ARIJIT PASAYAT ( 1 ) ON being moved by Revenue under Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short the Act), following question has been referred by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi Bench-B (in short Tribunal ) for opinion of this Court: "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,,the Tribunal is correct in law in holding that the capital gains arising from the transfer of capital assets by the assessee is not taxable in this year ?" ( 2 ) FACTUAL position as stated in the statement of case essentially is as follows: Assessment year involved is 1969-70. Assessee, a private limited company, amongst others was engaged in the generation and distribution of electricity in the Municipal town of Moga in Punjab. It had obtained a licence for that purpose on 21/02/1939 from the Government of Punjab by notification of that Government under the provisions of Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (in short electricity Act ). Licence was issued initially for a period of 15 years and was subject to renewal for certain period. Provisions of the electricity Act wore modified so far as their application to Punjab is concerned by Punjab Electricity Act, 1939 (in short punjab Act ), in certain respects. Clause-9 of the licence provided for compulsory purchase of the undertaking by the Government of Punjab at the expiry of the licence in the manner prescribed therein. Government of Punjab served a notice on the assessee dated 8/02/1949 claiming to exercise its option to purchase the undertaking and took over possession of the undertaking on 20/02/1949. Rs. 1 88,640. 00 was offered as price. Assessee did not accept the same and claimed Rs. 11,86,943/ - As dispute arose between parties as regards valuation, matter was referred to the sole arbitration of Mr. R. B. D. D. Dhawdn by the Government of Punjab on 25/03/1954, Mr. Dhawar made an award on 20/08/1956 Assessee objected to the award Trial Court accepted the award and High court affirmed the order. However, Supreme Court set aside the award and appointed Justice B. P. Sinha, retired Chief Justice of India as the sole arbitrator. An award was made on 17/09/1967 by Justice Sinha and price of the undertaking was determined at Rs. 4,83,000. 00. Interest was also awarded from February, 1949 till I 7/09/1967. However, Supreme Court set aside the award and appointed Justice B. P. Sinha, retired Chief Justice of India as the sole arbitrator. An award was made on 17/09/1967 by Justice Sinha and price of the undertaking was determined at Rs. 4,83,000. 00. Interest was also awarded from February, 1949 till I 7/09/1967. Government s objections against the award were rejected by the Civil Court and award was made rule of the Court on 1/06/1968. Assessee received compensation amount and interest of Rs. 2,24,000. 00 as awarded by the arbitrator in the year under consideration. During assessment proceedings assessee s plea was that no transfer took place in the year under consideration and that no capital gains arose in the year. Income-tax Officer rejected the contention and held that the amount of compensation was determined in the assessment year in question by award of the Supreme Count and capital gains arose in that year. Accordingly capital gains were computed at Rs. 2,91,581. 00. Said amount was included in the assessment of assessee s income. Mattel was carried in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (in short AAC ). It was urged before the AAC on behalf of assessee that transfer took place in February, 1949 when the undertaking was taken over by the Punjab Government and no capital gains arose in the assessment year under consideration. AAC relied upon a decision of this Court in P. C. Gulati Vs. CIT, ( 1972)86 ITR 501 and held that sale of the undertaking took place during the year under consideration when the decree of Civil Court was passed and that capital gains arose in the said year. Matter was carried in appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal. It was contended that transfer of capital assets took place in February, 1949 when the undertaking was taken over by the Punjab Government in exercise of its option to purchase the same under- clause-9 of the licence. Undertaking vested in the Government of Punjab under the provision of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Electricity Act. Reference was also made to Section 2 (47) of the Act , which, inter alia, provides that transfer includes extinguishment of rightsin the assets. Undertaking vested in the Government of Punjab under the provision of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Electricity Act. Reference was also made to Section 2 (47) of the Act , which, inter alia, provides that transfer includes extinguishment of rightsin the assets. Assessee s right of ownership in the capital assets stood extinguished in February, 1949 when the undertaking vested in the Punjab Government and the only right assessee had thereafter was to receive the purchase money. As no transfer took place in the year under consideration and under Section 45, no capital gains arose on receipt of compensation. In the alternative it was pleaded that purchase was completed within six months of the expiry of the period of licence even if no purchase money was paid in view of Section 4 of the Punjab Act. On this ground also it was submitted that transfer of undertaking took place in 1949 ,and not in the year under consideration. Revenue s stand was that sale of undertaking took place when decree was passed by the Civil Court and further P. C. Gulati s case (supra) had application to the facts of the case. On consideration of rival submissions Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessee does not relate to the year under consideration and was not assessable in the year in question. On being moved, reference as afore-stated has been made. ( 3 ) WE have heard learned counsel for Revenue. There is no appearance on behalf of assessee in spite of service of notice. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to learned counsel for Revenue, Tribunal was not correct in its view that no capital gains arose during the year under consideration. According to him, decree of the Trial court was passed during the assessment year under consideration on the basis of the award which was made by the arbitrator appointed by the Supreme Court. Right, if any, of the assessee was an inchoate one and not a crystalised one. The "right got crystalised in the assessment year under consideration and, therefore, Tribunal ought to have held that capital gains arose during the year under consideration. Reliance has been placed on several decisions more particularly in Commissioner of Income tax Vs. Sardar Arjun Singh Ahluwalia (Deed.) (1999) 240 ITR 693 and K. C. P. Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (2000) 245 ITR 421. Reliance has been placed on several decisions more particularly in Commissioner of Income tax Vs. Sardar Arjun Singh Ahluwalia (Deed.) (1999) 240 ITR 693 and K. C. P. Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (2000) 245 ITR 421. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the stand taken by Revenue certain settled principles have to be taken note of. In Commissioner of Income-tax, west Bengal-11 Vs. Hindustan Housing, and Land Development Trust Limited (1986)161 ITR 524 it was observed by the Apex Court that there is clear distinction between Cases where right to receive payment is in dispute and it is not a question of merely quantifying the amount to be received and cases where the right to receive payment is admitted and the quantification only of the amount payable is left to be determined in accordance with settled or accepted principles. The words "arising" or "accruing" have received interpretation by a long chain of decisions. An important decision on the point E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. . and Ors Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, (1954) 26 ITR 27 (SC) in which it was explained that the expression "accrue" describes right to receive profit and that there must be a debt owed to assessee by somebody. Unless and until there is created in favour of the assessee a debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he as acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him. It was, inter alia, observed as follows: : "the basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed "debitum in presenti, solvendium in future". Unless and until there is created in Favour of the assessee a debt by somebody, it cannot be said that he has acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him". Debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in future by reason of a present obligation. In Pople v. Arguello ( 1969) 37 Calif. 524, the Supreme Court of California observed as follows: "standing alone, the word "debt" is as applicable to a sum of money which has been. promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. In Pople v. Arguello ( 1969) 37 Calif. 524, the Supreme Court of California observed as follows: "standing alone, the word "debt" is as applicable to a sum of money which has been. promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. If we wish to distinguish between the two, we say of the former that it is a debt owing, and of the latter that it is a debt due. In other words, debts are of two kinds, "solvendium in presenti" and solvendium in futuro". A sum of money which is a certainty and in all events payable is a debt without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency , however, is not a debt or does not become a debt. until the contingency has happened "the principles were reiterated by the Apex Court in kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. CWT, (1966) 59 ITR 767. Section 5 of the Act deals with the scope of total income. The expressions "income" "is received", accrues and "arises" as appearing in section 5 of the Act have not been defined. According to Oxford English dictionary, meaning of the expression "accrue" is "to fall as a natural growth or increment; to come as an accession or advantage". The word "arise" is defined,. as "to spring up, to come into existence . The two words, i. e,, "accrue and arise" do not mean actual receipt of profits or gains. Both these words are used in contradistinction to the word "receive". Thus it is manifest that if an assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to accrue to him though it may be receive later on. (See CIT Vs. Govind Prasad Prabhu Nath, 1988) 171 ITR 417 (SC) ). It can be said without hesitation that" the words "accurue" or "arise" though not defined are certainly synonymous and are used in the sense of bringing in as a natural result. Though strictly speaking and as per dictionary meaning, there is some distinction, yet in-the Act they are used to denote idea of ideas very similar and the difference lies in this that one is more appropriate. Where applied to a particular case (sec CIT Vs. Ahmedbhai umarbhai and Co. (1950) 18 ITR 472 (sc) ). Though strictly speaking and as per dictionary meaning, there is some distinction, yet in-the Act they are used to denote idea of ideas very similar and the difference lies in this that one is more appropriate. Where applied to a particular case (sec CIT Vs. Ahmedbhai umarbhai and Co. (1950) 18 ITR 472 (sc) ). ( 7 ) AS noticed above ,by operation of the statutory provisions and terms of the licence, the undertaking vested with the Government of Punjab, Dispute related to quantum to be paid for as price of the undertaking. As indicated in the statement of case, the dispute arose between the parties as to the valuation. In other words there was no dispute on right to receive payment. It was only quantification which was ion dispute. Decisions cited by learned counsel for Revenue reiterated the above position and in fact in all these cases the principles laid down in Hindustan Housing s case. (supra) have been adopted. That being the position factually the Tribunal s conclusion are irreversible. Accordingly we answer the question in the affirmative i. e. in favour of assessee and against Revenue.