercise jurisdiction, but those guidelines cannot be mandatory in all circumstances. The High Court does not interfere when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available or when there in established procedure to remedy a wrong or enforce a right. A party may not be allowed to bypass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. The High Court does not act like a proverbial "bull in a china shop" in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226." (Emphasis supplied) 4. We also refer to the ruling of the Apex Court reported in (Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha), where the Apex court, after referring the decision rendered in M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natrajan, pointed out that the power is supervisory in nature and observed thus : (at pp. 2253 and 2254 of AIR), "In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the Civil Court. 2253 and 2254 of AIR), "In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the Civil Court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure code is of superior judicial quality than what is generally available under other statutes, and the Judge being entrusted exclusively with administration of justice, is excepted to better. .............The High court, in the present case, therefore, ought not to have embarked upon a decision of the writ petition on merits, and should have refused to exercise its special jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy before the Civil Court." 5. In Mohan Pandey v. Smt. Usha Rani Rajgaria, while pointing out as to when the constitutional jurisdiction has to be exercised, the Apex Court observed thus : (at p. 1227 of AIR), "The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their judgment under appeal." 6. Coming to the present case, three aspects have to be pointed out, viz., a) The appellant has an equally efficacious alternative remedy and hence he need not be allowed to bypass the normal channel viz., civil litigation. b) This is not an exceptional case, where the provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure. Equally it is not as if,the delay ifany, in getting the relief would seriously affect the interests of the appellant. At best it may be that the appellant may not be able to enjoy more happiness or comfort which he might get by attending the club, during the pendency of the interim application or the suit as the case may be. c) From the pleadings of the appellant as referred to in the earlier paragraphs, it is abundantly clear that there are disputed questions of fact and witnesses have to be examined to arrive at factual findings. 7. c) From the pleadings of the appellant as referred to in the earlier paragraphs, it is abundantly clear that there are disputed questions of fact and witnesses have to be examined to arrive at factual findings. 7. In the result, there are no merits in the appeal and the same is dismissed, however, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. Nos. 11550 and 11551 of 2000 are also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.