(1) WE have gone through the review petitions and the connected papers. (2) THE main ground for moving the review petitions is found in para 3 of the petitions which reads as under: "3. That it is humbly submitted that in the judgment of this Honble Court the above submissions have not been considered particularly the a first submission and the submission at para 2 above." (3) ON the aforesaid basis para 4 of the petitions seeks review. It reads as under: "4. In view of the same the petitioner humbly submits that the above submissions may kindly be taken into consideration and the judgment and order passed by this Honble Court may kindly be reviewed in the interest of justice and equity." (4) SO far as the first submission is concerned it deals with the question whether compulsory purchase order was time-barred because it was passed after expiry of two months as allowed by Section 269-UD(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It is, of course, true that this point was urged but after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner it was found to be not sustainable. Ofcourse, there is no clear reference in the judgment about this aspect, but in our view, this does not require any further inquiry by issuing notice in these review petitions by this Court for the simple reason that there is no substance in the said contention. It has to be kept in view that the fresh compulsory purchase order was passed on 28/11/1996. Before the passing of the said order, as the history of the litigation as depicted in the judgment sought to be got reviewed shows, the question of earlier compulsory purchase order was on the anvil of scrutiny of this Court. The appeal filed by the original seller in this Court being Civil Appeal No. 3849 of 1991 was allowed by this Court on 13/3/1996 and the earlier compulsory purchase order of 24/1/1991 was set aside. The contention of the review petitioners is that within two months thereafter the fresh compulsory purchase order should have been passed. As per the first submission in the review petitions the compulsory purchase order should have been passed on or before 31/5/1996 (sic 13/5/1996). The contention of the review petitioners is that within two months thereafter the fresh compulsory purchase order should have been passed. As per the first submission in the review petitions the compulsory purchase order should have been passed on or before 31/5/1996 (sic 13/5/1996). But this contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the order of this Court dated 13/3/1996 was sought to be got modified by IA filed by Shri D.P. Sharma who submitted that the compulsory purchase order followed by auction-sale of 20/6/1991 should be treated as a completed transaction which had to be protected as per the observations made in the case of C.B. Gautam v. Union of India meaning thereby, there would be no occasion for going behind the earlier compulsory purchase order which, according to him, had become final. This IA, by order dated 25/7/1997, was dismissed as withdrawn. Not only that, thereafter, even review petition was moved by Shri Sharma seeking similar relief which got dismissed on 24/9/1997. In view of this development, therefore, sixty days period would be available at the earliest from 25/7/1997 or latest within two months from 24/9/1997. Be that as it may, in the meantime, show-cause notice for passing of fresh compulsory purchase order was already issued by the appropriate authority on 5/6/1996 which was months earlier than the time available for passing appropriate fresh order of compulsory purchase. Not only that, the said notice got stayed by the order of the High Court at the review petitioners own instance on 19/9/1996 and the stay was vacated by the High Court only on 7/11/1996. During the currency of the stay order, therefore, there was no a occasion for the authorities to pass the fresh compulsory purchase order. That came to be passed on 28/11/1996. Thus the second compulsory purchase order cannot be said to be in any way time-barred. As we have noted above, such an order could have been passed on the expiry of two months from 25/7/1997, if not from 24/9/1997. For all these reasons, therefore, there is no substance in this contention of the review petitioners as tried to be made out in the first submission. Resultantly, the final order passed by this Court cannot be said to have suffered from any patent error which calls for interference in review proceedings. For all these reasons, therefore, there is no substance in this contention of the review petitioners as tried to be made out in the first submission. Resultantly, the final order passed by this Court cannot be said to have suffered from any patent error which calls for interference in review proceedings. (5) SO far as the submission in para 2 is concerned it has already been dealt with from p. 17 bottom to p. 18 of the impugned order and it amounts to an attempt on the part of the petitioner to get the matter reargued. Similar objection would remain sustained against other contentions in the review petitions which are also attempts to get the matter reargued. (6) CONSEQUENTLY, no case is made out for our interference in these review petitions. The review petitions are, therefore, dismissed on merits.