BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant in this case was the defendant in the suit and the respondent was plaintiff. In order to avoid any confusion the parties are referred to as plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff filed a suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts of a firm. The firm was sought to be dissolved with effect from 27-1-1983. The case of the plaintiff was that he along with the defendant established a Rice and Flour mill at Muthyalapalli village and a partnership was created by virtue of written agreement on 8-10-1982. A piece of land measuring 15 cents was purchased by the defendant in his name under a registered sale deed. The defendant also secured 25 horse power electric motor and 25 H. P. Oil engine and the mill was established by the name of Sri Laxmi Gnaneswara Rice and flour mill. The plaintiff had to contribute rs. 69,300/- being 30% of the total investment and defendant had to contribute rs. 1,76,0007- being 70% share. The plaintiff contributed an amount of Rs. 55,000. 00 the balance of Rs. 14,300. 00 was due to be paid by the plaintiff. Profits and losses had to be shared in the ratio of their investment. Partnership was at will. The defendant obtained approval and permission from the panchayat and also licence from the Joint collector, West Godavari for running the mill in his name. As per the terms of the agreement the defendant has to manage the mill. The plaintiff belongs to a different village. Therefore he executed a Power of attorney in favour of one T. Rangarao so that he could look after his interests in the business. The defendant failed to render accounts properly and started taking away the profits. Therefore the Power of Attorney holder of the plaintiff issued a registered notice to the defendant dissolving the firm with effect from the date of notice and called upon the defendant to render accounts. The defendant failed and a suit was filed, the defendant resisted the suit on various grounds. The principal ground was that the agreement dated 8-10-82 was not true and was a forged document. The defendant also claimed that the Rice mill was sole proprietary concern. He stated that plaintiff was closely related to him and the plaintiff had been asked by the defendant to manage the mill in the month of September, 1982. The principal ground was that the agreement dated 8-10-82 was not true and was a forged document. The defendant also claimed that the Rice mill was sole proprietary concern. He stated that plaintiff was closely related to him and the plaintiff had been asked by the defendant to manage the mill in the month of September, 1982. The defendant further stated that he took some land on lease from one Tirumani mutyalu for storing the husk in October, 1982. When the defendant was sick the plaintiff was managing the mill. The plaintiff informed the defendant that said mutyalu was insisting for a written document with respect to lease and on this representation he obtained signatures of the defendant on blank papers. The defendant also denied that the plaintiff had contributed Rs. 55,0007- towards the mill. Following issues were framed by the trial court. (1) Whether the agreement alias "khararnama" dated 8-10-1982 is true and valid and binding? (2) Whether the suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts of the suit mill is not maintainable? (3) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to ?the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 15,000. 00 with an interest of 6% over it. The suit for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts was dismissed. The trial Court held that agreement dated 8-10-1982 was true but was not valid and binding on the defendant. The trial Court found that the plaintiff had committed breach of the terms of the agreement in not having contributed major portion of the investment. The trial court found that the plaintiff had only invested Rs. 15,000. 00. Appeal was filed by the plaintiff, cross-objections were filed by the defendant and the appeal was heard by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit. While considering the appeal and cross-objections the learned Single Judge framed three questions for determination; (1) Whether there has been an agreement of partnership between the parties? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of dissolution and accounts?he answered all the three questions in affirmative and decreed the suit. Hence this letter Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) IN the Memorandum of the Letters patent Appeal and also during the oral arguments following arguments were raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant. (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of dissolution and accounts?he answered all the three questions in affirmative and decreed the suit. Hence this letter Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) IN the Memorandum of the Letters patent Appeal and also during the oral arguments following arguments were raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant. (I) The Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 and the rules made thereunder prohibits transfer of licence or entering into partnership and as such if there was an agreement that was void. (II) Even if the agreement was not void ab initio it was opposed to public policy as it was in contravention of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act and hence hit by section 23 of the Contract Act. (III) The suit was not maintainable under Section 69 of the Transfer of property Act (sic. Partnership Act) as the partnership firm was admittedly not a registered firm. In support of the first argument the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Sections 6, 8, and 13 of the Rice milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. Section 6 lays down that owner of an existing rice mill may make an application to the licensing officer for grant of licence for carrying on rice milling operations in that rice mill. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 lays down that application shall be made in prescribed form giving the particulars required. Sub-section (3) lays down that licencing Officer shall grant licence on such conditions as he may deem proper. Sub- section (4) lays down that licence granted under Section 6 shall be valid for a period specified in the licence. Section 8 of the Act lays down that no person after the commencement of the Act shall establish a new rice mill except under and in accordance with the permission granted under Section 5. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 lays down that no rice mill operation shall be carried except under and in accordance with licence granted under Section 6. Other sub-sections of Section 8 are not necessary for the purpose of this case. Section 13 deals with penalties for those who contravene the provisions of Sections 8 and 18. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 lays down that no rice mill operation shall be carried except under and in accordance with licence granted under Section 6. Other sub-sections of Section 8 are not necessary for the purpose of this case. Section 13 deals with penalties for those who contravene the provisions of Sections 8 and 18. Under the rules made under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 lays down that licence granted under Section 6 of the Act shall be in Form-IV and shall be subject to the conditions specified therein. Form-IV contains six conditions. The sixth condition reads as under:"6. This licence shall not be transferred to any other person by the person to whom it is issued and in case of change of the ownership of the mill, by lease, or otherwise; a fresh licence shall be applied for by the person who has acquired such ownership. "going by these provisions in the Act and the Rules the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the partnership in this case would amount to transfer of licence to the plaintiff-respondent which was specifically barred under the provisions of the Act and the Rules make it clear that the transfer of licence is not at all permissible and therefore the agreement even if proved was against the provisions of the Rice Milling Industries (Regulation) Act and the Rules made thereunder and therefore was void ab initio. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent submits that this argument was not made at all either before the Trial Court or before the first appellate Court, therefore this argument should not have been raised at this stage. But, since we have heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties and the argument is legal therefore we are inclined to consider it. The partnership was created for running the business of rice milling. The agreement does not in any case transfer the licence. The licence continues to remain in the name of the appellant who was the defendant in the suit. There is no bar either under the Act or the Rules made thereunder to enter into partnership by a licensee. The partnership was created for running the business of rice milling. The agreement does not in any case transfer the licence. The licence continues to remain in the name of the appellant who was the defendant in the suit. There is no bar either under the Act or the Rules made thereunder to enter into partnership by a licensee. These are altogether two different matters, one is concerned with licence for running the rice mill and the other is inter se arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant with respect to sharing the investment and the profit and losses of the partnership firm. Neither Sections 6, 8, and 13 nor Rule 4 or condition 6 of the licence prohibit the licensee to enter into partnership with any other person. What it prohibits is the transfer of the licence and it has never been the case of the plaintiff that the licence had been transferred. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant relies on a judgment of Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Parihar vs. M. P. S. R. T. C. This judgment is altogether in different circumstances where the Supreme Court was interpreting provisions of Motor vehicles Act. A route had been given to state Road Transport Corporation, on a premium this route was allowed to be run by a private transporter. The Supreme court found that, allowing a private person to run his own business of transport was contrary to various provisions of Motor vehicles Act. The Supreme Court found that under Section 61 of the Act no permit could be transferred and the permit could only be transferred on the death of a holder to his legal successor. It also found that under Section 42 of the Act no vehicle could be permitted to ply save in accordance with the conditions of the permit. Therefore, the supreme Court held that the action was not justified. Running of a vehicle under M. V act by transfer of a permit by its holder to another person was specifically prohibited, therefore the Supreme Court held that the corporation was not authorised to permit another person to run his vehicle on his own under a permit issued to the corporation by paying some premium to the Corporation. The present case is not at all coming within the law laid down by the supreme Court in the. said judgment. The present case is not at all coming within the law laid down by the supreme Court in the. said judgment. Another judgment to which reference has been made is a judgment by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court reported in Gobardhan Chakraborthy vs. Abani mohan. The judgment of the Calcutta High court was altogether in different circumstances. On the other hand there is a judgment of Supreme Court reported in Ved gupta vs. M/s. Apsara Theatres. Before it is stated as to what law was laid down by the supreme Court certain facts of the case are necessary to be mentioned. There was a partnership with respect to running of a cinema theatre. There were disputes between the partners. One of the partners was a licensee under the Cinematograph act. The other partner tried to get the licence renewed in the name of the partnership which was rejected by the competent authority and the appellate authority. The High Court also rejected their plea and Supreme Court dismissed the s. L. P. Thereafter, it appears that the persons who were not licence holders but were partners of the firm were running the business of cinema. They filed a suit against the licensee and got an injunction order against him. He approached the licensing authority informing him that he has liabilities under the Cinematograph Act under the licence but since he is not being allowed to run the cinema therefore he should not be held responsible for any omissions and commissions and that the persons who are running cinema should be restrained from running the cinema. An order was passed by the competent authority to the following effect:"whereas it has been brought to my notice by Shri Ved Gupta, sole licensee, Apsara Theatre that the district and Sessions Judge, Jammu has issued a temporary injunction against the exhibition of films by him in the above said theatre; and whereas the S. P. City by his letter no. 1/conf. Dt. 1/conf. Dt. 16-9-80 has intimated that there was exhibition of films on 25th September, 1980, in Apsara theatre by persons other than the licensee; and whereas under the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, read with rules, none other than licensee is permitted to exhibit films during the currency of the licence without permission of the licensing authority; now, therefore, I, A. Sahasranaman, district Magistrate, Jammu, hereby order that exhibition of films in apsara Theatre will remain suspended till further orders. This order shall come into force with immediate effect. "this order was challenged in a Writ Petition in the High Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition, Letters Patent appeal was filed which was allowed. There was some argument on the manner in which the appeal was decided but presently we are not concerned with that aspect of the matter. One of the Judges of the High Court has construed that the licence had been granted to the premises and not to a person and as such partners of the firm were entitled to use the licence. This argument was rebutted by the Supreme Court. The supreme Court found that the licence had been issued to the sole licensee and the firm had no interest in the licence. This was the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court which was finally upheld by the Supreme court. In para 17 the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 6-F of the cinematograph Act, held;"the object and purpose of this section obviously is to empower the licensing authority to revoke the licence in the event of the commission of an offence under Section 6 or Section 6-E of the act, nor merely by the licensee but also by any person who may be in actual charge of a cinematograph or management of the cinematograph. In other words, a licence is liable to be revoked not merely when the licensee is convicted of an offence under section 6 or Section 6-E of the Act but also in the event of conviction of such offence of any person belonging to the class of persons other than the licensee enumerated therein. The provisions of the section contain a clear indication that the holder of the licence (licensee) may be a person different from the owner or manager or partner of the cinematograph. The provisions of the section contain a clear indication that the holder of the licence (licensee) may be a person different from the owner or manager or partner of the cinematograph. "the provisions of Cinematograph Act and rice Milling Industries (Regulation) Act are almost similar, therefore, we are of the view that grant of licence to a person does not bar him from entering into partnership for running the business. Partnership operates in a different field whereas the licence operates in a different field. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act or the Rules made thereunder which would bar the licensee to enter into partnership. What it bars is the transfer of a licence and it is nobody s case that the licence was transferred. Therefore, this argument cannot be accepted and is rejected. ( 4 ) FOR the reasons given here in above the second argument that the agreement was against the public policy as it was in contravention of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act is also rejected. ( 5 ) THE other contention raised was that the agreement was contrary to Section 69 of the Partnership Act. This has been elaborately considered by the learned Single judge while disposing of the appeal and he has found that a suit for rendition of accounts could be filed under proviso (a) to section 3 (sic. clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 69 ). We do not find any infirmity in the reasoning of the learned Single Judge. In this regard the learned Counsel for the appellant relies on a judgment of Supreme court in Loonkaran Sethia vs. Ivan E. John. The suit in which the Supreme Court gave the judgment was for enforcernent of rights under the agreement and as a matter of fact it was for enforcement of the agreement entered between the parties. The firm was not registered, therefore the case fell strictly under Section 69 (1) and (2) of the partnership Act, whereas the present case is for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts which is under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 69. Therefore, the judgment of Supreme Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant. Another judgment relied upon is Ram Adhar vs. Rama kirat of Allahabad High Court. Therefore, the judgment of Supreme Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant. Another judgment relied upon is Ram Adhar vs. Rama kirat of Allahabad High Court. In this matter the suit was with respect to recovery of the amount due to the partnership from the defendant for the purchase of bricks by him and the Allahabad High Court rightly found that the suit was barred under section 69 (2) as the partnership was not registered. On the factual issues we do not want to reappraise the evidence. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.