JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners (plaintiffs) have preferred this revision petition against the judgment dated 20.5.99 passed by the Additional District Judge No.1, Sikar in Civil Misc. Appeal No.21/98 by which the appeal was partly allowed setting aside the judgment of the trial Court (Civil Judge (JD) Laxmangarh) but granting liberty to the defendant Nos. 7 & 8 (respondent Nos. 7 & 8) to take electricity connection at the disputed "Nohra" for running establishment of Ice Factory through defendant No.1 to 4, provided they (defendant Nos. 7 & 8) would take prior permission in the form of No Objection Certificate from the defendant Rajasthan State Pollution Control Board (for short the Board) under the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act 1974 (for short "Pollution Control Act") and unless such NOC is granted they were restrained by temporary injunction from carrying on business of Ice Factory till disposal of the suit. 2. The petitioners (plaintiffs) are residents of Ward No.13 & 14 of Laxmangarh town. The dispute arose when the defendant No.7 & 8 (Shokat Ali & Pawan Kumar Kachhwal) by converting their residential plot in question into commercial premises and taking 50 HP electricity connection thereat, without consent of their co-sharers wanted to establish an Ice Factory in a thickly populated area of residential colony after having been successful in getting No Objection Certificate dated 4.3.98 from the defendant Nos. 5 & 6 (Municipal Board Authority) in violation of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. It is the plaintiffs' case that no permission from the defendant Nos. 9 & 10 (Pollution Control Board Authority) has been taken and that since the ammonia gas used in the Ice Factory is harmful for human beings as it affects their health in several ways, inasmuch as, heavy power electricity connection would vibrate the houses adjoining the factory besides generator used would cause air & water pollution in the form of public nuisance. Thus, in these circumstances the petitioners (plaintiffs) prayed for mandatory injunction & perpetual injunction for restraining (1) the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 (Electricity Board Authorities) from giving high power electricity connection and (2) the defendant Nos. 5 & 6 (Municipal Authorities) from giving permission for converting residential premises to commercial one; (3) defendant Nos. 9 & 10 (Pollution Control Authority) from giving water connection to the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 (Electricity Board Authorities) from giving high power electricity connection and (2) the defendant Nos. 5 & 6 (Municipal Authorities) from giving permission for converting residential premises to commercial one; (3) defendant Nos. 9 & 10 (Pollution Control Authority) from giving water connection to the defendant Nos. 7 & 8 for setting up the proposed Ice Factory in the residential locality area. Mandatory injunction was also sought from the Civil Court for restraining the defendant Nos. 9 & 10 from permitting the defendant Nos. 7 & 8 to establish the proposed Ice Factory, in the area in question. 3. Alongwith suit an application for temporary injunction was also moved to the same effect. Reply was filed by the defendant No.7 denying the facts stated by the plaintiffs in their T.I. applications and replication. The defendant Nos. 5 & 6 so also Nos. 1 to 4 have filed separate replies stating that conversion charges have been deposited by defendant No.7 after obtaining NOC and requisite permission under Factories & Boilers Department to establish the Ice Factory and the electric connection has also been given. 4. The trial Court rejected the application for temporary injunction by its judgment dated 27.5.98, against which the plaintiffs preferred misc. appeal before the appellate Court. The appeal was partly allowed by the impugned judgment. Hence, this revision petition. 5. During the course of hearing, Shri N.K. Maloo, learned counsel for the plaintiffs (petitioners) contended that the Courts below have failed to consider hazardous aspect involved in setting up an Ice Factory in a residential colony since ammonia gas being deployed in running of Ice Factory is hazardous substance to the residents of the locality and keeping in view the safety of the residents, permission for setting up ice factory should not be granted because the ammonia gas caused several diseases like intestinal, disorders, trancoma, hepatitis, besides lungs & skin diseases. Secondly, Shri Maloo contended that the courts below have not considered that no objection certificate dated 4.3.98 was issued in contravention of statutory provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act because objections were not invited, notices were not affixed at site inasmuch as even the persons living nearby were not given opportunity of hearing. Secondly, Shri Maloo contended that the courts below have not considered that no objection certificate dated 4.3.98 was issued in contravention of statutory provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act because objections were not invited, notices were not affixed at site inasmuch as even the persons living nearby were not given opportunity of hearing. That apart, two different maps were produced by the defendant No.7 one before the Municipal Authorities and other before the Factories & Boilers Department for permission, which show different modes of construction of the ice factory. The map produced by the Municipality is for tin shed and the other one produced from the Boilers department is for RCC construction. Thus, Shri Maloo contended that production of different maps shows that the defendant No.7 has not come with dean hands but this aspect was not given any weightage by the courts below. 6. Shri Maloo also contended that the courts below have wrongly appreciated the affidavits which were produced by the defendant No.7 to motivate the courts on wrong facts whereas there are no such factories in Ward No.14, as would be evident from the inspection report dated 18.3.98 of defendant No.6, and that apart, aforesaid inspection made on 18.3.98 was merely a formality in view of the fact that the NOC was issued on earlier dates, i.e. 4.3.98 & 10.3.98, for which the respondent Nos.5 & 6 have not clarified as to why two separate NOCs were issued for the same purpose. 7. Shri R.K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the contesting respondents (defendant Nos. 7 & 8) contended that no details of alternate area have been shown on record from which it could be inferred that the defendants are also having any commercial or industrial plot where they could be insisted upon to set up their ice factory instead of setting it up in a dense thickly populated area in Ward No.14. Shri Agrawal submitted that the requisite permission as also No Objection Certificates dated 21.10.95 & 30:8.99 have already been obtained by I the defendant Nos. 7 & 8 from the Small Scale Industries Department and the Factories & Boilers Department, inasmuch as, the conversion charges have also been deposited with the Municipality, so as to establish & set up Ice Factory on a legally regularised commercial plot of land after observing requisite essential formalities under the relevant laws. 7 & 8 from the Small Scale Industries Department and the Factories & Boilers Department, inasmuch as, the conversion charges have also been deposited with the Municipality, so as to establish & set up Ice Factory on a legally regularised commercial plot of land after observing requisite essential formalities under the relevant laws. Shri Agrawal also submitted that once all the requisites under the laws have been completed and thereafter electrical connection has also been sanctioned by the Electricity Board, no temporary injunction in a suit for perpetual or mandatory injunction can be granted, inasmuch as Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit against the orders of the defendants either Municipal Board or the Pollution Control Board or the Electricity Board. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the impugned order so also the record and the legal position on the subject. 9. I would like to discuss at the outset a brief resume of the decisions cited by both the parties. Shri Maloo cited a series of decisions viz. (1) Vimla Devi Vs. Jang Bahadur (1977 RLW 326) , (2) Gangubai Vs. Sitaram ( AIR 1983 SC 742 ) , (3) V. Lakshmipathy Vs. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 Karnataka 57) , (4) Sugarcane G & S Sugars Shareholders Association Vs. T.N. Pollution Control Board ( AIR 1998 SC 2614 ) , (5) Re. Bhivani River Vs. Sakshi Sugars Ltd. ( 1998(6) SCC 335 ) , (6) Obayya Pujari Vs. Member Secretary KS PCB (AIR 1999 Karnataka 157) , (7) Kishna Devi Vs. Vishnu Mitra AIR 1982 Rajasthan 287 , (8) Radhey Shyam Vs. Gur Prasad AIR 1978 Allahabad 86 , (9) A.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. M.V. Nayudu ( AIR 1999 SC 812 ) , (10) M.C. Mehta (Badkhal & Surajkund Lakes matter) Vs. Union of India ( 1997(3) SCC 715 ) , (11) State of U.P. Vs. Rajkaran Singh ( 1998(8) SCC 529 ) , (12) Ajeet Mehta Vs. State (1989(1) RLR 894) ; and (13) Jagdish Vs. State (1993(3) WLC (Raj.) 38 . 10. I have carefully perused the decisions cited by Shri Maloo. None of the decisions (supra) renders any assistance to the plaintiffs in advancing their cause for grant of temporary injunction because in the decisions in the cases referred to above at S.Nos. State (1989(1) RLR 894) ; and (13) Jagdish Vs. State (1993(3) WLC (Raj.) 38 . 10. I have carefully perused the decisions cited by Shri Maloo. None of the decisions (supra) renders any assistance to the plaintiffs in advancing their cause for grant of temporary injunction because in the decisions in the cases referred to above at S.Nos. 2 to 6 & 9 to 11 (supra), the matters were dealt with in a writ petition challenging the action of the State Pollution Control Board and the final adjudication was done. after taking into consideration relevant evidence on record whereas this Court is dealing with the matter in revisional jurisdiction against the non-grant of temporary injunction, which is restricted to the fetters provided under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. 11. The decisions in matters referred to above at S. Nos. 12 & 13 were rendered while dealing with orders on the complaints of public nuisance under Section 133 Criminal Procedure Code 12. In Radhey Shyam Vs. Gurprasad (supra) the Allahabad High Court in second appeal, arising out of suit of permanent injunction against the establishment of a Flour Mill in the premises of the defendant which materially affected physical comforts of the plaintiff held that permanent injunction can be issued against the defendant. 13. In Kishna Devi Vs. Vishnu Mitra (supra) the defendant made construction over sanitary lane inasmuch as the UIT granted permission therefor, this Court held that since there was invasion on civic rights in general and right to use sanitary land of plaintiff in particular; there is no bar for civil court to grant temporary injunction merely because of grant of permission by UIT. It was a case where suit for permanent injunction was filed and wherein in written statement, the till: contended that 5 ft. wide vacant space was to be kept by the defendant in the lane in question while making construction but the defendant interprets it to mean that it is for the use of defendant only. Thus, both the decisions (supra) cited by Shri Maloo do not help in advancing the plaintiffs' case for grant of temporary injunction. 14. In Vimladevi Vs. wide vacant space was to be kept by the defendant in the lane in question while making construction but the defendant interprets it to mean that it is for the use of defendant only. Thus, both the decisions (supra) cited by Shri Maloo do not help in advancing the plaintiffs' case for grant of temporary injunction. 14. In Vimladevi Vs. Jang Bahadur , this Court while dealing with a revision petition against the Judgment of the appellate Court which set aside the order of the trial court refusing temporary injunction but directed the maintenance of status quo as it existed on the date of filing of the suit held that where court of first appeal interferes with trial court's order in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant aspects of the matter such an order was held to have been passed without jurisdiction and was set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. But in the present case the facts are distinguishable hence the ratio of aforesaid decision is not attracted. 15. Shri R.K. Agarwal learned counsel for the respondents on the question of jurisdiction/maintainability of suit and scope of interference under section 115 Civil Procedure Code, has placed reliance upon the decisions reported in : (1) Hindustan Aeronautics Vs. Ajit Prasad ( AIR 1973 SC 76 ) (2) Manik Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy ( AIR 1986 SC 446 ) (3) Lachmandas Vs. Santokh Singh ( 1995 (4) SCC 201 ) (4) Sanjay Musale Vs. State of M.P. ( 1998(6) SCC 616 ) (5) Bhojraj Kunwar Oil Mill Vs. Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1984 SC 1894 ) (6) Shivarao Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 952 ) (7) Laxmiraj Shetty Vs. State of Tamilnadu (8) Shivkumar Chadha Vs. Municipal Ors. Delhi ( 1993(3) SCC 161 ) (9) Bhiya Vs. Mangla (1995 ILR Raj. 910) (10) Lakhan Nayak Vs. Badudev Swamy (AIR 1991 Orissa 33) (11) Asst. H.R. & C.E. Salem Vs. N.K.S.E. Mudaliar AIR 1987 Madras 187 . 16. In Bhiya Vs. State of Tamilnadu (8) Shivkumar Chadha Vs. Municipal Ors. Delhi ( 1993(3) SCC 161 ) (9) Bhiya Vs. Mangla (1995 ILR Raj. 910) (10) Lakhan Nayak Vs. Badudev Swamy (AIR 1991 Orissa 33) (11) Asst. H.R. & C.E. Salem Vs. N.K.S.E. Mudaliar AIR 1987 Madras 187 . 16. In Bhiya Vs. Mangla , (supra) this Court in second appeal preferred against the judgments and decree of the courts below held that permission to sue or defend may be implied from conduct of suit and since the provision of Order 1 Rule 8 Civil Procedure Code, in a representative suit, as to giving of notice is mandatory and not directory, therefore, substantial compliance is necessary to maintain decree inasmuch as non-compliance is sufficient to vitiate decree and proceedings. 17. In Lakhan Nayak Vs. Basudev and Assistant Commissioner and R.& C.E. Salem Vs. N.K.S.E. (Supra) the controversy as to non-compliance of provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 (2) Civil Procedure Code, was raised in first and second appeals before Orissa High Court after the suit was finally decided. In the instant case the suit is yet pending, so the issue as to whether there is non-compliance of Order 1 Rule 8 (2) Civil Procedure Code or not has yet to be adjudicated and decided after permitting the parties opportunity of leading the evidence on record. Hence, ratio of this decision also does not help in advancing the case of petitioners. 18. In Sanjay Musale Vs. State of M.P. (supra) the Apex Court held that PIL petition filed by a meddlesome interloper was not maintainable because of concealment of material facts and involving no public interest. In Shivarao Vs. Union of India , the Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court against the Judgment of High Court declining to issue a writ of mandamus. The Apex court held that since the matter involved complex and technical enquiry, judicial proceeding is not appropriate for determination of such matter. In Laxmiraj Shetty Vs. State of Tamilnadu (supra) in Criminal Appeal, the Apex Court held that facts stated in the matter on the basis of News Paper reports are hearsay in nature and therefore inadmissible unless maker of statement is examined in absence of which no judicial notice thereof can be taken. 19. In Laxmiraj Shetty Vs. State of Tamilnadu (supra) in Criminal Appeal, the Apex Court held that facts stated in the matter on the basis of News Paper reports are hearsay in nature and therefore inadmissible unless maker of statement is examined in absence of which no judicial notice thereof can be taken. 19. The decisions discussed above in the facts and circumstances are not attracted in the present case since the suit is yet pending for final adjudication before the concerned civil court and any expression of opinion at this stage may prejudice the case of either parties since the challenge in this petition is against the interim order declining the relief of interim injunction in a pending suit. 20. In Hindustan Aeronautics Vs. Ajit Prasad (supra) the Apex Court held that the High Court should not interfere even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not unless it is apparent that the order has been passed by the subordinate court in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. It was a case where the plaintiff filed suit challenging the validity of the enquiry and suspension ordered against him. The trial court issued an interim ex parte order but at later stage revoked ex parte order after hearing both the parties against which the plaintiff went in appeal wherein the appellate court modified the order of trial court directing the defendant to refrain from proceeding with the enquiry till decision of the suit but sustained the suspension of the plaintiff. The High Court in revision petition preferred by the plaintiff stayed the operation of suspension order. Against that stay, the Apex Court held as indicated above and set aside the High Court's stay order and restored appellate court's order. 21. In Manik Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy (supra), the Apex Court reversed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court holding that interference in revisional jurisdiction on conjectures and surmises was illegal as to the finding on evidence given in proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. It further held that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the Subordinate Court. 22. In Lachmandass Vs. It further held that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the Subordinate Court. 22. In Lachmandass Vs. Santokh Singh (supra) the matter related to rent control and eviction under the Haryana Rent Control Act. The Apex Court held that where statute provides for right of appeal as well as discretionary remedy of revision, it intends to create two jurisdiction different in scope and content and discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from material impropriety, perversity and illegality. It also held that revisional power of High Court under Section 15(6) of Haryana Rent Control Act is wider than that under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. The Apex court further held that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction has no powers to re-assess and re-appreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power, and that limitation is implicit in the concept of revision. It was also a case where the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction had reversed the judgment of eviction passed by the Rent Control Authority as affirmed by the Appellate Authority and thus the revision was against the judgment of final adjudication of the rent suit itself. In Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill Vs. Yograj Sinha (supra) the Apex Court held that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional powers was confined only on ground that merely because a different view on facts elicited was possible is not permissible in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It was also a case where civil suit for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation of the rent premises was finally adjudicated upon and decreed and the decree was confirmed by the order of the Apex Court while dismissing Special Leave to Appeal of the tenant. Thereafter the eviction decree was put into execution and physical possession was handed over to the landlord. But the tenant moved application for being reinducted into possession under section 17 of the Bombay Rent Control Act on the ground that the landlord failed to use the premises for which possession was obtained in eviction decree. Thereafter the eviction decree was put into execution and physical possession was handed over to the landlord. But the tenant moved application for being reinducted into possession under section 17 of the Bombay Rent Control Act on the ground that the landlord failed to use the premises for which possession was obtained in eviction decree. Since there was delay in moving the application under section 17 of the aforesaid Act, application for condonation of the delay was also moved which was allowed by the trial court condoning the delay against which the landlord filed revision petition before the Assistant Judge, who reversed the findings of the trial court. The High Court affirmed the view of the Assistant Judge and against which the tenant preferred Special Leave to Appeal and in appeal the Apex Court holding as above, restored the trial court's order of condoning the delay and remitted the matter for disposal of the application under Section 17 of the aforesaid Act. 23. In Shiv Kumar Chadha Vs. Municipal Ors. of Delhi (supra) in paras 29 and 30, the Apex Court held as under: 29. "It is well known that in most of the cities building regulations and bye-laws have been framed, still it has been discovered that constructions have been made without any sanction or in contravention of the sanctioned plan, and such constructions have continued without any intervention. There cannot be two opinions that the regulations and bye-laws in respect of buildings, are meant to serve the public interest. But at the same time it cannot be held that in all circumstances, the authorities entrusted with the demolition of unauthorised constructions, have exclusive power, to the absolute exclusion of the power of the court. In some special cases where "jurisdictional error" on the part of the Ors. is established, a suit shall be maintainable. 24. Following safeguards were suggested by the Court for observance: (1) The court should not ordinarily entertain a suit in connection with the proceedings initiated for demolition, by the Commissioner, in terms of Section 343(1) of the Ors. Act. The court should direct the persons aggrieved to pursue the remedy before the appellate tribunal and then before the administrator in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Act. The court should direct the persons aggrieved to pursue the remedy before the appellate tribunal and then before the administrator in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. (2) The court should entertain a suit questioning the validity of an order passed under Section 343 of the Act, only if the court is of prima facie opinion that the order is nullity in the eyes of law because of any "jurisdictional error" in exercise of the power by the Commissioner or that the order is outside the Act." "30. It need not be said that primary object of filing a suit challenging the validity of the order of demolition is to restrain such demolition with the intervention of the court. In such a suit the plaintiff is more interested in getting an order of interim injunction. It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and, such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles-ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him." 25. Having considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel with reference to the principles of law laid down in the decisions cited at the bar, prima facie, I am of the view that indisputably temporary injunction has been sought by the plaintiffs/petitioners in the nature of mandatory or perpetual injunction and in the main suit, for restraining:-(1) the defendants (Municipal Authorities) from converting residential plot in question of the defendant No.7 into commercial one; (2) the defendant Nos. 7 & 8 from getting their suit residential plot converted into commercial one through Municipal Board, and then from setting up Ice Factory on the said converted residential plot; (3) the defendants (Electricity Board Authorities) from releasing 50 HP electricity connection for setting up Ice Factory in favour of defendant No.7 on the suit plot; (4) defendant No.9 (Water Supply Authority) from releasing water supply connection for the Ice Factory on the suit plot, and (5) for injunction directing the defendants (Pollution Control Authorities) to control the water and air pollution being caused out of the establishment of the Ice Factory on a residential plot situated in thickly populated area of the town. 26. The suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction is pending final adjudication. Admittedly, after the suit has been instituted, the Municipal Authorities have granted permission for conversion of residential plot into commercial one and electricity and water supply connections have already been released for the suit land and likewise Small Scale Industries as also the Factories & Boilers Departments have issued No Objection Certificates dated 21.10.95 & 30.8.99 to set up ice factory on the suit plot. The questions whether the orders favouring defendant Nos. 7 & 8 either for permission of conversion of the residential plot into commercial plot or for the release of electrical & water supply connections or for permission or No Objection Certificate being issued by respective departments, referred to above for setting up Ice Factory on the suit plot are legal or not all, all such questions have to be adjudicated upon finally by the trial Court in the pending suit after full fledged trial in accordance with procedure provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, I refrain myself to express any opinion or adjudge the merits of the aforesaid orders as it is not within the scope of exercise of revisional jurisdiction and cannot be examined in this revision petition arising out of the judgments of the courts below or with regard to impugned order which is in the nature of interim order declining the relief of interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 because any expression of opinion without taking into consideration the evidence, which has yet to be led during trial in the suit to adjudge the validity of aforesaid orders, may prejudice one or the other party in having a fair trial since the final decision in the suit is as yet subjudice. 27. Thus, it cannot be denied that the essential requirements under relevant laws to set up an Ice Factory have already been completed by defendant Nos. 7 & 8. Thus, at this stage in a suit for mandatory or perpetual injunction when both the courts below have found no prima facie case, balance of convenience etc. in favour of the plaintiffs, in my considered view the plaintiffs have rightly been declined the relief of temporary injunction as sought for in T.I. application on the contentions canvassed by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, I am of the view that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by interfering with the impugned order will not be proper and hence refrain to re-examine or re-assess the material on record and then to substitute findings on facts for those of the subordinate court which examined the material on the application for grant of temporary injunction in a suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction. I do not find any error of law or jurisdiction or material irregularity and illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the appellate court so as to invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. 28. However, the challenges as to the validity of orders or permission or No Objection Certificate issued by the defendants departments/Board and as to the maintainability of suit, itself, are left open for being considered during full fledged trial in suit for mandatory injunction. In my considered view in the facts & circumstances of this case, I must refrain from entering into the controversy as to the maintainability of the suit at this stage in revisional jurisdiction. In my considered view in the facts & circumstances of this case, I must refrain from entering into the controversy as to the maintainability of the suit at this stage in revisional jurisdiction. It is settled law that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course and the court should be always willing to extend its hand to protect a citizen who is being wronged or is being deprived of a property without any authority of law or without following the procedure which are fundamental and vital in nature. Keeping in view the principles of law laid down in the decisions (supra) discussed above, a civil court should entertain a suit questioning the validity of an order passed under a statute only if the court is of prima facie opinion that the order is nullity in the eyes of law or there is jurisdictional error in exercise of the power by the authority under that statute or that the order impugned is outside the purview of that statute. Thus a suit is maintainable only where exceptional circumstances are established or where "jurisdictional error" on the part of the authority vested with the power under a statute either under the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, or the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 or the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1947, is established on record notwithstanding the statutes referred to above which provide a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil court in matters where such issues as aforesaid are raised. 29. As a result of the discussion made above, this civil revision petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. The impugned order dated 20.5.99 passed by the Additional District Judge No.1, Sikar in civil appeal No. 21/98 allowing it partly against the order dated 27.5.98 of the Civil Judge (JD) Laxmangarh in civil misc. application No.21/98, is hereby upheld. As this revision petition has been disposed of, ad interim stay orders dated 23.9.99 & 5.11.99 passed by this Court in this revision petition stand vacated. Since the revision petition arises out of suit for mandatory & perpetual injunction involving important questions of fact and law, the trial Court is directed to expeditiously decide the suit, itself, but not beyond six months from the receipt of this order. Since the revision petition arises out of suit for mandatory & perpetual injunction involving important questions of fact and law, the trial Court is directed to expeditiously decide the suit, itself, but not beyond six months from the receipt of this order. A copy of this order be sent to the trial Court forthwith.Revision Dismissed. *******