TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) A short but interesting question relating to the term of office admissible to the President and Vice President of a Zilla Panchayat constituted under Section 302-A of Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, falls for consideration in these petitions. The answer to the question turns on a true and correct interpretation of Sections 177 and 302-A of the Act. The controversy arises in the following circumstances :- ( 2 ) ). During the term of office of the Members of the concerned Zilla Panchayats of the existing revenue Districts the State constituted seven new Districts of Haveri, Udupi, Chamrajnagar, Davangere, Koppal, Gadag and Bagalkot. New Zilla Panchayats for the newly created districts were established in terms of S. 302-A of the Act, and elections to the posts of President and Vice President of the newly constituted Panchayats, held in April, 1998. Twenty months later by a Notification dated 3rd of December, 1999, the State Election Commission notified reservations for schedule caste, schedule tribe, and Women candidates in the Zilla Panchayats of the new Districts in terms of Sec. 177 (2) of the Act. The Notification was meant to be a prelude to the holding of fresh elections on the assumption that the term of office of the existing incumbents elected in April 1998 would expire on different dates by the end of December, 1999. In due course the Divisional Commissioner, announced these elections by separate Notifications issued in that regard. Elections were accordingly held and new incumbents placed in position for the Zilla Panchayats of Haveri, Udupi and Davangere. The Notifications calling for fresh elections in respect of the remaining four Zilla Panchayats namely Chamrajnagar, Koppal Gadag and Bagalkot, have been assailed in these petitions. In the case of Zilla Panchayat, Chamrajnagar election for Upadhyaksha's post was held on 22nd of December, 1999, pursuant whereto the newly elected Upadhyaksha, has assumed office while the Adhyaksha could not do so in view of an interim order issued by this Court. According to the Respondents even though the petitioners have not been formally relieved from the positions held by them, yet none of them is actively discharging the duties attached to their office. The facilities ordinarily admissible to such incumbents have also been withdrawn eversince the period of 20 months has expired. According to the Respondents even though the petitioners have not been formally relieved from the positions held by them, yet none of them is actively discharging the duties attached to their office. The facilities ordinarily admissible to such incumbents have also been withdrawn eversince the period of 20 months has expired. ( 3 ) APPEARING for the petitioners M/s. Udaya Holla and Prabhulinga Navadgi, argued, that the term of office of the petitioners had not expired with the result that the Election proposed to be held by the Respondents were neither due nor otherwise warranted. They contended that in terms of Section 302-A (1) (e), the term of office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and the members referred to in clauses (b) and (c) would expire on such date as the Government may by Notifications specify. No such notifications specifying the term having been issued, it was incorrect to suggest that the petitioners had ceased to be in office upon the expiry of the period of 20 months, generally prescribed as the term of office under Section 177 (3) of the Act. On behalf of the Respondents, it was argued that the provisions of Section 302-A (1) (e) were subject to those contained in Section 177, so that the question of the term of office of a re-constituted Zilla Panchayats going beyond what was prescribed by Section 177 (3) did not arise. Alternatively it was contended that even if the Government had any authority to extend the term of the office of the existing incumbent, the same could not ought to have been done by issuing an appropriate Notification within the period of twenty months from the date of the election. No such Notifications having been issued by the Government, it must be assumed that it did not wish to prescribe a term different from the one prescribed under Section 177 (3 ). ( 4 ) SECTION 177 of the Panchayat Raj Act, deals with election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and the term of their offices. Sub-section (3) with which we are concerned in these petitions runs thus :-"the term of office of every Adhyaksha and every Upadhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat shall, save as otherwise provided in this Act, be twenty months from the date of his election or till he ceases to be a Member of Zilla Panchayat, whichever is earlier. Sub-section (3) with which we are concerned in these petitions runs thus :-"the term of office of every Adhyaksha and every Upadhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat shall, save as otherwise provided in this Act, be twenty months from the date of his election or till he ceases to be a Member of Zilla Panchayat, whichever is earlier. " ( 5 ) A bare reading of the above, would show that the term of office of every Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Zilla Panchayat, shall be 20 months from the date of his election or till he ceased to be a member of the Zilla Panchayat whichever is earlier, except in cases where the Act may provide otherwise. Section 302-A of the Act, was introduced by Act No. 10/1997 to make a provision for the Constitution of a Zilla Panchayat if during the term of the office of the members of an existing Zilla Panchayat new Taluk or District is constituted under the Land Revenue Act. It inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act, the consequences stipulated in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) thereof would ensue with effect from the date of constitution of a new District. One of the consequences prescribed in terms of clause (e) relates to the term of office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and the members of the Zilla Panchayats. Clause (e) of sub-section (1) to Section 302-A, reads as under :- (a) to (d) xxx xxx xxx " (e) The term of office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and the members referred to in clauses (b) and (c) shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 138, 140, 148, 177, 179 and 186 expire on such date as the Government may by notification, specify. " ( 6 ) THE consequences stipulated by the provisions of Section 302-A it is note worthy are meant to ensue notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act. In other words Section 302-A is meant to operate as an exception to the provisions of the Act relating to or dealing with any one of the matters stipulated in clauses (a) to (e) under sub-section (1) thereof. The term of the office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha is as seen earlier specifically stipulated under Section 177 (3) of the Act. The term of the office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha is as seen earlier specifically stipulated under Section 177 (3) of the Act. That provision is on the face of it general in nature, and admits of situations where the terms of office prescribed thereunder may not be applicable. One such situation is envisaged under clause (e) to Section 302-A (a) which in unequivocal terms makes a provision for the term of office of the incumbents of a re-constituted Zilla Panchayat and instead of making the same co-terminus with the expiry of 20 months period empowers the Government to specify the date on which it would expire. The argument that Section 302-A (1) (e) and the power to specify the date of expiry of the term is subject to the provisions of Section 177 so that the Government really has no power to prescribe an extended term has not impressed me. It is true that the provisions of Section 302 (1) (e) are subject to the provisions of Section 177, yet, the power vested in the Government to stipulate a term will be meaningless and redundant if any such stipulation is controlled by sub-section (3) of Section 177. Placed in juxta position Section 177 (3) stipulating a definite term on the one hand and S. 302-A (1) (e) empowering the Government to prescribe a different term on the other would appear to be totally incongruous and incompatible. That is because if the term of office is statutorily prescribed and the provision stipulating the same does not empower the Government to extend or shorten the same then the power to fix the term under Section 302-A (1) (e) would be totally otiose. Such an anomalous situation must be avoided. It is one of the well established canons of interpretation of statutes that a construction which may render any part of the Statute or any provision made therein, redundant should be avoided and a harmonious construction preferred so that both the provisions have a reason to stay and a purpose to serve. Three significant circumstances assume importance in this regard. The first is that Section 177 (3) even while it prescribes a term of office does so, subject to the other provisions of the Act. Three significant circumstances assume importance in this regard. The first is that Section 177 (3) even while it prescribes a term of office does so, subject to the other provisions of the Act. The expression "save as otherwise provided in this Act", appearing in sub-section (3) to Section 177 clearly signifies that there is nothing sancrosanct or dogmatic about the term of office prescribed thereby. The second and an equally important circumstance is that the provisions of Section 302-A of the Act, which are in the nature of an exception to other provisions contained in the Act, especially those covered by clauses (a) to (e) take effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act. That section 177 is not confined to fixing the term of office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha only is also noteworthy. A careful reading of that provision would show that the same requires the election commission to prescribe reservations for persons belonging to SC/st and Backward Classes. It also makes a provision for the method by which such reservations shall be made and the rotation thereof. A harmonious construction of the two provisions would therefore require that the expression "subject to the provisions of Sections 138, 140, 148, 177, 179 and 186" appearing in clause (e) is understood to mean 'subject to all other provisions contained in the said sections except the one relating to the fixation of the term of office of the incumbents'. In so far as the term of office is concerned, Sections 177 and 302-A (1) (e) can co-exist only if they are understood to reserve in favour of the State the authority to fix a term different from the one generally stipulated. That apart Section 302-A is a special provision meant to deal with special situations that arise from creation of new revenue districts during the term of office of an existing Zilla Panchayat. It must therefore govern such situations in preference to the generality of the other provisions contained in the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, AIR 1964 SC 207 is in this regard apposite where their Lordships have observed as under :-"it is settled law that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply. " ( 7 ) IT is also one of the recognised Rules of constructions that in cases where two provisions are not otherwise re-concilable the one appearing latter should take effect in reference to the earlier. That principle was recognised in The King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. , AIR 1947 PC 94 in the following words :-"where a section of an enactment contains two provisions and the second proviso is repugnant in any way to the first, the second proviso must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and speaks the last intention of the makers". ( 8 ) SUFFICE it so say that the provisions of Section 177 notwithstanding in so far as the term of office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of a re-constituted Zilla Panchayat is concerned, the Government has subject to the requirements of reservations and rotations etc. stipulated in Section 177, the power to specify by Notification a different term. ( 9 ) THAT leaves me with an incidental question which too was argued at some length by learned Counsel for the parties. According to the petitioners since the Government had not specified the term of their office they had a right to continue till such time the needful is done. The failure of the Government or its omission to invoke the power vested in it by Section 302 (1) (e) would according to the petitioner enure for the benefits to the incumbents and result in an automatic extension of their term till such a notification is issued. Per contra the respondents argue that Section 302 (1) (e) being in the nature of an exception the power to fix a different term could and ought to be exercised by the Government before the expiry of the period of 20 months generally stipulated under Section 177 (3 ). ( 10 ) THE exercise of power under Section 302-A (1) (e) can either be for reducing or extending the same beyond the stipulated period of 20 months. If the Government upon consideration of the relevant factors decide to reduce the term any such reduction would be meaningful only if it is ordered within a period of 20 months from the date of the election of the incumbents. On the contrary if the Government decide to extend the term a decision to do so must be taken before the last day of the term generally prescribed. On the contrary if the Government decide to extend the term a decision to do so must be taken before the last day of the term generally prescribed. This would be necessary to avoid a vacuum on the expiry of the 20 months period. In either situation therefore the power reserved to the Government under Section 302-A (1) must be invoked within 20 months of the date on which the elections were held. In case the Government do not do so, the logical inference from their omission would be that they have decided against either curtailing or extending the term generally stipulated. No such notification either reducing or extending the term beyond 20 months has in the instant case been issued. This implies that the Government did not consider this to be a case either for shortening or for extending the tenure of office of the petitioners. The matter could indeed be placed beyond the pale of any controversy if a Notification had been issued making the Government's intention on the subject explicit. The very fact that the Government did not do so for whatever reason would not however ipso facto result in an extension of the term of office in favour of the petitioners. Inaction on the part of the Government whether on account of official apathy or otherwise, cannot provide a valid basis for holders of public office to hang on nor is there any juristic basis to interpret any such inaction or omission of the Government as constituting an automatic extension in the term of office of the incumbents. As a matter of fact, the failure or the omission on the part of the Government to exercise the power vested in it under Section 302-A (1) (a) till the expiry of the 20 months term, can be reasonably understood to mean that the Government never really intended to invoke that power. ( 11 ) THERE is yet another aspect, to which I must advert at this stage. In the objections filed on behalf of the Respondents it was asserted that Section 302-A (1) (e) did not envisage or empower the Government to stipulate a term other than the one stipulated under Section 177 (3 ). When this matter came up for hearing Mr. In the objections filed on behalf of the Respondents it was asserted that Section 302-A (1) (e) did not envisage or empower the Government to stipulate a term other than the one stipulated under Section 177 (3 ). When this matter came up for hearing Mr. Puttegowda, Counsel for the Respondents State was asked to state on affidavit whether the Government was prepared to considers question of stipulating an extended term, if its understanding and interpretation of the provisions of the Act, was found to be erroneous. Mr. Gowda, has in response filed an affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary to Government, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, in which apart from reiterating its understanding of the provisions of the Act, and asserting that the Government have no authority to fix a term beyond 20 months, it has specifically stated thus :-"i submit that there are no circumstances existing to fix a term other than 20 months in respect of the Zilla Panchayat of newly created districts and therefore the Government do not find any reason to extend the term beyond 20 months. In the event this Hon'ble Court comes to the conclusion that the Government is having power as contemplated under S. 302 (A) (i) (e), the Govt. does not intend to extend the term of office of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in respect of newly constituted Districts. Hence, the State Election Commissioner notified the elections of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in respect of newly constituted Districts. " ( 12 ) IT is evident from the above that the Government do not find any reason to extend the term of office of the present incumbents beyond the period of 20 months. In that view a direction to the Government to examine the question of fixing a different term issue a Notification would not make any material difference. Whether or not circumstances exist to justify the fixation of an extended term, is a matter to be considered by the Government. Its decision on the subject would deserve to be respected unless the same is shown to be so outrageously arbitrary that it cannot be sustained. As noticed earlier out of seven Zilla Panchayats elections in three have already been held and new incumbents placed in position. Its decision on the subject would deserve to be respected unless the same is shown to be so outrageously arbitrary that it cannot be sustained. As noticed earlier out of seven Zilla Panchayats elections in three have already been held and new incumbents placed in position. In the case of Zilla Panchayat, Chamrajnagar, the election to the office of the Upadhyaksha has already been completed and the new incumbent is in the office. Directing the State Government at this stage to consider afresh the question of extending the term and to issue a formal Notification would apart from being an exercise in futility complicate the matters. In the circumstances, even when the understanding of the State Government that it had no power to prescribe a different term for a re-constituted Panchayat, has not been found to be correct, I see no reason to interfere with the elections already notified. Since the election process has already started the same should in my opinion be allowed to proceed to its logical end. ( 13 ) IN the result these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .