RAMANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed by the opposite party in W. C. No. 2 of 1994 on the file of Commissioner for Workmen s compensation, Hyderabad. ( 2 ) THE appellant No. 1 is the contractor and appellant No. 2 is the Mutawalli in- charge of Darga Rajul Qualtal, Misrigunj, hyderabad. Respondent No. 1 herein is the workman who is the applicant in W. C. No. 2 of 1994. Aggrieved by the compensation granted to the workman in the said W. C. , the present appeal is filed. ( 3 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1 workman was working under the appellant No. 1 for the past several years. On 26. 8. 1993, he was working in the premises of the appellant No. 2 darga as per the directions of the appellant no. 1. The appellant No. 1 directed the respondent No. 1 workman to blast stones in the premises of the appellant No. 2 Darga. As per the directions of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, while the workman respondent No. 1 was blasting the stones, the accident took place. After making arrangements for blasting the stones, the respondent No. 1 workman had left the place of site for his lunch. On his return, the appellant No. 1 came to the site, informed the respondent no. 1 workman that blasting did not take place properly. Thereafter, at the direction of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, the respondent no. 1 workman approached the blasting spot to check up whether any blasting has taken place or not. In the course of such checking, blasting took place and the respondent No. 1 workman sustained injuries. He was shifted to the Osmania General hospital, Hyderabad, and for twenty days he was in the hospital. In the surgery conducted on the respondent No. 1 workman, three fingers of his right hand were removed. Police registered a case in Cr. No. 55 of 1993 under section 337, Indian Penal code against the appellants. The respondent No. 1 workman filed an application for compensation under the Workmen s Compensation Act on the ground that because of the injuries sustained by him he suffered permanent disability, and he claimed compensation of Rs. 1,00,000. Police registered a case in Cr. No. 55 of 1993 under section 337, Indian Penal code against the appellants. The respondent No. 1 workman filed an application for compensation under the Workmen s Compensation Act on the ground that because of the injuries sustained by him he suffered permanent disability, and he claimed compensation of Rs. 1,00,000. ( 4 ) APPELLANT No. 1 as well as the appellant No. 2 contested the matter in the court below by filing their respective counters. In his counter, the appellant No. 1 stated that he undertook some construction work of the appellant No. 2 Darga and, respondent No. 1 workman has taken some amount in advance from him and started the work on 26. 8. 1993 after purchasing gunpowder and detonators to work at his own risk. It is contended that the work of blasting is not one of the agreed items of work to be carried out by the workman and the workman respondent No. 1 himself irresponsibly blasted the stones. It is contended that the appellant No. 2 Darga is a public place and normally the authorities of darga will not allow anyone to carry out any blasting work. It is contended that the workman respondent No. 1 had voluntarily indulged in this illegal act and exposed himself to the danger and so the appellants are not responsible for the accident and not liable to pay any compensation to him. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the appellant No. 2 darga its Mutawalli filed counter, inter alia, stating that the appellant No. 1 was entrusted with some construction work and the appellant No. 1 engaged the respondent no. 1 workman and there is no contract of employment between the workman, i. e. , respondent No. 1 and the appellant No. 2. It is further contended that the workman respondent No. 1 had exposed himself to the risk because of his own irresponsible attitude. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the workman respondent No. 1, in the court below, he examined himself and stated that he was getting a monthly salary of Rs. 1,500 apart from rs. 5 as daily batta and reiterated the facts mentioned in his claim application. ( 7 ) THE evidence of the respondent No. 1 workman is to the effect that on 26. 8. 1,500 apart from rs. 5 as daily batta and reiterated the facts mentioned in his claim application. ( 7 ) THE evidence of the respondent No. 1 workman is to the effect that on 26. 8. 1993 after drilling the rocks, which was done as per the directions of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, the initial blasting has not taken place. So, the appellants directed him to go and check the blasting site. As per the directions of the appellants, he (R-l) went to the blasting spot and while he was checking the blasting spot, blasting took place and he sustained injuries to his right hand. His evidence also discloses that at the time of accident, both the appellants were present at the site. He deposed that his entire family is depending on him and because of the accident he lost his earning capacity. According to him, the accident took place during the course of employment and he marked Exhs. A-1 to A-4. ( 8 ) THE appellants examined the appellant No. 1 as RW 1. In his evidence, appellant No. 1 denied the allegations made by the workman, R-1 in his claim petition and stated that in the criminal case filed out of the same accident, the court has acquitted the appellants and Exh. R-1, certified copy of the criminal court judgment was marked. RW 1 deposed that after the accident he has taken care of the workman R-1 for treatment and that the workman R-1 filed the case to extract compensation from him. ( 9 ) THE learned Commissioner, after hearing the arguments on both sides and relying upon Exh. A-4, injury certificate/ disability certificate, wherein the surgeon opined that the respondent No. 1 workman suffered 50 per cent disability because of the accident, awarded compensation of rs. 52,299. ( 10 ) AGGRIEVED by the said order, the present appeal is filed by the appellants. ( 11 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 workman. Perused the record, the evidence and the order under appeal. ( 12 ) IT is contended by the counsel for appellants that the accident took place because of the negligence of the workman r-1; the accident is incidental to the risk of employment, and it is an added peril. Perused the record, the evidence and the order under appeal. ( 12 ) IT is contended by the counsel for appellants that the accident took place because of the negligence of the workman r-1; the accident is incidental to the risk of employment, and it is an added peril. According to the learned counsel, if a workman while working with his master undertakes to do something which he is not ordinarily called upon to do and which involves extra danger, he cannot hold the master liable for such a risk and he is not entitled to claim any compensation. While extensively taking me through the judgment of the criminal court in C. C. No. 261 of 1993, which also arose out of the same accident, learned counsel for the appellants contended that in view of the acquit- tal of appellants by the criminal court and in view of the fact that the workman R-1 himself was responsible for the accident, the appellants need not pay any compensation to the workman R-l. He relied on the following passage/discussion made by the criminal court in its judgment in C. C. No. 261 of 1993:"in the present case on hand, accused 1 and 2 might have given the gunpowder for blasting the stone to PW 1, but it does not mean that PW 1 should keep his hands in the hole to check for non- blasting of the powder. PW 1 is well aware that, the blasting powder is a dangerous one, therefore, he waited for one hour to check the same and had his lunch with PW 2 and then he went to the stone and kept his right finger. The evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 does not show that the accused asked PW 1 to keep his hand to check the blasting powder. PW 1 himself kept his right hand into the hole to check the blasting powder. PW 1 is not a child that he does not know consequences of blasting powder. PW 1 is well aware about the consequences and the effect of blasting powder, but even then he kept his right hand into the hole. PW 1 ought to have kept one stick or any other item to check the same. He failed in his acts and he is also negligent in his acts. PW 1 is well aware about the consequences and the effect of blasting powder, but even then he kept his right hand into the hole. PW 1 ought to have kept one stick or any other item to check the same. He failed in his acts and he is also negligent in his acts. When he is negligent, he cannot throw the blame on the accused for handing over the blasting powder negligently. PW 1 might have lost 2 fingers in the incident, but to prove the charge of negligence, there should be specific act committed by the accused resulting in injuries to PW 1. That is absent in this case. " ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants contended that the evidence on record establishes that the workman himself has voluntarily put his fingers in the hole at the blasting spot and he himself was negligent, and because of his negligent act, the accident has taken place. He contended that the appellant No. 1 has given the respondent No. 1 workman medical treatment and paid him a sum of Rs. 600. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for appellants, the provisions of section 3 (1) (b) of the Workmen s Compensation act (for short the Act ), are not directly applicable to the accident in the present case. To attract section 3 (1) (b) of the Act, the employer must be directly responsible for the accident. If the accident has taken place due to negligence of the workman, the workman is not entitled to any compensation. ( 15 ) IN opposition to the above, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 workman, relying upon the very same judgment of the criminal court in C. C. No. 261 of 1993, contended that even though the criminal court acquitted the appellants, it is very clear from the findings of the criminal court that the appellants have given the gunpowder to the workman to blast the stones. He contended that the aspect of negligence has no role to play in deciding the cases arising under the Act (Workmen s compensation Act) filed by the workman claiming compensation for the employment injury suffered by him. He contended that the aspect of negligence has no role to play in deciding the cases arising under the Act (Workmen s compensation Act) filed by the workman claiming compensation for the employment injury suffered by him. He contended that the evidence on record establishes that the appellants have directly supervised the blasting; in the F. I. R. itself it was clearly mentioned that the gunpowder was supplied to the workman by the appellants and blasting was done at the instance of the appellants and the workman was forced to put his fingers in the hole as per the direction of the appellants. He contended that there is no added peril in this case and that no reliance can be placed on the judgment of the criminal court while deciding a claim application for compensation filed under the provisions of the Act, which is a beneficial piece of legislation in favour of workmen. ( 16 ) NO doubt, a reading of the order of the Commissioner as well as the judgment of the criminal court discloses that the facts are not in dispute. Admittedly, the workman R-1 was working under the supervision of the appellant No. 1 and while he was working in the premises of the appellant No. 2, the accident took place. It is an undisputed fact that the appellants have supplied the gunpowder. Even according to the evidence of the appellants, they were present at the site at the time of accident. ( 17 ) AS rightly contended by the counsel for respondent workman while deciding an application for compensation filed by a workman under the Workmen s Compensation Act, the main ingredient that has to be proved/established is the existence of relationship of master and servant between the workman and the employer concerned at the time of the accident. It is admitted case of appellants as well as the respondent workman that due to the said accident the respondent workman had lost his three fingers. ( 18 ) THE contention of the counsel for the appellants that because the appellants are acquitted in the criminal case the Commissioner ought to have rejected the claim of the respondent workman, is incorrect. ( 19 ) THE acquittal of the appellants in the criminal case cannot, and shall not, have any bearing on an application filed by a workman claiming compensation under the Act. ( 19 ) THE acquittal of the appellants in the criminal case cannot, and shall not, have any bearing on an application filed by a workman claiming compensation under the Act. Apart from that, in the criminal case judgment it was clearly held that the appellants have supplied the gunpowder to the workman and under their supervision only the blasting operation has taken place. The acquittal given to the appellants by the criminal court is not a ground to reject compensation to the workman under the act. ( 20 ) TO award punishment in a criminal case, the prosecution has to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, whereas it is not so in a claim application filed by a workman against the employer for compensation under the provisions of the Act (Workmen s Compensation Act ). ( 21 ) THE incidental observations made by the criminal court can, at best, be taken into consideration in a claim application filed by a workman under the Act, to decide the question as to whether there was any contributory negligence on the part of the workman or not while performing his duties, in the occurrence of the accident alleged. ( 22 ) IN this case, the appellants have directed the workman R-1 to find out as to whether blasting has taken place properly or not and when the workman R-l was checking the blasting spot as per the said directions, the accident took place. Instead of blaming the workman, the appellants ought to have taken proper care and given the worker proper instructions while extracting work from him. ( 23 ) IN Kondisetti Anjaiah v. T. Laksh- maia h, 1958-65 ACJ 32 (AP), a learned single Judge of this court, while dealing with the provisions of section 3 (1) of the workmen s Compensation Act, held that the following three tests have to be satisfied in determining whether an accident had arisen out of and in the course of a person s employment. They are, (i) at the time of the accident, the workman was in fact employed on the duties of his employment; (ii) that the accident occurred at the place where he was performing those duties; and (iii) that the immediate act which led to the accident is not so remote from the sphere of his duties as to be regarded as something foreign to them. ( 24 ) IN the decision, Jayathilal Dhanji and Co. , Oil Mills v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1963 AP 210 , this court was considering the provisions of sections 2 (8) and 66 of the Workmen s compensation Act (Sic. Employees State insurance Act, 1948) to decide whether the accident in that case had arisen out of and in the course of employment , of the workman therein. In that particular case, the oil mill employed an unskilled worker to feed the oil mill by pouring groundnut seeds into the crushing machine. The crushing machine was working by a belt, moved by the power driven shaft, the belt being mounted on to the pulley fixed to it as usual. On the date of the incident in that case, sometime before the accident the stock of groundnut seeds supplied to the workman was finished and the crushing machine was moving without being fed any seeds. Hence, arose the question of stopping the crushing machine, which continued to run along with the general machinery operating on the premises of the mill. The mechanic and fitter whose duty it was to take necessary action to disconnect the crushing machine from the rest of the moving machinery in the oil mill was absent from the premises. Then the workman, finding that the crushing machine was running unnecessarily, went down from the place where he was working, to shift the belt off the moving pulley connected to the crushing machine, and as the factory was not having necessary equipment by way of fast and loose pulley arrangement in order to safely facilitate such disconnection, tried to kick the belt off the moving pulley thinking that it may slip and get loose and thereby the crushing machine may stop working. In doing so, by accident, his leg got caught between the pulley and the belt and he was pulled up to a height of about six ft. from where he fell down and died instantaneously. On those facts, the court held that the injury suffered by the workman is employment injury and the employer is liable to pay compensation to the heirs of the workman under section 66 of the Act. ( 25 ) THE principles laid down in the above decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. On those facts, the court held that the injury suffered by the workman is employment injury and the employer is liable to pay compensation to the heirs of the workman under section 66 of the Act. ( 25 ) THE principles laid down in the above decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the case on hand, the appellants are also responsible for the accident. Having instructed the workman to go and check whether the blasting has taken place properly or not, they cannot now find fault with the workman after the occurrence of the accident and escape from their liability to pay compensation to the workman. ( 26 ) A Full Bench of the Kerala High court, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chandu, 1987 ACJ 68 (Kerala), had an occasion to consider the question whether the principal employer is liable to pay compensation to the injured workman who was employed by the contractor who took up certain work from another (principal employer ). The Full Bench following the ear- her Division Bench decision of that High court in M. J. George v. Sumathi, 1975 acj 513 (Kerala), held that the principal employer is liable as if he was himself the employer of the workman employed by the contractor and engaged in work connected with the trade or business of the principal employer at the principal employer s premises at the relevant time. In M. J. George v. Sumathi (supra), it was held:". . . IF a workman is killed or injured by the happening of an event, in the premises where he is employed under orders of his master or in accordance with the contract of service, the accident necessarily arises out of and in the course of the employment. It is immaterial if the event itself was caused by an act of God like storm, lightning or earthquake. What directly caused the death of the workman in the present case was the capsizing of the boat in which he was working under orders of his employer. Being drowned in such circumstances is one of the inherent dangers of fishing at sea. The accident arose out of a risk incidental to the employment. What directly caused the death of the workman in the present case was the capsizing of the boat in which he was working under orders of his employer. Being drowned in such circumstances is one of the inherent dangers of fishing at sea. The accident arose out of a risk incidental to the employment. It was a risk which his contract of service required him to face, and it is immaterial that it was a risk which was shared by all members of the public who chose to go to sea. The remoter cause of the storm was not the immediate or direct or proximate cause of his death; yet by the very nature of his employment, the deceased was exposed in a special degree to suffer the consequences of what flowed from the perils of the sea such as storm and such consequences were, as lordatkin puts it, sufficiently associated with his employment so as to make the employer liable under the Act. " ( 27 ) COUNSEL for appellants contended that the accident which caused injuries to the workman is an added peril . The definition of the word peril , according to the chambers 21st Century Dictionary, is"grave danger, a hazard, at one s peril, at the risk of one s life or safety etc. ". In this type of cases, as the present one on hand, either the principal employer or the contractor who engages workers must take at least the minimum precautions and provide sufficient safe environment to the workman to work. There is no evidence in this case to show that the appellants have taken any precautions or safety measures to prevent the accident. For using the term peril there must be some casualty, something which could not be foreseen, as one of the necessary incidents of adventure. In this case, the accident is not an unforeseen act. The term peril does not cover every accident which may happen, and it must be a peril of employment. It is clearly and easily assessable in this type of cases whether there is negligence on the part of the employer or not. The evidence on record clearly establishes the negligence on the part of the appellants, viz. , the contractor as well as the principal employer. It is clearly and easily assessable in this type of cases whether there is negligence on the part of the employer or not. The evidence on record clearly establishes the negligence on the part of the appellants, viz. , the contractor as well as the principal employer. Therefore, on the ground of added peril , the workman in this case cannot be denied just and reasonable compensation under the provisions of the Act. ( 28 ) FOR the above reasons, I do not find any perversity or illegality in the order under appeal and I hereby confirm the same. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.