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2000 DIGILAW 94 (PNJ)

State of Punjab v. Inderpal Kaur

2000-01-25

V.K.JHANJI

body2000
JUDGMENT V.K. Jhanji, J. - This is Defendants second appeal direction against the judgment and decree of the Courts below whereby on the basis of the finding that the award in regard to acquisition of land has not been made within two years of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1894 acquisition proceedings have lapsed, suit of the Plaintiffs for declaration to the effect that they are owners and are entitled to possession of land has been decreed. In the alternative, Defendants have been directed to start acquisition proceedings afresh and pronounce the award at the prevalent market price failing which possession of the suit land has been ordered to be restored to the Plaintiffs. 2. In the plaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the suit land was acquired by the Patiala State but the Collector neither gave any award nor offered any payment to Lukman Singh and Hem Singh who were owners of the suit land. Plaintiffs further alleged that as per the requirements of Patiala Land Acquisition Act No. III of 1995 B.K. (1938 A.D.) the award was required to be made but none was made. They alleged that the afore-mentioned Act, was replaced by the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act, 2006 BK (1949 AD). Thereafter, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was extended to Pepsu by the erstwhile Punjab Act, 1953 and in the year 1984, Section 11-A was inserted which made it mandatory for the Collector to make award within two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs alleged that this requirement has not been complied with and, therefore, the entire proceedings of acquisition have lapsed and they have become entitled to possession of land. Hence, the suit. Upon notice, Defendants in their written statement denied the averments made in the plaint and contended that not only compensation was fixed but also paid as far back as 1946 A.D. Defendants submitted that the suit land vested in the Patiala State and this was so recorded in the Jamabandis for the year 1949-50 A.D. and onwards. Defendants in their written statement referred to mutation No. 2903 of 1946 transferring the suit land to the State as the land owners had received compensation of Rs. 19586, 4 Annas, 2 Paise. Defendants in their written statement referred to mutation No. 2903 of 1946 transferring the suit land to the State as the land owners had received compensation of Rs. 19586, 4 Annas, 2 Paise. Defendants also submitted that after the land had vested in the State, land measuring 58 Bighas 10 Biswas was given in exchange to Harchand Singh Jeji son of Gulab Singh Jeji and with the passage of 50 years, land has gone in succession to the defendants of Harchand Singh Jeji and most of it has been sold to bona fide purchasers who have built their houses thereon. Defendants submitted that Plaintiffs have concealed all these facts and have not made parties to the suit the persons who have come in possession of the suit land. Defendants further submitted that land measuring 90 Bighas 15 Biswas whose ownership was vested in the State was purchased by Maharaja Yadvinder Singh for a consideration of Rs. 2,86,372/-. The said land remained in possession of the Maharaja during his life time and after his demise, it passed in succession to his son Maharaja Amarinder Singh. Defendants also referred to the various Jamabandis to show possession and ownership, firstly in the name of State and subsequently in the name of Maharaja Amarinder Singh and others who have purchased plots and built their houses thereon. Plaintiffs in their replication denied the submissions made by the defendants in their written statement and reiterated those taken by them in their plaint. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether Plaintiffs are owners of the land is suit as alleged in the plaint ? OPP. 2. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD. 3. Whether suit is within time ? OPP. 4. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit land ? OPP. 5. Relief. 4. In order to prove their case, two of the Plaintiffs, namely, Gurjit Singh Jeji and Gurveer Singh Jeji appeared as PW-1 and PW-2 and tendered documents, Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-7. In rebuttal, defendants examined Pritpal Singh, D.W. 1, Patwari, who deposed that the suit property was acquired and compensation was assessed as Rs. 19586, 4 Annas 2 Paise and the same was paid to the land owners on account of which State of Patiala became owner of the suit land. P-1 to Ex. P-7. In rebuttal, defendants examined Pritpal Singh, D.W. 1, Patwari, who deposed that the suit property was acquired and compensation was assessed as Rs. 19586, 4 Annas 2 Paise and the same was paid to the land owners on account of which State of Patiala became owner of the suit land. He proved on record copy of mutation No. 2903, Ex. D-1, vide which compensation was paid and Ex. D-2, mutation No. 2904, vide which land was exchanged between Harchand Singh Jeji and State of Punjab. He further proved copy of mutation, Ex. D-4, vide which land was purchased for a consideration of Rs. 2,86,372/-. The said land was a part of Moti Bagh Palace, Patiala. He further proved Ex. D-6 to Ex. D-16, various jamabandis, mutations and Aks Shajra, D-17 and D-19. On appreciation of the various documents and the statements made by the witnesses, trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed their suit to the following effect :- "I, therefore, pass a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are owners of the land in suit and are entitled to possession of the land in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants with costs. However, with a view to enable the defendants to take remedial measures by restarting acquisition proceedings, time upto 31.10.1995 is granted to the defendants. They are further directed to pronounce a fresh award at the prevalent market price. It is further directed that if no action is taken upto 31.10.1995, the defendants shall restore the possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs immediately thereafter." 5. In appeal preferred by the State, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the findings recorded by the trial Courts on various issues and, thereafter, dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal by the State. 6. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length and records perused. 7. It is the admitted case of the parties that the suit land was acquired between the years 1981 to 1986-87 B.K. A reading of Ex. Hence, this second appeal by the State. 6. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length and records perused. 7. It is the admitted case of the parties that the suit land was acquired between the years 1981 to 1986-87 B.K. A reading of Ex. P-7, copy of Roznamcha Waqaiti, Patiala City, 1998 B.K., corresponding to 1941 AD shows that some time in 1995 BK (1938 AD) land owners, namely, Lukman Singh and Hem Singh submitted an application to the Prime Minister stating therein that their land was acquired between 1981 to 1986 by the State but no compensation was pay to them. The said application was forward to the Revenue Minister. At that stage, it was revealed that the file relating acquisition of land had been lost and was not traceable despite thorough search. In order to assess the compensation, an enquiry was made from the Department concerned and the compensation of the land acquired was assessed at Rs. 19585, 6 Annas. A request then was made to the Finance Committee to allocate an additional grant of Rs. 19585, 6 Annas so that the compensation could be paid to the land owners concerned. The file thereafter was put up before the Finance Minister who noted that the additional grant during the financial year was not possible. He, however, made the recommendation that a provision be made in this regard in the next years budget. A reading of mutation No. 2903 (Ex. D- 1), sanctioned in 1946 A.D. shows that compensation of Rs. 19586, 4 Annas, 2 Paise was paid to the land owners and ownership of the land was transferred in the name of the State. Subsequently, entries regarding ownership in the name of the State came to be recorded in the Jamabandi for the year 1949-50 A.D. (Ex. D-15) and it is not in dispute that till date, ownership of the State is being shown in the subsequent Jamabandis. Thus, reading of these two documents, Ex. D-1 and Ex. Subsequently, entries regarding ownership in the name of the State came to be recorded in the Jamabandi for the year 1949-50 A.D. (Ex. D-15) and it is not in dispute that till date, ownership of the State is being shown in the subsequent Jamabandis. Thus, reading of these two documents, Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-15, proves two things : (1) that the land was acquired during the time when Land Acquisition Act No. III of 1995 B.K. (1938 AD) had not even been enacted and secondly, ownership of the land acquired was transferred in the revenue record in the name of the State after the compensation as determined by the Revenue Minister was paid to the land owners some time in 1946 A.D. 8. The contention of the counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiffs is that in absence of award, mutation cannot be taken as an evidence for proving that compensation was paid to the land owners. It is contended that mutation is neither primary or secondary evidence and the order sanctioning mutation does not confer title. It is true that mutation is not a document of title but no suspicion can be attached to the entries in the Jamabandi for the year 1949-50 A.D. and subsequent thereto which have remained unchallenged till date. A presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view of the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The presumption is no doubt rebuttable but the Plaintiffs have failed to displace the same. 9. As regards the contention that the defendants have failed to bring on record the award or a copy thereof, it is only to be stated that as noticed earlier, it clearly finds mentioned in Ex. P-7, Roznamcha Waqaiti, that the file relating to acquisition of land was not traceable despite thorough search and an enquiry was made from the department concerned and only thereafter, compensation was determined. No benefit, thus, can be given to the Plaintiffs because of the loss of record. More so, the conduct of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest is a clear indication of the fact that the land owners had received compensation and for that matter, no grievance in this regard was ever made by the land owners or their successors-in-interest for nearly 60 years. More so, the conduct of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest is a clear indication of the fact that the land owners had received compensation and for that matter, no grievance in this regard was ever made by the land owners or their successors-in-interest for nearly 60 years. There is no explanation from the plaintiffs as to why an objection in regard to payment of compensation was not made till the filing of the suit. 10. In view of the above, I am of the view that the Courts below committed grave error in holding that compensation of the land acquired had not been paid to the land owners and also in applying the provisions of Pepsu Land Acquisition Act No. III of 1995 B.K. (1938 A.D.) or the provisions of Patiala and East State Union Land Acquisition Act No. IV of 2006 B.K. (1949 A.D.) or Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, despite the fact that Act No. III of 1995 B.K. (1938 A.D.) and Act No. IV of 2006 B.K. (1949 A.D.) had not been enacted when the land in question was acquired. 11. Mr. H.S. Mattewal, learned Advocate General, Punjab, also contested the finding of the Courts below with regard to the suit being not bad for non- joinder of necessary parties. In my view, the finding in this regard is also not sustainable in law. Defendants in their written statement took a preliminary objection in regard to suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and it was specifically pleaded that with the passage of 50 years, land has gone in succession to the descendnts of S. Harchand Singh Jaijee with whom land was exchanged and most of it has been sold to bona-fide purchasers by way of plots who thereon have built their houses. This assertion of the defendants was not specifically denied by the plaintiffs, meaning thereby that the third party interest had come into being during the period of 50 years and the persons who were likely to be affected, were not impleaded as parties despite an objection raised at the outset by the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiffs has also not been able to advance any convincing argument as to how the finding in this regard is correct. Counsel for the plaintiffs has also not been able to advance any convincing argument as to how the finding in this regard is correct. Accordingly, it is held that the finding of the Court below that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties being erroneous cannot be sustained. 12. In the end, Mr. H.S. Mattewal, learned Advocate General, Punjab, questioned the very jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit challenging the acquisition proceedings. He cited judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1955, Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and others, 1996(7) Supreme Court Cases 218, S.P. Subramanya Shetty and others v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2076 and Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1997(1) Supreme Court Cases 134, to contend that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit challenging the validity or legality of the acquisition proceedings. In answer to these submissions, Mr. Anupam Gupta, Advocate, contended that no such objection in this regard was taken in the trial Court and as such, the same cannot be entertained at the stage of second appeal. He further contended that otherwise also, under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try all the suits of civil nature excepting the suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is contended that the Land Acquisition Act neither expressly nor by necessary implication bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in entertaining the suits of the present nature. In support of this contention. learned counsel referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and others v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1547. It is not necessary for me to deal with this contention as on facts, I have found that compensation with regard to acquisition of suit land was paid to the land owners and on payment, land vested in the State. 13. No other point was urged. 14. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed, judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set side and in consequence thereof, suit of the plaintiffs shall stand dismissed with costs. Costs are quantified at Rs. 2000/-. 13. No other point was urged. 14. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed, judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set side and in consequence thereof, suit of the plaintiffs shall stand dismissed with costs. Costs are quantified at Rs. 2000/-. Appeal allowed.